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ABSTRACT  
 
Sustainability is a major challenge in the rural water supply sector, where efforts 
to realise the right to clean water are undermined by high levels of non-
functionality. This thesis uses mixed methods to test the relative influence of ten 
proximate determinants of sustainability, and to critically examine the social, 
economic and political dynamics underlying these determinants – especially the 
community management model, which places responsibility for water point 
functionality on users. 
 
The study finds that the key proximate determinants include both technical factors 
(e.g. water point type and installation quality) and management factors (e.g. 
availability of funds and incidence of theft).  These in turn are driven by the way 
that community management structures interact with socially embedded 
institutions.  Contrary to the claims made for participatory approaches, the study 
finds that community management is frequently inefficient and disempowering. 
 
Drawing on the concepts of institutional bricolage and civil society failure, the 
analysis shows that community management generates conflict and reproduces 
inequality at community level, and embeds perverse incentives and consolidates 
clientelism at a wider level.  The study concludes that community management 
leads to erosion of social capital and abdication of state responsibility, and argues 
that donors should reconsider their support for it. 
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The roots of this study lie in personal experience.  In ten years of working in 
international development non-governmental organisations (NGOs), I frequently 
observed a mismatch between the assumptions underpinning development 
initiatives (i.e. that they would lead to long-term, sustainable, positive change), 
and the reality in many locations.  One obvious problem area was rural water 
supply, where it appeared that a significant number of projects were prone to 
failure - despite the use of participatory approaches and basic technology.  If 
sustainable benefit was elusive even for relatively straightforward projects such as 
these, I wondered what the implications might be for more complex and contested 
development interventions, such as those promoting girls’ empowerment. 
 
While many NGOs and other development actors make honest attempts to explore 
this question, they are arguably constrained in two major respects: first, by a focus 
on their own work, insufficiently contextualised; and second, by the ultimate need 
to make a case for their own effectiveness.  A doctoral thesis offered the 
opportunity to overcome both these limitations. 
 
  
 2  
1.1 PURPOSE AND RATIONALE 
 
The overall purpose of my research is to contribute to an understanding of why 
some development interventions lead to more sustainable outcomes than others.  
Specifically, I seek to understand why poor sustainability of water points is so 
widespread and enduring a phenomenon.  My ultimate aim is to identify ways in 
which development policy and practice could be changed to improve long-term 
results.    
 
Concern about the sustainable impact of development interventions in general was 
the initial seed for this study, and the focus on rural water supply in Malawi 
emerged soon thereafter.  The simplicity of the water project model makes it an 
ideal ‘case study’ of sustainability: inputs (simple technology and funding) are used 
to build an output (a water point) which produces an outcome (people having 
access to clean water) leading to long-term positive impacts (reduced drudgery, 
improved health, and economic benefits).  Whether a water point is working or not 
is very easily measured, in contrast to results in many other areas of development.  
Access to safe water is a fundamental human right (UN 2010), and remains a major 
global challenge (JMP 2012a).  Moreover, substantial amounts of existing data are 
available – especially for Malawi - which can be used as a baseline and as a basis for 
sampling. 
 
  
 3  
1.1.1 The challenge of ensuring sustainable access to safe water 
 
Access to safe water is crucially important for human health and well-being, and 
can be seen as one of the most fundamental human needs and rights.  Unsafe 
water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) are responsible for 4.2% of the global burden 
of disease as measured in disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), making inadequate 
WASH the fourth largest global health problem (WHO 2009: 10).  In low-income 
countries, unsafe WASH is the fourth largest cause of death, causing 6.1% of all 
deaths (WHO 2009: 11). 
 
In 2010, following many years of advocacy by sector stakeholders, the United 
Nations formally recognised the ‘right to water’ in General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/64/292, which 
‘Recognizes the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human 
right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights; [and] 
Calls upon States and international organizations to provide financial resources, 
capacity-building and technology transfer, through international assistance and 
cooperation, in particular to developing countries, in order to scale up efforts to 
provide safe, clean, accessible and affordable drinking water and sanitation for 
all’ (UN 2010). 
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Improving access to clean1 water is also one of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs): Goal 7, Target C is to ‘halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation’ (UN 2013). 
 
Progress towards this target is monitored by a biannual report from the Joint 
Monitoring Programme (JMP) of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).  While the latest JMP report shows that the MDG 
drinking water target has already been met, five years ahead of schedule (JMP 
2012a), it also notes that progress has been very uneven and that huge disparities 
remain, both between and within countries.  In particular, 19 out of the 50 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (not including Malawi) are not on track to meet the 
MDG. 
 
In total, 11% of the world’s population (780 million people) still lack access to safe 
water and 37% (2.5 billion people) lack access to adequate sanitation (JMP 2012a: 
2, 55).  The situation is worst in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where 39% lack access to 
safe water and 70% lack access to improved sanitation; the equivalent figures for 
developing regions overall are 14% and 44% (ibid: 54-55)2.  Worldwide, access is 
lower in rural than in urban areas, and such disparities are particularly large in SSA, 
where only 49% of rural dwellers have access to clean water, compared with 83% of 
                                         
1 In this thesis, ‘clean water’ and ‘safe water’ are used interchangeably.  See Chapter Two for a 
discussion of water quality standards. 
2 This chapter presents global and/or regional figures only.  Figures for Malawi in particular are 
presented in Chapter Four. 
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urban dwellers (ibid: 55). Thus, the water crisis disproportionately affects rural 
Africans.   
 
While it is true that the sanitation crisis is even greater than the water crisis (JMP 
2012a) and that improving sanitation may well yield greater benefits for human 
health than improving water supply (Waddington and Snilstveit 2009), this study 
focuses on water, because water is provided collectively whereas sanitation is 
generally a private affair. Similarly, the study’s focus is rural, not urban, because 
rural access to safe water is much lower, and rural access is almost always through 
public infrastructure (boreholes, wells, standpipes) whereas a much larger 
proportion of urban access is through private connections (JMP 2012a).  My focus is 
on provision of public goods and services through public (state or collective) action. 
 
Malawi was selected for this study primarily because of the availability of baseline 
data: all water points in the country were mapped between 2002-2005, in a process 
initiated and coordinated by the NGO WaterAid (Welle 2005). The resulting 
database (WaterAid 2005), now hosted by UNICEF Malawi, is not published but can 
be accessed on request.  My initial intention was to use this data as a baseline for a 
longitudinal research design, since a study of sustainability requires a strong 
temporal dimension.  However, for reasons explained in Chapter Five I adopted a 
cross-sectional research design instead, and used the database both to structure 
my sample and as a source of secondary data to test determinants of sustainability.   
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Malawi is one of the few sub-Saharan African countries that has already met the 
water MDG of halving (by 2015, relative to 1990 baseline) the proportion of the 
population without sustainable access to safe drinking-water (JMP 2012a, JMP 
2012b).  Its water sector is thus something of a success story.  Malawi is also a 
relatively small and (despite recent political upheavals) stable country with good 
communication and transport links, and is not significantly affected by factors such 
as conflict or population displacement.  As such it provides an opportunity to study 
a ‘best case scenario’ where many of the most obvious threats to sustainability are 
absent. 
 
However, because the MDG indicator used to measure ‘sustainable access to safe 
water’ does not actually measure sustainability, it may be that performance in 
Malawi (and elsewhere) is not as good as it first appears. Sustainability of access 
depends on the sustainable functioning of water infrastructure, which is not 
measured by the JMP. Instead, the JMP uses a proxy indicator, ‘use of an improved 
drinking water source’, which it defines as either a ‘piped household water 
connection located inside the user’s dwelling, plot or yard’ or ‘public taps or 
standpipes, tube wells or boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, [or] 
rainwater collection’ (JMP 2013: 13).  This indicator says nothing about whether 
this access is sustainable. 
 
Other data sources suggest that sustainability is a major concern (Harvey and Reed 
2004, Harvey and Reed 2007, RWSN 2009, Lockwood and Smits 2011, WaterAid 
2011). Many existing water points and systems simply don’t work; estimates from 
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the Rural Water Supply Network for 20 African countries suggest that on average 
about one-third of all water points are non-functional (range: 10% to 67%) (RWSN 
2009). Research from Tanzania suggests that one-quarter of new water points 
become non-functional within two years of installation (Taylor 2009a).  If accurate, 
such figures indicate a major failure of sustainability and imply that a significant 
proportion of investment in the rural water supply sector may be ineffective.  This 
apparently high level of failure exists despite strong community demand for clean 
water, significant investment in the sector, and considerable academic attention.  
 
1.1.2 Understanding sustainability: proximate determinants and underlying 
dynamics 
 
A large number of factors have been suggested as possible determinants of 
sustainability – where determinant means ‘an influencing factor’, and sustainability 
means ‘continued functioning over time’.  While some factors – for example the 
availability of spare parts for water points - are proximate determinants, with 
immediate and direct bearing on sustainability, their influence is driven by 
underlying social, political and economic dynamics.   
 
Much of the literature on rural water supply is written by practitioners who share a 
concern with practical efforts to improve sector performance (Schouten and 
Moriarty 2003, Harvey and Reed 2004, Lockwood and Smits 2011). These authors 
highlight many of the challenges facing efforts to ensure clean water for all, 
including both technical and financial issues – but often stop short of specifying 
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which are the most important influences on sustainability.  Key factors identified in 
this sector-specific literature include refresher training and post-construction 
support (Whittington, Davis et al. 2008), and financial management issues (Haysom 
2006). 
 
The argument that participation plays an important role in ensuring sustainability 
has been put forward by several authors (Narayan 1995, Kleemeier 2000, Marks and 
Davis 2012) and is a key reason for the promotion of ‘community management’, in 
which users are responsible for collectively managing their own water points.  
Participatory theory suggests that the benefits of participation include 
empowerment and equity as well as improved efficiency and effectiveness of 
development projects (Nelson and Wright 1995).  However, these claims are 
contested by those who argue that participatory approaches take insufficient 
account of questions of power and politics (Mohan and Stokke 2000, Botchway 
2001, Ribot 2007).  The literature on politics suggests that clientelist relationships 
are a major influence on outcomes, including access to services (World Bank 2004, 
Olivier de Sardan 2011, Booth 2012, van de Walle 2012).   
 
Over the past two decades, community management has come to dominate rural 
water supply in many low income countries.  Questions remain, however, as to 
whether this institution is an efficient or empowering way to ensure sustainable 
service provision, or whether it is vulnerable to ‘civil society failure’ (Mansuri and 
Rao 2013).  The perspective of ‘institutional bricolage’ (Cleaver 1999, Cleaver 
2012) highlights the process by which actors piece together hybrid institutions, and 
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suggests that introduced structures – such as community management - may 
interact with socially embedded rules and norms to produce unexpected outcomes.   
 
This study therefore has two aims.  The first is to contribute to the sector-specific 
literature (reviewed in Chapter Two) by seeking to identify the most important 
factors influencing sustainability of rural water supply in Malawi.  The second aim 
is to examine what I have called the political economy of community management, 
or the way that interests and incentives shape institutions, policies, and outcomes.  
To do this, I have looked to both the literature on participation (Chapter Three), 
and the literature on political economy analysis (Chapter Four). 
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1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION, DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
1.2.1 Research question, strategy and analytical framework 
 
This study seeks to answer two linked questions: 1) what are the main factors 
contributing to variation in the sustainability of improved public water points in 
rural Malawi, and how much of an influence does each factor have?; and 2) how 
and why do these factors influence sustainability?  The first aims at accurate 
description, the second aims at explanation. 
 
To answer the first question, I identify and test ten proximate determinants of 
water point sustainability.  To answer the second, I use political economy analysis 
and the perspective of critical institutionalism to examine the underlying dynamics 
influencing these determinants.  In particular, I critically assess the operation of 
the community management model that is so widespread in rural water supply. 
 
1.2.2 Design, sampling and methods 
 
This study employed a cross-sectional mixed methods design using stratified 
purposive and probability sampling, with a sampling frame based on a database of 
nearly 50,000 water points in Malawi which were mapped between 2003-2005. I 
collected new primary data on 679 water points and from 276 survey respondents 
in 24 villages in 4 districts (two high-functionality and two low-functionality), and 
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combined this with field observations and survey notes, and interviews with 26 key 
informants at village, district and national level.   
 
Table 1.1: Data sources for this study 
 Primary Secondary 
Quantitative Surveys:  
177 users, 99 managers, 338 surveyed water points, 
341 listed water points.   
Dataset has 955 cases, 266 variables. 
2005 WP Database:  
49,517 cases, 20 variables. 
Qualitative Survey notes:  
177 users, 99 managers, 338 water points. 
Interviews with 26 respondents:  
6 local government, 5 national government, 6 donors, 
9 NGOs, 1 area mechanic. 
Factor ranking exercise: 19 respondents among the 26 
interviewees. 
Blogs:  
28 bloggers,  
739 posts, spanning Sept 
2008 – Feb 2013. 
 
 
The mixed methods design of this study reflects its concern with both description 
and analysis.  The study first uses deductive reasoning based primarily on 
quantitative data to analyse the relative influence of ten key determinants of 
sustainability, and then integrates this with inductive analysis based largely on 
qualitative data to develop a theoretical explanation of the findings.  Different 
types and sources of data are used to triangulate the results in order to strengthen 
the warrant of the conclusions.  This mixed methods approach provides the 
framework for a study that is rooted in large-N empirical data collection and 
analysis, while also engaging in depth with theory. 
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1.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
1.3.1 Key findings and implications 
 
This study addresses the question of ‘which factors influence water point 
sustainability, and why’ at two levels. 
 
At the immediate presenting level I find that, among the ten main determinants of 
sustainability discussed in the literature, several - including the number of users, 
the age of the water point, and access to spare parts - have only a minimal effect 
on sustainability, whereas others - both technical factors (the type of water point 
and installation quality) and management factors (access to funds and skills for 
maintenance and repair) - are highly significant.  
 
Linking these findings with insights from theory, I analyse the political economy of 
the community management model by which sustainability is supposed to be 
ensured.  The findings demonstrate clearly that community management is not an 
effective way to ensure sustainable provision of public goods and services; on 
balance, it is inefficient and ineffective, inequitable and disempowering.  The 
insertion of community management institutions into a context already contested 
by modern and traditional authority results in a process of institutional bricolage 
that often ends in the erosion of trust and undermining of social capital.  
Community management provides an excuse for duty-bearers – donors, politicians, 
and officials – to abdicate responsibility, and it strengthens neo-patrimonialism and 
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undermines the social contract.  Ultimately this study concludes that community 
management has failed the people it was designed to empower, and cannot be a 
substitute for provision of universal public services through an effective state. 
 
1.3.2 Limitations 
 
A number of challenges regarding data reliability and internal validity were 
encountered and are discussed in detail in Chapter 5, together with my approach to 
anticipating and managing them.  Courtesy bias, respondent difficulties in recall, 
and translation problems all affected data quality.  My identity as a privileged 
white researcher from the former colonial power influenced both my own 
assumptions and approach, and the way I was perceived by Malawians; these 
barriers of language, culture, and expectations inevitably impacted on the extent 
of my insights.  I mitigated this by working with an excellent local research 
assistant, modifying my own dress and behaviour to demonstrate respect for local 
culture, and emphasising my status as an independent student not associated with 
any donors. 
 
The sampling frame for the study used random sampling wherever possible in order 
to maximise external validity.  However, as with all research, care must be taken 
in extrapolating from my findings.  While I do not claim that they are 
representative of all water points in Malawi, I would argue strongly that they 
illuminate critically important issues of national relevance. 
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1.3.3 Original contribution 
 
This study offers an original contribution in two ways. 
 
First, the research design.  This study innovatively uses both qualitative and 
quantitative data from both primary and secondary sources to build up a rich 
picture of the rural water supply sector in Malawi, combining deductive hypothesis-
testing with inductive theory generation.  It explicitly links a technical analysis of 
the proximate factors that appear to explain variation in water point sustainability, 
with a theoretical analysis of the underlying political, social and economic 
dynamics influencing those factors.  Such an approach is rare in the existing 
literature. 
 
Secondly, the conclusions.  By linking technical and theoretical analysis this thesis 
not only demonstrates empirically that community management is deeply flawed in 
practice, but also extends the analysis theoretically to show how and why this 
happens.  The study uses the concept of institutional bricolage to analyse how an 
exogenous institutional form (the water point committee) is shaped by the existing 
social context, with unintended and counterproductive consequences.  The study 
further provides an explanation for the enduring strength of the community 
management model by using political economy analysis to demonstrate the 
powerful incentives that perpetuate it, despite its flaws.  
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My findings and conclusions thus extend both the empirical literature on rural 
water supply, and the theoretical literature on participation, political economy, 
and public service provision. 
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1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. 
 
The next two chapters review two broad sets of literature.  Chapter Two examines 
the ‘technical’ literature on sustainable access to safe water, in order to identify 
the key factors that influence water point sustainability.  It concludes by outlining 
the first ‘proximate determinants’ part of my two-stage analytical framework.   
 
Chapter Three widens the focus to the more ‘theoretical’, and analyses the 
political economy of decentralised provision of public goods and services through 
community management, rooted in the theory of participation.  It concludes by 
outlining the second ‘underlying dynamics’ part of my analytical framework. 
 
The Malawian context for this study is outlined in Chapter Four, which presents a 
political economy analysis of Malawi in general, and of its rural water supply sector 
in particular. 
 
Chapter Five then sets out the study’s research paradigm, design, and methods. I 
discuss questions of research ethics and data quality, and describe my approach to 
analysing the data collected. 
 
Chapters Six and Seven present the study’s findings, in line with the two-part 
analytical framework developed in Chapters Two and Three. Chapter Six uses both 
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quantitative and qualitative data to test the ‘proximate determinants’ of 
sustainability identified in Chapter Two.  In Chapter Seven I then analyse the 
underlying dynamics that influence these results, using the second part of my 
analytical framework.  In particular, I critically examine the performance of the 
community management model of public service delivery. 
 
Finally, Chapter Eight reflects on both the process and the findings of the research, 
and concludes by drawing out the implications of this study for rural water supply 
in Malawi, and for development initiatives in general.  
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Chapter 2  
SUSTAINABLE ACCESS TO SAFE WATER 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on sustainable access to safe water in low-
income countries, and identifies the main hypothesised determinants of 
sustainability.   
 
Section 2.1 sets the scene with an overview of inputs (technology and funding) and 
results (outputs, outcomes and impacts) in the rural water supply sector. 
 
Section 2.2 discusses the definition of sustainability, including both financial and 
environmental sustainability.  I outline the influence of these concepts on 
development policy and practice in recent decades, and touch on some critiques 
suggesting that the discourse of sustainability has had counterproductive effects.  I 
then explore definitions of sustainability as applied specifically to the rural water 
sector, and adopt the straightforward ‘continuation over time’. 
 
In Section 2.3 I draw on existing models to develop an analytical framework for 
hypothesised determinants of sustainability, distinguishing between these direct 
determinants and the underlying political economy dynamics that influence them.  
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The critically important yet problematic location of ‘participation’ in these models 
is discussed.  
 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the first ‘hypothesis-testing’ stage of my 
analytical framework, and outlines the need for a second ‘theory-generating’ stage 
to explore the underlying dynamics. 
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2.1 INPUTS AND RESULTS 
 
Rural water supply involves the transformation of inputs (technology, funding) into 
outputs (infrastructure or water points) that will enable an outcome (access to safe 
water) to be achieved, resulting in positive impacts (reduced drudgery, improved 
health, and economic benefits) in terms of human welfare. 
 
People require water for a variety of purposes, both domestic (drinking, cooking, 
bathing, hand-washing, washing clothes and cooking utensils) and productive 
(irrigation, watering livestock).  While consumption needs may vary in response to 
individual factors such as health and livelihood strategies, and environmental 
factors such as climate, the World Health Organisation suggests that ‘a minimum of 
7.5 litres per capita per day [lcd] will meet the requirements of most people under 
most conditions’ for drinking and cooking (Howard and Bartram 2003: 3) while 20 
lcd for drinking, cooking and washing could be considered ‘basic access’ (ibid.).  In 
practice, actual consumption levels in low-income countries are often considerably 
lower (Thompson, Porras et al. 2001, Howard and Bartram 2003, Bhandari and 
Grant 2007, Whittington, Davis et al. 2008). 
 
There is an important link between convenience and consumption: people consume 
more water if the source is relatively close to the home, and vice versa, although 
the relationship is not linear (Carter, Tyrrel et al. 1999, Mathew 2004).  If water 
collection takes more than 30 minutes per round trip, there is an increased risk 
that people will fail to meet their minimum water needs (JMP 2010); hence, this is 
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recommended as a criterion for a basic level of service (WHO 2011, WASHCost 
2012).   
 
Water quality is typically considered to have four aspects: microbial, chemical, 
radiological and acceptability (i.e. taste, odour and appearance) (WHO 2011).  For 
users, the most salient aspects are often taste and hardness: excessively salty 
water cannot be drunk, and excessively hard water cannot be used for washing. 
Bacteriological water safety is especially important for drinking water, and is often 
of particular concern to water point installers – but users may not be aware of this 
issue, or may not value it highly (Bhandari and Grant 2007). 
 
In fact, it is likely that a significant minority of ‘clean’ water sources do not deliver 
adequately clean water (JMP 2012a).  The JMP is making efforts to improve 
assessment of water quality through its Rapid Assessment of Drinking Water Quality 
(RADWQ) methodology (JMP 2010), but there is a long way to go before quality is 
routinely monitored.  Of course, only a few of the ‘basic access’ 20 lcd are needed 
for drinking, and lower-quality water may be acceptable for other uses such as 
washing; in practice, households may use different sources for different purposes, 
depending on the required balance between water quality and convenience.  
Additionally, increased quantity of water is often more important than increased 
quality, because many diseases are ‘water-washed’ rather than ‘waterborne / 
faecal-oral’ (Thompson, Porras et al. 2001). 
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In summary, both quantity and quality of water are significant factors influencing 
the achievement of benefits from rural water supply. 
 
2.1.1 Inputs 
 
Technology: Hardware 
There are multiple hardware options for rural water supply, including hand dug 
wells, boreholes (both hand and machine drilled, and fitted with handpumps or 
powered pumps), protected springs, dams, rainwater harvesting, and gravity fed 
systems (Harvey and Reed 2004, WaterAid n.d.). The most appropriate technology 
for a given situation depends on a range of factors, including geology and level of 
demand.  For each technology type there are also multiple varieties - for example, 
there are 18 different public-domain handpumps (RWSN 2013) and many more 
proprietary designs. However, some countries – including Malawi - have successfully 
enforced standardisation of pump type (Baumann and Furey 2013).  
 
Currently, handpumps on boreholes or shallow wells supply nearly half of all rural 
Africa’s protected water supplies (Harvey and Narkevic 2009: 3), and 
approximately 60,000 new handpumps are installed on the continent each year 
(Sansom and Koestler 2009). The most widespread type in Africa is the Afridev, 
which was developed in the 1980s in Malawi and Kenya specifically to be suitable 
for ‘village level operation and maintenance’ (VLOM) (Hankin 2001, Baumann and 
Furey 2013). It has been suggested that there is a direct trade-off between 
simplicity and durability in the case of handpumps (Kleemeier and Narkevic 2010), 
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and it is widely acknowledged that operation, maintenance and repair (OMR) – 
‘software’ or management issues - are critically important for ensuring continued 
pump functionality. 
 
Technology: Software 
Since the 1990s, the main management option for rural water supply in most low-
income countries has been community management (CM) – ‘the idea that 
communities should operate and maintain their own water supply systems’ 
(Schouten and Moriarty 2003: 1).  The CM model’s roots can be traced to donors’ 
disillusion with perceived poor government performance in public service provision, 
coupled with the explosion of interest in participatory approaches in the 1980s and 
1990s (ibid.).  CM’s proponents argue that the best people to manage a water point 
are its users, since they are both motivated and available to ensure its continued 
functioning. 
 
While there is no blueprint for community management, it exists in broadly the 
same form in a wide range of locations.  The core of the model is the Water Point 
Committee (WPC), typically a group of ten villagers delegated by their community 
to take responsibility for the water point.  The WPC is intended to be gender-
balanced and democratically elected, with formal roles including a Chair and 
Treasurer.  Its responsibilities are both technical - maintaining and repairing the 
water point - and financial - collecting and saving community contributions so that 
funds are available for maintenance and repairs.  Villagers contribute through 
regular payment of user fees, as well as through initial contributions towards 
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installation, in cash or in kind.  WPC members are typically provided with a week’s 
training when they are first appointed, and it is then assumed that the WPC will be 
able to take on permanent responsibility for management of the water point. 
 
However, problems with community management became evident in the late 1990s 
(Colin 1999): maintenance was almost never done, communities were unable to 
manage many repairs, and consequently poor functionality plagued the rural water 
supply sector.  Despite the emergence of a significant and critical practitioner 
literature in recent years (Schouten and Moriarty 2003, Lockwood and Smits 2011), 
as well as wider critical engagement with the theory of participation (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001, Brett 2003, Cleaver 2012, Mansuri and Rao 2013), the community 
management model today remains the software option of choice for governments 
and donors alike, as confirmed by respondents in this study. 
 
Funding: Costs 
Both capital and recurrent costs of water supply vary significantly depending on the 
hardware and software adopted. Considerable effort has been invested in recent 
attempts to develop cost benchmarks (Hutton and Haller 2004, Fonseca, Franceys 
et al. 2011, WASHCost 2012), in line with the current emphasis on ‘value for 
money’ in development spending (DFID 2011). 
 
Capital 
For boreholes, the main capital cost is drilling, which varies depending on the 
geology of the drill site (i.e. type of rock and depth of water), distance from urban 
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centres, and construction quality (Danert, Carter et al. 2009). Additionally, drilling 
is not always successful, and several bores may need to be drilled before a good 
source is found (Harvey 2004).  Other significant capital costs are the pumpset, the 
civil works (concrete base, drainage channel, and laundry stand), and the 
‘software’ costs of mobilising communities and training WPC members.   
 
In per capita terms, the WASHCost research initiative suggests that capital costs 
are in the region of $20-60 per person for a borehole and handpump, with piped 
systems costing roughly double this (WASHCost 2012: 2). World Bank research 
suggests $100-200 as the capital cost per person of an average rural water point, 
with a borehole and handpump estimated to cost $20-90 per person (Ghosh 
Banerjee and Morella 2011: 198, 200) – meaning the two sources’ estimates are 
more or less in line.  Hutton and Haller (Hutton and Haller 2004: 14) estimated the 
cost of basic water supply improvements (borehole with handpump) as under $1.70 
per person per year in Africa, much cheaper than piped water ($12.75 per person 
per year). However, this assumes a 20-year lifespan of the technology, which may 
be very over-optimistic.   
 
Recurrent 
Recurrent operation, maintenance and repair (OMR) costs are critical to ensuring 
water point sustainability.  For some systems such costs are quite clear, and can be 
high: for example, fuel costs for diesel or electric pumps, or wage costs for systems 
that employ caretakers or pump attendants.  But for many water points, OMR costs 
can be hard to estimate in advance, and can vary considerably depending on 
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factors including technology type, quality of installation, regularity of 
maintenance, and user numbers.  A rough estimate of $100 per water point per 
year is sometimes used (Whittington, Davis et al. 2008, Baumann and Danert 
2008a).  In per capita terms, the WASHCost consortium gives higher estimates of $3 
to $6 per person per year for boreholes and handpumps, and $3 to $15 per person 
per year for piped systems (WASHCost 2012: 2).   
 
Any water infrastructure will eventually require replacement or upgrading. Full 
cost recovery takes this into account, but appears to be very rare in the water 
sector.  Full capital costs are very rarely (if ever) recouped from users; most users 
are completely unaware of the full capital cost of a water point, and user 
contributions often do not even cover basic OMR costs (Whittington, Davis et al. 
2008). Total lifecycle costs for a handpump have been estimated at $235 per year3 
(Baumann 2006), but Carter, Harvey et al. (2010) estimate that the average 
community collects only $30 to $40 per year, just one-seventh of the amount 
required. 
 
Global requirements 
Total global expenditure required to meet the WASH MDG was estimated by the 
WHO in 2008 to be $72 billion per year ($18 billion capital and $54 billion 
recurrent) (Hutton and Bartram 2008: 13). In contrast, actual expenditure on WASH 
was estimated at $14 to $16 billion per year, only about a fifth of the amount 
                                         
3 In line with the literature, this section give figures in US dollars. 
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required (ibid.). For Africa alone, World Bank research estimates that the total 
spending required to meet the WASH MDG is $22.6 billion per year or 3.5% of GDP, 
with more than three-quarters of this required for water (Ghosh Banerjee and 
Morella 2011: 202).  Nearly half (43%) is needed for new infrastructure, 31% for 
operation and maintenance (O&M), and 26% for rehabilitation; almost two-thirds of 
the total is needed in rural areas (ibid.)   
 
Funding: Sources of funding 
Funding for rural water supply may derive from three sources: tariffs (user 
payments), taxes (domestic revenue), and transfers (aid) from donors, including 
bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental (Trémolet and Rama 2012). In 
practice, donors are dominant.   
 
Transfers 
In many African countries, half or more of WASH funding comes from ODA rather 
than from domestic government sources (Ghosh Banerjee and Morella 2011: 219).  
The largest multilateral donor is the World Bank, and by far the largest bilateral is 
Japan (DFID 2012).  However, the share of WASH in global aid has declined from 
over 8% in the mid-1990s to below 5.5% in 2009 (WaterAid 2011: 29).  DFID 
allocates approximately 2% of its budget (£172 million in 2010/11) to WASH, with 
roughly half of this being disbursed through multilateral organisations, and has 
recently committed to doubling its WASH programme (DFID 2012).   
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Comprehensive information is generally only available for official (governmental) 
donors, via the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database and the 
International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). There is no equivalent dataset for 
private or non-governmental aid flows, which are significant in many countries 
(Ghosh Banerjee and Morella 2011), but Koch, Dreher et al. (2009) suggest that 
NGO aid tends to cluster, and to be concentrated in the same countries as their 
official ‘backdonors’.  International efforts are under way to establish a global 
standard for reporting financial flows for WASH (Trémolet and Rama 2012) but 
current information remains limited.  It is nonetheless clear that financing for 
WASH is inadequate in terms of both quantity (it is insufficient to meet needs) and 
quality (it is poorly targeted). 
 
Taxes 
Government expenditure on WASH in low-income countries is much lower than 
required, at only 1.1% of GDP in low-income non-fragile countries and 1.7% of GDP 
in low-income fragile countries (Ghosh Banerjee and Morella 2011: 216). Allocations 
to WASH are far lower than allocations to education and health (WaterAid 2011).  
Overall, the ‘water infrastructure funding gap’ amounts to 1.8% of GDP for sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole, or nearly $12 billion per year (ibid: 228-229).  The 
African Ministers’ Council on Water identifies failure of governments to mobilise 
domestic revenues as a key problem, and suggests that African countries should 
earmark 5% of domestic revenues for WASH expenditure (AMCOW 2011). Previously, 
UNDP suggested a benchmark of 2% of GDP, half from public spending and half from 
cost recovery from households (UNDP 2006).  
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Tariffs 
Since donors have focused on capital investment, and governments have proved 
unable or unwilling to provide adequate funding for WASH, users themselves have 
been increasingly held responsible for bearing the costs of operation, maintenance 
and repairs (OMR).  These user fees are a key feature of the community 
management model that grew out of the financial crisis in public services in the 
1980s (Schouten and Moriarty 2003) and are now a central plank of government 
rural water supply strategy in almost all African countries (Harvey 2007).  However, 
they remain a topic of much debate within the WASH sector (Whittington, Jeuland 
et al. 2012).   
 
Those in favour of user fees put forward two main arguments.  First, they claim 
that user fees are necessary for financial sustainability - if the recurrent costs of 
water service provision cannot be covered by governments or donors, users must 
share the burden.  The cost of maintaining access to clean water is not 
unreasonably high, and although availability of cash may be seasonally constrained, 
users can almost always find cash for other purposes such as funerals (Msukwa and 
Taylor 2011) and indeed alcohol (Haysom 2006).  Thus, proponents argue that user 
fees are both necessary and affordable.  Indeed, some go further and suggest that 
‘self-supply’ must be a major element of the solution to water access (Sutton 2010, 
Sutton 2011).  Secondly, proponents argue that user fees encourage a sense of 
ownership and empowerment, by giving people a financial stake in their water 
point.   
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On the other hand, critics of user fees argue that they neither generate sufficient 
funds to ensure sustainability, nor foster ownership.  A very large majority of WPCs 
do not manage to collect anywhere near the amount required for OMR: for 
example, in Ghana ‘rural households … are paying very little for the improved 
water services, and as a result, the finances of many [WPCs] are in poor shape’ 
(Whittington, Davis et al. 2008: 13).  Community co-financing requirements are 
more likely to create feelings of injustice and resentment, rather than of 
empowerment and ownership (Babajanian 2011).  And evidence from Tanzania 
(Haysom 2006) suggest that even where people are willing to pay for water, this 
does not translate into taking responsibility for the water point, in the sense of 
holding leaders accountable for performance. 
 
Furthermore, there is clear evidence that, even at very low levels, user charges 
put people off using clean water, as demonstrated by a recent systematic review of 
willingness-to-pay for clean water in Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya and Zambia (Null, 
Kremer et al. 2012).  Low willingness-to-pay is not exclusively due to poverty; 
rather, people underestimate the benefits of clean water.  These results echo 
other research demonstrating that charging for privately-consumed public goods, 
such as anti-malarial bed-nets and deworming drugs, significantly reduces uptake 
of those goods, resulting in sub-optimal levels of use (Kremer and Miguel 2007, 
Dupas 2009). The clear implication is that tariffs are both ineffective and counter-
productive as a source of funding for water provision; instead, clean water should 
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be subsidised as a public good.  Nonetheless, user contributions currently remain 
central to the community management model of rural water supply. 
 
Funding: Targeting 
Whether from taxes or transfers, the limited large-scale funding that does exist is 
often poorly targeted. The WASH sector overall suffers from several biases, notably 
towards middle-income rather than low-income countries, towards urban rather 
than rural people, and towards new installations rather than maintenance of 
existing infrastructure (WaterAid 2011, WHO 2012). There are also significant 
geographical inequalities in the way that funds are allocated within countries: for 
example, in Malawi, Sugden (2003) found that the ratio of water points per 
thousand people ranged from zero to nineteen. 
 
The bias towards construction rather than maintenance is a source of especial 
concern to many observers.  The vast majority of funding in the water sector is 
directed towards new installations, with much smaller amounts invested in 
rehabilitation, and very little in ongoing operation, maintenance and repair (OMR).  
In low-income countries only one-sixth of expenditure is on OMR (Ghosh Banerjee 
and Morella 2011: 216), despite the fact that the WHO estimates noted above 
suggest that fully 75% of the funding required is needed for OMR (Hutton and 
Bartram 2008).  This overemphasis on capital investment, and underfunding of 
recurrent costs, has serious implications for sustainability. 
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2.1.2 Results: Outputs, outcomes and impacts 
 
Distinguishing clearly between outputs (functioning water points), outcomes 
(people with access to safe water) and impacts (improved health, reduced 
drudgery, economic benefits) is analytically essential, although regrettably not 
always attempted or achieved. 
 
In recent years there has been significant investment globally in data collection 
and management for WASH as well as in other sectors, driven by the need to assess 
progress towards the MDGs.  The key source of outcome data is the Joint 
Monitoring Programme for Water and Sanitation (JMP) of the WHO and UNICEF (JMP 
2011, JMP 2012a) which compiles data from a range of national statistical sources 
including census data, Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), and Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) for over 200 countries, in order to monitor progress 
towards MDG 7.  Data on outputs is much less comprehensive; the only source of 
cross-national data is based largely on guesswork (RWSN 2009).  In contrast, a large 
number of studies have been conducted to examine the impacts of WASH 
programmes, and their findings have been summarised in systematic reviews 
(Waddington and Snilstveit 2009, Waddington, Snilstveit et al. 2009).  Below, I 
examine each of these in turn. 
 
Outputs and Outcomes: Water points and access to water 
The most comprehensive and most reliable source of data on sustainable access to 
safe water is the JMP, which bases its figures on representative population surveys 
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conducted by National Statistical Offices. However, as noted in Chapter One, there 
are subtle but important differences between the JMP measure of ‘access to 
improved drinking water sources’ and the MDG target of ‘sustainable access to safe 
drinking water’.  Crucially, the JMP statistics do not measure how sustainable the 
access is.  More people are now getting access to clean water because of a surge in 
construction of new water points – but if many of those water points stop working 
within a short time, the improvement in access figures will be short-lived.  
Secondly, as the JMP itself points out, ‘not all improved sources in actual fact 
provide drinking-water that is safe’ (JMP 2010: 9).  WHO research suggests that half 
of all protected wells, and one-third of boreholes and protected springs, are 
contaminated (JMP 2011: 34).  Adjusting JMP estimates to take account of water 
quality results in significant decreases in estimates for access to safe water, for 
example by 11% in Ethiopia and 10% in Nigeria (ibid: 36).  Other studies have found 
even higher discrepancies between reported access and adequate-quality access 
(Jimenez and Perez-Foguet 2008: 6).   
  
In contrast to the JMP’s outcome-based approach, some analysts (including many 
government water ministries) use an output-based approach, based on information 
- or assumptions - about water supply infrastructure, its functionality, and the 
number of users served.  According to the only major compilation of output figures 
available, average water point non-functionality across 20 countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa is 36% (RWSN 2009).   
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Frustratingly, some analysts conflate the two types of measure, and discount 
population (outcome) figures for access to water by infrastructure (output) figures 
for water point functionality – an invalid calculation, since the two measures are 
based on different factors. For example, for Malawi, Baumann and Danert give the 
figure of 71% access to improved drinking water sources (they do not give a source, 
but presumably this figure is drawn from the 2006 MICS, as shown in JMP 2010), but 
then go on to claim that since ‘it is estimated that 31% of the improved rural water 
points are not functioning, thus effective coverage is reduced to 55%’ (Baumann 
and Danert 2008a: 10).  Clearly, a person-based index should not be multiplied by a 
technology-based index: the MICS data represents people who say they actually 
draw water from an improved drinking water source, whereas the non-functionality 
figure relates to numbers of water points.  Others, including DFID, repeat the same 
mistake (de Saint Méloir 2009, DFID 2012: 58). 
 
It thus appears that the approach taken to measuring ‘sustainable access to safe 
water’ depends on who is using the statistic and what point they wish to make. 
Unsurprisingly, politicians and international aid officials tend to emphasise the 
positive story told by the JMP outcome figures, whereas NGOs and other water 
sector stakeholders often highlight output non-functionality in order to focus 
attention on sustainability.  While it is important to celebrate the progress that has 
undoubtedly been made in recent decades towards universal access to clean water, 
greater objectivity and clarity are necessary in order to diagnose and address the 
problems that remain.  In Malawi, the statistics (66% functionality, 80% access) 
might suggest a simple solution: fix the broken infrastructure, and 100% access 
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might follow.  However, this takes no account of the dimension of equity.  Many 
broken water points may be located in areas where people have access to 
alternative improved sources.  Both functionality and equity of distribution of 
water infrastructure must be addressed in order to approach 100% access.   
 
Impacts: Health and time benefits 
Two main benefits of access to safe water have been identified in the literature: 
improved health, and reduced drudgery (i.e. greater convenience and/or time 
savings).  Some analyses also suggest that direct economic benefits can be 
significant, if improved access to water supports increased agricultural production; 
and there may also be indirect economic benefits since improved health and 
reduced drudgery lead to increased human productivity.  However, since the 
primary focus of my analysis is domestic water consumption, I focus here on the 
direct impacts on health and time.   
 
As noted in Chapter 1, unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene is responsible for 4.2% 
of the global burden of disease as measured in disability-adjusted life years 
(DALYs), and unsafe WASH is the fourth largest cause of death in low-income 
countries.  It has long been claimed by proponents of clean water supply that such 
investments lead directly to health benefits, particularly through reduced 
incidence of waterborne diseases such as diarrhoeal infections (White, Bradley et 
al. 1972, Hunter, MacDonald et al. 2010, Elbers, Godfrey et al. 2012).  However, a 
1996 study of almost 17,000 people in 8 countries concluded that ‘health benefits 
from improved water were less pronounced than those for sanitation.  Benefits 
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from improved water occurred only when sanitation was also improved’ (Esrey 
1996: 608). Other studies have found no positive effects on health of water 
infrastructure programmes (Klasen, Lechtenfeld et al. 2012).   
 
A systematic review concluded that improving access to clean water is most 
effective in tandem with improvements in sanitation, especially the elimination of 
open defecation, and in hygiene practices, especially hand-washing with soap after 
defecation and before eating or preparing food, and safe disposal of childrens’ 
faeces (Waddington, Snilstveit et al. 2009).  Even if water is fetched from a safe 
source, it may become contaminated after collection through unsafe storage; 
Masangwi, Morse et al. (2009) found that households using borehole water were 
almost equally as likely as those using unimproved wells to suffer from diarrhoea.  
Thus, access to clean water is important but not sufficient for improved health, 
and must be coupled with improved sanitation and hygiene if health benefits are to 
be achieved. 
 
A second significant and widely-noted benefit of improving access to safe water is 
the consequent reduction in the burden of fetching water, which is borne almost 
exclusively by women and children (Aladuwaka and Momsen 2010). Improved access 
to safe water frees their time for more productive activities, such as income 
generation or schooling (Rauniyar, Orbeta et al. 2011), or for leisure, social and 
religious activities (Gutierrez 2007).  In fact, these convenience-related benefits 
are more immediately felt and better appreciated by users than the assumed 
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health benefits: ‘users prioritise convenience in access to water over other possible 
concerns such as health’ (Haysom 2006: 40).   
 
There are also productive and social impacts of improving access to safe water. 
Easier access to water can support agricultural production, both through main-crop 
irrigation and through hand watering of small kitchen gardens.  Water availability is 
a very significant constraint on production in many poor countries, such as Malawi, 
which relies on rain-fed agriculture with a single growing season. Social benefits 
have also been noted: researchers found that ‘in Tanzania and Ghana, where 
receiving visitors with hospitality is socially important, people can now offer 
potable water or pleasant-tasting tea in clean cups.  More people from 
neighbouring villages started to visit the communities with water points and this 
has led to increased status and self-respect’ (WaterAid 2001: 21). 
 
Achievement of these positive impacts rests, of course, on the long-term 
sustainability of the water points themselves – which, as already noted, cannot be 
assumed.  The next section examines the concept of sustainability in more depth, 
and assesses the record of the sector so far. 
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2.2 SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Sustainability is one of a number of development ‘buzzwords’ or ‘fuzzwords’ whose 
overuse and lack of clarity risk making them meaningless (Cornwall 2007, Cornwall 
and Eade 2010).  It is ‘a consummately effective ‘boundary term’’ (Scoones 2010: 
153) linking the worlds of science and politics; but ‘has become one of the most 
overused and abused words in development vocabulary’ (Sugden 2003: 1).  
Nonetheless it is central to my topic, and must therefore be clearly defined. 
 
2.2.1 Definition  
 
Two broad spheres of meaning can be distinguished: environmental, and economic.  
The concept of environmental sustainability came to prominence with the 
Brundtland Commission’s definition of sustainable development as ‘development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland 1987: 43); it emphasises the 
need to steward natural resources.  It has some relevance to the rural water 
sector, in that access to water in some areas may be threatened by the drying up 
of aquifers due to over-extraction and/or reduced replenishment from rainfall. 
 
The second sphere of meaning, economic, is more commonly used in development 
discourse.  It implies either that outcomes will continue after inputs cease, or that 
new resources are found to replace the initial inputs.  This concept of sustainability 
– the idea that external agents can intervene to kick-start a project or process, 
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which will continue indefinitely once they withdraw funding and other support - is 
central to much development policy and practice today, and this is the meaning of 
sustainability most frequently used in the literature on rural water supply.  
However, many authors do not specify which set of meanings they refer to, but 
simply emphasise ‘continuation over time’ as the core of the concept (Webster, 
Dejachew et al. 1999, Harvey and Reed 2004, Rosenberg, Hartwig et al. 2008, 
Baumann and Danert 2008a, Lockwood and Smits 2011). For all these authors, 
sustainability simply means ‘continuation over time’ without (significant) further 
inputs. 
 
There is, however, evidence that ‘the sustainability doctrine’ can paradoxically 
lead to short-term opportunism on the part of development actors, as observed by 
Swidler and Watkins in Malawi, where donor focus on sustainability in HIV/AIDS 
programmes ‘created a capricious, irrationalising environment that reinforced a 
contingent, opportunistic orientation among recipients’ (Swidler and Watkins 2009: 
1183). The insecure nature of aid funding often leads not to the development of 
sustainable local sources of funding (which may be a chimera in any case) but 
rather to a scramble to access the next short-term grant. Another critique of the 
‘illusion’ of sustainability is offered by Kremer and Miguel (2007).  Using the 
example of deworming in Kenya, they show that continued public subsidy is the 
most effective way to ensure continued provision of public goods, and suggest that 
‘it may be difficult for external interventions to promote sustainable voluntary 
local public good provision’ (Kremer and Miguel 2007: 1060). 
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The emphasis on sustainability in the rural water supply sector, as well as in other 
development sectors, is reflected in the now widespread agreement that water 
supply needs to be implemented using a service delivery approach rather than a 
project approach (Lockwood and Smits 2011).  The focus has thus shifted away 
from delivering stand-alone outputs (water points) to delivering outcomes 
(continued access to clean water) - a welcome shift that implicitly puts 
sustainability at the centre.  Ensuring sustainable access to clean water depends on 
ensuring continued functionality of the infrastructure.  Thus, I define sustainability 
in the context of this study as ‘continued water point functionality over time’. 
 
2.2.2 Dimensions 
 
Since the purpose of this study is to assess the influence of various factors on the 
outcome of sustainability, we must first define how this outcome variable is to be 
measured.  Measuring sustainability is challenging, since multiple aspects of quality 
and quantity must be considered (Whittington, Davis et al. 2008).   
 
The quantity of water delivered depends on the yield of the water point 
(influenced by the size of the source, the efficiency of the technology, and the 
number of users), and the number of days that it is operational (which depends on 
seasonality, and the frequency and duration of breakdown).  The quality of water 
has four facets, as previously discussed: microbial, chemical, radiological and 
acceptability.  Microbial quality is generally considered the main concern by 
providers of water points, and is influenced by factors such as siting, construction 
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quality, and user behaviour. However, acceptability criteria such as taste, 
hardness, convenience and queuing time are much more salient to users.  User 
satisfaction is also influenced by perceived costs, in terms of money, time, or 
energy.  The importance of user perceptions in achieving functionality (and 
sustainability) has also been noted in other sectors, for example in projects 
promoting improved cooking stoves (Chowdhury, Koike et al. 2011).  The 
performance metrics that are important to outsiders may be very different from 
those that are valued by users. 
 
There are currently no performance standards for functionality or sustainability in 
the sector, although the WASHCost initiative is attempting to set benchmarks for 
cost-effectiveness.  Although the problem is widely recognised, and the WASH 
Sustainability Charter (SustainableWASH.org 2011) has been endorsed by almost 
one hundred organisations, the question of what constitutes an acceptable level of 
functionality and sustainability is only rarely addressed either in the literature or in 
practice.  The sole exception is the recent work of the WASHCost initiative, which 
has suggested a definition of ‘a basic level of service’ as:  
‘People access a minimum of 20 litres per person per day, of acceptable quality 
(judged by user perception and country standards) from an improved source which 
functions at least 350 days a year without a serious breakdown, spending no more 
than 30 minutes per day per round trip (including waiting time).’ (WASHCost 2012: 
1). 
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This definition appears highly aspirational, not least because it specifies 
functionality on 350 days out of 365 (96%) – a rate considerably higher than current 
average water point functionality almost everywhere, as discussed in the next 
section. 
 
To summarise, then, sustainability can be measured in several ways: as a snapshot, 
or through a combination of elements including breakdown frequency and 
breakdown length (which can be combined to give functionality as a percentage of 
time), water quality, and yield.  Box 2.1 summarises these six metrics or outcome 
variables. 
 
Box 2.1: Dimensions of water point sustainability 
Metric Variable name 
Functionality at time of assessment FUNCT 
Frequency of breakdown BREAKFREQ 
Duration of breakdown BREAKLENGTH 
Days operational since installation %DAYSFUNCT 
Quality of water WATERQUAL 
Quantity of water YIELD 
 
The main metric used in the sector is the first, functionality, normally expressed as 
a binary (Yes/No) value and aggregated to give the percentage of water points that 
are functional in a given location. 
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2.2.3 Data 
 
We have already seen that the major international data-gathering effort in the 
water sector, the JMP reporting process, does not collect data on functionality.  
The little data that exists on this topic is partial and perhaps unreliable – even 
more so than official development statistics, which have themselves been subject 
to significant critique (Jerven 2012, Jerven 2013).   
 
National inventories of WASH infrastructure are seen as an important first step in 
monitoring sector performance, but they are costly and often, once completed, are 
underutilised (Welle, Schaefer et al. 2012).  Such inventories have been completed 
for several countries, including Ethiopia and Malawi, but updating and data 
utilisation remain major challenges.  Indeed, one earlier dataset, a 1993-1997 
water point inventory for Zambia, was completely ‘lost’ during government 
reorganisation (Gutierrez 2007). 
 
The best available data suggests a major sustainability challenge.  Nearly ten years 
ago, Harvey and Reed (2004): 5-6 reported depressing estimates from several 
sources:  
‘In 1994 it was estimated that 40 to 50 per cent of handpumps in SSA 
were not working (Diwi Consult & BIDR, 1994), and according to RWSN 
(2004b) there are currently approximately 250,000 handpumps in Africa, 
less than half of which are operational. This is backed up by data from 
Uganda (DWD, 2002a) and South Africa (Hazelton, 2000) which indicate 
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similar operational failure rates. An evaluation in Mali in 1997 found 90 
per cent of pumps inoperable one year after installation (World Bank, 
1997).’   
 
More recently, the Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN 2009) collated estimates for 
handpump non-functionality in twenty sub-Saharan African countries.  These 
estimates range from 10% in Madagascar and 20% in Uganda and Guinea, to 65% in 
Sierra Leone and Cote D’Ivoire and 67% in DRC, with the average for the 20 
countries being 36% non-functionality.  The figures appear to come from individual 
informants, and little or no information is given regarding the methods used in 
calculating them. Still, despite its flaws, this is probably the best data that is 
currently available, and these estimates are used widely in the sector, including by 
the JMP itself (JMP 2011, Lockwood and Smits 2011). 
 
Their relevance is reinforced by the work of Kleemeier (2010: 5-6) who combines 
the RWSN estimates with World Bank data and finds considerable agreement 
between her four sources of data; non-functionality is very low in some countries 
(e.g. Senegal 5% and Madagascar 10%) but much higher on average for Africa as a 
whole.  Indeed a figure of 30-40% for water point non-functionality in Africa in 
general, and Malawi in particular, appears to be well entrenched and widely used 
(RWSN 2005, Matamula 2008).  Oddly, the RWSN (2009) estimate for Malawi is 40%, 
with the source listed as MICS 2006 – which is strange, since MICS is a population 
survey not an infrastructure survey, and in any case good infrastructure data (the 
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2005 Malawi WP database) was available at the time, showing non-functionality 
was 34%. 
 
Some attempts have been made to generate more accurate data through surveys 
and mapping in a number of countries, a process that has gained momentum in 
recent years as technology has developed (Pearce and Howman 2013).  For 
example, WaterAid in Tanzania commissioned a private company to survey water 
points; having mapped 51 districts (out of a total of 127 districts in Tanzania) they 
found that only 54% of all the improved public water points were working, and that 
25% of new water points stop working within the first two years (Taylor 2009a: 1, 
Taylor 2009b).  An earlier mapping effort in Tanzania (covering 3 regions plus one 
extra district) showed overall functionality of only 45%, with WaterAid water points 
having functionality of 67% in the same areas (Haysom 2006: 1). In Liberia, (Rudge 
and Bosc 2009) found functionality of 64%.   
 
These high failure rates, of a third or more, have important implications for 
achievement of the MDG on water.  First, they suggest that the achievement of 
positive outcomes (in terms of improved access to clean water) is unlikely to be 
sustainable due to poor sustainability of outputs (water points); and second, this 
implies a very significant level of wasted inputs (investment).  The question of why  
so many water points fail – the question to which this thesis offers some answers - 
is thus critically important for the sector. 
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2.3 EXPLAINING WATER POINT SUSTAINABILITY – AND FAILURE 
 
A range of models have been put forward in an attempt to explain water point 
sustainability or failure.  Although this distinction is not always made in existing 
models, I have found it helpful to distinguish between 1) the proximate factors that 
directly affect water point sustainability, and 2) the underlying social, political and 
economic dynamics that shape their impact.  As an illustration, consider the 
question of availability of funds for maintenance and repair, highlighted as a key 
factor by many studies.  Low savings by a Water Point Committee is likely to 
severely reduce the likelihood of water point functionality, since if a breakdown 
occurs there will be no money for repairs.  A simplistic response to identification of 
this determinant might be simply to recommend better collection of funds.  
However, we need to go beyond observing this correlation to examine in more 
depth why WPC funds are typically so low – an enquiry that touches on questions of 
social status and structures, the politics of how the water sector is organised, and 
the economics of rural livelihoods. 
 
I therefore adopt a two-stage analytical framework.  The first ‘hypothesis-testing’ 
stage identifies the key proximate explanatory variables associated with variation 
in water point functionality, and tests them in order to assess their relative 
importance.  The second ‘theory-generating’ stage involves explaining the 
influence of these factors through analysis of underlying social, political and 
economic dynamics.  Chapter Three engages with this second theoretical stage.  
The remainder of the current chapter outlines the first stage: reviewing the key 
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proximate determinants highlighted in the literature, examining several 
overarching models proposed by previous authors, and presenting my own 
synthesis. 
 
2.3.1 Key proximate determinants 
 
A wide range of factors are noted in the practice-based literature.  They can be 
broadly divided into two groups: design and installation factors, and post-
construction factors.  Brief summaries are given below. 
 
Design and installation factors 
 
Geology and siting 
Geological conditions determine the difficulty of accessing groundwater and the 
type of water infrastructure that can be installed - e.g. shallow well, borehole or 
piped system (Harvey and Reed 2004). A balance has to be struck between optimal 
siting in technical terms (determined by geology and system design requirements), 
and optimal siting for users. Good siting requires good hydro-geologists, who are 
often in short supply in low-income countries. User participation in siting decisions 
has been shown to improve sustainability (Khwaja 2009) but may entail some 
compromise on system design.  
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Climate  
Sustainability will be compromised if the aquifer is rapidly exhausted (either 
because it was insufficient in the first place, or because rainfall is too low to 
replenish it) or if the water table is too low to provide water year round (Harvey 
2004). Climatic factors can also damage water infrastructure directly.  For 
example, flash floods frequently wash out piped systems in Malawi (Baumann and 
Danert 2008a).   
 
Type of technology 
Inappropriate choice of technology and/or poor system design can threaten 
sustainability (Bhandari and Grant 2007).  Poor choice or design may be due to 
ignorance (either on the part of contractors, and/or by users, if they play a major 
role in system choice) or sometimes incentives (e.g. if installers are offered bribes 
by suppliers to select a particular technical option). Proliferation of many different 
types of technologies makes it harder to ensure that spare parts and expertise are 
available for maintenance and repairs; standardisation is helpful (Lockwood and 
Smits 2011). 
 
Quality of installation 
It is often assumed that most borehole failures are due to problems with the 
handpump rather than failure of the borehole itself, but this is not always the case. 
If boreholes are not drilled deep enough (to cut costs, or because drillers lack 
sufficient expertise), or drilled during the wet season (because of time and cost 
pressures), they are more likely to fail (Harvey 2004).  Construction quality is one 
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of the most important factors influencing sustainability of water supply systems 
(Sara and Katz 1997), yet this is often hard to quantify.  It is in turn affected both 
by the availability of resources and the quality of supervision.  However, many 
projects rely on unskilled ‘supervision’ by community members, or very sporadic 
site visits by district government staff. 
 
User numbers 
High user numbers are associated with lower sustainability due to wear and tear 
(Komives, Akanbang et al. 2008, Whittington, Davis et al. 2008). High user numbers 
also affect consumption levels (Mathew 2004) and may drive some users to resort 
to unprotected sources (Bhandari and Grant 2007).  Interestingly, sustainability 
may also be lower if there are too many water points per user; if users have easy 
access to a good alternative, they are less likely to invest in fixing a broken water 
point (Whittington, Davis et al. 2008). 
 
System age 
Intuitively, the age of a water supply system is likely to affect its functionality; 
common sense suggests that older water supply infrastructure is less likely to be 
operational than newer systems. However, recent studies have provided 
contradictory results: water point age was indeed associated with functionality in 
Peru, but not in Bolivia or Ghana (Whittington, Davis et al. 2008). 
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Post-construction factors 
 
Frequency of maintenance 
In theory, regular maintenance of water infrastructure should reduce or eliminate 
the incidence of breakdown and need for repairs.  Indeed, user manuals advise 
water point managers to conduct regular tests in order to identify and fix potential 
problems (SKAT-RWSN 2007).  However, the literature suggests that maintenance is 
rarely done (Colin 1999). 
 
Accessibility of spare parts 
Several sources (Hankin 2001, Harvey and Reed 2004, RWSN 2005, Baumann and 
Danert 2008a, de Saint Méloir 2009) suggest that access to spare parts is a critical 
factor influencing water point sustainability. For example, Whittington, Davis et al 
(2008: 12) found that it took much longer to fix breakdowns in Ghanaian 
handpumps (18 days on average) than in Latin American gravity fed systems (1-5 
days), and attributed this to Ghanaians having to source spare parts from outside 
the country.  However, other studies have found no relationship between 
functionality and access to spare parts (Haysom 2006, McNicholl 2011). 
 
Availability of maintenance and repair skills 
The community management (CM) model envisages that WPC members, supported 
in some locations by ‘Area Mechanics’, will have the skills to maintain and repair 
water points.  However, many observers have argued that this is unrealistic, noting 
problems including poor quality training, illiteracy, and low motivation on the part 
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of trainees (Baumann and Danert 2008; de Saint Meloir 2009; Bhandari and Grant 
2007; Haysom 2006).  On the other hand, Sara and Katz noted that ‘one of the most 
conclusive findings of [our] study is that both household and water committee 
training plays an important role in ensuring … sustainability’ of water supply 
systems (1997: 50).  
 
Availability of funds for maintenance and repair 
As discussed above, ability and willingness to pay for recurrent costs are critical 
issues in ensuring sustainability.  While the community management model 
envisages that users bear these costs, in practice the amounts collected are often 
much lower than required (Carter, Harvey et al. 2010), and users often wait and 
hope for NGOs and other external agents to cover these costs instead (Whittington, 
Davis et al. 2008).  Users may also be unwilling to pay if they do not trust the 
committee (Haysom 2006, Gorton, Sauer et al. 2009). 
 
Availability of external support 
Many sources (Carter, Tyrrel et al. 1999, Webster, Dejachew et al. 1999, WaterAid 
2001, Harvey and Reed 2004, Carter and Rwamwanja 2006, Lockwood and Smits 
2011, Opare 2011) acknowledge that there is a need for continued external support 
of some sort – a conclusion echoed in other types of development programmes, 
such as improved cookstoves (Bailis, Cowan et al. 2009).  The critical role of local 
government in post-construction support (PCS) is often noted (Carter and 
Rwamwanja 2006), and a large study found that refresher technical training for 
water point caretakers, plus regular visits by district water and sanitation teams 
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(local government officials) are the most promising types of post-construction 
support (Komives, Akanbang et al. 2008).  
 
Incidence of theft 
The incidence of theft and vandalism is not particularly widely acknowledged in the 
literature, although some references can be found (e.g. Kleemeier 2000). However, 
there is evidence that it may be a significant factor in some places; for example, 
theft explained two-thirds of non-functionality in one sub-District in Malawi 
(Campbell 2009). 
 
2.3.2 Overarching models 
 
Several authors have attempted to synthesise the individual factors listed above 
into an overarching model of sustainability. 
 
For example, Harvey and Reed (2004) identified eight elements influencing 
sustainability, stressing the importance of viewing these factors as interlinked 
building blocks, rather than in isolation.  Their list combines what I have called 
‘proximate’ and ‘underlying’ factors: 
1. Policy context 
2. Institutional arrangements 
3. Financial and economic issues 
4. Community and social aspects 
5. Technology and the natural environment 
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6. Spare parts supply 
7. Maintenance systems 
8. Monitoring. 
 
Three of the eight (finance, spare parts supply, and maintenance skills) have 
frequently been used as shorthand for assessing sustainability (Sugden 2001, Sugden 
2003, Rudge and Bosc 2009); and Harvey and Reed’s analysis fed through into an 
RWSN strategy paper (RWSN 2005), which unusually and helpfully indicated the 
relative importance of each of the 15 factors identified.  
 
More recently, the Triple-S programme (Sustainable Water Services at Scale - a 6-
year multi-country learning programme led by IRC (the International Water and 
Sanitation Centre) and funded by the Gates Foundation) identified nine areas 
necessary to improve sustainability (Lockwood and Smits 2011: 2): 
1. Professionalization of community management 
2. Increased recognition and promotion of alternative service provider options 
3. Sustainability indicators and targets 
4. Post-construction support to service providers 
5. Capacity support to decentralised government (to the service authorities) 
6. Learning and sharing of experience 
7. Planning for asset management 
8. Financial planning frameworks to cover all life-cycle costs 
9. Regulation of rural services and service providers. 
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While more specific than Harvey and Reed(Harvey and Reed 2004), this list still 
does not clearly identify the relative importance of these factors; nor is it specific 
about who should do what, when, and at what cost to address these challenges.  
Ultimately, neither Harvey and Reed’s building blocks, nor the Triple-S list, provide 
a suitable analytical framework for this study. 
 
Another recent report by some of the same authors provides an overview of five 
key studies, and highlights twelve ‘critical issues affecting sustainability’ 
(Lockwood, Bakalian et al. 2010: 13): 
Pre-project issues: 
1. Community participation 
2. Demand-responsive approaches 
3. Empowerment 
4. Technical design 
5. Construction quality 
6. Gender and poverty focus 
7. Training. 
Post-project issues: 
8. Finance and tariff collection 
9. User satisfaction 
10. Capacity of water committees 
11. Definition of roles and responsibilities for system management 
12. On-going training. 
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Reviewing these, they identify two elements as of primary importance: adequate 
tariff for recurrent costs (issue #8), and external follow-up support (issue #12).   
 
This framework underpinned a large-scale (400 communities and 10,000 individual 
informants) study examining the impact of post-construction support on 
sustainability in Ghana, Peru, and Bolivia.  The study’s findings ‘contradict the 
general perception that most rural water systems fail’ (Whittington, Davis et al. 
2008: 4) and ‘found far fewer project failures in either treatment or control 
villages than expected’ (ibid: 8). 
 
However, the representativeness of the study is limited by its sampling; the 
researchers purposively selected projects ‘that used a ‘state of the art’ demand 
driven, community management model’ (ibid: 7) and that had been in operation for 
several years; the only variation between treatment and control villages was 
whether they had received post-construction support (PCS). Thus, their research 
design screened out unsuccessful projects at the first hurdle; and as they observed 
themselves, ‘demand-driven, community managed rural water supply programs 
that have been in operation for several years are not all that common’ (ibid: 7). 
Consequently, although the researchers themselves have claimed that ‘the 
demand-driven, community-management model seems to be working’(Bakalian and 
Wakeman 2009: xiv), their results only help us understand whether, in successful 
projects, post-construction support makes them even more successful; not whether 
the demand-driven, community management model itself is generally successful. 
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Nonetheless, important lessons emerge from this study.  The Ghana research 
(Komives, Akanbang et al. 2008) considered 18 possible sustainability factors, of 
which only three were found to be particularly significant: receipt of technical 
training by water point caretaker/operator; regular visits by district water and 
sanitation team members, and village receiving only one handpump.  More broadly, 
(Bakalian and Wakeman 2009) conclude that financial sustainability is the key 
issue. 
 
The list of ‘critical issues’ drawn up by Lockwood, Bakalian et al. (2010) also has 
some similarities to the list of ‘proximate explanatory variables’ set out in section 
2.3.1, including the division into pre- and post-construction factors.  However, they 
list complex concepts (such as ‘empowerment’) alongside aspects that can be much 
more easily assessed (such as ‘construction quality’).  For the purposes of this 
study, it seemed to make more sense to consider questions of empowerment and 
participation – which would be difficult to investigate through primarily 
quantitative research - within a wider theoretical framework, and to use this to 
interpret my findings regarding the influence of proximate determinants. 
 
2.3.3 Synthesis: analytical framework for hypothesis-testing 
 
The analytical framework for the first stage of this study therefore encompasses 
ten key proximate explanatory variables - factors that immediately influence the 
outcome of sustained water point functionality – in two groups: design and 
installation, and post-construction (Box 2.2).  Two other proximate determinants 
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discussed in section 2.3.1 (geology and climate) were excluded from the 
framework, for two reasons: the literature suggests that they are relatively less 
important influences on sustainability, and collection of the necessary geological or 
climatic data was beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Box 2.2: Proximate explanatory variables for water point sustainability 
Design and installation factors Variable name 
Type of technology WPTYPE 
Quality of installation INSTQUAL 
User numbers USERS 
System age AGE 
Post-construction factors Variable name 
Frequency of maintenance MAINTFREQ 
Accessibility of spare parts SPARES 
Availability of maintenance and repair skills SKILLS 
Availability of funds for maintenance and repair FUNDS 
Availability of external support SUPPORT 
Incidence of theft THEFT 
 
These ten variables are those that the literature suggests have an immediate effect 
on water point functionality, and so this study collects data to test the influence of 
each.  However, in order to explain why they operate as they do, it is necessary to 
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engage in particular with the theory of participation, which underpins the 
community management model on which rural water supply in Malawi is based.  
This is the focus of the next chapter. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter began by presenting an outline of the rural water supply sector in 
general – both the inputs required, in terms of technology and funding, and the 
results achieved, especially in terms of functional infrastructure.  Several key 
points were highlighted, including the large gap between funding needed and 
funding available, the reliance of the sector on transfers from donors for capital 
expenditure and on user fees to cover recurrent costs, and the biases in investment 
towards urban areas and towards new construction rather than maintenance and 
repair.  Data on water point functionality highlighted a major problem with 
performance in the sector. 
 
Having defined water point sustainability as ‘continued functionality over time’, 
section 2 of this chapter considered six ways in which this might be measured, or 
six dimensions of the outcome variable ‘sustainability’. 
 
The literature suggests a large number of factors that may influence water point 
sustainability, both individually and in combination.  Paring down these lists and 
models, I have identified ten key proximate explanatory variables that will be 
tested in this study. 
 
To summarise, then, this first stage of my analytical framework will enable me to 
address the question ‘what are the main factors that contribute to variation in the 
sustainability of improved community water points in rural Malawi?’ as well as the 
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question ‘how much of an influence does each factor have?’  The next chapter 
extends the analytical framework further, to examine the underlying dynamics 
driving these factors. 
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Chapter 3  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNITY 
MANAGEMENT: UNDERLYING INFLUENCES ON 
SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on rural water supply and identified 
the key ‘proximate explanatory variables’ or determinants of water point 
sustainability.  This chapter extends the analysis into more theoretical territory, 
arguing that the operation of those explanatory variables is in turn driven by 
underlying political economy dynamics relating both to the nature of governance in 
many low-income countries, and to the dominant model of service delivery in the 
rural water sector - community management. 
 
Section 3.1 situates ‘sustainable access to safe water’ within the wider literature 
on public goods and services, and examines the arguments regarding the relative 
roles, successes and failures of the state, market and civil society in ensuring the 
provision of those goods and services.  The influence and implications of the 
literature on good governance and, more recently, on ‘going with the grain’ of 
neopatrimonial politics, are debated. 
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Section 3.2 reviews the literature on public participation and collective action.  
Participatory theory is (deliberately) diffuse and diverse; nonetheless it is arguably 
the most important strand in development theory, policy and practice in recent 
decades.  In this section I explore both the claims for, and critiques of, 
participation and collective action. 
 
The theory of participation underpins the strategy of community management, 
which is the dominant delivery model in rural water supply in most low-income 
countries.  Section 3.3 outlines the roots, the reach, and the reality of the 
community management approach.  I examine the extent to which the claimed 
benefits of participation are operationalized through community management, and 
discuss the implications of this evidence for theories of participation.   
 
The chapter concludes by outlining the second stage of my analytical framework, 
focused on the question: ‘Is community management an effective way to ensure 
sustainable provision of public goods and services?’ 
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3.1 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL WATER SUPPLY 
 
The concept of political economy, like that of sustainability, is multi-faceted and 
contested.  Some see it as the application of the methods of economics to the 
study of politics (Weingast and Wittman 2006); others propose that it is, rather, the 
study of how politics affects policy choices and economic outcomes, focusing on 
the central concept of conflict of interests (Drazen 2000).  It is in this latter sense 
that I use the phrase here. 
 
3.1.1 Public goods and services 
 
The provision of public goods has long been a core concern of political economy.  
Public goods are most commonly defined as goods that are non-rival and non-
excludable, such as clean air or a lighthouse (Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1: Types of goods. 
 Excludable Non-excludable 
Rival Private good Common good / Common pool resource 
Non-rival Club good Public good 
 
 
Placing rural water supply within this framework is not entirely straightforward.  In 
some situations, water supply is a private good (e.g. private household 
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connections); in others, depending on local management arrangements, it may be a 
club good (e.g. where users must pay a fee to use the supply) or a common pool 
resource (e.g. where use is free, but water availability is limited).   
 
The key characteristic is that water supply, like education and healthcare, is a 
‘social good’; although it is individually consumed, it has some public-good 
characteristics.  Public services – services provided by the state for the benefit of 
its citizens – are concerned with the provision of such social goods, for two broad 
reasons (World Bank 2004).  First, externalities: services like healthcare, education 
and clean water supply have important positive spillover effects that are 
insufficiently taken into account in individuals’ decisions about whether and how 
much to pay for them, so they will be under-provided by the market. Second, 
equity: access to healthcare, education, clean water and so on are commonly 
agreed to be fundamental human rights (as noted in Chapter One), with the 
implication that the state should ensure that they are accessible to all, regardless 
of wealth or income.  However, although it is generally accepted that the state 
bears significant responsibility for ensuring provision of these services, there is 
considerable debate over the precise mechanisms by which this should be 
achieved. 
 
3.1.2 The state and the market in public service provision 
 
Following the Second World War a consensus emerged among wealthy nations that 
the state should play a major role in development, not least through direct 
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provision of public goods and services.  In Europe, the three decades following 1945 
saw unprecedented expansion of the role of the state in both the social and 
economic sphere.  The same assumptions underpinned policy elsewhere, as many 
countries emerged from the yoke of colonialism (Chang 2003).  Consequently, rural 
water supply in low-income countries was seen as the responsibility of the state 
(Schouten and Moriarty 2003). 
 
This consensus on the role of the state collapsed in the 1970s and 1980s.  
‘Neoliberal’ critics argued that the state-led approach had failed, pointing to 
evidence of poorly functioning public services and problematic public finances.  
The neoliberals swept to political power in the UK in 1979 and in the US a year 
later, and their economic prescriptions, conveniently (though misleadingly) 
summarised as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 1993), dominated global 
public policy for the next three decades.  Key planks of the agenda included fiscal 
discipline, financial liberalisation, and privatisation (Chang 2003).   
 
In the name of fiscal discipline, and in response to economic crisis, many low 
income countries were encouraged to adopt structural adjustment policies in the 
1980s, which frequently involved the reduction of public services and/or the 
introduction of user fees. The harmful effects of such policies were strongly 
criticised (Cornia, Jolly et al. 1987, Jolly 1991), and in health and education there 
has now been a shift back to emphasising ‘free at the point of delivery’ services, 
exemplified by the global impetus behind universal free primary education 
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encapsulated in MDG2.  However, as noted in Chapter Two, the rural water sector 
still promotes user fees. 
 
Alongside the new liberal economic prescriptions emerged the discourse of ‘good 
governance’, emphasising political democratisation and large-scale administrative 
reform.  While rich nations had been happy to turn a blind eye to poor governance 
in poor countries during the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the claimed 
‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1989) meant that Western governments discovered a 
new interest in promoting democracy and human rights.  These became a 
significant focus of aid and foreign policy engagement - as well as of domestic 
activism within poor countries that were no longer Cold War proxies – and many 
new democracies flowered during the 1990s, particularly in Africa. 
 
However, the ambitious good governance agenda faced significant implementation 
challenges, and critiques of its ‘overwhelming’ nature prompted articulation of a 
vision of ‘good enough governance’ in its place (Grindle 2002), with the emphasis 
on setting a few key priorities and ensuring that responsibility for delivering on 
them was clear.  The emphasis on good governance endured in donor policy (DFID 
2006), albeit with increased acknowledgement of the primacy of politics (Leftwich 
2005); but with ‘underwhelming’ results (Kelsall 2008: 627).  As a consequence, a 
new focus developed on ‘the politics of what works’ - and why - in particular 
polities and societies, alongside an emphasis on ‘working with the grain’ of African 
politics (Kelsall 2008, Booth 2011a).   
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The nature of this ‘grain’ is generally identified as clientelism, in which rulers 
maintain power through relations of patronage with individuals or small groups - for 
example, the transactional exchange of a vote or loyalty in return for payments or 
other preferential treatment (Lockwood 2006, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, van de 
Walle 2012).  The concept of neopatrimonialism is closely related to, and is often 
used interchangeably with, clientelism.  A contested term (Erdmann and Engel 
2009), neopatrimonialism was first proposed by Eisenstadt in 1973 to distinguish 
between ‘traditional patrimonialism’ (drawing on Weber’s distinction between 
legal-rational, traditional and charismatic legitimacy) and modern forms (Bruhns 
2012), and specifically refers to the use of the resources of the modern state in 
sustaining clientelist relations (Bach and Gazibo 2012).  Thus, ‘the characteristic 
feature of neopatrimonialism is the incorporation of patrimonial logic into 
bureaucratic institutions’ (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 62).  For example, 
politicians often use control over public services as a mechanism of clientelism, 
e.g. through allocation of jobs, allocation of services themselves, or diverting 
resources from their intended purpose (World Bank 2004).   
 
African states are hybrid states – part modern institutions, but also strongly 
influenced by traditions of personal rule and patronage (Lockwood 2006).  It has 
been argued that the state itself is ‘a relatively empty shell’ and ‘the real business 
of politics is conducted informally’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 95).  As a result of this 
‘veranda politics’ (Harrison 2008) more attention is often paid to creating the 
appearance of good governance than to implementing real change - a ‘style over 
substance’ problem neatly captured by Pritchett et al in the phrase ‘isomorphic 
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mimicry’ (Pritchett, Woolcock et al. 2010). Of course, as van Donge, Henley et al. 
(2012) point out, clientelism has also been a major feature in economically 
successful South-East Asia.  However, while it is certainly possible for 
neopatrimonial states to combine patronage politics with developmental 
effectiveness in the sense of poverty reduction or improved provision of public 
services – Rwanda is one recent example (Booth 2011b) – most such states have a 
poor record. 
 
This, then, is the broad political context of service provision in Africa: a complex 
interplay between an externally-driven agenda rooted in traditions of liberal 
democracy and Weberian administration, and a domestic heritage of 
neopatrimonial authority and personalised politics. Actors wishing to influence 
outcomes in this context require analytical tools that pay close attention to 
informal norms and processes as well as formal structures (Copestake and Williams 
2012).  This need has prompted the emergence of political economy analysis (PEA): 
an approach and a set of tools that are ‘concerned with the interaction of political 
and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between 
different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain, and 
transform these relationships over time’ (Collinson 2003: 3).  I employ PEA to 
analyse the political economy of Malawi, and of its rural water supply sector in 
particular, in Chapter Four; but first I discuss the most significant policy responses 
to the problems of state and market failure - decentralisation and participation. 
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3.1.3 Decentralisation and participation  
 
Decentralisation - the process of transferring (state) power from the centre to 
lower/outer levels – has been a key element of the ‘good governance agenda’ since 
the 1990s.  In theory, decentralisation should lead to increased accountability and 
responsiveness of the state to its citizens – hence improving state legitimacy 
(Faguet 2014). It should reduce information asymmetries between principals and 
agents, and improve coordination, resulting in better public service provision 
(World Bank 2004). 
 
Decentralisation has thus become a key element of reform in the public sector, 
including rural water supply (WPP 2010).  However, it is now well recognised that 
decentralisation of responsibilities is not necessarily accompanied by 
decentralisation of resources or powers (Ribot, Agrawal et al. 2006); there is often 
‘excessive central control over sector revenues and intergovernmental transfers’ 
(WPP 2010: 11). Local authorities in most low-income countries are critically 
hampered by lack of capacity: low skills and few resources (Lockwood and Smits 
2011).  At the same time, citizens face many barriers (educational, informational, 
logistical, and financial) to organising to claim their rights. 
 
Even when power is truly devolved, physical ‘closeness to the people’ by no means 
automatically translates into greater likelihood of acting in their interests.  Local 
politicians are not necessarily any more responsive to citizens than national ones, 
and ‘there is no reason to expect that decentralisation will be pro-poor’ (Moore 
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and Putzel 1999: 1).  In a neopatrimonial political context where incentives are 
top-down rather than bottom-up – where promotion and resource flows are 
dependent on personal allegiance not on performance assessment – 
decentralisation may make very little difference to outcomes.  Indeed, it may 
make it harder for citizens to organise to claim better services, since the centre 
can abdicate responsibility and blame local factors.  Democratic decentralisation 
may also result in the transfer of powers to unelected local institutions such as 
traditional chiefs and NGOs – a type of ‘pluralism without representation [which] is 
often a formula for elite capture, not democracy’ (Ribot 2007: 44). 
 
The vogue for decentralisation of public service provision has also been closely 
associated with an emphasis on citizen involvement or participation. Indeed, a 
strong case could be made that participation has been the defining theory of 
development over the last two or three decades.  In rural water supply, it is 
operationalized in the form of community management, in which an elected group 
of villagers collectively manage, maintain and repair their own water point after 
installation.  This model is founded on assumptions about the instrumental and 
intrinsic benefits of user participation – assumptions that I now examine in detail. 
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3.2 PARTICIPATION: THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
Following Martinussen’s (1997) distinction between development theories, concepts 
and strategies I suggest that ‘participation’ is a development theory of the context-
specific or middle range (rather than grand theory) type, i.e. ‘a hypothesis about 
promoting and obstructing conditions to development’ (Sumner and Tribe 2008: 84) 
in which ‘the literature acts as proxy for theory’ (Bryman 2008: 8).  Collective 
action is a concept or ‘development objective’, and community management is a 
strategy or ‘set of actions and interventions to promote development’ (Sumner and 
Tribe 2008: 84) associated with the theory of participatory development.   
 
The emergence of participation as a theory of development was in part a response 
to the collapse of credibility of ‘grand theories’ of development in the 1970s and 
1980s (Sumner and Tribe 2008).  As Mohan and Stokke (2000) point out, it has roots 
at both ends of the political spectrum, with the ‘new right’ promoting participation 
as a means to improve efficiency of public services, and the ‘new left’ focusing on 
participation as an empowering process.  As a body of theory it is diffuse, and has 
long defied attempts to define it (Oakley 1991); indeed, attempts to pin it down 
have themselves sometimes been criticised as running counter to participatory 
principles.  It can be seen as having roots in the deliberative philosophy of Jurgen 
Habermas, with its core meaning located in the idea of ‘collective public 
deliberation’ (Farrington 2011: 152).  One simple and influential definition of 
participation proposed by World Bank authors is ‘a process by which people, 
especially disadvantaged people, influence decisions that affect them’ (Bhatnagar 
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and Williams 1992: 177); more fully, it is ‘a voluntary process by which people, 
including the disadvantaged (in income, gender, ethnicity, or education), influence 
or control the decisions that affect them’ (Narayan 1995: 7).  Crook and Manor, 
focusing on political participation, defined it as ‘citizens’ active engagement with 
public institutions’ (1998: 7); although I would suggest that ‘individuals’ active 
engagement with public action’ is a more inclusive formulation.   
 
Mansuri and Rao (2013) suggest that participation can be promoted or induced in 
two broad ways:  
• Community development: ‘efforts to bring villages, urban neighbourhoods, 
or other household groupings into the process of managing development 
resources without relying on formally constituted local governments’ (ibid: 
1); and 
• Decentralisation: ‘efforts to strengthen village and municipal governments 
on both the demand and supply sides’(ibid: 2).   
The present study focuses particularly on the former; but, as has already been 
discussed, and as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the political 
context - including the extent to which power is decentralised - is a critical 
influence on the potential for community development through collective action.  
 
3.2.1 Collective action and the ‘community’ 
 
The term ‘collective action’ is used to signify actions that are undertaken 
collectively towards common goals (Olson 1977), of which cooperation between 
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households to ensure rural water supply is one example. Collective action requires 
common interests and shared rules.  While Ostrom (1990) and others have devoted 
considerable attention to articulating shared rules or ‘design principles’ for 
collective action, such approaches have given significantly less weight to the issue 
of diversity of interests. 
 
Development interventions frequently assume a large degree of common interest 
on the part of ‘the community’, generally defined as people living within a 
particular geographic area; but this ‘myth of community’ (Guijt and Shah 1998) is 
misleading (Leach, Mearns et al. 1999).  While the term may be a ‘helpful 
shorthand’, it must be used with care (Nunan 2006).  People have diverse interests 
– based on gender, class, caste, age, income, wealth, livelihood, health status and 
many other elements of identity and forms of social stratification – and diverse 
groups often find it harder to organise successful collective action (Ray and 
Bhattacharya 2011).  Addressing this is a key challenge for participatory 
approaches. 
 
3.2.2 Arguments for participation 
 
Broadly speaking, two main arguments are made for participation: efficiency and 
empowerment (Nelson and Wright 1995, Mohan and Stokke 2000) .  Participation is 
claimed to have instrumental benefits, increasing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of development work, as well as (perhaps more importantly, for many of its 
proponents) intrinsic or transformational value in promoting empowerment and 
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equity. Different degrees of participation have been distinguished, with a critical 
difference between strong (‘partnership or ceding control’) and weak (‘consulting 
or informing’) participation (Brett 2003: 5). 
 
Efficiency and effectiveness 
Proponents argue that participation increases both the efficiency of development 
programmes - meaning the economical conversion of inputs into results (OECD 
2010), and their effectiveness - meaning the extent to which the programmes’ 
objectives are achieved (ibid.).  Participatory approaches are seen as more 
efficient because unpaid local labour and participants’ financial and in-kind 
contributions can replace inputs that would otherwise have to be paid for, thus 
enabling donor funding to be spread more widely. 
 
In terms of effectiveness, Narayan and colleagues (Isham, Narayan et al. 1995, 
Narayan 1995) have argued influentially that increased participation in the water 
sector leads to improved project outcomes.  Drawing on statistical analysis of 
reports from 121 rural water projects, they found that ‘beneficiary participation is 
the single most important factor contributing to project effectiveness’ (Narayan 
1995: 75).  Sara and Katz (1997) also found that demand-responsive water supply 
services were more likely to be sustained, and other authors have made similar 
claims for instrumental effectiveness (Bhandari and Grant 2007, Taylor 2009a, 
Aladuwaka and Momsen 2010, Madrigal, Alpízar et al. 2011, Marks and Davis 2012). 
Kleemeier (2000) found that participation was important in keeping small-scale 
piped water schemes functioning in Malawi, and Prokopy (2005) concluded that 
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participation through contributing to capital costs and through household 
involvement in decision-making was positively associated with outcomes in India.  
Gender also appears important: Komives, Akanbang et al. (2008) found that water 
points with a higher proportion of female committee members were more likely to 
be functioning.  
 
It is argued that participation leads to improved outcomes through engendering a 
sense of ownership (Whittington, Davis et al. 2008), a conclusion also reached by 
Marks and Davis (2012) and Prokopy (2005), for whom financial participation 
through either up-front capital contribution or monthly user fees is the key form of 
participation.  However, the argument that contributing to capital costs is 
important and positive runs counter to the findings of Babajanian (2011) and also 
to the wider literature on subsidies versus user charges (e.g. Banerjee and Duflo 
2012) which suggests that such ‘contributions’ are regressive and counter-
productive.   
 
Overall, there is mixed evidence on the effect of participation on provision of 
public goods and services.  On the one hand, community monitoring of healthcare 
providers in Uganda (Björkman and Svensson 2010) and of teachers in Kenya (Duflo, 
Dupas et al. 2012) led to marked improvements in service provision.  On the other 
hand, Olken (2005) found that centralised audits were more effective than 
community monitoring at reducing corruption in road-building projects in 
Indonesia, and Banerjee, Banerji et al. (2010) found that a programme to 
encourage parent participation in monitoring teacher performance in India had no 
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effect on learning outcomes.  However, these examples all relate to participation 
in monitoring of public services, rather than participation in the provision of the 
service, as in rural water supply.  The question of whether such participation is 
effective remains open. 
 
Equity and empowerment 
The idea of empowerment is central to much of the participation literature, not 
least in the writings of Robert Chambers (Chambers 1983, Chambers 1997).  
Participatory approaches are seen as a means of challenging and reversing power 
imbalances – between rich and poor, urban and rural, men and women, 
development workers and villagers. 
 
Participation is also argued to be important for equity, which can be seen as both 
an instrumental and an intrinsic benefit.  An example is given by Handa, Huang et 
al. (2012), who found that community-based targeting of cash transfer programmes 
in Malawi, Kenya and Mozambique was highly effective in reaching the poorest, and 
achieved better pro-poor targeting than average cash transfer programmes around 
the world. A more complicated picture is painted by Labonne and Chase (2009) who 
studied community-driven development in 66 villages in the Philippines. They found 
that resources did indeed flow to the poorest villages but also to the most 
politically active, and (controlling for poverty) the most unequal, because there 
the leader was more likely to override community preferences and influence inter-
village competition to ensure that the resources came to his village.  Thus, the 
evidence linking participation and equity is complex and mixed. 
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An interesting insight into the intrinsic value of participation from the point of view 
of participants themselves emerges from Cochran and Ray’s (2009) study of equity 
considerations in rainwater-harvesting schemes in Rajasthan, India.  It found that 
community members felt they gained ‘symbolic capital’ from participating in 
community activities, which was just as important to them as more concrete 
benefits from the project.  Thus, although the economic benefits of this project 
(water for irrigation and livestock) were distributed quite unequally, virtually all 
villagers felt that the costs should be shared equally. The net effect of this 
participatory project was an increase in economic inequality in the village – but 
this was accepted by all including the ‘losers’, who felt they had asserted a degree 
of social equality through their participation. This example highlights both the 
possibility that participation may increase inequality, and the difficulty of making 
judgements as a non-participant. 
 
A related aspect of the equality argument is that participation represents full 
citizenship (Jones 2011) – an idea that can be linked to the ‘symbolic capital’ 
gained through participation by the Rajasthani villagers.  However, this argument 
has interesting normative implications, as it can lead to a view that participation is 
not just a right but also a responsibility, i.e. that people ought to participate in 
collective action even if they do not wish to do so.   
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3.2.3 Critiques of participation 
 
It was perhaps inevitable that after the rapid flowering of participatory theory and 
action in the 1980s and 1990s a backlash would emerge.  Participation was 
provocatively described as ‘the new tyranny’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001) due to its 
dominance of development discourse, and the past decade or so has seen 
considerable effort devoted – by sceptics and enthusiasts alike - to examining the 
empirical basis for participation’s ‘heroic claims’ (Cleaver 1999: 597).   
 
Improving performance: results, or theatre? 
There is a significant body of evidence countering the claim that participatory 
approaches are especially effective. In their wide-ranging review of the evidence, 
Mansuri and Rao (2013) conclude that participation has only modest impacts on 
outcomes, and that inequality has an important counteracting effect. Critics have 
argued powerfully that participation too easily becomes a ‘performance’ – in the 
theatrical sense of players following a script for an audience - in which success is 
determined by the ability of a project model to establish ‘the causal link between 
participatory processes and efficient implementation that is absent (or difficult to 
establish) in practice’ (Mosse 2005: 162).  Indeed, in the case studied in depth by 
Mosse, patronage rather than participation was in fact the main social organising 
principle. 
 
In contrast to participatory theory, the practice of participation may in fact 
sometimes reduce efficiency and effectiveness. For example, the devaluation of 
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expertise can lead to poor decision-making on technical issues; Khwaja (2009) 
found that community participation in technical decision-making had a negative 
effect on project outcomes.  Participation also has significant transaction costs 
(Mosse 2005, Ray and Bhattacharya 2011) which may partly account for why 
Kleemeier (2000) found that participation worked well for the smallest schemes 
but not for large ones. 
 
At the level of organisational practice, reality often does not match participatory 
rhetoric.  Brett (2003) notes the contradiction between the espoused participatory 
theory and the actual organisational practice of all development organisations, 
which are hierarchical and expertise-based, and Burger and Owens observe that 
‘NGO descriptions of their efforts to involve the community in projects are 
frequently not aligned with the accounts of the communities’ (2010: 1266).  
 
Finally, at the level of societal change, participation has rarely been associated 
with rapid development - in the sense of both economic growth and rising human 
development standards (Brett 2003). Indeed, if anything, a case could more easily 
be made that low levels of citizen participation have been a hallmark in many of 
the countries that have been most successful at rapidly raising living standards, 
such as China and South Korea.  This challenge has arguably received insufficient 
attention from theorists of participation. 
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Equity or elite capture? 
The claim that participation supports equity and empowerment is similarly 
challenged by the evidence. For example, Casey, Glennerster et al. (2012) show 
that, in Sierra Leone, major efforts to foster participation in decision-making by 
marginalised groups had no long-term effect; male elders and chiefs retained just 
as much control as in places where there had been no such efforts.  One of the key 
ways in which participation can fail is through ‘elite capture’ (Mansuri and Rao 
2013).  This may happen intentionally – as observed by Mosse (2005) in India, where 
the rich presented themselves as poor and were the main beneficiaries of the 
programme; or unintentionally, since the poorest are, by definition, most 
marginalised and hardest to reach, and least likely to participate. Indeed, surveys 
in 29 countries in Africa and Latin America show that the better off are more likely 
to participate: household income and housing status are positively correlated with 
community participation (Awortwi 2013), and causality is much more likely to flow 
from wealth to participation than in the other direction.   
 
Demand-led programming is often problematic, since it results in the privileging of 
those with greatest voice, who are likely already to be relatively privileged.  
External actors seek interlocutors who can communicate easily with them, and 
almost inevitably these will be members of the educated, confident elite (Dill 
2009).  In Malawi, the most demand-driven social action fund resulted in the most 
unequal distribution of benefits (Schou and Tsoka 2010).  Recent research on 
decentralised forest management finds that it leads to a significantly higher risk of 
elite capture of forest harvest benefits, and that this risk increases over time 
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(Persha and Andersson, in press) - so the greater the degree of local control, the 
greater the inequity.  The same researchers found that strong links with an 
external organisation improved accountability and reduced inequity - echoing other 
findings from Benin, where a recent shift towards more centrally-directed, need-
based programming has had a positive impact on improving equity, compared with 
previous demand-led approaches (BMZ 2011). 
 
Donors may also inadvertently encourage elite capture through re-legitimising 
customary non-democratic institutions (Ribot 2007), for instance through relying on 
them as means of mobilising participation.  Brett also notes the awkwardness of 
attempting to implement participatory approaches in a context where people ‘may 
well be locked into hierarchical and deferential structures’ (2003: 14-15).  This 
tension between modern and traditional forms of social organisation, and the 
process of ‘institutional bricolage’ (Cleaver 2012) that characterises their 
interaction, is central to this study. 
 
An interesting alternative interpretation is that what occurs in practice is not 
necessarily elite capture.  Baland and Platteau (1999) highlight the ambiguous 
impact of inequality on the potential for collective action, showing that in some 
circumstances it provides incentives for elites to support collective action towards 
outcomes that also benefit non-elites. Vajja and White, in their study of social 
funds in Malawi and Zambia, concluded that ‘the nature of community 
participation is indeed shaped by existing power and social relations’ (2008: 1145) 
but that this does not so much represent ‘elite capture’ as a form of paternalism, 
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with which community members are generally satisfied even though the outcomes 
are not what they would themselves have chosen.  Vajja and White emphasise the 
critical role played by individuals or ‘prime movers’, rather than collectives, in 
initiating ‘collective action’ and in determining project choice, and conclude that 
‘social funds use social capital rather than create it’ (ibid: 1163).  That is to say, 
such institutions draw on and reinforce existing social networks and power 
structures rather than building new ones.  This analysis also has interesting 
parallels in recent work – from various political perspectives - emphasising the 
positive aspects of paternalism (e.g. Thaler and Sunstein 2008, Duflo 2012). 
 
Empowerment or abdication? 
For individuals, in theory, participation in community decision-making should be a 
positive, empowering experience.  But in reality participation carries heavy 
transaction costs – time and energy, and often money too - but also the costs of 
managing conflict within the community (Cleaver 1999).  These go a long way to 
explaining the problems faced by many participatory projects in mobilising 
participation; villagers may well see participation as a means to an end (getting the 
development project) rather than of any intrinsic value (Babajanian 2011). 
Development workers have tended to respond by criticising the approaches used to 
engender participation and resolving that projects should try harder - the 
assumption seems to be that all individuals would (and should) want to participate, 
and the right not to participate is rarely promoted.  In Malawi, where the concept 
of participation carries associations with forced labour dating back to the Banda 
era (Msukwa and Taylor 2011, Nkhoma 2011), such an attitude is heavily loaded.  
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Even when people do wish to participate, the potential for securing empowerment 
through participation is severely constrained by existing social structures (Cleaver 
2004, Cleaver 2007, Cleaver 2012).  
 
For groups, participation theoretically builds social capital - ‘social networks and 
the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’ (Putnam 2001: 
19).  But in fact ‘there is little evidence that induced participation builds long-
lasting cohesion, even at the community level’ (Mansuri and Rao 2013: 9).  As Vajja 
and White (2008) demonstrate, participation draws on social capital, but does not 
strengthen it.  Indeed, induced participation – which frequently takes the 
bureaucratic form of externally-initiated committees - can have a negative effect 
on social trust, as found by Vollan (2012) in South Africa.  It seems that induced 
participation is often part of the problem, not the solution. 
 
While the roots of the current emphasis on participation can be traced, as we have 
seen, in part to the hope that it might offer a way to overcome the shortcomings of 
the state, the balance of evidence suggests this is not the case. Indeed, for 
societies as a whole, ‘local participation appears to increase, rather than diminish, 
the need for functional and strong institutions at the centre’ (Mansuri and Rao 
2013: 11).  The role of central government and formal structures is critical, but 
may be neglected if excessive focus is instead placed on participation - what 
Botchway (2001) has called ‘the paradox of empowerment’.  He highlights the 
danger that participation may ‘become a substitute for the structural reforms 
needed for social change’ (ibid: 136) and may be ‘used to justify the state’s 
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evasion of its responsibilities’ (ibid: 148).  Similar points are made by Mohan and 
Stokke (2000), highlighting the importance of the politics of the local, and by Brett 
(2003), who argues that participation glosses over power inequalities, leaving them 
intact.  Certainly, a strong case can be made that community management of rural 
water supply is an example of this phenomenon, of participatory approaches 
diverting attention from the central problem of poor state performance. 
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3.3 COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT OF RURAL WATER SUPPLY: 
PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE 
 
The previous section outlined the arguments for and against participatory 
approaches in general.  This section examines the literature concerning the 
application of these approaches in the rural water supply sector in particular – 
specifically through the practice of community management. 
 
Community management is one of the key ways in which the theory of participation 
has been operationalised, and is particularly strongly established in the rural water 
supply sector, where its dominance was enshrined in both the 1990 Delhi Statement 
and the 1992 Dublin Principles (Nicol, Mehta et al. 2012).  Harvey and Reed (2007) 
suggest there are three core reasons why community management has become so 
popular: it is a reaction to poor performance and service delivery by government; 
it suits the ‘project approach’ of NGOs and donors very well; and it is rooted in a 
‘Western ‘cultural idealization’ of communities in low-income countries’ (Harvey 
and Reed 2007: 366).   
 
Indeed, as already noted, the community management model has roots in two 
contemporaneous currents of thought: neoliberal economics, and participatory 
theory and practice.  Although these are often thought of as politically opposed - 
neoliberalism seen as an agenda of the right, and participation identified with the 
left - in fact they share a common emphasis on the rights and responsibilities of the 
individual.  It could thus be argued that community management suited donors and 
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governments very well indeed since, far from challenging existing power 
structures, it provided a convenient ‘exit clause’ for donors worried about aid 
dependency and difficult questions of long-term sustainability.  In theory, civil 
society – in the form of community committees - would take on the long-term 
responsibility for service provision that was abdicated by the state and unfulfilled 
by the market. 
 
The doctrine of community management thus spread rapidly in the 1990s, and 
today remains the dominant model of rural water supply in many low-income 
countries. However, growing criticism in both academic and practitioner literature 
has suggested that community management does not deliver as promised, and led 
to calls for greater professionalisation, or ‘community management plus’ 
(Lockwood and Smits 2011).   
 
Reflecting on this debate, I identified two key questions requiring research.  These 
shape the remainder of this chapter, and are used as a framework for analysis of 
this study’s findings in Chapter Seven: 
1. To what extent does the operation of community management in practice 
reflect its potential benefits in theory?   
2. What explains the differences between the theory and the practice of 
community management? 
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3.3.1 Community management in practice 
 
Undoubtedly, ‘all theory is an abstraction’ (Sumner and Tribe 2008: 86).  As such, 
it cannot be expected to exactly match reality.  But if the reality of participatory 
development differs significantly from the theory, there is a need to re-examine 
the theory.  This section develops many of the arguments for and against 
participation that were highlighted in the previous section, but with a particular 
focus on community management of rural water supply. 
 
Efficiency and effectiveness? 
In many cases it is difficult to assess whether community management leads to 
improved programme performance, due to the absence of a counterfactual.  
However, it is possible to examine whether community management works on its 
own terms – and the evidence is not inspiring.  For example, an evaluation of water 
and sanitation programmes in Benin, based on community management models, 
found that poor quality construction, lack of skills and spares, low transparency in 
financial management of water facilities, low accountability, and lack of data were 
key problems (BMZ 2011).   
 
Although a few practitioners still claim that community management works (Lane 
2012), most assessments acknowledge that it has serious problems.  In the words of 
one major sector initiative, ‘the community management model has brought many 
benefits; however, in most countries around the world it has by and large failed to 
achieve the ultimate goal of reliable and sustainable water supply at scale’ (Triple-
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S 2009: 1).  As Harvey and Reed have observed, ‘despite the blanket application of 
community management of rural water supplies in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
sustainability of such interventions remains woefully inadequate’ (2007: 366). 
 
The original positive findings of Narayan (1995) have been superseded by studies 
showing much more mixed results, such as the findings of Heinrich and Lopez 
(2009) that participatory approaches had a positive effect on participants’ 
perceptions of project effectiveness, but not on actual outcomes.  Two aspects of 
performance are of particular interest. 
 
Technical aspects 
In terms of installation quality, there are serious concerns about community 
management.  The participation agenda risks privileging the views (including 
assumptions and prejudices) of the uninformed over those of experts; indeed the 
discourse of participation is profoundly anti-expert, associating expertise with 
elitism.  Thus, there is a risk that technical skills (engineering, financial 
management, etc.) may be underemphasised and that technical decisions may be 
directed by those without the necessary knowledge to make optimal choices 
(Khwaja 2009).  Technical expertise is important: the absence of proper supervision 
has, in Uganda, resulted in some private contractors installing new water points 
using second hand parts (Golooba-Mutebi 2012). Evidence from road programmes in 
Indonesia also suggests that community monitoring is a poor substitute for 
independent quality inspection and audit (Olken 2005). 
 
 89  
Community management rests on the existence of voluntary water point 
committees (WPCs), able to undertake regular maintenance and respond to 
breakdowns immediately.  In reality, a large proportion of such committees 
become dormant relatively soon after installation is completed.  Despite the 
rhetoric of voluntarism that is central to the community management model, 
committee members are often more motivated by the hope of getting a paid job, 
and by the opportunity to access small payments in the meantime (Boesten, Mdee 
et al. 2011).  When such expectations prove unrealistic, committee members 
become disillusioned and disengage from their roles (O’Reilly and Dhanju 2012).  
Low skills and low motivation are self-reinforcing; one study in Ethiopia found that 
‘none of the trainees … even tried to maintain the pump. 90% of operation and 
maintenance trainees were not confident to maintain the systems by themselves if 
failure occurs in the future’ (Tarekegne 2009: 42).  As Carter (2009) observes, the 
software of community management is just as prone to fall into disrepair as the 
hardware of water supply.  Ultimately, community management is not able to 
ensure the availability of skilled technicians.  
 
Financial aspects 
Central to the community management model is the assumption that financial 
sustainability of the water point will be ensured through regular user contributions 
to a Maintenance Fund. In reality, this is rarely the case.  As discussed in Chapter 
Two, very few committees manage to collect even a small fraction of the 
contributions due.   Problems of accountability and trust are central to people’s 
low willingness to pay (Harvey 2007).  In Uganda, refusal to pay monthly fees is 
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widespread, and funds are only collected when the water point breaks down; a key 
factor is that users do not trust committee members to hold their money (Golooba-
Mutebi 2012).  In Tanzania, Haysom (2006) found that poor financial management 
was the most important factor influencing water point functionality; in the vast 
majority of cases, WPC funds were much lower than they should have been 
according to the reported scale and frequency of user charges and reported 
expenditures. 
 
Equity and empowerment? 
In theory, community management should be empowering both for WPC members, 
who learn new skills and take on new responsibilities, and for users, who elect the 
WPC.  It should also be equitable, because everyone in the community is expected 
to contribute equally.  In reality, however, the literature suggests that neither is 
the case. 
 
Committees 
Community based management requires the creation of new structures – 
committees - at village level.  The proliferation of such committees and their 
interaction with pre-existing power relations - their difficult ‘institutional 
engineering’ (Jones 2011) - represents a significant political dynamic.  
‘Development by committee’ has been widely criticised.  For example, Zulu argues 
that community based natural resource management (CBNRM) ‘created new elites 
(forest committees) who largely operated as corrupt, unaccountable ‘village 
bureaucracies’, alienating communities from CBNRM. Widespread forest 
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degradation and institutional breakdown ensued. Community management became 
committee management, and part of the problem. Rare ‘success’ was associated 
with idiosyncratic leadership qualities of village heads’ (Zulu 2008: 687).  Blaikie 
(2006) also highlights the danger of elite capture of committees. 
 
Access to committee positions represents not just responsibility, but also access to 
resources in the form of training and skills, status, power, cash and payments in 
kind - particularly so in the case of water point committees, which have revenue-
raising powers.  The method of appointment of committee members (selection or 
election – though in practice the distinction is not always clear-cut) is therefore 
very important. There is considerable opportunity for relatively powerful and high-
status community members to influence membership of the committee, and once 
in post, there is considerable opportunity for members to mismanage funds.  
 
While widely acknowledged as an issue, there is little comparative research in this 
area. One exception is an NGO study of a food distribution programme in Malawi 
implemented through village committees (Concern Universal 2006). It found that 
committees organised by village heads ‘lacked accountability and transparency’ 
and were characterised by ‘numerous incidents of transfer mismanagement’; 
democratically elected committees ‘were more efficient, transparent and 
accountable than the other committee structures’ but ‘would require payment for 
their services’ in an expanded project; and beneficiary/carer committees were the 
most ‘responsible and dependable’ but were ‘generally less capable than other 
types of committee and required more external support’ (Concern Universal 2006: 
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4).  The study also found that ‘close monitoring gave significantly better results 
than the ‘hands-off’ approach’ (ibid: 6). While not directly transferable to water 
point management, the findings seems to suggest that electing WP management 
committee members is optimal, that it may be necessary to pay individuals whose 
duties are significant, and that ongoing close monitoring by an external authority is 
highly desirable.   
 
Context 
Water point committees do not operate in a vacuum.  As Cleaver has repeatedly 
pointed out, people’s ability to use their agency is shaped by a range of structural 
factors including social relationships and cultural conventions, and challenging the 
cultural grain may be highly costly for individuals (Cleaver 2001, Cleaver 2004, 
Cleaver and Hamada 2010).  The community management model is based on 
unrealistic assumptions about the desire and ability of people to participate, and 
what this will cost them (Brett 2003, Banerjee and Duflo 2008).  Such costs may 
include the time required to participate, the financial costs of ‘community 
contributions’ and importantly the fact that participatory decision-making may well 
entail conflict.   
 
Indeed, there is little evidence that participation in community management is 
important to villagers per se.  On the contrary, Haysom persuasively argues that 
‘what villagers want is water, and the management of the requisite delivery system 
is to a large extent inconsequential to the users’ (Haysom 2006: 41).  Similarly, 
Cleaver (2004) has pointed out that transformation of the material conditions of 
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the poor must be integral to any understanding of empowerment.  If this is the 
case, and if – as DFID recently concluded – ‘community management of water 
supplies significantly increases vulnerability and … needs to be revisited’ (DFID 
2012: 86), then it is clearly time to question the model. 
 
3.3.2 Institutional bricolage 
 
If it is obvious that there are significant differences between the theory and the 
practice of community management, what explains this and how can it be 
analysed?  I suggest that two organising concepts may be particularly helpful: 
institutional bricolage (Cleaver 2012) and civil society failure (Mansuri and Rao 
2013). 
 
The concept of institutional bricolage helps to illuminate the interaction between 
introduced / exogenous bureaucratic institutions and existing / endogenous socially 
embedded institutions.  It describes the way that actors shape structures by 
‘patching together’ institutions, while at the same time emphasising the fact that 
those actors and their actions are themselves socially embedded.  It thus provides a 
lens through which we can observe and understand the way in which both 
introduced and embedded institutional forms may be substantially reshaped by 
their interactions, through processes of articulation, aggregation, and alteration 
(de Koning 2011).  I argue that this can help explain the failure of community 
management, and, more broadly, the failure of externally-induced collective 
action to produce the intended results. 
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Critical institutionalism (Cleaver 2012, Hall, Cleaver et al. 2014) critiques and 
expands the ‘institutionalist’ perspective pioneered particularly by Elinor Ostrom in 
her work on rules governing collective action in common property resource 
management (Ostrom 1990).  Whereas Ostrom was interested in demonstrating that 
institutions could be crafted to facilitate effective collective action, critical 
institutionalism suggests that the scope for agency in designing new institutions is 
considerably constrained by existing structures or institutions.  These institutions 
have been defined as ‘sets of working rules’ (Ostrom 1990: 51) that set out who 
can (or must) do what – or what is required, permitted, and forbidden.  More 
broadly, they are not just the rules, but also the norms and beliefs (de Koning 
2011) and roles and relationships (Cleaver, Franks et al. 2013) that influence 
human action. 
 
Thus, the introduction of community management - in the form of a democratically 
elected, gender-balanced, trained committee with new financial and operational 
powers - challenges many foundational elements of existing social structures, such 
as inherited chiefly power and women’s subordination. Proponents of community 
management have generally underestimated the enduring power of traditional 
institutional forms and the way that the new forms of community management 
would be adapted and shaped by them.  So, for example, while the theory of 
community management holds that committees will raise funds through equal per-
household monthly contributions to a water point fund, in practice this ‘rule’ is 
adapted to local context: sometimes in socially-progressive ways (e.g. through 
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exemptions for the elderly, or adjusting collection timetables in line with 
seasonality) but sometimes in regressive ways (e.g. through exemptions for 
powerful individuals, or through misuse of funds by committee members or chiefs).  
Srivastava describes how the idealised institution of community management was 
distorted in practice in a flagship rural water programme in India, highlighting the 
multiple ways in which ‘the local institutions reconstructed the core ideas… such as 
participation and community ownership’ (2012: 41); the underlying social and 
political structures were evidently much stronger than the new model. 
 
Olivier de Sardan’s work on multiple ‘modes of governance’ is also helpful here. 
Defining governance as ‘any organised method of delivering public or collective 
services and goods according to specific logics and norms, and to specific forms of 
authority’ (2011: 22), he identifies eight modes: chiefly, associational, municipal, 
project-based, bureaucratic, sponsorship-based, religious and merchant.  The 
different modes work together in ‘co-delivery’ of public goods or services, and as 
political, social and economic drivers change over time, a process of ‘institutional 
accretion’ – or bricolage - occurs in which new forms of governance do not replace 
old ones, but simply ‘pile up’ on top of the old, creating complex multi-layered 
structures of power and legitimacy. 
 
Olivier de Sardan’s description of the imported Western ‘associational mode’, 
which is ‘appropriated’ by target populations, but generally not at all in the way 
that its instigators hope, has considerable resonance with community management 
in rural water supply: ‘elections are often replaced by appointments … meetings do 
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not take place on the expected dates… funds which are accumulated in the 
community coffers are ‘borrowed’…’ (ibid: 26).  The reason, he suggests, lies in the 
centrality of patron-client relationships, which, he claims, operate in all modes. 
 
The enduring strength of patron-client relations means that new institutional forms 
may be diverted from their original purpose; there is a substantial risk of elite 
capture. It is therefore not at all straightforward to claim that community 
management will empower the marginalised; the degree to which it does must be 
balanced against the degree to which it provides a framework for the powerful to 
entrench their position and extract rents.  Indeed a strong case can be made that 
community management is often counterproductive in practice: it drains people’s 
time and energy, it is far too open to financial abuse, it actively discourages the 
development of specialist skills and services, and it makes accountability far too 
diffuse to be operationalized. 
 
Designers of development interventions have tended to pay much more attention 
to the design of formal institutions, such as water point committees, than to 
informal institutional structures, such as the nature of patron-client relations.  The 
tools of political economy analysis employed in Chapter Four are designed 
specifically to counter this tendency.   
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3.3.3 Civil society failure 
 
The idea of ‘civil society failure’ – defined as ‘a situation in which groups that live 
in geographic proximity are unable to act collectively to reach a feasible and 
preferable outcome’ (Mansuri and Rao 2013: 4) is an important complement to the 
more established concepts of ‘state failure’ and ‘market failure’. Market and state 
failures are typically seen as problems of information and coordination in systems 
characterised by principal-agent relationships (e.g. customer-company, voter-
government).  While civil society is more generally (though not entirely) 
characterised by collective action relationships (e.g. unions, churches, campaigns, 
self-help groups), these are also subject to problems of information and 
coordination. 
 
Information asymmetries 
Rural water supply provides many examples of information asymmetries in 
collective action, both within communities, and between communities and other 
actors (such as the state).  Asymmetric access to financial information is of 
particular importance. 
 
Within communities, most people do not know what it costs to install – or repair - a 
water point, and most users do not know how much they have collectively saved in 
their water point maintenance fund.  Several studies have suggested that low 
willingness to pay by users is a major factor in low sustainability, and that this 
reflects users’ lack of trust in committees (Haysom 2006, Komives, Akanbang et al. 
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2008).  Trust is important not just in terms of whether users trust that their 
committee will look after their funds correctly, but also in terms of whether they 
trust that their water point will not be stolen. Theft and vandalism are issues that 
are surprisingly little-mentioned in the literature on water point sustainability, yet 
there is evidence suggesting that in some instances these are significant factors 
(Kleemeier 2000, Campbell 2009).  The extent to which information asymmetries 
exist within communities, and the extent to which trust is affected, evidently 
needs further research.  
 
Information asymmetries between different actors involved in rural water supply 
are also a significant constraint.  For example, district water officers often do not 
know which water points need repair, or where the greatest need for new 
investment lies.  Donors do not know enough about long-term sustainability or cost-
effectiveness of their investments in the sector.  Water users do not know how 
much has been spent on providing services to them.  These information gaps mean 
that it is very hard for citizens to hold the state to account for service provision – 
the ‘long route’ to accountability (World Bank 2004), or for donors to know how 
cost-effective their grants have been. 
 
In terms of accountability for inputs, there is robust evidence from other sectors 
that improved transparency can have a significant positive impact.  Reinikka and 
Svensson (2003, 2011) clearly demonstrated the power of access to information in 
improving public services through deterring misappropriation of funds and 
increasing focus on outcomes in education and health; they argue that such 
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innovations in governance of public services are an effective way of improving 
outcomes.  There appears to be considerable scope to apply these lessons in the 
WASH sector. 
 
Regarding accountability for results, there is strong awareness of the problem in 
the WASH sector, and considerable efforts have been invested in generating and 
sharing information about performance.  Examples include the (failed) Danida-
funded MOM programme of quarterly monitoring visits in Ghana (Komives, 
Akanbang et al. 2008), investment in mapping (WaterAid 2008, MacDonald 2009, 
Water for People 2013), and other initiatives using technology to remotely monitor 
water point functionality (Thomson 2012, Thomson, Hope et al. 2012).  However, 
the failure of the Maji Matone initiative in Tanzania – which asked villagers to 
report water point breakdown - suggests that such programmes face wider 
constraints (Daraja 2011).  It has been suggested that user participation in holding 
providers directly accountable for service provision (the ‘short route’ to 
accountability) is more promising than the ‘long route’ of ensuring accountability 
through politicians and policymakers (World Bank 2004).  However, information 
asymmetries severely limit the extent to which this is possible. 
 
Coordination problems 
Community management – and collective action in general – entails significant 
coordination costs.  As discussed already, participation requires considerable 
investment of time and energy, and in this sense it may not be efficient; desired 
outcomes might be achieved at lower cost using less participatory approaches.  A 
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common response to these coordination costs is withdrawal or non-participation 
(Cleaver 1999, Cleaver 2007): users may stop making contributions into the repair 
fund; committee members may stop doing maintenance or repairs.  In the language 
of Hirschman (1970), people may ‘exit’ from participation because the costs of 
exercising ‘voice’ are too high.   
 
For example, if the village head misuses the maintenance fund, people are likely 
simply to stop contributing, rather than try to hold the chief to account.  If the 
water point breaks down and there is no money in the maintenance fund, people 
may prefer to wait for an external donor (e.g. the MP or an NGO) to fix it – 
although they may have to live for years without clean water in the meantime.  
Both are clear cases of coordination failure.  In both cases, the ‘voice’ option is 
likely to be difficult and contentious, a prospect that runs contrary to conflict 
avoidance principles that are deeply ingrained in many village societies (Cleaver 
1999). The requirements of maintaining social harmony are overriding; structural 
limits on voice imposed by gradients in social status within communities mean that 
exit is the path of least resistance for individuals, although it is non-optimal for the 
collective. 
 
These micro examples illustrates a wider point, that demand-led approaches to 
improving governance are likely to fail unless the wider context is supportive.  As 
Booth observes, ‘theory and empirical studies show that client ‘voice’ is a weak 
source of results-based accountability unless accompanied by strong top-down 
pressures of some kind’ (2011b: 3).  It is notable that, in the literature, there are 
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no examples of water users coming together to challenge their committees’ record 
on financial management, or to challenge district decision-making on resource 
allocation for water supply. Rather, success reportedly derives from effective top-
down leadership (Zulu 2008, Golooba-Mutebi 2012). 
 
In summary, civil society action – collective action – is subject to the same 
information asymmetries and coordination problems as states and markets.  In this 
sense, ‘civil society failure’ is part of the explanation for the problems of 
community management.  However, it is by no means at the root of the issue.  As I 
will argue in Chapter Seven, civil society failure is more of a symptom than an 
explanation of the problem. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter set out my approach to analysing the underlying social, political and 
economic factors that influence the proximate variables discussed in Chapter Two.  
In particular, the chapter has explored the question of whether the evidence 
supports the hypothesis that community management is an effective way to ensure 
sustainable provision of public goods and services. 
 
After tracing the roots of the community management model in the theory of 
participation, and in changing views of the role of the state in recent decades, two 
key questions were considered.  These questions form the second stage of my 
analytical framework. 
 
First: to what extent does the operation of community management in practice 
reflect its potential benefits in theory?  The literature suggests that there is a 
considerable gap between the reality of community management and the 
theoretical promise of participation, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, and 
equity and empowerment. 
 
Second: what explains the differences between the theory and the practice of 
community management?  The literature suggests that ‘civil society failure’ 
(Mansuri and Rao 2013), due to problems of coordination and information, is more 
widespread than is generally acknowledged; and that ‘institutional bricolage’ 
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(Cleaver 2012) explains how and why the formal structures and processes of 
community management are shaped by existing structures of power and authority.   
 
With these questions in mind, I now focus on the specific case of Malawi. 
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Chapter 4  
RURAL WATER SUPPLY IN MALAWI 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter sets the scene for the particular focus of this study, Malawi, using the 
approach of political economy analysis (PEA). While there are numerous PEA tools, 
they all share a core concern with four elements: structural features, institutions, 
actors and incentives (Harris, Kooy et al. 2011: 17). This four-part framework is 
adopted here to examine the Malawian political economy as a whole in order to 
understand the wider context, before focusing more closely on the rural water 
supply sector using the ‘water governance’ analytical framework proposed by 
Franks and Cleaver (2007).   
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4.1 MALAWI: A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 4.1: Map of Malawi. 
 
Source: (UN 2013). 
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4.1.1 Structural factors 
 
‘The conditions that influence the state and political system… 
foundational elements of the context in which analysis must be 
grounded’ (Harris, Kooy et al. 2011: 17). 
 
Geographic 
Malawi is a small landlocked Southern African country with a land area of 
118,000km2 (GOM 2013), bordered by Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique (Figure 
4.1).  The country runs broadly along a North-South axis formed by the Rift Valley, 
in which Lake Malawi lies. There is one annual rainy season, between December 
and March, during which almost 90% of the rain falls; May to October are totally dry 
across most of the country (Baumann and Danert 2008a). 60% of cultivated land is 
used for the staple food, maize (Ellis and Manda 2012); cash crops including 
tobacco, tea, sugar and coffee are also grown (IFAD 2013). Less than 1% of 
cultivated land is irrigated (IFAD 2013). 
 
Demographic 
All the data below have been drawn from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators ‘World Databank’ website (World Bank 2013a), the most comprehensive 
and current source available, which incorporates data from Malawi’s most recent 
national census (NSO 2008). 
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A large majority (84%) of Malawi’s population of 15.4 million people are rural 
dwellers, and most rely on subsistence farming. Population density is relatively 
high at 158 people per sq. km, and agricultural land is in short supply at only 0.25 
hectares per person. Population growth is high at 3.2% per annum; the population 
increased by 50% from 1996 to 2011. Nearly half (46%) are under 15 years of age.   
 
Malawi has made progress in recent years on some key demographic indicators. 
Under-5 mortality dropped from 143/1000 in 2003 to 83/1000 in 2011. Life 
expectancy increased from 47 to 54 over the same period, thanks in part to action 
to reduce the prevalence of HIV (from 14% to 10%), and antiretroviral provision to 
improve survival rates for those infected.  
 
The main ethnic group in Malawi are the Chewa (33%) with large minorities of 
Lomwe, Yao, Ngoni and Tumbuka along with smaller numbers from several other 
tribes (CIA 2013).  The official language is English while the ‘common language’ is 
Chichewa (GOM 2013). Adult literacy stood at 75% in 2010, up from 64% in 1998 
(World Bank 2013a).  While tribal identity is important in Malawi, there is little 
inter-tribal conflict. 80% of Malawians are Christian, while 13% are Muslim (NSO 
2008: 13). 
 
Historical and political 
Pre-colonial Malawi was a politically contested land, severely affected by the trade 
in slaves and ivory (McCracken 2012).  Social and political organisation was based 
around extended kinship groups headed by chiefs and/or monarchs, a structure 
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which was used instrumentally by the British colonists, and which still plays an 
important role in modern Malawi. 
 
Following 73 years (1891-1964) as a British Protectorate, Malawi won independence 
in 1964.  Its first President was Dr Hastings Banda, who as leader of the Malawi 
Congress Party was a key figure in the struggle for Independence.  His authoritarian 
and highly personalised one-party regime endured for 30 years, until he was forced 
to accede to donor demands and citizen pressure for multiparty elections in 1994 
(Cammack and Kanyongolo 2010). 
 
Bakili Muluzi won the 1994 election and presided over a period of economic 
mismanagement and increased corruption.  His protégé Bingu wa Mutharika then 
won the 2004 election, but promptly distanced himself from his former political 
master. Mutharika’s first term brought macroeconomic stabilisation and 
considerable progress on delivering public goods such as healthcare and roads, as 
well as the popular and effective Farm Input Subsidy Programme (Cammack and 
Kanyongolo 2010).  However, his increasingly authoritarian style, along with high 
inflation and fuel shortages, prompted public protests in 2011. Mutharika’s death in 
April 2012 precipitated a brief political crisis which was ultimately resolved 
peacefully and constitutionally when the Vice President Joyce Banda (no relation to 
Hastings) took over as President (Dionne and Dulani 2013). 
 
 109  
Political parties in Malawi are highly personalised, and defined mainly by their 
leaders rather than by policy differences.  While there are dozens of registered 
parties, a select few dominate the scene: 
• Malawi Congress Party (MCP) established 1960 – Hastings Banda’s party, 
which led the country to independence in 1964 and operated a one-party 
state until the 1993 referendum. 
• United Democratic Front (UDF) established 1993 – Bakili Muluzi’s party. 
• Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) established 2005 - formed by Bingu wa 
Mutharika as an offshoot of the UDF after his election in 2004. 
• People’s Party (PP) established 2011 – Joyce Banda’s party, formed after she 
was dismissed from the DPP for opposing Mutharika’s promotion of his 
brother. 
 
In the most recent (2009) elections, the DPP Presidential candidate Bingu wa 
Mutharika won 66% of the vote while the MCP candidate John Tembo won 31% 
(Malawi Electoral Commission 2009).  The DPP also won 114 (59%) of the 193 seats 
in the National Assembly; the MCP won 26 (13%) and the UDF won 17 (9%).  The 
next elections are scheduled for 2014. 
 
Economic and social 
Malawi has seen rapid economic growth in recent years, with growth rates 
averaging 7.5% from 2006-2011, higher than the 6% target in the 2006 Malawi 
Growth and Development Strategy (GOM 2012b).  However, growth slowed from 
9.7% in 2008 to (a projected) 3% in 2012 (World Bank 2013b), and with population 
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growth also at 3%, this equates to stagnant real incomes.  Poverty rates are falling, 
but remain high: the 2010/11 Integrated Household Survey showed that 51% (57% in 
rural areas) of the population live in poverty, down from 65% in 1998, with 25% 
(28% rural) living in ultra-poverty4 (World Bank 2013b).  
 
Malawi’s Human Development Index score has been rising slowly over recent 
decades, from 0.270 in 1980 to 0.400 in 2013 (rank: 171/187), but remains below 
the average for sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 2013). Malawi scores relatively well on 
health, but relatively poorly on income.  Annual GNI per capita is $360, or $870 in 
purchasing power parity terms (rank: 184/191 countries for which 2011 data is 
available) (World Bank 2013a).  Malawi continues to be one of the most aid-
dependent countries in the world, ranking 18th in 2011, with an ODA to GNI ratio of 
15% (World Bank 2014), and donor activity is highly fragmented (de Renzio and 
Angemi 2012). 
 
A significant part of Malawi’s strong economic growth in recent years has been 
attributed to the government’s highly successful national Farm Inputs Subsidy 
Programme, which has been credited with turning Malawi around from severe food 
insecurity and famine (Tiba 2011) to a significant food surplus (Conroy, Blackie et 
                                         
4 The Bank does not provide definitions in this source, but we can assume that they use the 
international poverty line of USD 1.25 per person per day as the definition of ‘poverty’.  ‘Ultra-
poverty’ is less clearly defined.  Lipton defined the ultra-poor as “a group of people who eat below 
80 per cent of their energy requirements despite spending at least 80 per cent of income on food” 
(Lipton, M. (1986). "Seasonality and Ultrapoverty." IDS Bulletin 17(3): 4-8.); IFPRI defined ultra 
poverty as living on less than half of the international poverty line: 54 US cents per day at the time 
of their publication; 62 cents now (Ahmed, A. U., R. V. Hill, L. C. Smith, D. M. Wiesmann, T. 
Frankenberger, K. Gulati, W. Quabili and Y. Yohannes (2007). The world's most deprived: 
Characteristics and causes of extreme poverty and hunger International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) ) 
 111  
al. 2006, Dorward and Chirwa 2011, Vandemoortele and Bird 2011, Chinsinga 
2011b).  The programme was very strongly identified in the public mind with 
Mutharika and the DPP, who pushed the programme despite criticism of its 
inefficiency and inequity from international donors. Nevertheless the programme 
was both highly popular, and also apparently highly successful in increasing 
agricultural production for a number of years.  However, more recently Malawi has 
again suffered significant food shortages, suggesting that underlying problems 
remain (Ellis and Manda 2012). 
 
4.1.2 Institutions and Actors 
 
Institutions: ‘The rules of the game… both formal and informal… that 
govern behaviour’ (Harris, Kooy et al. 2011: 17). 
 
Actors: ‘The individuals or organisations that are most relevant to the 
issue in question’ (Harris, Kooy et al. 2011: 17). 
 
Malawi’s political economy combines formal democracy and Weberian bureaucratic 
forms with traditional authority and a neopatrimonial political culture. 
 
Formal institutions 
Upon democratisation in 1994, Malawi adopted many of the formal institutions 
associated with democracy, including separation of powers, five-year electoral 
terms, a free press and free civil society.  However, Parliament is weak in relation 
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to the Presidency, and individual MPs often appear more interested in pursuing 
personal advancement than in promoting policies – politicking rather than 
governing (Cammack and Kelsall 2011). 
 
Malawi is divided into three administrative regions (Northern, Central and 
Southern) and 28 Districts. For the first few decades after independence, political 
structures were relatively centralised, but in common with many other low-income 
countries Malawi has attempted to engage in both political and administrative 
decentralisation since the late 1990s (Chiweza 2005).  The justification for 
decentralisation was twofold: 1) to improve service delivery, and 2) to strengthen 
democracy at grassroots level (GOM 2005a: 2). 
 
In 2000 the decentralisation process devolved greater autonomy and responsibility 
to elected District Councils (re-named Assemblies in 2010). However, since the 
expiry of the original Councillors’ terms in 2005, new local elections have been 
repeatedly postponed, most recently until 2014 (Cammack and Kanyongolo 2010, 
Dionne and Dulani 2013). Consequently, civil servants run the districts without local 
political masters, instead responding to central government directives and 
supervision, with local MPs and traditional authorities in an advisory role.  District 
policy is, at least in theory, guided by District Development Plans (e.g. Ntcheu 
District Council 2010a), which are themselves informed by a District Socio-
Economic Profile (e.g. Ntcheu District Council 2008). 
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Under decentralisation, new institutions were also created at village and sub-
district level. The Village Development Committee (VDC) is ‘a representative body 
from a village or group of villages [which] facilitates planning and development at 
the community level’ (GOM 2005a: 42).  The committee comprises one elected 
member from each village covered by the VDC, the local councillor for the VDC’s 
Ward, four women representatives nominated by the other VDC members, and an 
extension worker elected by his/her colleagues (GOM 2005a).  The VDC is expected 
to identify development initiatives at village level, propose these through the ADC 
to the District, and implement activities using community self-help resources and 
(when available) external support. At sub-district level, the Area Development 
Committee (ADC) represents all VDCs in a Traditional Authority (TA) area.  The ADC 
holds monthly meetings to set priorities for development in the Area and acts as a 
communication channel between the District and the VDCs. 
 
Institutions of inherited traditional authority also exist alongside, and are 
supported by, these new institutions of democracy and administration (Figure 4.2).  
Districts are divided into Traditional Authorities (TAs), each under the aegis of an 
individual also known as a TA.  Group Village Heads (GVH) and their subordinate 
Village Heads (VH) report to the TA.  TAs, GVHs and VHs receive financial support 
from the state via the Districts, play an advisory role to VDCs and ADCs, and have 
considerable authority over issues including land allocation and local justice.  The 
result is a complex interplay of modern democratic and traditional inherited power 
structures. 
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Figure 4.2: Layers of governance in Malawi, democratic and traditional. 
 
 
Completing the formal institutional picture is a range of civil society groups, 
including churches and other faith groups, traditional collective institutions such as 
burial societies, and more recently-established civil society organisations (CSOs), 
many of which have been ‘seeded’ by the intervention of international NGOs over 
the last two decades.  Overall, there has been substantial growth in the number of 
CSOs in Malawi since the end of the Banda regime in 1994 (Makuwira 2011).  Non-
state providers have played a major role in provision of some services, particularly 
health (Batley 2006). 
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Informal ‘rules of the game’ 
In practice, both the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ institutional structures outlined 
above are ‘enveloped by the neopatrimonial practices of political ‘big men’’ 
(Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: xiii).  Personalised patron-client relations are 
dominant, characterised by a deferential culture and weak downward 
accountability.   
 
At national level, formal democratic trappings have sometimes been simply a 
charade: ‘the budget as theatre’, in the memorable phrase of Rakner, Mukubvu et 
al. (2004). In the first decade of democracy under Muluzi, delivery of public 
services became highly politicised (Cammack and Kanyongolo 2010). While the 
Mutharika regime placed much greater emphasis on improved economic 
performance, this was nonetheless achieved using neopatrimonial means (Cammack 
and Kelsall 2011). The resolution of the April 2012 Presidential succession crisis in 
favour of Joyce Banda signals the growing importance of the formal rules of the 
constitution – although some analysts suggest that the informal roles played behind 
the scenes by ‘big men’ in the army and judiciary were crucial in resolving the 
crisis (Dionne and Dulani 2013). 
 
At district level, the local government system is characterised by a high degree of 
‘institutional fragility’ (Bratton 2012) due to its short history and very low degree 
of institutionalisation. Major problems with the implementation of decentralisation 
in practice – slow pace, confusion, unevenness, resistance by the centre – meant 
that when local elections were finally held they were highly party-politicised and 
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the calibre of local councillors was generally low (Cammack and Kanyongolo 2010).  
The resulting institutions are ‘toothless’ and their plans are ‘hardly implemented’: 
elected bodies are made up of appointees, and committees are dormant, not 
meeting unless in response to external stimulus (Chiweza 2010: 5,6).  Poor record-
keeping and non-existent data banks further undermine accountability, and 
resource flows are highly politicised (ibid.)   
 
Structural institutional complexity has led to what Cammack and Kanyongolo refer 
to as an ‘overlapping jigsaw-puzzle of government agencies’ (2010: 12).  The 
resultant confusion leads to weak accountability, since each agency can claim that 
responsibility for service delivery lies elsewhere. Relatedly, there is low ‘policy 
capacity’ – a multiplicity of policy documents, but few actual implemented policies 
(Booth, Cammack et al. 2006). The durability of traditional institutions alongside 
modern ones adds another layer of complexity.   
 
Although modern democratic structures are nominally dominant, in fact, at village 
level, traditional authority often enjoys a higher degree of legitimacy than elected 
authorities.  Indeed, while such respect for and deference to traditional authority 
is common in many African countries, it is particularly strong in Malawi (Logan 
2013).  In many areas, nominally democratic structures such as VDCs are in reality 
appointed by traditional leaders (Chiweza 2010).  Traditional authorities dominate 
village activity in practical terms, for example in initiating community participation 
in social fund projects (Vajja and White 2008).  Less positively, they also dominate 
decision-making in key areas such as allocation of fertiliser subsidy (Chinsinga 
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2011b) and land reform (Chinsinga 2011a), resulting in elite capture of programme 
benefits. Despite this, traditional leaders are much more widely trusted than 
elected leaders (Ellis, Kutengule et al. 2003, Zulu 2012); in general, Malawians rate 
their elected representatives much lower for responsiveness than citizens in most 
other African countries (Bratton 2012: 518). 
 
In effect, in Malawi, the formal modern institutions of democracy and bureaucracy 
have been recently grafted onto a much more embedded heritage of traditional 
socio-political institutions based on inherited authority and personalised rule.  The 
complex interplay of these two systems is well captured by the concept of 
‘neopatrimonialism’ (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997); what happens in Malawi is 
still very much determined by the informal rules of personalised power. One clear 
example is the Farm Input Subsidy Programme, designed to assist the poorest 
households throughout the country. Despite the universalist intent of this 
programme (Collin 2011), researchers found that ‘households in areas where the 
ruling party won the last presidential election acquire significantly more subsidized 
inputs than other households’ (Mason and Ricker-Gilbert 2013: 75).  
 
4.1.3 Incentives 
 
‘The rewards and punishments that are perceived by individuals to be 
related to their actions and those of others’ (Ostrom et al. 2002), 
quoted in (Harris, Kooy et al. 2011: 17). 
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Democratic theory suggests that citizen power in the form of the vote provides the 
key incentive for the state to perform; citizens hold political representatives 
accountable via the ballot box for the performance of the institutions of the state, 
including the bureaucratic provision of public goods and services.  Bureaucrats are 
accountable upwards to political masters, who are themselves accountable 
downwards to citizens.  The theory implies that the politician is judged by the 
voter, and the bureaucrat is in turn judged by the politician, on the basis of their 
performance in delivering public goods and services. However, this simple model 
fails to explain the complex reality of the Malawian political economy. 
 
Exogenous bureaucracy  
In reality, much of the modern bureaucratic superstructure is driven by the 
economic logic of external financing, which provides the sole incentive for its 
existence.  When the funding ends, the institution withers (Chiweza 2010). External 
funding provides perverse incentives for local initiatives, paradoxically undermining 
the very sustainability that it purports to engender through diverting energies into 
jumping through administrative hoops (Swidler and Watkins 2009) or through 
seeding a plethora of competing mini-bureaucracies such as village committees. 
 
Endogenous patronage 
At the same time, socially-rooted relationships of patronage and hierarchy form an 
enduring and pervasive context for all development action, and mean that 
attempts to impose democratic egalitarian institutional forms - such as elected 
gender-balanced village committees – rarely have the intended results.  As Zulu 
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observes with regard to community based natural resource management (CBNRM), 
‘local actors selectively adopt, ignore, or alter institutional choices imposed by 
governments and donors, creating institutional hybrids’ with unintended outcomes 
(2012: 194) – a classic example of bricolage.  Exogenous institutional forms display 
little resilience to elite capture, and are held in low regard by ordinary people. 
Zulu’s research showed that large majorities had little or no trust in CBNRM 
committees and believed they did not represent community interests (Zulu 2012).  
In some cases, external institutions are little more than unwitting pawns in local 
political dynamics; Cammack (2012) documents one such case of a water NGO 
working in peri-urban Blantyre. 
 
The enduring strength of the endogenous political economy poses an interesting 
analytical challenge. If, as public choice theory claims, people act rationally in 
their own interests, why do the marginalised majority not act to limit the power of 
the elites?  Cammack suggests that ‘the dominance of clientelist politics will end 
only when there is predictable delivery by the state of sufficient public goods for 
everyone’ (Cammack 2012: 46) – but this is a vicious circle, because it is precisely 
those clientelist political structures that prevent the delivery of sufficient public 
goods for everyone, instead ensuring that resources are unequally distributed.  At 
the same time, the clientelist political culture means that any individual’s best 
chance of securing a better share of resources is to promote a particular patron, 
still within the clientelist structure.  Thus, clientelism is an extremely strong and 
stable system. 
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Upwards and downwards accountability 
At the risk of oversimplification, the situation can be summarised in terms of two 
powerful dynamics of upwards accountability: traditional/autocratic and 
modern/bureaucratic. In both, ‘lowers’ are accountable to ‘uppers’, to use 
Chambers’ (1994) terms; incentives for downwards accountability on the part of 
elites (respect in the traditional model, the vote in the modern model) are weak 
and subject to manipulation, and information asymmetries are pervasive. 
 
Citizens have low expectations of government, so they do not express or exert 
themselves regarding its failures (Cammack 2012).  Using Hirschman’s (1970) 
typology of responses to decline, they choose ‘loyalty’ to one individual patron, or 
‘exit’ if they can (e.g. if they are wealthy enough to turn to the market instead) 
rather than using ‘voice’ to secure change.  The concept of downward 
accountability is unfamiliar to both elites and citizens -  although a recent pilot 
project using community scorecards to improve public services across eight districts 
in Malawi showed some promise (Wild and Harris 2012). 
 
At the same time, upwards accountability fails.  Whereas a tight system of rules 
and sanctions underpinned relative state effectiveness during the Banda period, 
under Muluzi and Mutharika performance discipline has weakened substantially 
(Cammack and Kanyongolo 2010).  Civil servants win promotion not on the basis of 
their achievements in terms of service delivery and citizen satisfaction, but on the 
basis of their cultivation of powerful patrons.  Lack of performance discipline 
extends also to the activities funded by external donors: for example, DFID 
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concluded that there was little to show for the large sums they had channelled 
through government systems in the early 2000s (Barnett, Chisvo et al. 2006). 
 
These pervasive features of the Malawian political economy play out in all public 
service sectors.  The rural water supply sector is no exception, and it is to this that 
I now turn. 
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4.2 THE RURAL WATER SUPPLY SECTOR 
 
The structure of this section is based on a framework for water governance – 
meaning ‘the system of actors, resources, mechanisms and processes which 
mediate society’s access to water’ proposed by Franks and Cleaver (2007: 303, 
294).  I contend that the actors are more central than is suggested in the original 
model, in that they (attempt to) design and (ultimately) shape the mechanisms 
that translate resources into outcomes.  Figure 4.3 sets this out in diagram form; 
the similarities between this ‘water governance’ framework and the PEA structure 
used in the previous section are clear. 
 
Figure 4.3: A framework for water governance. 
 
 
Source: adapted from (Franks and Cleaver 2007). 
 
Resources 
Actors, 
Mechanisms, 
Processes 
Outcomes 
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I first consider the resources (policy, infrastructure, investment) available in the 
sector.  Two key mechanisms of access are then discussed: technology 
(‘hardware’), and the dominant model of community management (‘software’). 
The main actors/agents involved in the sector are surveyed, and outcome data is 
summarised.  Finally, I examine the processes and incentives that drive these 
outcomes.  
 
4.2.1 Resources 
 
‘The material and non-material properties of social systems from which human 
governance of water is constructed… both authoritative and allocative’ (Franks 
and Cleaver 2007: 293, 295). 
 
This section focuses on sector policy as the key authoritative resource, and 
investment as the key allocative resource. 
 
Policy 
Within the Malawi government, water supply is addressed together with irrigation 
under the aegis of the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development (MOIWD).  Key 
documents guiding practice in the sector include the Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy II (MGDS II) (GOM 2012b) and its predecessor, MGDS (GOM 
2007); and the National Water Policy 2005 (GOM 2005b). 
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Water supply is included together with irrigation as one of the nine priority areas in 
the current MGDS II (GOM 2012b).  However, the document provides little in the 
way of practical guidance to the sector; the goal (‘to improve access to water 
through an integrated water management system’) and expected medium-term 
outcomes (‘well developed and managed water resources’ and ‘increased access to 
safe water points within 500m distance’) are vague, and the strategies are equally 
non-specific (GOM 2012b: 72).  The document also neatly illustrates a pervasive 
feature of water policy in Malawi, the mismatch between problem identification 
and solution specification.  Thus, despite identifying the main challenges as 
including ‘aging infrastructure, inadequate maintenance capacity, theft and 
vandalism resulting in more than 30 percent nonfunctionality of the infrastructure’ 
(GOM 2012b: 73), the MGDS states that the government’s focus will be on 
‘construction of dams, establishment of piped water systems and drilling of 
boreholes where gravity fed systems cannot work’ (ibid.). There is a clear 
disjunction between the identification of maintenance of existing infrastructure as 
a major problem on the one hand, and articulation of a strategy focusing on 
building new infrastructure on the other.  The emphasis on gravity fed systems is 
also surprising, given the poor performance record of such schemes. 
 
The National Water Policy sets out the following ‘specific policy goal’:  
‘3.2.4 Rural Water Services: To achieve sustainable provision of 
community owned and managed water supply and sanitation services 
that are equitably accessible to and used by individuals and 
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entrepreneurs in rural communities for socio-economic development at 
affordable cost’ (GOM 2005b: 4). 
 
Thus, sustainability, equity of access and use, and affordability are three key 
concepts underpinning national policy on rural water supply.  Two other points are 
worth noting.  One is the focus on anticipated economic benefits of water supply, 
implied by the references to ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘socio-economic development’.  
This stands in interesting contrast to the literature reviewed, which tends to 
emphasise health and/or time impacts, rather than economic benefits of rural 
water supply. The other point, of particular relevance to this study, is the 
emphasis on ‘community ownership and management’ as the single model of rural 
water supply.  This, of course, reflects development discourse at the time the 
policy was written, although some criticism of community management was already 
being voiced by 2005 (Schouten and Moriarty 2003). 
 
Indeed, the National Water Policy (NWP) is arguably trying to be all things to all 
people.  For example, the eighteen ‘guiding principles’ include ‘3.4.6 Water 
resources shall be optimally, equitably and rationally allocated …’ and ‘3.4.8 Water 
development programmes shall be based on demand responsive and demand driven 
approaches, beneficiary participation and empowerment’ (GOM 2005b: 6); but, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, there is often a trade-off between the two: demand-
driven approaches often increase inequality, since the more privileged are more 
able to exercise voice.  Such complexities are nowhere acknowledged in the NWP.  
Moreover, the (fifteen) strategies set out in the policy for achievement of the 
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(eight) specific objectives are too numerous, non-specific, and not rooted in 
problem identification.  Overall, the NWP has significant shortcomings. 
 
Indeed, a careful reading of the NWP reveals that responsibility for operation and 
maintenance is allocated to no-one.  In the NWP’s outline of the respective roles of 
the various stakeholders in the water sector, local governments have only four 
responsibilities while NGOs have ten; management and maintenance of existing 
infrastructure is not mentioned at all in the lists of responsibilities of national or 
local government, and is only briefly mentioned elsewhere, where NGOs are 
exhorted to support ‘communities’ to do this.  In the five pages of the NWP that 
list the responsibilities of eleven different stakeholders, there is no section for 
‘communities’ – so, although the entire policy rests on the assumption of 
community management, the (very significant) responsibilities that are to be 
shouldered by these centrally important stakeholders are never articulated. 
 
The MOIWD’s main vehicle for implementation of the NWP in recent years has been 
the second National Water Development Programme (NWDP), running from 2007 to 
2015 with a budget of USD $250 million (Lockwood and Kang 2012, World Bank 
2013c) mainly funded through a concessional loan from the World Bank.  Under the 
NWDP initial steps have been taken towards the establishment of a Sector Wide 
Approach (SWAP) (GOM 2008), including the initiation of annual joint sector review 
processes, and the production of annual sector performance reports of 
progressively increasing quality (GOM 2009, GOM 2011b, GOM 2012a).  However, 
development of the SWAP has been severely hampered by capacity limitations 
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within MOIWD, resulting in a dysfunctional ‘dialogue’ characterised by politicking 
by different agendas (Lockwood and Kang 2012); to date, the SWAP remains on the 
drawing board. 
 
At District level, WASH policy is theoretically guided by District Sector Investment 
Plans (DSIPs).  However, close analyses of a sample of such plans (Kasungu District 
Assembly 2007, Ntcheu District Council 2010b) reveal major flaws in design and 
budgeting; it seems likely that DSIPs are exercises in wishful thinking rather than 
practical guides to action. 
 
Investment 
It is extremely difficult to obtain information about the scale of activity and 
investment of the many different players involved in the water sector. The problem 
is compounded by the fact that water is the responsibility of MOIWD, while 
sanitation and hygiene are under the Ministry of Health.  Some important sources 
of data (e.g. MEJN 2010) are clearly unreliable in places, and all are compiled by 
institutions with particular interests to promote (GOM 2012a, Washwatch 2013).  
The figures presented in Table 4.1 appear to be the most recent and reliable 
available. 
 
Table 4.1: Size of the water supply sector in Malawi. 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Government WASH budget  
(current $US, millions)  
4.7 13.7 18.6 32.9 20.0 
as % of total Government budget  0.4 1.0 1.1 1.7 1.0 
as % of GDP  0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 
Source: (Washwatch 2013). Data is for expenditure, apart from 2008 and 2010 which are budgeted 
data, since expenditure data is not available. 
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Table 4.2 below places investment in WASH in the wider context of government 
expenditure on health and education5.   
 
Table 4.2: Malawi Government budget allocations to selected sectors, 2004/05 to 
2010/2011. 
 2005/06  2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  2009/10  2010/11 
Water % 0.8  0.8  0.9  1.7  2.0  3.1  
Education % 10.2  11.3  10.1  8.4  9.2  16.1  
Agriculture % 12.7  13.25  12.08  14.04  13.06  8.1  
Health % 7.28  7.82  10.54  10.1  8.92  15.5  
Source: (GOM 2012a) Table 3.2, page 13. 
 
Although the ‘Water’ budget has been increasing significantly in recent years, only 
a tiny proportion is devoted to rural water supply.  More than half of the 2010/11 
water budget (MWK 4.9bn) was allocated to the NWDP and a further MWK 4.1bn 
was allocated to irrigation, leaving only MWK 0.1bn, or about 1% of the budget, for 
borehole construction (GOM 2012a: 14).  To put this in context, Ghosh Banerjee 
and Morella estimated the ‘water infrastructure financing gap’ for Malawi to be 
5.1% of GDP or $144 million per year – seven times larger than the 2010 budget 
(2011: 228-229). 
 
Trends over time: While the share of WASH in Malawi’s government expenditure 
declined significantly in the early part of the last decade (Gutierrez 2007), the data 
above suggest that this was reversed after 2007, although a decline can again be 
                                         
5 It is immediately clear that there are differences between the WASH figures in Table 4.1 and the 
Water figures in Table 4.2. Part of the discrepancy may be due to Water being a sub-sector of 
WASH, and to one dataset using calendar years while the other uses financial years.  Although it is 
not possible to triangulate the data directly, both datasets do confirm broadly similar trends. 
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seen in 2010.  WASH expenditure averages about 1% of the overall government 
budget. 
 
WASH expenditure compared with other sectors: allocations to WASH are much 
lower than allocations to education, health or agriculture.  On the other hand, 
MEJN data suggests that the proportion of government expenditure going to WASH 
more than doubled from 2004/5 to 2009/10, while shares in the budget for 
education and health declined (MEJN 2010: 19). 
 
Relative contributions of different sources of funds: The vast majority (86%) of 
MOIWD’s expenditure is funded by donors, significantly higher than the average 
ratio in other government departments (MEJN 2010: 4).  Donor funding to WASH 
and irrigation totalled 6% of all donor funding to Malawi between 2006-2009, 
compared with 42% for health, which is by far the largest recipient sector (MEJN 
2010: 13).  No information at all is available on the scale of NGO investment in 
WASH in Malawi (GOM 2012a). The MEJN study only received responses from two of 
the twenty-five NGOs identified and targeted; even WaterAid, which funded the 
study, did not provide data (MEJN 2010: 14). This is a major lacuna, since according 
to Gutierrez (2007) such funding could account for up to 75% of sector spending. 
 
A key factor influencing the level of investment in the sector is donor confidence in 
the MOIWD, which has historically been very low due to its low capacity and 
frequent change of personnel (ODI 2004, Welle 2005, Gutierrez 2007).  
Furthermore, other development sectors have been prioritised by key players, 
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overshadowing WASH: the government has prioritised agriculture, and donors and 
NGOs have prioritised health, especially HIV/AIDS (Morfit 2011).   
 
There are major imbalances in the allocation of WASH funding overall.  Virtually all 
government WASH funding (97%) is centrally controlled by the MOIWD (Lockwood 
and Kang 2012: 23).  There is a very significant urban bias: in 2008, WASH spending 
per capita was about twenty times higher in urban areas, at USD $22.00 versus USD 
$1.16 in rural areas (Lockwood and Kang 2012: 23).  Allocations to Districts are 
minimal: using MOIWD figures, Scott calculated that the average annual budget for 
a District Water Development Office is approximately USD $4900 (Scott 2012: 277), 
barely sufficient to drill a single borehole.  
 
Until recently, allocation of funds from the MOIWD to Districts was simply based on 
historical allocation.  In 2011 the National Local Government Finance Committee 
consulted on a proposed change to the allocation mechanism that would bring 
practice in the water sector in line with health and education, through use of a 
single national formula to calculate allocations.  Calculations showed that the 
proposed new allocation formula – 50% based on the number of water points in the 
district, and 50% based on the percentage of the population unserved – would 
result in very significant changes in many districts (GOM 2011a). 
 
The 2010/11 district budget provisions envisaged a 4% reduction on the previous 
year’s budget for water, within the context of an overall 7% increase in district 
budgets.  While the budget allocation to Districts for water stood at MWK 33.5 
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million, this was dwarfed by the allocations for health (274 times larger), 
education (45 times larger), and agriculture (16 times larger); indeed, almost all 
other sectors of the local government budget were larger than water, including 
gender, fisheries, immigration, forestry, housing and trade (GOM 2010a: iii).  More 
recent budget projections forecast significant increases in several sectors, 
especially education, but a relative stagnation in the water budget (GOM 2011c: 
383). And yet, as the Afrobarometer survey showed, water is the second-highest 
priority for rural dwellers, and the third-highest for Malawians overall (Tsoka and 
Chunga 2013).  It thus seems clear that the Malawian budgeting process is far from 
demand-driven. 
 
In addition to the standard District funding allocation, known as ORT (Other 
Recurrent Transfer), Districts can also access the Local Development Fund (LDF), 
established in 2008 as a successor to the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF).  Both 
were World Bank funded programmes with twin objectives: ‘providing financing for 
locally prioritised development projects and increasing local government capacity’ 
(Lockwood and Kang 2012: 11).  However, there have been reports of political 
influence in allocation of LDF funds, meaning that the supposed need-based 
allocation criteria are actually not met; and, as with MASAF, projects are no doubt 
chosen by ‘prime movers’ rather than collectively (Vajja and White 2008). Although 
MASAF funded significant numbers of water projects, use of LDF funds for WASH has 
so far been very low (Lockwood and Kang 2012).   
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Finally, deployment of the limited resources available at District level is poor.  
Examination of Output Based Budgets for the four Districts that are the focus of 
this study suggest very limited capacity in planning, budgeting, and performance 
management. For example, in Chikhwawa, the MWK 1.3 million allocation for water 
is split as follows: one-third (MWK 439,968) for ‘construction / rehabilitation of 20 
boreholes or shallow wells’; and two-thirds (MWK 877,010) to ‘provide adequately 
for office services’ – with the performance metric being ‘number of monthly 
reports produced’ (GOM 2010b: 9).   
 
4.2.2 Mechanisms of access 
 
‘Particular context-specific arrangements for organising access to 
water’ (Franks and Cleaver 2007: 295). 
 
This section focuses first on physical infrastructure, then on the social 
infrastructure of community management. 
 
Hardware: technology and infrastructure 
Table 4.3 summarises the latest available national data on access to improved 
water infrastructure6.   
 
                                         
6 This data is from the JMP, as no data is available directly from the Malawi government.  As at 24 
October 2013, the Malawi government homepage (http://www.malawi.gov.mw) hyperlink for the 
MOIWD led to the website for the WASH SWAP (http://waterswap.org/) which contained only an 
error message saying ‘This site has been suspended’. 
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Table 4.3: Use of drinking–water sources in Malawi. 
Year 
Use of drinking–water sources in Malawi (percentage of population) 
Urban Rural National 
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1990 91 40 51 5 4 35 2 33 46 19 42 6 36 41 17 
2000 93 35 58 5 2 57 2 55 31 12 63 7 56 27 10 
2011 95 30 65 5 0 82 2 80 14 4 84 7 77 13 3 
Source: (JMP 2013: 25). 
 
Although the data above is not broken down by hardware type, the most recent 
census indicates that approximately half of all Malawians (48%) obtain their water 
from boreholes with handpumps, a much larger proportion than those who use a 
standpipe (12%), private piped source (7%) or protected well (6%) (NSO 2008: 19). 
In rural areas, 55% use boreholes while only 16% use any other type of protected 
source (ibid).  However, borehole technology is virtually ignored in national policy 
and practice, with only minimal budget allocations.  At the same time, very large 
sums of money are invested in piped schemes which have an extremely poor 
functionality record (GOM 2012a).  This paradox surely requires explanation. 
 
One factor that is commonly acknowledged to be a positive influence on 
functionality is Malawi’s handpump standardisation policy (Baumann and Danert 
2008a).  The Afridev, a public domain pump originally developed in Malawi (Hankin 
2001) and specifically designed for village level operation and maintenance 
(VLOM), is used for deep mechanically-drilled boreholes, while the Malda is used 
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for hand-dug wells. This successful handpump standardisation has been a 
significant factor in keeping functionality rates as high as they are, as it means 
there is greater effective demand for the spares for these pump types, and greater 
opportunity for mechanics to develop the specialist O&M skills required. 
 
Software: the community management model 
As enshrined (or assumed) in the National Water Policy, the community 
management model is a central element of the water sector in Malawi.  Virtually 
all water point installations follow the same basic approach of establishing and 
training a village water point committee, and handing over management 
responsibility after installation is complete.  As an MOIWD employee explained to a 
sector conference, CBM is believed by the Ministry to work very well and to be the 
key to tackling sustainability (Matamula 2008) – despite the fact that the model has 
been in place since the 1990s, and non-functionality remains high. 
 
As noted above, the dominance of the community management is so strongly based 
on assumptions that the responsibilities of communities are not even articulated in 
the National Water Policy, and there are no national guidelines on the topic.  
Community management is simply assumed to be the way to deal with the 
challenge of long-term management of water supply services; a mechanism to 
ensure that all costs post-construction are borne by the users.  Even so, community 
management does not in fact come cheap.  Although data is scarce, UNICEF figures 
indicate that community management costs (essentially, the costs of mobilising 
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users and training committee members) comprise 16% of the total costs of borehole 
construction (GOM 2012a). 
 
4.2.3 Actors 
 
This section provides an overview of the main organisations involved in the rural 
water supply sector in Malawi. 
 
National government 
Recent years have seen frequent changes in the national Ministerial structure, with 
Irrigation moved from Agriculture to Water, then all three merged, then split 
again.  In 2013, responsibility for rural water supply is held by the Ministry for 
Irrigation and Water Development (MOIWD). The MOIWD’s main water programme is 
the World Bank-financed second National Water Development Project (NWDP) 
already discussed (World Bank 2013c), which focuses on urban water supply, and 
piped schemes in towns and rural areas. Five Water Boards (Lilongwe, Blantyre, 
Northern Region, Central Region and Southern Region) are responsible for water 
supply in towns and cities.   
 
Local government 
In line with Malawi’s Decentralisation Policy, rural water supply was decentralised 
to District level in 2006 (MLGRD 2013). However, as noted above, the reality of 
devolution is patchwork and ‘projectised’ (Lockwood and Kang 2012: 26); 
decentralisation of responsibility has not been accompanied by decentralisation of 
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resources, and District Water Offices are notoriously understaffed and underfunded 
(Baumann and Danert 2008a, MEJN 2010, WPP 2010, Lockwood and Kang 2012, GOM 
2012a). The slow pace of devolution is generally attributed to ‘lack of capacity’ at 
District level and/or the stalling of political decentralisation (postponement of 
local elections). However, there is an instructive contrast between the level of 
funds devolved to Districts in the WASH sector (roughly 3%) and in the Health sector 
(roughly 30%) (Lockwood and Kang 2012: 9), which suggests that sector-specific 
factors – such as, perhaps, the relative capacity and commitment of staff in the 
respective Ministries - are significant. 
 
International donors 
The key donors to the water sector include the World Bank (WB), the European 
Commission (EC), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the 
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the African Development Bank 
(AfDB), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).  Most of them channel 
the majority of their funding through the national government, although DFID and 
the EC fund several large international NGOs, and UNICEF engages in direct 
partnerships with thirteen District Water Offices.  The donors established a Water 
and Sanitation Development Partners Group in 2008 to coordinate their support for 
the sector (JICA 2012). 
 
NGOs 
Malawi is well supplied with NGOs in general, and the water sector is no exception.  
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Baumann and Danert (2008a) found 31 NGOs involved in rural water supply and 
suggested that this was not a comprehensive list,  while MEJN (2010) listed 25; WES 
Network, the coordinating group for NGOs working on WASH in Malawi, has over 50 
members.  Key international NGOs (INGOs) working on rural water supply include 
WaterAid, Concern Universal (CU), World Vision, Emmanuel International, 
Engineers Without Borders (EWB), InterAide, and Water For People.  There are 
relatively few Malawian NGOs specialising in WASH, and those that exist work in 
partnership with INGOs. 
 
While some large NGOs (e.g. CU) focus mainly on water point installation and 
rehabilitation, others (e.g. EWB) focus on strengthening local government capacity 
to deliver sustainable water supply; some (e.g. WaterAid) do both. WaterAid played 
a significant role in initiating water point mapping in Malawi (Welle 2005), while 
EWB has been focusing on helping districts to implement Excel-based monitoring 
systems in recent years (Scott 2012).  Meanwhile, Water for People has been 
piloting its own mobile mapping approach, FLOW (Water for People 2013). 
InterAide has specialised in establishing networks of Area Mechanics (de Saint 
Méloir 2009). 
 
Communities 
The key actors in the community management model are of course the 
communities themselves, represented by the Water Point Committee, as discussed 
earlier.   Within communities, however, there may be a number of other important 
individuals or institutions with significant influence on access to water, including: 
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traditional leaders (VH, GVH, TA); religious leaders and entities (churches, 
mosques); modern governance structures (VDC, ADC); and other committees, either 
nested (such as VDC sub-committees) or stand-alone (such as committees 
established by other types of development projects focused on child care, AIDS 
orphans, forest management, and so on.) 
 
4.2.4 Outcomes 
 
This section first presents data on outcomes (i.e. people having access to clean 
water), then on outputs (i.e. numbers and functionality of water points).  Various 
challenges relating to data are then examined, including problems of indicator 
confusion, updating, and coordination. 
 
Outcomes: access to clean water 
Malawi has made great strides in improving access to clean water over the past 15 
years, with 83% of the population now enjoying such access (JMP 2012a: 47).  It is 
‘on track’ to meet the MDG target, and in fact is the highest-performing country in 
sub-Saharan Africa, with 48% of the 2010 population having gained access to 
improved drinking water sources since 1995 (JMP 2012a: 11).  The proportion of the 
rural population with access to clean water has increased from just 35% in 1990 to 
80% in 2010 (JMP 2012b).  As shown in Table 4.4, access to clean water is now 
significantly higher in Malawi than in neighbouring countries, or in other parts of 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as a whole.   
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Table 4.4: Access to improved drinking-water sources, 2010. 
% of 
population World 
Developing 
Regions 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Malawi Tanzania Zambia Mozambique 
Urban 96% 95% 83% 95% 79% 87% 77% 
Rural 81% 79% 49% 80% 44% 46% 29% 
Total 89% 86% 61% 83% 53% 61% 47% 
% gaining 
access 
since 1995 
23% 26% 26% 48% 16% 26% 21% 
Source: (JMP 2012a), statistical tables on pp38-55. 
 
However, this progress is unevenly spread, and access is not always constant: 24% 
of rural dwellers (and 16% in cities and 8% in towns) report that they have gone 
without enough clean water ‘many times’ or ‘always’ over the past year (Tsoka and 
Chunga 2013: 9).  Performance also varies significantly between districts, as shown 
in Figure 4.4.  Sector stakeholders are concerned that ‘access in rural communities 
is not improving’ but instead has stagnated since 2007 (GOM 2012a: iii); and the 
limited data available suggests that a significant proportion of improved sources do 
not provide water of adequate quality, and/or that poor household hygiene leads 
to water contamination before consumption (GOM 2012a: 37). 
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of population with access to improved water sources, by 
District. 
 
Source: GOM (2012a), Figure 8.2 on page 61, using data from DHS 2010. 
 
So, despite the impressive increases in access since 1990, water supply was rated 
as the third most important problem facing the country overall by Afrobarometer 
respondents, and rated second most important by those living in rural areas (Tsoka 
and Chunga 2013: 48).  Respondents also felt that government performance in 
providing water and sanitation services had declined between 2002 and 2012 
(Asunka 2013).  In summary, Malawi has made good progress, but more needs to be 
done to ensure access to clean water for all. 
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Outputs: water point numbers and functionality 
The increase in Malawians’ access to clean water can be attributed in large part to 
the significant increase in investment in WASH in recent years outlined earlier – 
although comprehensive data regarding the number of new water points 
constructed is simply not available, and there is cause for concern about the long-
term sustained functionality of new infrastructure (MEJN 2010).  Indeed, the best 
(only) national data available is from the 2005 Malawi WP Database (WaterAid 
2005), which covers 25 districts and shows average functionality of 66.1%.  
However, there is wide variation between districts (Figure 4.5), between TAs 
within districts (Figure 4.6), and between different technology types (Figure 4.7).  
For example, Figure 4.5 shows that functionality is much higher in Mangochi than in 
Lilongwe, although both districts have roughly the same number of water points. 
 
Figure 4.5: Water point functionality by District. 
 
Source: author’s calculations from WaterAid (2005). 
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Figure 4.6 highlights variation within a single district, showing that some TAs (e.g. 
Chadza) have very high functionality while in others (e.g. Chitukula) more than half 
the water points are non-functional. 
 
Figure 4.6: Water point functionality by TA, Lilongwe District. 
 
Source: author’s calculations from WaterAid (2005). 
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Figure 4.7 shows that the large majority of water points are boreholes, and that a 
good majority of these are functional, whereas about half of all standpipes are not. 
 
Figure 4.7: Numbers of water points and their functionality, by technology type. 
 
Source: author’s calculations from WaterAid (2005). 
 
Mechanically drilled boreholes with a manual pump are the best-performing 
technology type, with 76.7% of such water points being functional at the time of 
the survey. Functionality is even higher for those boreholes fitted with Afridev 
pumps, at 78.7%, better than all other pump types (author’s calculation). At the 
other end of the spectrum, protected springs perform very badly with only 25.4% 
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functional - but there are (reportedly) only 67 of them in the country in total.  
Gravity fed standpipes, of which there are many (12,121), also perform poorly, 
with less than half being functional. Although there are very few boreholes with 
powered pumps, only half are functioning, implying that use of a powered pump 
rather than a handpump decreases the likelihood of system sustainability. 
 
Some anomalies in the data are apparent.  For example, more than two-thirds of 
hand-dug wells with ‘no way to extract water’ are classified as functional, and 
nearly 10% of boreholes with no pump are similarly classified as functional.  Rather 
than being mistakes, however, it seems likely that the problem lies rather in the 
classifications on offer in the survey.  Many hand-dug wells in Malawi are shallow 
hollows in the ground, from which water is scooped directly into a bucket.  Such 
wells have ‘no [technical] way to extract water’ but they still supply water and as 
such are ‘functional’. 
 
This comprehensive database is unfortunately now quite out of date.  At the time 
of compilation it was intended to be regularly updated, but this has not happened; 
and while plans are in place to establish a national water point monitoring system 
(AfDB 2012), this is not yet available.  Few Districts have comprehensive datasets 
for their own infrastructure, and even fewer implementing agencies monitor 
functionality long term.  However, a handful of ad hoc and small-scale studies have 
yielded more recent functionality data.  
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For gravity fed / piped systems (GFS), a 2011 survey showed only 26% of GFS taps in 
Northern Malawi were functional, with somewhat better performance (45%  
functionality) in Central and Southern Malawi (GOM 2012a: 65-66).  Strangely, the 
2011 Sector Performance Report from which this data was taken has nothing 
whatsoever to say about functionality of other types of water points, which make 
up the bulk of Malawi’s water access infrastructure.  However, Campbell (2009) 
found 70% functionality for boreholes installed by Concern Universal in Thyolo 
District, and 82% functionality for water points installed by other agencies.   
 
In summary, the best available data show that, although one-third of improved 
water points in Malawi are non-functional, nonetheless four-fifths of the rural 
population report that they get drinking water from an improved source.  By 
implication, maintaining and repairing existing non-functional water points might 
be just as effective as (or more so than) constructing new water points in bringing 
Malawi closer to 100% access to clean water.  
 
Data challenges 
Overall, poor data availability is a significant problem in the RWS sector in Malawi, 
noted by many commentators.  There is no comprehensive current overview of 
sector investment or outputs either at national or district level.  The 2005 Malawi 
WP Database has been only minimally updated since compilation, meaning that it is 
now of very limited analytical use. In Districts, DWOs complain that most NGOs and 
some projects financed by the MOIWD or the Constituency Development Fund do 
not report to them on WASH activities; most DWOs do not have any accurate 
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information on the WASH infrastructure for which they are nominally responsible.  
Although the African Development Bank recently made a grant of nearly 2 million 
Euros to the MOIWD to strengthen water sector monitoring and evaluation (AfDB 
2012), this project has not yet been completed. 
 
Confusion between output and outcome data is also common; as noted in Chapter 
Two, Baumann and Danert (2008a) multiply a person-based index by a technology-
based index to argue that access to safe water in Malawi is considerably worse than 
it actually is; and the same mistake is repeated by others.  This confusion reflects a 
lack of clarity in the sector overall regarding which metric is most important. 
 
Ultimately, of course, the outcome – people accessing clean water - is of most 
interest.  But output data is critically important.  Each non-functional water point 
represents a waste of resources; at approximately £5000 each in today’s prices, the 
roughly 10,000 non-functional boreholes in Malawi represent approximately £50 
million of failed investment.  If outcomes are improved through massive investment 
in new infrastructure but a large proportion of these new water points cease to 
function within a few years, policymakers, practitioners and donors need to review 
their strategy.  
 
4.2.5 Processes and Incentives 
 
Having outlined the broad contours of the RWS sector in Malawi, this section now 
considers the processes and incentives that operate to translate the resources, via 
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the mechanisms and actors, into the outputs and outcomes described above.  
Linking back to Section 4.1, three key areas are highlighted: exogenous and 
endogenous incentives, and accountability challenges. 
 
Exogenous incentives 
Two key processes can be identified, both driven by external incentives. 
 
First: over-investment in concrete short-term outputs. The rural water supply 
sector is pervaded with ‘project logic’ and subject to donor timetables.  Action is 
driven almost entirely by funding, in line with the pattern identified by Chiweza 
(2010) in other sectors.  For example, efforts to develop monitoring systems at 
District level only function so long as there is external funding (Scott 2010), and 
the ubiquitous ‘sitting allowances’ reflect a work culture where activity is driven 
very largely by financial incentives.  Donors are all individually subject to 
requirements to disburse funding rapidly and demonstrate concrete, specific 
achievements, and consequently all stakeholders focus primarily on construction of 
new water points.  Despite strong advocacy in the sector more widely for a move 
away from projects towards treating rural water supply as an ongoing service 
delivery challenge, the sector in Malawi remains rooted in a ‘build a water point 
and hand it over to the community’ model.   
 
The second process is ‘isomorphic mimicry’ (Pritchett, Woolcock et al. 2010) – the 
pretence of substance through the adoption of form only - also driven by funding 
logics.  The National Water Policy is a case in point: a policy exists on paper, but it 
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is of such low quality that it is of little use as a practical guide for action.  
Similarly, decentralised governance structures are supposed to give citizens greater 
control over expenditure - but so few resources trickle down through the chain to 
the districts that, even if they have capable committed staff, they are unable to 
deliver.  From the perspective of donors and NGOs, the building blocks of 
participatory governance are in place, allowing them to believe that, by handing 
over control of the newly-built water point to the Water Point Committee, they are 
contributing to the strengthening of democracy and the empowerment of citizens.  
From another perspective, however, this behaviour could be seen as a form of 
abdication of responsibility, forcing village structures into premature load-bearing. 
 
Endogenous incentives 
At national level, the reality of the sector is more political than is generally 
acknowledged.  The poor performance of the water sector relative to other sectors 
such as health and education – reflected in the failure to develop a SWAP, the 
failure to decentralise resources, the multiple reincarnations of the Ministry and 
the ‘pass-the-parcel’ of the Ministerial water portfolio – is clearly a political 
product.  Technocratic attempts to secure improvements – such as an international 
consultancy’s attempts to propose a new framework to strengthen O&M (Baumann 
and Danert 2008a, Baumann and Danert 2008b), or efforts to ensure that the 2005 
water point database is kept up to date – have foundered in the face of ministerial 
opposition or indifference.  The massive skewing of investment towards large-
scale, centralised gravity-fed schemes – despite their poor functionality record – is 
politically driven rather than evidence driven. Politics also has a strong influence 
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on investment and on functionality at local level: ‘political’ water points, i.e. 
boreholes drilled by MPs or using Constituency Development Funds, are particularly 
prone to poor construction quality (Baumann and Danert 2008a: 25). As Gutierrez 
(2007) observed, the challenges in the sector are mainly political, rather than 
technical. 
 
At village level, the theory of community management stands in contrast to deep-
rooted clientelist logics.  The situation is further confused by the way that project 
implementation varies between stakeholders.  For example, while some water 
point installers insist on in-kind contributions, others do not – and in any case, 
practice may differ from policy: as one NGO worker commented, ‘you will be 
lenient when the community has killed a goat for you’ (quoted in Baumann and 
Danert 2008a: 27).  And although communities are supposed to pay for repairs 
themselves, in practice they may rely on ‘patrons’ – the local MP, other politicians 
seeking election, other local ‘big men’, a religious institution, or an NGO – to 
provide assistance.   
 
Accountability challenges 
One key result of the combination of these two sets of processes and incentives is 
the devolution – or abdication - of a very large degree of responsibility to 
communities themselves, much more so than in other sectors such as health or 
education. The stakeholders with access to economic or political resources focus 
their efforts on delivering short-term outputs in line with exogenous funding 
incentives, and/or on securing personal benefits in line with neopatrimonial 
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political incentives. In both cases, accountability is upwards, but is not necessarily 
based on performance as measured by any metric that is meaningful to the 
intended beneficiaries. 
 
Two further specific challenges are worth highlighting.  One is the worryingly high 
incidence of theft and vandalism, which, although little-mentioned  in the wider 
literature on water point sustainability, emerges surprisingly strongly from the 
Malawi literature, including government policy documents (GOM 2012b). Both 
Baumann and Danert (2008a) and Kleemeier (2000) highlight the problem, and 
Campbell (2009) found that it explained two-thirds of non-functionality.  High 
incidence of theft and vandalism may suggest two things: low sense of ownership, 
and weak rule of law. 
 
The second challenge relates to information management.  The 2005 water point 
database represented a major investment by multiple NGOs in establishing a 
national system for monitoring water points, intended to inform future investment 
in both new construction and in repairs; but like a previous effort in Zambia, the 
initiative has failed (Gutierrez 2007).  Scott (2012) notes two key barriers to 
effective monitoring systems: first, that district staff are not held accountable for 
having data; and second, that even if they do have the data, the scope for using it 
is relatively limited, since the vast bulk of resources in the sector are centrally 
controlled, and districts have no direct control over NGO siting decisions.  These 
structural constraints have a major influence on the viability of institutionalised 
monitoring systems.  Similarly, there exists no analysis of the relationship between 
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the investment put into the sector and the results achieved - no analysis of cost-
effectiveness. Clearly the incentives for evidence-based decision-making are much 
weaker than those for politics-based decision-making. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed the structure and performance of the rural water supply 
sector in Malawi, drawing on many of the themes and concepts discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three.  Using a ‘political economy analysis’ approach, I have 
examined both the formal and informal institutions and incentives that shape ‘how 
things work’ in Malawi in general, and in the rural water supply sector in 
particular. 
 
The chapter has shown that there are significant tensions between some of the key 
actors in the sector (national government, district government, and non-
governmental organisations) as well as major challenges of coordination, weak 
accountability and poor data.  Lack of rigorous data on water point sustainability 
and its causes is also a serious problem. 
 
The analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates clearly that rural water supply 
is not primarily a technical challenge, but rather a political one, shaped by 
economic incentives. This reinforces the value of the two-part analytical 
framework developed in previous chapters, and informs the research design and 
methods outlined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the research strategy, design and methods selected. The 
particular value of a mixed methods approach to the research question is 
highlighted, and the sampling frame is set out in detail.  Research instruments for 
collection of both quantitative and qualitative data are presented, and careful 
consideration is given to research ethics. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
of the sources, and quality, of the data on which the subsequent analysis is based. 
 
Chapter Two highlighted a range of proximate factors that, individually or in 
combination, may directly influence water point sustainability.  Chapter Three 
argued that the operation of these factors is determined by underlying social, 
political and economic dynamics.  Hence, this study adopts a two-stage analytical 
framework.   
 
In stage one I seek to answer the question: what are the main factors that 
contribute to variation in the sustainability of improved community water points in 
rural Malawi, and how much of an influence does each factor have?  I do this 
through examining the influence on water point sustainability of ten proximate 
explanatory variables.  In stage two I address the question: how and why do these 
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factors influence sustainability?  I do this through analysing the underlying social, 
political and economic dynamics that influence these results. In particular, I assess 
whether the community management model delivers on its theoretical intrinsic and 
instrumental benefits. 
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5.1 RESEARCH PARADIGM, DESIGN AND SAMPLING 
 
5.1.1 Research philosophy and paradigm 
 
This section outlines the background to my research approach, beginning with the 
research philosophy or paradigm – the worldview, or organising framework 
(Bergman 2010) from which it derives.  The research question addressed by this 
study is at one level concerned with physical realities – the functioning of 
technology and the provision of a public good, access to clean water.  As such it is 
concerned with a phenomenon that can be objectively seen and understood 
empirically, an approach conventionally called positivist.  At a second level, 
however, beyond the question of whether a given water point functions or not, this 
study also seeks to understand why.  It is therefore concerned with human 
behaviours and motivations – aspects that need to be understood from within as 
well as assessed from without.  The constructivist research tradition offers a 
helpful model here, with its emphasis on multiple interpretations of reality. 
 
Like Gorard (2010), I find the dichotomy between positivism and constructivism 
artificial and unhelpful.  Along with positivists, I believe that social phenomena 
have an existence independent of their perception by social actors; but I also agree 
with constructivists that social phenomena and their meanings are continually 
being created by social actors, and therefore that knowledge is always subject to 
revision.  I believe that it is useful and valid to apply the methods of the natural 
sciences, including observation and measurement, to the study of social 
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phenomena; but I also realise that the same phenomenon can be interpreted very 
differently by different actors, that these interpretations influence actions, and 
those actions in turn shape the phenomenon.  However, although meanings do 
guide actions at individual levels, this is not always conscious, logical or optimal; 
and patterns at a wider level can be discerned using natural scientific methods.  
Thus, in philosophical terms, my position is perhaps closest to pragmatism or 
critical realism, a position that is frequently associated with a commitment to 
mixed methods (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie et al. 2007, Mertens 2010, Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 2010).  
 
Indeed, this philosophy drives my commitment to a dual approach to this study, 
which is both deductive (theory-guided, typically associated with quantitative 
research) and inductive (theory-generating, typically associated with qualitative 
research).  The deductive aspect is represented by the first part of my analytical 
framework, which draws on previous studies to identify and then test ten 
proximate determinants of sustainability.  The inductive aspect is represented by 
the second element of my framework, which begins with a broad question about 
the effectiveness of community management, and seeks to explore this in the 
specific context of rural water supply.  Ultimately, I argue that combining these 
two approaches yields new insights in two dimensions: it offers not only much 
greater clarity about the relative importance of the ten posited determinants, but 
also a revised and considered critique of community management, deeply rooted in 
empirical findings. 
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Thus, my choice of a mixed methods approach is rooted in my belief that both can 
offer helpful and complementary insights, and that combining multiple methods 
and types of data is ‘quite normal for anyone who genuinely want[s] to find out the 
answer to their research questions’ (Gorard 2010: 2).  I agree with Bergman (2011) 
that, despite the differences in ontology, epistemology, design and methods 
typically associated with the two main types of research, it is indeed possible and 
valuable to bridge these divides with careful mixed methods research.  There are 
two key strengths of such an approach: 1) the dialectic between them strengthens 
both, because the insights of one approach lead to a more critical application of 
the other; and 2) they provide different perspectives which can triangulate each 
other and build a richer and more robust analysis (Ivankova, Creswell et al. 2006).  
These strengths underpin the growing popularity of mixed methods studies, which 
now comprise approximately 15% of research in applied disciplines (Alise and 
Teddlie 2010).  As Bryman observes, ‘bringing quantitative and qualitative findings 
together has the potential to offer insights that could not otherwise be gleaned’ 
(2007: 9).  One clear example is the work of Davis and Baulch (2011) on poverty 
assessments in Bangladesh, and Shaffer (2013) provides a number of others.  
 
It has been claimed that mixed methods research has historically favoured 
quantitative over qualitative insights, and that a new emphasis on the qualitative is 
required (Hesse-Biber 2010), but this study aims to achieve an even balance 
between the two.  The quantitative analysis focuses particularly on description of 
the phenomenon, and the qualitative analysis more on explanation; but both types 
of data contribute to both types of analysis, and I argue that both are essential and 
 158  
neither could stand alone.  I have endeavoured, through the detailed description of 
research design and methods that follows, to give an accurate account of how the 
research has been conducted and the way in which the two elements have been 
integrated (Alise and Teddlie 2010). 
 
5.1.2 Research design 
 
Following De Vaus (2001) and Gorard (2010) I consider that research design must 
come before commitment to any specific methods.  I carefully weighed up the 
advantages of each of the four classic research designs - experimental, cross-
sectional, longitudinal, and case study (De Vaus 2001) - before settling on the 
design for this study.  
 
Experimental design has enjoyed growing prominence in international development 
in recent years, for good reason (Banerjee and Duflo 2012).  It has, however, also 
been strongly critiqued on grounds of reductionism, limited applicability to many 
important questions, and limited explanatory power (Deaton 2010, Lilja, 
Kristjanson et al. 2010, Picciotto 2012). Although there is certainly scope, indeed 
need, for more experimental research in the WASH field, a randomised controlled 
trial is beyond the capacity of an individual doctoral researcher and was 
accordingly deemed inappropriate for this study. 
 
Cross-sectional design offers a snapshot at a given point in time, comparing two or 
more objects of study – such as water points in two or more villages.  Such an 
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approach is limited in its capacity to assess change over time, which is a critical 
component of assessing sustainability.  Although the time element can be 
addressed through participant recall, respondents may forget past events or 
remember them inaccurately.  Nevertheless, if recorded historical data is 
accessible to the cross-sectional researcher, this limitation may be overcome.  For 
example, most water points in Malawi are inscribed (by writing with a stick in the 
wet concrete when they are first built) with the date of construction, the name of 
the installer, and frequently other details.   
 
Longitudinal design compares differences ‘over time’ as well as ‘between groups’, 
and thus can provide a richer research picture, particularly well-suited to a study 
of sustainability.  It requires more than one round of data collection – baseline, and 
at least one subsequent follow-up.  Researchers can sometimes use existing 
secondary data as the baseline, and this was the approach initially intended for this 
research.  However, owing to limitations in the available data (discussed in Chapter 
Eight) it was not possible in practice. 
 
Case study design examines a particular phenomenon through in-depth analysis of 
one or more cases.  A case is often at a relatively small scale, such as a single 
village.  At a larger scale, the present study could be seen as using the ‘case’ of 
RWS in Malawi to explore wider questions concerning the political economy of 
community management of public goods and services. 
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In practice, studies of sustainability of rural water supply often adopt a case study 
format; frequently, the researcher already knows the project and seeks to 
understand it in more detail, e.g. (Mathew 2004, Carter and Rwamwanja 2006).  A 
meta-analysis of collective action literature found that small-N studies (fewer than 
30 observations) predominate, making up 69% of all studies found; and half of these 
were single case studies (Poteete and Ostrom 2008).  However, a limited number of 
large cross-sectional studies have been undertaken.  For example, Whittington, 
Davis et al. (2008) conducted an unusually large study (400 villages, 10,000 
respondents) in which the research team spent on average one day in each 
participating village, where they conducted group and individual interviews and 25 
randomly sampled household surveys.  In Ghana, the most used borehole in each 
village was observed for a whole day; in all sites, engineering staff completed a 
technical assessment. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the literature appears to contain no examples of 
experimental approaches directly focused on my research question.  However, 
important lessons can be learned from experimental studies in related fields, such 
as Concern Universal (2006) on institutional arrangements, Björkman and Svensson 
(2010) and Reinikka and Svensson (2011) on information flows, and J-PAL (2012) on 
willingness to pay. 
 
I considered several possible research designs for this study, including a purely 
longitudinal design following up on secondary data, and an action research case 
study design based on a 6-12 month placement within a District Water Office.  I 
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rejected the first as too limiting: considerable investment has been made in the 
water sector since the baseline data was collected, and a focus exclusively on ‘old’ 
water points might entail loss of significant insights from more recent 
developments in RWS. The second potential design was impractical for pragmatic 
reasons, being incompatible with the needs of my children and partner.  Instead, I 
adapted the idea by including in my analysis secondary narrative data (blog posts) 
from individuals who had done such placements, under the auspices of the 
Canadian NGO Engineers Without Borders, in a range of District Water Offices. 
 
The final design adopted for this study is essentially cross-sectional with 
longitudinal elements: cross-sectional because it compares outcomes across a wide 
range of cases in order to test the influence of a number of explanatory variables, 
and longitudinal because it assesses change over time using both primary and 
secondary data.  The selection of Malawi as the focus country was driven by the 
availability of nationwide secondary data, in the form of the 2005 WP database. 
This data provided a basis for the sampling frame, and a baseline for longitudinal 
analysis. 
 
5.1.3 Sampling 
 
Sampling is critically important because it determines the degree to which a study 
has wider relevance (De Vaus 2001).  In this study, my principal aim was to 
generate findings of relevance to practitioners and policymakers (local and national 
government officials, donors, and NGOs) in the WASH sector in Malawi as a whole.  
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I also hoped that my findings would cast new light on community management 
more generally. 
 
The quantitative and qualitative research traditions are typically associated with 
two different approaches to sampling, respectively ‘probability’ and ‘purposive’ 
sampling.  Sampling is often required at several levels, and a different approach 
may be required at each level; this may especially be the case in mixed methods 
research (Teddlie and Yu 2007: 85) and is certainly true for this study. Where 
possible, I used probability sampling, in order to reduce the likelihood of non-
random variation (bias) in the sample. At some levels, however, use of random 
sampling risked limiting the wider relevance of the study, so purposive sampling 
was used instead.  This mixed approach to sampling is somewhat unusual, and little 
discussed in the literature.  In an important sense, mixing probability and purposive 
sampling at different levels may undermine the justification for both. 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons for using mixed sampling in certain 
circumstances, provided that there is a strong justification for each type of 
sampling and the implications for validity are clearly articulated, as below. 
 
The mixed sampling frame adopted for this study is summarised in Figure 5.1.  
Probability sampling was considered preferable for the large-N, quantitative 
element of the study (surveys of water points, and their users and managers) in 
order to achieve maximum representativeness of the sample and therefore to 
maximise external validity. However, it would be necessary to randomly sample 
381 of the ~50,000 water points in Malawi in order to have 95% confidence that the 
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results were representative7. Logistically, this was beyond the scope of this study.  
But even more importantly, it would have been inappropriate, since the object of 
interest in this study is not a single water point in isolation but the system of rural 
water supply within which it is embedded, including the relationships between 
village, installer, and local and national government.  It therefore made more 
sense to use cluster / stratified sampling to select sample districts (since districts 
are non-overlapping structures of oversight for all waterpoints) and then randomly 
sample water points within those districts.   
 
Sampling was therefore stratified at five levels: district, TA, VDC, water point, and 
respondent.  Random sampling was used wherever possible, i.e. at VDC and water 
point levels. However, at some levels random sampling was either not feasible or 
not optimal, and purposive sampling was therefore used to select Districts, TAs, 
and respondents.  The rationale for each sampling decision is set out in more detail 
below.  In summary, the intended research sample involved: 
• 4 Districts (2 high-functionality and 2 low-functionality) 
• 8 TAs (1 high-functionality and 1 low-functionality per district) 
• 24 VDCs (3 per TA, randomly sampled) 
• 96 water points (4 per VDC, randomly sampled) 
• 288 survey respondents (2 Users and 1 Manager per water point) 
• 20 key informants at national and district level. 
  
                                         
7 Using http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html 
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Figure 5.1: Sampling diagram. 
 
Key: White boxes: purposive sampling; dotted boxes: stratified purposive sampling; grey boxes: random sampling. 
NB: although the full sampling framework is only shown for District 1 / VDC 1 / Water point 1, the same framework is applied to all other Districts, VDCs 
and water points. 
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Districts (stratified purposively sampled) 
Since the focus of the study is on variation in performance, I sought ‘exemplar 
cases’ of high and low performance. Using the 2005 WP Database, I stratified the 
districts to identify the five highest-functionality and five lowest-functionality 
(Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1: Water point functionality in selected Districts in Malawi, 2005 
 District % of WPs functional 
H
ig
he
st
 
Blantyre 85.8% 
Thyolo 83.6% 
Mangochi 80.0% 
Salima 78.9% 
Rumphi 77.0% 
Lo
w
es
t 
Machinga 57.9% 
Ntcheu 53.4% 
Chikwawa 49.1% 
Mulanje 48.9% 
Phalombe 45.6% 
Source: 2005 WP Database. 
 
I excluded urban districts (Blantyre) and those with a high proportion of gravity-fed 
systems (Phalombe and Mulanje) as they were obviously not representative of most 
districts in Malawi, then mapped the remainder.  Since neighbouring districts might 
be expected to share geological, topographical, climatic, social and political 
features to some extent, I identified two pairs of neighbouring districts with 
contrasting functionality levels: Mangochi (high functionality) and Ntcheu (low); 
and Thyolo (high) and Chikwawa (low). Ntcheu is in Central Region; the other three 
districts are in Southern Region (Figure 5.2). 
 
It is worth noting that this selection was based on the somewhat optimistic 
assumption that water point functionality levels in each district had not changed 
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significantly since the 2005 WP Database was compiled.  In fact, common sense 
suggests that there may well have been significant changes in functionality in some 
districts in the intervening six or so years; but without more recent data there was 
no better way to identify sample districts. 
 
Figure 5.2: Map showing sampled Districts. 
 
Source: adapted from (UN 2013). 
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Ntcheu 
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Thyolo 
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TAs (stratified purposively sampled) 
Within each sampled district, I identified the highest- and lowest-functionality TAs, 
using either the 2005 WP Database or (where available) more recent district-wide 
secondary data.  Unless there were compelling reasons to the contrary, I selected 
these TAs as the next layer of the sampling frame. Exceptions occurred in Ntcheu, 
where I selected Kwataine and Masitimale (both low-functionality) rather than 
Mpando since a new NGO project had recently started in the latter; and in 
Mangochi, where I selected Mbwana Nyambi instead of Makanjira, because the 
functionality data from the latter was reportedly highly inaccurate.  It was only 
after completing fieldwork in the first District, Ntcheu, that I decided to change 
the sampling frame to include one low-functionality and one high-functionality TA 
in each district in order to get a broader picture of each location, hence the 
asymmetrical sample of TAs.  
 
Table 5.2: Sampled TAs, by District. 
District 
(%Functionality; 
#WPs) 
Selected TAs (%Functionality) TA Data Source 
High 
Functionality 
Low Functionality 
Ntcheu  
(53.4%; 2691) 
- Chakhumbira (43.2%) and 
Kwataine (48.4%) 
2005 WP Database plus 
DWO advice, July 2011 
Mangochi  
(80.0%; 3240) 
Mbwana Nyambi 
(93.4%) 
Nankumba  
(73.2%) 
2010 UNICEF WP Atlas plus 
DWO advice, October 2011 
Thyolo  
(83.6%; 1270) 
Chimaliro  
(85.0%) 
Nsabwe  
(49.6%) 
DWO advice, July 2012 
Chikwawa  
(49.1%; 1408) 
Masache 
(96.1%) 
Lundu 
(44.5%) 
District WP database, July 
2012 
Note: District level data is from the 2005 WP database, which is the basis on which the Districts 
were sampled; but at the time of fieldwork this data was out of date. 
 
VDCs (randomly sampled) 
Clustering the sample by VDC was both logistically and analytically helpful.  It 
minimised travel time, which was by public means (between VDCs) and by foot or 
 168 
bicycle (within VDCs).  Spending a whole day in one VDC, rather than a short visit 
to an individual water point, facilitated the use of more than one research 
instrument in one place, enabling triangulation of findings.  
 
I sampled three VDCs in each TA, on the basis that this would provide sufficient 
data while still being logistically manageable. Experience suggested that it would 
be important to use random sampling at this level, in order to avoid the likelihood 
that gatekeepers (specifically, District Water Officers) might direct me towards 
unrepresentative VDCs.  I therefore used a random number table to select three 
VDCs per TA from a full list of VDCs sourced from the district.  The sampled VDCs 
are listed in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Sampled VDCs, by TA and District. 
District TA VDC Fieldwork 
Ntcheu 
Chakhumbira 
Zidana 
Tchayatchaya 
Namale July 2011 
Kwataine 
Masitimale  
Chimphamba 
Nachiye 
Mangochi 
Mbwana Nyambi 
Mkumba 
Mzinda 
Kumbalama 
October 2011 
Nankumba 
Chamba 
Kasankha 
Chiwalo 
Thyolo 
Nsabwe 
Ndaona 
Chalonda 
Mzundu 
June 2012 
Chimaliro 
Chidothe 
January 
Boyidi 
Chikwawa 
Lundu 
Tomali 
Sekeni 
Nkhwazi 
June / July 2012 
Masache 
Jackson 
Mphonde 
Masache 
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Water points (randomly sampled) 
Once again, experience indicated that random selection of water points would be 
essential to avoid the possibility of village informants directing me towards 
unrepresentative sites.  Since accurate lists of water points in each VDC are non-
existent, it was necessary to compile such a list at the introductory meeting in 
each VDC, with the help of the Village Head(s) and VDC members.  This listing 
process generally involved 6-10 informants and took approximately one hour.  Once 
the list was complete, I used a random number table to select four improved water 
points (regardless of functionality) at which surveys of Users and Managers would 
be conducted in Chichewa by my research assistant, Yanjanani (Yanja) 
Chimpokosera.  I surveyed as many as possible of the other water points on the list 
myself, using a shorter survey format and working through an interpreter from the 
VDC. 
 
Survey respondents (purposively sampled) 
At each sampled water point, Yanja surveyed two types of respondent: Managers 
(i.e. individuals with responsibility for managing or maintaining the water point, 
such as Water Point Committee members), and Users (i.e. people who collect 
and/or consume water from the water point). Generally, two Users and one 
Manager were surveyed to enable triangulation of responses; precise respondent 
numbers are shown in Appendix 8. Convenience sampling was used to select 
Managers; often, only one was available. Convenience sampling was also used to 
select Users, either on the basis that the respondent was using the water point at 
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the time of the survey (which is in itself a fairly random circumstance), or because 
their home was close to it. 
 
Key informants (purposively sampled) 
Complementing the village-level fieldwork, a purposive sample of key informants 
was drawn up at national and district level, as shown in Table 5.4.  I aimed to 
recruit 5 informants from each of the 4 categories.  Although this was lower than 
the 6-12 interviews per category of informant suggested as sufficient to achieve 
saturation by Guest, Bunce et al. (2006), it provided a large and varied enough 
sample to be relatively representative. These informants were asked to participate 
in semi-structured interviews and a ranking exercise. 
 
Table 5.4: Sampling frame for key informants. 
Category Examples 
National Government Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development 
Local Government District Water Officers 
Director of Planning and Development 
Area Mechanics 
Donor UNICEF 
DFID 
JICA 
Non-Governmental Organisation WaterAid 
Engineers Without Borders 
Concern Universal 
Water for People 
WES Network 
 
Additionally, a courtesy call was paid to the Traditional Authority in each research 
site, and meetings were held with the Group Village Head and VDC members in 
each location.  Although not formal interviews, these meetings also yielded data in 
the form of field notes.  Appendix 9 list the key informants. 
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5.2 METHODS 
 
This section outlines the approach taken to data collection and fieldwork, the 
research instruments used, and questions of research ethics.  
 
5.2.1 Data collection 
 
This study set out to make use of both numerical and narrative data, from both 
primary and secondary sources (Table 5.5).   
 
Table 5.5: Data types used in this study. 
 Primary Secondary 
Quantitative User, Manager and Water Point 
surveys 
2005 WP Database 
Qualitative Interviews with key informants, 
including factor ranking 
exercise. Field/survey notes. 
Blog posts by EWB Fellows. 
 
Secondary quantitative data - the 2005 Malawi WP Database, sourced from UNICEF 
Malawi - was used as a basis for some initial sampling decisions.  It was also used 
for the first level of analysis, to explore the influence of three of the ten 
proximate explanatory variables.  Primary quantitative and qualitative data were 
then collected in the field.  After fieldwork was completed and the primary data 
analysed, secondary qualitative data (sourced from the internet) was used to 
triangulate the findings.  The data sources are discussed in more detail in section 
5.3. 
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Initially, visual research methods, and water point mapping in particular, were of 
particular interest to me.  The data collected for the Malawi 2005 WP database was 
originally intended to be used in map format, and several initiatives in recent years 
have explored the potential of mapping for monitoring water point performance 
(Pearce and Howman 2013).  However, the same practicalities which have limited 
the uptake of mapping in the sector (access to software, sufficiently powerful 
computers, and the skills to use them) also affected me.  It soon became clear that 
developing the capacity to use maps effectively as part of this study would require 
time and resources that I did not possess.  Instead, like many Malawian District 
Water Officers, I relied on working with data in Excel and SPSS rather than in 
ArcGIS. 
 
Fieldwork 
Owing to family circumstances, I was unable to spend long periods of time 
conducting fieldwork in Malawi. However, it was possible to overcome this 
constraint with a combination of thoughtful research design, an excellent local 
research assistant (Yanja), and several shorter field visits.  Three such trips 
totalling eight weeks were undertaken: three weeks in July 2011 (Ntcheu), two 
weeks in October 2011 (Mangochi), and three weeks in June/July 2012 (Thyolo and 
Chikhwawa).  Fieldwork was timed to coincide with the dry season, when rural 
roads are most easily passable, and when water points are most likely to run dry. 
 
Each trip followed the same pattern. After a day in the district capital, 
interviewing the District Water Officer and other key informants, and scheduling 
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visits, one full day was spent conducting research in each sampled VDC.  Travel was 
in public minibuses and pickups, by bicycle taxi and on foot; in some cases it took 
many hours to travel from one VDC to the next.  Accommodation was generally in 
villagers’ homes (often with the TA or GVH) and occasionally in guesthouses. 
 
A typical day’s fieldwork saw myself and Yanja arriving in a village at around 8am. 
The GVH was notified in advance (by phone and/or letter) of our visit and its 
purpose, and asked to assemble a group of 6-8 key informants (generally Village 
Heads and VDC members) and compile a list of water points.  It frequently took an 
hour for the meeting to assemble, and another hour to compile the list.  Yanja 
would then leave to conduct User and Manager surveys at the four randomly-
sampled water points, while I would accompany a local translator (often a VDC 
member) to visit as many of the other water points on the list as possible: this 
involved walking or cycling 10-20 km through the VDC, visiting 20-30 water points 
for 10-15 minutes each. At the end of the day we would pay the GVH a courtesy 
call, offer thanks, and leave. We made small thank-you gifts of money to the 
translators and guides who accompanied us throughout the day, and occasionally 
gave spare parts to WPC members when we felt confident that they were needed 
and would be used well. 
 
The official languages of Malawi are Chichewa (spoken by the majority) and English 
(spoken by those who have had some years of formal schooling). Other languages 
are widely spoken in particular areas; in TA Mbwana Nyambi, Mangochi District, the 
mother tongue was Yao.  Since the constraints on fieldwork duration meant I could 
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only learn some basic Chichewa phrases, the support of my research assistant, 
Yanja, was invaluable. Her role centred on conducting surveys of water point Users 
and Managers at village level, but she also played a crucial role in facilitating the 
research, particularly in terms of interactions with Traditional Authorities and local 
chiefs. 
 
Wherever possible, key stakeholders in the research were notified in advance.  The 
purpose of notification was threefold: a) to show courtesy, b) to request their 
advice and input, and c) to offer them the opportunity to ask questions or raise 
objections if they wished.  Before commencing any fieldwork in Districts I 
consulted key Ministry officials; in each District my first port of call was the District 
Water Officer, and in each TA, the Traditional Authority him/herself.  DWOs and 
TAs were very helpful in facilitating communication with sampled VDCs by phone or 
hand-delivered letter, although messages occasionally became scrambled. 
Nevertheless, we were welcomed in all TAs and villages, even when they were not 
expecting us. Likewise, all key informants contacted happily agreed to be 
interviewed, and only one was unavailable. 
 
5.2.2 Research instruments 
 
Structured surveys: Users, Managers, and Water Points 
Quantitative data was generated using a structured survey format (Appendices 3-
6).  The 8-page Manager survey (Appendix 6) was based on the 5-page User survey 
(Appendix 5), with the addition of extra sections on breakdown history and 
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management arrangements, on the assumption that Managers were more likely to 
have such information.  The one-page Water Point survey (Appendix 4), designed in 
response to need following data collection in the first District, focused on a few 
key questions, and the List survey (Appendix 3) captured the list of all water points 
in the area according to the VDC.  The survey formats were primarily designed to 
generate data for testing the ten proximate explanatory variables.  Appendix 11 
sets out the relationship between the variables and the survey questions.  The data 
was entered into, and analysed using, SPSS. 
 
Careful consideration was given to the possibility of collecting survey data using 
smartphones - a rapidly-growing area of action research in WASH and other sectors 
(Christensen, Mikkelsen et al. 2011, Jones, Drury et al. 2011, Dillon 2012). 
Advantages include the elimination of time-consuming data entry at a later date, 
the ability to ensure that inconsistencies are identified in the field and that there 
are no missing responses, and the ability to integrate audio and visual data 
collection into the survey.  Accordingly I identified suitable software (Open Data 
Kit), used it to build the survey, and fully intended to use it to conduct the 
research.  However, during the first week of fieldwork and before data collection 
commenced, it became apparent that this would not work for technical and 
logistical reasons - once I arrived in Malawi that I discovered that bright sunshine 
on the screen made it very difficult to record data outdoors using the phone, and I 
also had serious concerns about battery life.  Instead, we used paper and pen.  In 
fact, this turned out to our advantage, as the much more flexible paper format 
allowed far greater latitude for recording qualitative information alongside survey 
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responses – data which subsequently proved analytically important.  Had we used 
smartphones, we would probably have failed to record a significant amount of 
useful and nuanced contextual information. 
 
Survey notes and observations 
Quantitative surveys are often criticised for rigidity.  As Robert Chambers observed 
in 1983, they ‘embody the concepts and categories of outsiders rather than those 
of rural people’ (Chambers 2008: 6), and analysis based on them is often simply the 
product of ‘fallible programming of fallible punching of fallible coding’ (ibid., 8).  
For Chambers’ reasons and others, surveys form only one part of my data.  I was 
also mindful of the experience of other water researchers; for example Haysom 
(2006) who quickly found that her structured questionnaire was too rigid and not a 
suitable instrument for her research in Tanzania, and that informal conversations 
were a more effective way to collect data.  On the one hand, I was wary of the 
possibility that such an approach might simply generate many non-comparable 
anecdotes; on the other hand, I was convinced that such informal conversations 
could be vitally important sources of nuanced insight that might not be accessed or 
recorded through the survey process.  Accordingly, I requested Yanja to make notes 
in the margins of the survey forms whenever the respondent added contextual 
information.  These notes were then typed up and coded in NVivo. 
 
Semi-structured interviews and factor ranking exercise 
A semi-structured interview schedule (Appendix 7) was used to structure data 
collection from key informants, although in practice interviews often took a more 
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fluid form.  Interviewees were also asked to complete a ‘factor ranking exercise’ in 
which they were asked to identify in their own words the key factors influencing 
water point sustainability, and to allocate percentage weightings to each factor to 
indicate their relative importance. 
 
5.2.3 Research ethics 
 
Overseas research poses special ethical challenges (ESRC 2012), including: 
• Misunderstandings arising from different languages and cultures, on the part 
of the researcher, the respondent(s), or both.  This was a moderate risk in 
this case, since I did not speak Chichewa or any other local Malawian 
language.  However, it was mitigated by the fact that English is one of the 
national languages of Malawi, by my prior experience in Malawi, and by my 
excellent local research assistant, Yanja. 
• Power inequalities between myself as the researcher and the respondents.  
This was a moderate risk due to the colonial and post-colonial history of 
Malawi, and also to the simple economic inequality between the research 
respondents and myself: my plane ticket alone cost far more than an 
average rural household’s annual income. 
 
Such ethical concerns were arguably somewhat heightened by conducting fieldwork 
in short bursts, thus reducing the length of time in the field and hence the 
opportunity to develop cultural and linguistic understanding, as well as increasing 
the cost of fieldwork.  However, all research is constrained by pragmatic issues, 
 178 
and I gave careful thought to overcoming these challenges.  The remainder of this 
section demonstrates how this study meets the standards set in the ESRC’s 
Framework for Research Ethics (ESRC 2012). 
 
Integrity, quality and transparency 
The purpose and methods of this research were made transparent to research 
subjects from the start, through an information sheet (Appendix 1) and/or verbal 
introduction.  The research design and methods were reviewed in accordance with 
University of Birmingham and ESRC Ethical Review procedures.   
 
Informed consent 
All participants were informed of the purpose, methods and intended possible uses 
of the research, and what their participation entailed.  Interviewees were given a 
one-page written consent form (Appendix 2) while survey respondents were 
informed orally, due to low literacy levels in rural villages.  Respondents were 
informed of their right to withdraw at any point, and interviewees were re-
contacted at the end of the writing-up process to secure consent for the use of 
specific quotes. 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
I understand ‘anonymity’ to mean that research participants should not be 
identifiable by readers of the research, and should be protected, for example, 
through the use of pseudonyms; and ‘confidentiality’ to mean that research data 
should only be seen by a limited number of people who have a legitimate need to 
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access it.  Anonymity is a means of ensuring confidentiality (Wiles, Crow et al. 
2008). 
 
Although respondents at village level were always more than happy to give their 
names, even if they were making critical comments, I have anonymised all 
responses, whether surveys or interviews.  Where I refer to a particular survey, I 
identify the source by its type (U=User, M=Manager, W=Water point) and number in 
my SPSS dataset.  For interviews, I indicate only the category of interviewee (local 
or national government official, donor, or NGO). 
 
Confidentiality was ensured through secure data collection and storage, with only 
myself and Yanja having access to the paper data.  Electronic data was held on 
password-protected computers and a password-protected online backup site. 
 
Voluntary participation 
All respondents participated entirely voluntarily. No payment was made to survey 
respondents or interviewees, although as noted above we made small payments to 
guides and translators.  In the overwhelming majority of cases, people were very 
keen to speak to us.  At village level, I was well aware that this might be due to 
false expectations regarding access to resources, and I was careful to emphasise 
my status as a research student, not a donor.  When pressed for resources on one 
or two occasions, my response was to highlight existing local support mechanisms 
(especially the District Water Office) and encourage their use. 
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Harm avoidance 
For the respondents, participation was low risk as the research was on a relatively 
uncontroversial topic.  I had wondered whether respondents might be exposed to 
some risk if they revealed evidence of wrong-doing (for example, embezzlement of 
funds), but a large proportion of respondents did indeed discuss such matters 
openly.  Anonymisation provided further protection for all respondents. 
 
For the researchers, the main risk associated with the project was involvement in a 
road traffic accident.  Death rates from traffic accidents are far higher in Malawi 
than in the UK (26 per 100,000 population per year in Malawi, compared with 3.59 
in the UK8) despite much lower vehicle access in Malawi. As far as possible the risk 
was minimised through careful choice of means of transport.  The minor risk of ill 
health from contaminated food or water was minimised through careful choice of 
food and drink; as anticipated, drinking village borehole water did not cause any 
health problems. 
 
Independence 
The research was independently designed and conducted, without affiliation to any 
particular organisation (aside from University of Birmingham) or viewpoint.  ESRC 
studentship funding gave me complete independence, and all those who assisted 
the research in Malawi did so without any expectation of unduly influencing its 
findings. 
 
                                         
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_traffic-related_death_rate 
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Participant voice 
The ultimate purpose of this research was to contribute to improvements in access 
to clean water in rural Malawi by improving understanding of the factors underlying 
water point sustainability - or failure.  I was conscious that my presence might lead 
villagers to hope for external support, and I tried to address this both through 
managing their expectations (i.e. emphasising my status as an independent 
researcher with no NGO/donor connections) and minimising my demands on 
people’s time (e.g. specifying that only a few VDC members should meet us, 
specifying only one translator to accompany me).  I also attempted to ensure that 
the study would provide a channel for the voices of water point users and managers 
to be heard clearly without distortion relating to institutional agendas or 
fundraising priorities.   
 
  
 182 
5.3 DATA SOURCES, QUALITY, AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.3.1 Data sources 
 
Table 5.6 summarises the data sources on which this study’s analysis is based.  The 
sample differed slightly in practice from the sampling framework set out in section 
5.1. Table 5.7 outlines the (minor) differences. 
 
Table 5.6: Summary of data sources for this study. 
 Primary Secondary 
Quantitative Surveys:  
177 users, 99 managers, 338 surveyed water points, 
341 listed water points.   
Dataset has 955 cases, 266 variables. 
2005 WP Database:  
49,517 cases, 20 variables. 
Qualitative Survey notes:  
177 users, 99 managers, 338 water points. 
Interviews with 26 respondents:  
6 local government, 5 national government, 6 donors, 
9 NGOs, 1 area mechanic. 
Factor ranking exercise: 19 respondents among the 
26 interviewees. 
Blogs:  
28 bloggers,  
739 posts, spanning Sept 
2008 – Feb 2013. 
 
Table 5.7: Sample: Intended and actual. 
 Intended Actual Notes 
Districts 4  4 2 high-functionality and 2 low-functionality 
TAs 8 8 1 high-functionality and 1 low-functionality per district, except in 
Ntcheu (both low-functionality), because I changed the TA sampling 
frame after the first fieldwork trip in order to get a broader picture 
of water point performance in each District. 
VDCs 24  25 Only W data was collected in two of the VDCs. 
WPs 96 92 One of the Ntcheu VDCs had no improved WPs. 
Users 192 177  
Managers 96 99  
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Primary quantitative: Surveys 
Within the 25 VDCs, a total of 679 improved water points were listed by community 
leaders9.  We conducted a Water Point (W) survey at 338 of the 679 water points 
(49.8%) using convenience sampling, and in-depth User (U) and/or Manager (M) 
surveys at 92 randomly-sampled water points (13.5%) (Table 5.8). 
 
Table 5.8: Water points sampled for User and Manager surveys, by District. 
District # WPs 
Ntcheu 21 
Mangochi 24 
Thyolo 23 
Chikhwawa 24 
Total 92 
 
At the majority of these 92 randomly-sampled water points (n=61, 66%), two User 
surveys and one Manager survey were carried out.  At the others, either 0, 1 or 2 
Users and/or Managers were surveyed, depending on whether respondents could be 
found.  For each sampled water point, between 1 and 4 Users and/or Manager 
surveys were completed.  The total number of surveys conducted is shown in Table 
5.9.  97% of Users surveyed were female; for Managers, gender is not known for 
16% of respondents, but 57% of the remainder were female and 43% were male. 
 
  
                                         
9 Data was also collected on unimproved sources, but these have been excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 5.9: Number of surveys conducted in each District. 
 Survey Type Intended 
Sample per 
District 
Actual Sample Size Total 
Ntcheu 
* 
Mangochi Thyolo Chikhwawa 
** 
L WPs listed but not 
surveyed 
- 81 105 132 23 341 
W Water points - 90 115 79 54 338 
 Total # WPs in sampled 
VDCs 
- 171 220 211 77 679 
 Total # WPs sampled 
for U and M surveys 
24 21 24 23 24 92 
U Users 48 38 48 46 45* 177* 
M Managers*** 24 32 26 21 20 99 
 Total # Respondents 72 70 74 67 65 276 
Notes: 
* In Tchayatchaya VDC in Ntcheu, no User or Manager surveys were conducted because there were 
no improved water points. Comprehensive field notes were taken instead. 
** Considerably fewer water points were surveyed in Chikhwawa than in the other districts because 
several of the Chikhwawa VDCs had very few water points.  Additionally, for 3 of the User surveys in 
Chikhwawa, only narrative notes were taken and the survey proper was not conducted; these were 
essentially interviews rather than surveys. 
*** Some Manager surveys were conducted with several committee members together, with their 
collective responses recorded on one survey. 
 
While there are some slight differences in sample size between districts, I contend 
that the sample is sufficiently well balanced to obviate any need to apply 
weighting procedures to the data. 
 
Data was collected using four separate, though related, instruments: surveys for 
Users, Managers, and Water points, plus a form for listing all water points in the 
VDC.  Appendix 11  shows the relationships between the survey questions and the 
variables (outcome variables and proximate explanatory variables) that are the 
focus of this study.  Data was entered into SPSS for analysis, and the resulting 
dataset comprises 955 cases and 266 variables. 
 
  
 185 
Primary qualitative: Interviews, survey notes, factor rankings 
I conducted 20 formal semi-structured interviews with a total of 26 respondents; 5 
were joint interviews.  Fourteen of the interviews were voice-recorded then 
transcribed in full; comprehensive notes were taken at the other six.  Nineteen of 
the 26 individuals also provided responses to the factor ranking exercise.   
 
The second major source of primary qualitative data (in fact the most significant in 
terms of volume, running to 283kb in contrast with the 162kb of interview 
material) was survey notes.  These notes derived from three sources: 1) notes 
taken by Yanja in the margins of the User and Manager surveys, reporting 
information from her conversations with respondents; 2) my own equivalent notes 
on the Water Point surveys; and 3) other fieldwork notes.  All were transcribed into 
NVivo for coding and analysis, as described in Section 5.3.3. 
 
Secondary quantitative: 2005 Malawi WP database  
The 2005 Malawi WP Database provided a starting point both for sampling and for 
quantitative analysis.  The data, covering 49,517 water points in 26 of the 28 
districts in Malawi10, was collected over a period of 3 years (May 2002 to June 
2005) by ten different NGOs in a process initiated by WaterAid (Welle 2005). A very 
small minority of water points had more recent entries from subsequent data 
collection exercises. The database was published by UNICEF in 2006 and is officially 
                                         
10 At the time that the survey was conducted, Neno district (created in 2003) was still part of 
Mwanza district.  It appears that no data was collected for Ntchisi district in Central region. 
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‘owned’ by the MOIWD, although the master copy of the database is still housed by 
UNICEF.   
 
Although the survey format included questions on maintenance and whether a 
committee was in place (Kampala 2007), the version of the database to which I had 
access did not include data on these questions, and consequently the analytical 
value of the database was more limited than I had at first hoped. In fact, I was only 
able to use it for analysis of one outcome variable (FUNCT) and three proximate 
explanatory variables (WPTYPE, INSTQUAL, and AGE), and additionally for 
exploration of geographical variation in functionality (by region, district, or TA). 
 
As described in Section 5.1.3, I also used the 2005 WP database as a sampling 
frame, except in Mangochi and Chikhwawa districts, where more recent water 
point databases had been compiled. 
 
Secondary qualitative: Blogs 
Secondary qualitative data was sourced from the blog posts of 28 Fellows of the 
NGO Engineers Without Borders (EWB), spanning the period 2008-2013.  The EWB 
Fellows are Canadian professionals or students with a background or interest in 
WASH, who undertake voluntary placements in Malawi, generally in District Water 
Offices.  Since I was unable to undertake such a placement myself, their blogs 
provided an alternative window on life in a District Water Office. In a sense, these 
represented ‘field notes’ by individuals undertaking the type of fieldwork that I 
would myself have done, if not for other commitments.  
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Placement duration varied widely (from 3 to 35 months), as did the analytical value 
of the blogs. Longer-term Fellows generally worked in more than one location. The 
data comprised 739 blog posts totalling 1377 KB of data, i.e. nearly five times as 
much data as in the survey notes. Inevitably, the data had limitations: many of the 
posts were irrelevant; the authors had a very particular perspective (expatriate, 
young, inexperienced); and the public, permanent nature of blogging undoubtedly 
influenced what people wrote.  Nevertheless, analysis of this material represents 
an innovative approach to accessing fresh insights on the research questions. 
 
I coded the blogs last, largely using emergent coding; and I used this secondary 
qualitative data to triangulate my primary findings rather than as a major source of 
analytical conclusions. 
 
Mixed methods: combining data sources 
In summary, this study draws on four main types of data, from several sources.  
The purpose of combining data types and sources in this way is to arrive at a 
richer, more nuanced understanding of the subject of study than can be achieved 
using a single approach.  The data were collected and analysed in an iterative 
pattern, with insights from one feeding into another to build up a nuanced, 
multifaceted picture of the study topic, from which conclusions were drawn only if 
they were supported by evidence from multiple data sources. 
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5.3.2 Data quality 
 
The conclusions of any research are only as sound as the data on which they rest; 
hence, consideration of data quality is essential both when designing a study, and 
when analysing the results.  Good research design is key to minimising bias that 
may otherwise arise from unrepresentative sampling or from human cognitive 
biases (Kahneman 2012). However, other forms of bias may also affect the data 
collected, notably ‘courtesy bias’ on the part of respondents (White and Phillips 
2012).  The impact of this phenomenon on this study is discussed below, following a 
broader consideration of data quality issues overall, as they relate to quantitative, 
qualitative, and mixed methods data and approaches.  Codes in brackets refer to 
specific example of the phenomena under discussion; e.g. W367 means Water Point 
Survey #367, and U219 means User Survey #219. 
 
Quality of quantitative data 
Typically, quantitative analysis is concerned with two aspects of data quality: 
reliability and validity (Bryman 2008: 149-150). 
 
Reliability refers to whether a measure is consistent.  It has three aspects: 
• Stability, i.e. that one respondent’s answers to the same question put 
repeatedly are consistent (‘test-retest reliability’);  
• Internal reliability, i.e. that one respondent’s answers to related questions 
are consistent; 
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• Inter-observer consistency, i.e. that multiple respondents’ answers to the 
same question are not contradictory. 
 
Validity refers to whether a variable actually measures what it sets out to 
measure. It has two key aspects:  
• Criterion validity, i.e. that the instrument is an accurate reflection of the 
phenomenon being measured.  For example, a measure of quantity of water 
consumed would not be a valid measure of water quality. 
• Content validity, i.e. that the instrument measures the whole item being 
measured.  For example, a measure of water point functionality should 
assess both whether the water point produces water, and whether people 
actually use it.  
 
Primary quantitative data 
In general, I consider that both criterion validity and content validity of my data 
are robust: the survey questions were designed to encapsulate the phenomenon 
being studied both accurately and comprehensively.  In designing the survey, I 
erred on the side of completeness rather than brevity in order to maximise validity. 
For example, instead of simply asking ‘do people contribute to a water point 
maintenance fund’, my surveys included 31 questions with bearing on water point 
finances, of which 20 were included in both U and M surveys: detailed questions 
about whether people were supposed to contribute, how much, whether they did in 
practice, whether anyone was exempt, whether there was a penalty for non-
payment, when and how much the respondent last contributed, how much had 
 190 
been saved for water point maintenance and repairs, whether the committee 
reported back to all villagers on what was done with the contributions, and so on.  
The advantage of such an approach is that it enables the researcher to ‘dig down’ 
beyond initial responses to get closer to an objective assessment; indeed, Yanja 
herself observed that these surveys generated much more accurate data than 
other, more ‘shallow’ surveys that she had previously conducted.  However, the 
disadvantage is that it may generate a set of responses that are internally 
contradictory; hence, efforts to increase validity highlight problems in reliability, 
illustrating the fact that the problem is not so much with the data collection 
methods as with human inconsistency. 
 
Stability implies that another researcher going back to the same individuals and 
asking the same questions would get the same answers.  However, there are 
several reasons to doubt this, the main one being respondent bias.  Certainly for 
the water points I surveyed myself, my identity as an affluent white outsider 
inevitably influenced people’s responses. On numerous occasions, it appeared that 
respondents were telling me what they thought I wanted to hear, rather than what 
was actually true.  Initial answers often represented the theory of water point 
management (active gender-balanced committee meeting regularly, frequent 
financial contributions by all villagers), rather than the reality of what was actually 
happening in practice, which only became clear after further questioning.  On one 
or two occasions, major distortion was apparent: for example, my translator in one 
VDC told a patently false story about having used extraordinarily large sums of his 
own money to fix a water point, apparently in hope of accessing resources from me 
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(W141).  Overall, it seems probable that a different researcher asking the same 
people the same questions might well obtain somewhat different answers, 
depending on the respondents’ perception of the researcher.  Nonetheless, I 
suggest that the broad correlation between the findings from Yanja’s surveys and 
my own, and our success in ‘digging deeper’ as surveys and interviews progressed, 
mean that although individually unstable, taken together the responses are still 
collectively reliable. 
 
Recollection problems might also affect stability of the data; a large proportion of 
responses recorded on the surveys were ‘don’t knows’. In the field, it was 
noticeable that people quite often responded to the question ‘why did the water 
point break down’ by listing a large number of things that may or may not have 
gone wrong with it (‘rod, U-seal, rod connectors, hanger pin…’) (M068/W562; 
W674; W763; W768; W773) – but which were unlikely all to have broken 
simultaneously. It seemed plausible that respondents were offering a range of 
responses to ‘test’ whether I would be satisfied with one of them, and it frequently 
took 5-10 minutes of close questioning to get clearer answers. 
 
The problem of internal reliability, or inconsistency, has already been touched 
upon above: respondents quite frequently contradicted themselves.  Sometimes 
this was clear from the survey responses alone: for example: U2 said financial 
arrangements were ‘very poor’ (Q63) but still said she was ‘quite satisfied’ with 
financial arrangements (Q70); M20 said the water point had been out of order for 
30 days in the past year, but zero days in the past 5 years;  M29 said the WPC met 
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once a month (Q84) but then said the last meeting was in November, 8 months 
previously (Q85); M37 said that the committee was active (despite the borehole 
being broken down for a long time) and last met in May; but that ‘none’ attended 
the meeting; M39 said the WPC was not active (Q80) but then said it met every 
month, including the previous Tuesday (Q81).  Overall, inconsistent responses were 
especially common regarding the existence and activity of WPCs, and regarding 
financial management. 
 
In other cases, responses to survey questions were consistent, but then 
contradicted by the qualitative data in the survey notes.  One example is U123, a 
user of W630, whose survey responses on water point finances (pay occasionally, 
MWK50/hh/month, elderly are exempt, everyone else contributes, last collection 
was 3 months ago, the committee always report back on expenditure, financial 
management is good) were flatly contradicted by Yanja’s notes from her 
conversation with U123: ‘This is the third committee and is not trained.  All that 
were trained are no longer WPC members.  For this borehole the community don’t 
contribute and the WPC is not active because the community speaks a lot on funds 
management so the WPC stopped asking for anything.  The community thinks that 
the WPC are eating their money’.  In such cases I was often more inclined to 
believe the detailed, nuanced notes rather than the survey responses.  
Triangulation with other respondents also increased certainty; in this case, both of 
the other respondents for this water point (U124 and M74) indicated problems with 
the committee, suggesting that the U123 notes rather than the survey were more 
accurate.  
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Inter-observer inconsistency was also noted; there are numerous examples in the 
data of two respondents giving contradictory answers to the same question (e.g. 
between M19 and M20 on financial management; between M42 and M43 on financial 
contributions; between user and translator regarding rod numbers at W567; 
between M66 and M67 on access to spares).  Sometimes this could be put down to 
differences in knowledge (e.g. between Users and Managers), or differing 
perspectives or interpretations of what happened; but more frequently it seemed 
to be either a product of ignorance or a deliberate strategy.  Where there was no 
third source with which to triangulate, I found myself in a difficult position: which 
version should I choose to believe?  And if I chose the most ‘plausible’, would I 
simply be distorting the data with my own preconceptions? 
 
A simple, easily-resolvable example of contradictory data relates to water point 
age.  Yanja and I frequently found that the information provided by the VDC at the 
listing meeting was inaccurate; true dates were generally inscribed in the water 
point’s concrete civil works. This was particularly noticeable in VDC 3A3, where the 
listed installation dates were often several years out (e.g. W576 listed as 2010 but 
actually 2006; W577 listed as ‘2008 CU’ but actually ‘2005 COMWASH’) and was also 
a problem in VDC 3B1 (e.g. W595 was listed as ‘2002 PROSCAP functioning 
borehole’; but in fact was found to be ‘1998 MASAF non-functioning borehole’). 
 
An extreme form of unreliable data is data that is obviously unbelievable. In a 
number of places I annotated my survey notes with ‘don’t believe’, recording my 
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sense that I was being told a story with little relation to reality.  In some cases this 
was prompted by glaring inconsistencies or contradictions; in others, by my sense 
that the report was such an outlier, when placed in the wider context, that it was 
unlikely to be true.  For example, at W655 I was told that the WPC was trained for 
‘one month’; at W672 I was told at first that the water point had 1000 users (the 
estimate was later revised to a more plausible 26 households); M25 said they had 
dismantled the borehole 2-3 times each week in the last year; and M82 reported 
that it took a 6 hour return journey and K1000 to get spares – although this village 
was only a few kilometres from a major trading centre. 
 
Secondary quantitative data 
It is harder to judge reliability and validity of the 2005 Malawi WP Database and 
other secondary data sources simply because there is far less information available 
regarding the data collection process.  The data appear to be reliable and valid, 
and have been used by others (international donors, and the Malawi government) 
as though they are.  However, the examples below suggest that this secondary data 
may be subject to the same flaws as the primary data. 
• An EWB Fellow who spent some time exploring the 2005 Database found 
significant clustering of GPS coordinates, strongly suggesting that surveyors 
had entered data for some water points without actually visiting them (B25); 
similar problems have been noted by other researchers in the WASH sector in 
Malawi (Delaplace 2011). 
• The mapping process was conducted at different times by different agencies 
in different districts.  As a result, there is some variability in the type and 
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quality of data collected (for example, some categories are only used for 
some districts), and there are likely to have been other systematic 
differences in the way that responses were coded in different districts. 
• In Mangochi District, I was reliably informed that the most recent data for 
Makanjira (which appeared to have the highest functionality rate of all TAs 
in the District) was highly unlikely to be accurate. Makanjira is the most 
remote TA, and my informants stated that fuel shortages had prevented 
accurate mapping of its water points; instead, they implied, the data might 
have been (partly) invented.  If so, this would be an extreme example of 
content invalidity, where the measure (functionality rate) bears no relation 
at all to what it is supposed to represent. 
• Also in Mangochi District, problems with analysing data had resulted in 
obviously inaccurate statistics (such as a claim of 124% functionality) being 
published in the most recent District Water Point Atlas (Mangochi District 
Council 2010). 
 
In summary, despite careful attention to research design and methods, there are 
some significant concerns relating to reliability and validity of the quantitative 
data in this study – although, in some cases, triangulation with qualitative data 
helps strengthen the reliability of quantitative data.  Two important conclusions 
emerge: 1) specifically regarding this study, that these caveats regarding reliability 
and validity must be borne in mind when interpreting the data; and 2) more 
generally, that the ‘neatness’ of quantitative data may easily conceal considerable 
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‘fuzziness’ due to the way in which the researcher or the respondent has decided 
to simplify complex information about reality. 
 
Quality of qualitative data 
I now consider qualitative data.  To a considerable extent, the criteria of reliability 
and validity can be applied to qualitative research with only minor adjustments 
(Bryman 2008).  However, some authors have proposed alternative criteria: Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) suggest credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability; Tracy (2010) proposes eight criteria; and Spencer and Britain (2003) 
list eighteen.  While the alternative approaches all have some merit, in practice 
three key issues were most prominent in this study: reliability was sometimes 
compromised by translation problems, and validity was called into question by 
respondent bias and researcher bias. 
 
Primary qualitative data 
Translation problems mainly affected the W surveys and associated survey notes, 
i.e. the village-level data I collected independently, separately from Yanja. These 
problems took two forms, ‘incomprehension’ (where the translator had insufficient 
skills in English to actually translate in either direction), and ‘insertion’ (where the 
translator inserted his or her own views rather than translating, a problem that 
occurred in both directions).  ‘Incomprehension’ rendered my research particularly 
difficult in two VDCs, Mkumba and Chamba. ‘Insertion’ was a problem in another 
five VDCs, and particularly in Mzundu; of course, it may have been more 
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widespread, but would have gone undetected precisely because of my lack of 
knowledge of Chichewa. 
 
Respondent bias was frequently apparent during fieldwork. While I take a broadly 
realist or pragmatic approach in this study, rooted in a belief that it is possible to 
make objective statements about many aspects of the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of 
water point sustainability, I also acknowledge that multiple competing versions of 
the truth can seem equally plausible, depending on one’s perspective.  
Respondents may produce different versions of ‘the truth’ depending on (their 
beliefs about) who is asking and why.  For the researcher, this can be 
problematic11.  
 
My survey notes frequently highlight the difficulties I encountered in reaching one 
clear version of events, even with regard to relatively simple closed questions such 
as ‘when was the last time this water point broke down?’  As noted earlier, I often 
felt that respondents’ main concern was to tell me what they thought I wanted to 
hear, rather than what actually was the case.  A classic example was a TA’s 
assurance that the walk to the next day’s VDC was less than 3km, when in fact it 
was at least 10km.  Attempting to overcome this ‘courtesy bias’ (White and Phillips 
2012) frequently took five or ten minutes of careful questioning (and gentle 
highlighting of inconsistencies in responses) in order to arrive at a reasonable 
degree of clarity on issues such as water point breakdown history or financial 
                                         
11 I am, of course, well aware of the awkwardness of discussing such problems based largely on my 
gut feelings regarding the ‘truthiness’ (Colbert 2005) of my respondents and my data. 
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management.  This seemed partly to do with many respondents’ limited knowledge 
of the matter in question, e.g. not knowing what caused a particular breakdown.  
However, it also seemed to suggest that, by telling me different stories, 
respondents were trying to work out which one I might be more interested in or 
more likely to believe. 
 
My identity or ‘positionality’,that is, who my respondents perceived me to be 
(Jakobsen 2012), as an affluent white outsider, was of course a significant factor in 
this.  Respondents associated such people with donors and NGOs - sources of 
resources, and people with definite ideas about how community management of 
water points should be organised.  Despite my efforts to emphasise my student 
status, many respondents obviously still hoped that my research might be a 
precursor to funding. I had anticipated this at the design stage, when considering 
research ethics; accordingly, I endeavoured to communicate as clearly as possible 
both the limitations to what my research might achieve, and my desire to hear 
about the reality of community management, not the theory. 
 
My main approach to addressing respondent bias was triangulation, both at the 
time (questioning inconsistent responses) and retrospectively (comparing responses 
from different sources, including comparison of qualitative and quantitative data).  
Nevertheless, it was frequently difficult to get to a clear, single version of ‘the 
truth’, and the variability in the data often required considerable interpretation on 
my part. 
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The other side of this phenomenon, researcher bias, must also be acknowledged.  
The scope for researcher bias is higher when discussions are not audio-recorded, as 
was the case for all village-level fieldwork. Much of the qualitative data is 
therefore in the form of written notes, and it is likely that researcher bias shaped 
what we were most predisposed to hear and record in writing.  Additionally, we 
cannot be certain whether the notes are verbatim transcripts of a respondent’s 
answer, or the rephrasing of a researcher or translator.  When reporting findings in 
subsequent chapters, I use quotation marks to indicate quotes from the written 
notes; these should be taken as endeavouring to convey the respondent’s meaning 
as accurately as possible, but may not be exactly what the person in question said 
themselves, word for word. 
 
These three issues, and especially the second, must to some extent call into 
question the robustness of the data, and consequently of my conclusions.  The 
difficulty of ensuring reliability and eliminating bias is a challenge faced in all 
research, but especially research such as this, in which the researcher represents 
potential access to resources and so the respondents have strong incentives to try 
to give the most advantageous, rather than the most accurate, response.  It is also 
inevitable that on a short visit one will only obtain a limited insight into the 
interplay of local political, economic, social and cultural interests that may shape 
responses.  The best that can be done is to openly acknowledge issues regarding 
data quality, to deal transparently with questionable data, and to be careful only 
to draw conclusions that the data can support.  The use of Nvivo to code the 
qualitative data helps ensure transparency, since coding decisions can be audited. 
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Secondary qualitative data 
Blog posts are subject to a very particular type of respondent bias due to their 
public, personal and permanent nature.  Bloggers write for a purpose; in the case 
of the EWB fellows, this was often mainly to communicate with friends and family 
back in Canada, although some appeared to use their blog as a forum for more 
philosophical reflections and as a means of communication with the wider global 
community of ‘people interested in development who read blogs’.  Additionally, 
the bloggers analysed here are a self-selecting non-random sample of a very 
particular population group; as such, the external validity of their observations is 
arguably limited. 
 
Specific biases likely to affect the reliability and internal validity of the data 
include self-promotion (the likelihood that the blogger will mainly cast themselves 
in a positive light) and self-censorship (the likelihood that the blogger will hold 
back when writing about controversial issues and/or about individual colleagues).  
Examples of the latter include B24, although in other examples (B11, B13) EWB 
fellows wrote openly about corruption and programme failure.  Thus, as with the 
primary qualitative data, the researcher must exercise a considerable degree of 
judgement in analysing this data – which in itself can introduce further bias. 
 
Mixed methods: ensuring inference quality 
As outlined above, both the quantitative and qualitative data collected and 
analysed for this study are subject to various biases that affect data quality.  
However, use of mixed methods approaches helps in addressing challenges of 
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reliability and validity through triangulation (Bryman 1988).  Mixed methods 
approaches also help in distinguishing between data quality and inference quality 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003).  Having acknowledged the limitations in the data, 
we can still ensure that our inferences are sound, i.e. that the conclusions drawn 
are only those that can be supported by the data as a whole.  This is the approach 
taken in the chapters that follow. 
 
5.3.3 Data analysis 
 
In analysing all four types of data I made use of computer programmes: SPSS and 
Excel for quantitative data, and NVivo for qualitative data.  Here I set out briefly 
how I analysed the data, and my rationale for adopting particular approaches, as 
well as explaining how I combined both types of data to illuminate the research 
questions. 
 
Analysis of quantitative data 
In analysing this data using SPSS and Excel Pivot Tables, I relied on the guidance of 
Field (2009) and UCLA (2013).  Analysis was a multi-stage iterative process, as the 
primary dataset was complex, with multiple survey questions relating to each 
variable, and the dataset stratified at multiple levels.  In some cases data was 
recoded into new variables to facilitate analysis.  I began by using descriptive 
statistics to get a sense of the data, then used either Pearson’s chi square (for 
categorical explanatory variables) or logistic regression (for continuous explanatory 
variables) to analyse the factor’s relationship with functionality. 
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Most of the explanatory variables in the 2005 WP database, and many in my 
primary dataset, were categorical-nominal (e.g. District, WP Type, Funder) rather 
than continuous (e.g. WP Age, # Users, Months since last breakdown).  Since 
nominal data can only be used to consider frequencies (Field 2009: 9), this limited 
the type of statistical analysis that was possible.  
 
In some cases, in order to overcome this limitation, new datasets were computed 
from the originals.  For example for the 2005 Malawi WP Database, a new dataset 
was computed in which the cases are Districts, TAs, and WP Types (rather than 
individual water points). This enabled the calculation of continuous variables for 
these cases (such as % of functional water points in each TA), which in turn enabled 
the use of a wider range of analytical tools and statistical tests to interrogate the 
data. 
 
Analysis of qualitative data 
I found NVivo to be a valuable tool to help me process and analyse the substantial 
amounts of qualitative data collected (Bazeley 2007). I took two approaches to 
coding the interviews, survey notes and blogs: structured (deductive) and emergent 
(inductive).  I used a range of techniques to identify themes, especially repetitions 
and indigenous typologies (Ryan and Bernard 2003).  First, I coded the interviews 
and surveys according to the structure set out in the first part of my analytical 
framework, i.e. using the proximate explanatory variables and outcome variables.  
In some places I created new sub-variables, for example ‘Mismanagement of funds’ 
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under the variable ‘FUNDS’.  Second, I identified new (sets of) codes that emerged 
from the data, including sets for ‘Data Quality’, ‘Individuals and Institutions’ (or 
‘Actors’), and other ‘Emergent Codes’.  With hindsight, I could also have coded the 
material using the ‘water governance framework’ categories outlined in Chapter 
Four, or the Efficiency and Empowerment categories discussed in Chapter Three.  
Although I did not do this explicitly, these themes are drawn out in the analysis in 
Chapter Seven.  The final coding structure is reproduced in Appendix 12.  I used the 
coded data both to prioritise or weight factors and themes on the basis of 
frequency of appearance in the data, and to identify illustrative examples for a 
factor or theme. 
 
Mixed methods: integrating data analysis 
Conscious of the challenges to integration of quantitative and qualitative research 
findings (Bryman 2007, Mertens and Hesse-Biber 2012), I explored various 
approaches to combining my findings, before selecting the approach taken in the 
two chapters that follow.  During analysis, I moved frequently between the two 
types of data, enabling insights from one to inform my approach to the other – an 
‘iterative, cyclical approach’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2010: 275) that arose 
naturally from the simultaneous collection and processing of the data.  Three 
examples illustrate this: 
• Use of the proximate explanatory variables that were tested using the 
quantitative data as the first element of a two-stage approach to coding, to 
enable direct comparison between the findings from the survey notes, and 
the quantitative survey data. 
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• Use of the ‘theft’ coding of the survey notes to help retrospectively 
construct the ‘theft’ variable in the primary quantitative data.   
• Use of quantitative summaries of qualitative data (e.g. counting the number 
of times that different themes appeared in the data) to inform the degree of 
emphasis accorded to those themes in my analysis.   
 
Ultimately, the analysis aims to give equal attention to both datasets.  In Chapter 
Six, quantitative analysis of each variable is presented first, followed by qualitative 
analysis; this is not intended to suggest any primacy for statistics, but is simply the 
logical order given the deductive nature of that part of the study’s analytical 
framework.  Chapter Seven draws more heavily on the qualitative data, exploring 
themes highlighted by the analysis in the previous chapter. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter has set out my research strategy, design and methods in detail.  
Beginning with an explanation of my philosophical position, I have outlined my 
associated commitment to using mixed methods to answer my research questions.  
In setting out the careful sampling framework for this study, I have explained how 
this maximises the validity of the research.  By providing a detailed explanation of 
the methods used, and the way in which quantitative and qualitative data have 
been integrated in the study, I have emphasised both the scope and the rigour of 
the work, and the way that they support inference quality. 
 
This chapter has also carefully considered some of the key difficulties encountered 
regarding data quality – problems that are perhaps not always made explicit in 
reporting research, particularly where quantitative data are concerned.  I have 
explained the measures taken to overcome these challenges, including persistence 
and triangulation.  In summary, through a clear exposition of my research strategy, 
design and methods, I have demonstrated that this study is able to answer the 
research questions with accuracy, depth and confidence. 
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Chapter 6  
ANALYSIS OF PROXIMATE EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
 
Introduction 
 
The next two chapters present the results of my research.  The two-part 
presentation of the findings mirrors the two-part structure of the analytical 
framework.  First, in this chapter, I analyse the proximate determinants of 
sustainability identified in Chapter Two.  The bulk of the quantitative analysis is 
presented here, together with illustrative qualitative material.  Then, in Chapter 
Seven, I examine the underlying dynamics that shape these results, with reference 
to the framework and questions developed in Chapter Three. 
 
This chapter begins with a recap in Section 6.1 of the six outcome variables that 
are proxies for water point sustainability (Box 6.1). The advantages and 
disadvantages of each are discussed, and FUNCT is identified as the key outcome 
variable.   
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Box 6.1: Components of water point sustainability 
Component Variable name 
Functionality at time of survey FUNCT 
Frequency of breakdown BREAKFREQ 
Duration of breakdown BREAKLENGTH 
Days operational since installation DAYSFUNCT 
Quality of water WATERQUAL 
Quantity of water YIELD 
 
Next, Section 6.2 examines the influence on FUNCT of the ten proximate 
explanatory variables identified in Chapter 2 (Box 6.2).  The relative significance of 
each variable is assessed, based on analysis of both quantitative and qualitative 
data; and the most important factors are highlighted.   
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Box 6.2: Proximate explanatory variables for water point sustainability 
Design and installation factors Variable name 
Type of technology WPTYPE 
Quality of installation INSTQUAL 
User numbers USERS 
System age AGE 
Post-construction factors Variable name 
Frequency of maintenance MAINTFREQ 
Accessibility of spare parts SPARES 
Availability of maintenance and repair skills SKILLS 
Availability of funds for maintenance and repair FUNDS 
Availability of external support SUPPORT 
Incidence of theft THEFT 
 
Finally, Section 6.3 reports findings from the ‘factor ranking exercise’ conducted 
during the key informant interviews.  Chapter Seven then further interrogates the 
data, in order to explain these results. 
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6.1 OUTCOME VARIABLES 
 
In Chapter Two I defined the outcome of interest, water point sustainability, as 
‘continued functionality over time’. I also identified several components or 
proxies: functionality at the time of assessment (FUNCT), frequency of breakdown 
(BREAKFREQ), duration of breakdown (BREAKLENGTH), percentage of days 
functional in a given time period (%DAYSFUNCT), quality of water (WATERQUAL) 
and quantity of water (YIELD).  Three are continuous variables (BREAKFREQ, 
BREAKLENGTH, and DAYSFUNCT) while the others (FUNCT, WATERQUAL, and YIELD) 
are, in my dataset, categorical-nominal. Table 6.1 summarises the data I collected 
on each of the six outcome variables, showing which survey type includes data on 
which variables. 
 
Table 6.1: Data availability for outcome variables by survey type. 
   
Survey type* and # 
of surveys 
   
W L M U 
Outcome Variable Variable Type 338 341 99 177 
FUNCT Functionality Categorical Yes Yes Yes  
BREAKFREQ Frequency of breakdown Continuous Yes  Yes  
BREAKLENGTH Duration of breakdown Continuous Yes  Yes  
%DAYSFUNCT % days functional in last year / 5 years Continuous   Yes  
WATERQUAL Quality of water Categorical   Yes Yes 
YIELD Quantity of water Categorical   Yes Yes 
*: W= Water point, L= List (compiled by VDC members); M=Manager, U=User. 
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6.1.1 FUNCT: Functionality 
 
Functionality (FUNCT) is recorded in all four data sets: W, L, M and U12.  However, 
functionality rates differ slightly between the data sets, as shown in Table 6.2.   
 
Table 6.2: Discrepancy in FUNCT by survey type. 
Data source 
FUNCT? 
Total 
No Partly Yes 
W Water point surveys 30% 7% 63% 100% 
L Listed by VDC 28% 6% 66% 100% 
U User surveys 19% 8% 73% 100% 
M Manager survey 20% 11% 69% 100% 
ALL 26% 7% 66% 100% 
W + U + M 25% 8% 67% 100% 
 
The largest difference is between the W and U data set (the W surveys reported 
30% non-functional against 19% in the User surveys; and 63% functional against 73% 
in the User surveys) – a difference that reflects the imperfect nature of the 
sampling.  In some cases, VDCs were mistaken, i.e. they listed a water point as 
functional when it was not (or vice versa).  Thus the W, U and M data are more 
reliable. I base the remainder of this section’s analysis on the W data, as it is the 
most comprehensive. 
 
  
                                         
12 Although a specific question on FUNCT was not included in the U survey, a value for FUNCT has 
been recorded based on the researchers’ notes and/or data from M, W or L surveys for the same 
water point. 
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Table 6.3: FUNCT by District and TA. 
District 
% of WPs functional 
W and L data W data only 
Ntcheu 
TA 
Chakhumbira 34% 36% 
Kwataine 26% 35% 
Total 30% 36% 
Mangochi 
TA 
Mbwana Nyambi 87% 85% 
Nankumba 85% 82% 
Total 85% 83% 
Thyolo 
TA 
Nsabwe 70% 70% 
Chimaliro 75% 64% 
Total 73% 67% 
Chikhwawa 
TA 
Lundu 49% 50% 
Masache 68% 75% 
Total 58% 61% 
 
The W data shows considerable variation in FUNCT by District and TA (Table 6.3). 
Only a third (36%) of water points in Ntcheu are fully functional13; whereas 
functionality is much higher in Chikwawa (61%), Thyolo (67%) and Mangochi (83%).  
Direct comparison with functionality for those districts from the 2005 Malawi WP 
dataset (Ntcheu 53%, Chikwawa 49%, Thyolo 84%, and Mangochi 80%) cannot be 
made, since my W data are not randomly sampled at District level.  However, the 
figures do suggest that functionality has significantly decreased in Thyolo and in 
Ntcheu in the past few years (although the Ntcheu data is skewed downwards, 
since both TAs sampled in the district were selected to be low-performance), while 
increasing slightly in Chikhwawa and Mangochi. 
 
                                         
13 Although not shown in the Table, a significant proportion of water points in three TAs (20% in 
Chakhumbira, and 8% in both Nsabwe and Masache) are only partly functional.  Many of the part-
functional points are taps that only operate intermittently.  For analytical purposes I classify part-
functional water points along with non-functional ones, since the health and time benefits of 
improved water points require consistency in functionality. 
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Although the sampled TAs were purposively chosen to represent both high and low 
functionality, in fact it is only in Chikhwawa district that there is significant 
variation in FUNCT between the two TAs (Lundu 50% vs Masache 75%).  Curiously, 
the Masache figure differs significantly from the 96% functionality for that TA 
shown in the District Water Officer’s own database (Chikhwawa District Water 
Office 2010).   
 
In Thyolo, the reportedly ‘low-functionality’ TA Nsabwe in fact had higher FUNCT 
(70%) than the supposedly high-functionality TA Chimaliro (64%) - surprising, since 
these two TAs were selected on the basis of secondary data provided by the DWO 
showing opposing levels of functionality (Chimaliro 85% vs Nsabwe 50%).  It is 
possible that my Nsabwe sample may have been somewhat skewed, since logistical 
challenges excluded the most remote VDCs from the sample, but it seems unlikely 
that this would explain all of the difference. 
 
In Mangochi, the supposedly ‘low-functionality’ TA Nankumba in fact had 82% 
functionality - also surprising, since the Mangochi District Rural Water Atlas shows 
TA Nankumba to have the lowest functionality rate of all TAs in the district, at 73% 
(Mangochi District Council 2010: 26).   
 
In summary, there is significant variation in FUNCT both between and within 
Districts.  This suggests that sub-District factors – the explanatory variables 
explored in Section 6.2 – are significant determinants of functionality.  The 
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discrepancies between data from different sources also highlight the fact that 
analysis may be more complex than initially anticipated. 
 
6.1.2 BREAKFREQ: Frequency of breakdown 
 
Data on breakdown frequency is available from 92 of the 99 Manager surveys, but 
from only 144 of the Water point surveys (less than half) covering only 3 districts14.  
The partial nature of the data means that particular care must be taken in drawing 
wider conclusions, and this variable cannot be used as the main outcome variable.  
However, analysis highlights some interesting patterns. Clear differences in 
BREAKFREQ are apparent both between and within districts (Table 6.4).  The high 
performance of boreholes in Mangochi, especially in Mbwana Nyambi where 42% 
have never broken down, suggests that installation quality (INSTQUAL) may be a 
particularly important factor. 
 
Table 6.4: BREAKFREQ: Number of breakdowns since installation. 
District TA # BH 
# Breakdowns since installation 
0 1 or 2 3 to 5 6 or more Don't know 
Mangochi Mbwana Nyambi 53 42% 40% 15% 4%   
  Nankumba 15 33% 53% 7% 7%   
Thyolo Nsabwe 19 21% 26% 16% 32% 5% 
  Chimaliro 26 8% 27% 27% 35% 4% 
Chikhwawa Lundu 5 0% 80% 0% 20%   
  Masache 14 21% 7% 14% 57%   
(Source: W data) 
 
                                         
14 BREAKFREQ data was not collected for Ntcheu because the Water point survey format was not 
developed until after Ntcheu data collection was completed. 
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Since older boreholes are more likely to have broken down, a better basis for 
comparison is the number of breakdowns during the past 12 months. Again the data 
highlights the particularly strong performance of water points in Mangochi district 
(Table 6.5). 
 
Table 6.5: BREAKFREQ: Number of breakdowns in the last 12 months. 
District TA # WPs 
# Breakdowns in last 12 months 
0 1 or 2 3 to 5 6 or more NA or DK 
Ntcheu 
Chakhumbira 14 14% 36% 7% 7% 36% 
Kwataine 18 33% 17% 6% 11% 33% 
Mangochi 
Mbwana Nyambi 15 40% 53%     7% 
Nankumba 9 56% 22%   11% 11% 
Thyolo 
Nsabwe 7 14% 86%       
Chimaliro 11 27% 55% 18%     
Chikhwawa 
Lundu 7 29% 71%       
Masache 11 27% 45% 18%   9% 
TOTAL 92 
     (Source: M data) 
 
6.1.3 BREAKLENGTH: Duration of breakdown 
 
Again, data here is limited: I have data on breakdown duration (first and last 
breakdown) from only one-tenth of the Water point surveys and half of the 
Manager surveys, relating only to 5 out of 8 TAs.  Mean reported breakdown 
duration is 136 days, but the range is very large (0 – 1800 days) and there is high 
variability between locations and between first and last breakdowns.  The 
limitations of this data mean that little meaningful analysis is possible, and 
BREAKLENGTH cannot be used as an outcome variable in statistical analysis. 
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6.1.4 %DAYSFUNCT: % of days functional in the last 1 year / last 5 years 
 
While the variable FUNCT represents a snapshot, showing whether a water point 
was working on the day of the survey, an alternative metric is the percentage of 
time that each water point functions.  I attempted to compute this using data from 
Managers on the number of days that their water point was non-functional in the 
past year and the past five years.  However, I only had data from 91 Managers, and 
much of it was unsatisfactory - the numbers were contradictory, or the answer 
‘many’ was given instead of a number.  It was therefore not possible to calculate 
meaningful values for this variable. 
 
6.1.5 WATERQUAL: quality of water 
 
Although I did not have the technical capacity to collect and analyse data on 
microbial, chemical, or radiological aspects of water quality, I nevertheless 
collected perception / satisfaction data from Users and Managers regarding two 
‘acceptability’ aspects of water quality: taste and hardness.  The data show that 
out of 276 Users and Managers, only 14 complained of hardness and 15 complained 
of taste (Table 6.6). However, this data may not fully reflect perceptions; 
certainly, I am surprised that so few complaints about taste were recorded in TA 
Lundu, where many of the water points produce very salty water.  
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Table 6.6: WATERQUAL: Complaints about water quality. 
District TA 
Complaint 
Hardness Taste 
Ntcheu 
Chakhumbira  - -  
Kwataine 1 -  
Mangochi 
Mbwana Nyambi 3  - 
Nankumba  - 5 
Thyolo 
Nsabwe 3 4 
Chimaliro 2 2 
Chikhwawa 
Lundu 1 4 
Masache 4 -  
TOTAL 14 15 
 
Thus, while this data offers some limited insight into user perception of water 
quality, it is not sufficiently robust to use as an outcome variable in statistical 
analysis. 
 
6.1.6 YIELD: quantity of water 
 
Again, while physical tests for yield were not practical, I was able to collect 
perception / satisfaction data from Users and Managers on yield, and on time spent 
queuing.   The data (Table 6.7) indicates that there is a particular problem with 
low yield in Thyolo and Chikhwawa districts.  The very large number of complaints 
about queuing time in TA Kwataine is unexpected, since observations did not 
suggest that queues were generally much longer in that area than in others.   
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Table 6.7: YIELD: Complaints about water point yield. 
District TA 
Number of complaints 
Low yield Time queuing  
Ntcheu 
Chakhumbira 1 8 
Kwataine 4 25 
Mangochi 
Mbwana Nyambi 3 -  
Nankumba -  -  
Thyolo 
Nsabwe 11 5 
Chimaliro 5 4 
Chikhwawa 
Lundu 9 -  
Masache 5 3 
TOTAL 38 45 
 
A further question asked Users and Managers whether there was enough water for 
the number of users (Table 6.8).  In Ntcheu, more than half the respondents said 
there was ‘never enough’ water; and in Thyolo more than half said there was 
‘often not enough’.  In contrast, in Mangochi district, a large majority said there 
was ‘always enough’ water.  Overall, this perception data highlights important 
spatial variability in YIELD. 
 
Table 6.8: YIELD: Is there enough water? 
District TA 
Is there enough water for the number of users? 
TOTAL Yes, 
always 
Normally 
enough 
Often not 
enough 
Never 
enough 
Ntcheu 
Chakhumbira 14% 18% 11% 57% 100% 
Kwataine 0% 2% 2% 95% 100% 
TOTAL 6% 9% 6% 80% 100% 
Mangochi 
Mbwana Nyambi 78% 5% 15% 3% 100% 
Nankumba 68% 0% 3% 29% 100% 
TOTAL 73% 3% 9% 15% 100% 
Thyolo 
Nsabwe 24% 3% 73% 0% 100% 
Chimaliro 39% 3% 58% 0% 100% 
TOTAL 32% 3% 65% 0% 100% 
Chikhwawa 
Lundu 38% 0% 35% 27% 100% 
Masache 31% 0% 19% 50% 100% 
TOTAL 34% 0% 26% 40% 100% 
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This section has summarised the data on six outcome variables that are proxies for 
sustainability.  Each offers useful insights; but as we have seen, data limitations 
render most of them unsuitable for use in statistical analysis.  Only one, FUNCT, is 
suitable for use in this way.  In order to simplify analysis, I recoded FUNCT into a 
binary (yes/no) variable in which partly-functional water points were classified as 
not functional, since I have defined sustainability as continued (not intermittent) 
functioning over time. 
 
Having examined the outcome variable data, I now turn to the explanatory variable 
data. 
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6.2 INDIVIDUAL PROXIMATE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
In this section I examine each of the ten key proximate explanatory variables in 
turn, using both quantitative and qualitative data.  The analysis is presented as 
follows: 
• Quantitative data analysis (2005 Malawi WP database if available, then my 
own survey data): descriptive statistics, statistical analysis. 
• Qualitative data analysis: coding frequency, main emergent themes, 
illustrative quotes. 
• Summary: my overall assessment of the significance of the variable in 
explaining water point sustainability. 
 
This section draws on a very large quantity of data from a range of sources.  
Appendix 11 provides an overview of the relationship between the quantitative 
data and the variables (summarised in Table 6.9), and sets out in detail how the 
questions in the List (L), Water point (W), Manager (M) and User (U) surveys relate 
to the outcome variables, proximate explanatory variables and associated 
hypotheses that are explored in this chapter. 
  
 220 
Table 6.9: Quantitative data availability for explanatory variables by survey type. 
Explanatory variable 
Survey type 
W L M U 
WPTYPE Yes Yes Yes  
INSTQUAL Yes Yes Yes Yes 
USERS   Yes Yes 
AGE Yes Yes Yes  
MAINTFREQ   Yes  
SPARES Yes  Yes  
SKILLS   Yes Yes 
FUNDS (Yes)  Yes Yes 
SUPPORT   Yes  
THEFT *  * * 
*: see section 6.2.10 
 
An overview of the coding structure employed to analyse the qualitative data is 
provided in Appendix 12, and Appendix 13 summarises coding frequencies.  In the 
extracts reproduced in this chapter, the sources are identified as shown in Table 
6.10. 
 
Table 6.10: Qualitative data source identifiers. 
Identifier Respondent type 
A Area Mechanic 
D Donor 
G National government 
L Local government 
M Manager 
N NGO 
U User 
W Water point survey* 
 
In a few cases, the text does not relate to a particular water point or respondent, 
but rather to a location.  These are coded ‘number-letter-number’ – so 3B2 
indicates District ‘3’, TA ‘B’, VDC ‘2’.  For the water point surveys, the source is 
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my own notes from translated conversations, often with multiple respondents.  For 
most other sources, extracts are from individual interviews. 
 
6.2.1 WPTYPE: Type of water point technology 
 
Chapter Four demonstrated that functionality varies by type of technology in 
Malawi, as elsewhere; in general, boreholes are more likely to be operational than 
gravity fed standpipes.  I therefore tested the relative impact of different water 
point types on FUNCT. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
The headline figure in the 2005 WP database is that, nationally, 75% of boreholes 
are functional while only 48% of gravity fed standpipes are working.  Analysis of 
this database using Pearson’s chi-square (Field 2009: 698) confirms the very strong 
association between WPTYPE and FUNCT: X2 (6) = 4053.5 (p<0.001), and Cramer’s 
V = .317 (p<0.001).  The standardised residuals show that the result is mainly 
driven by boreholes performing much better than expected, and by taps (gravity 
fed standpipes) performing much worse than expected.   
 
My own survey data shows the same clear pattern: functionality is strongly 
influenced by WPTYPE (Table 6.11).  Using all 952 observations (from Water point, 
User and Manager surveys plus the VDC Lists), functionality is highest for boreholes 
(n=752, 74% functional).  Only just over a quarter of taps are functioning properly 
(n=117, 27% functional), although another 17% function partially. 
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Table 6.11: FUNCT by WPTYPE (all survey data). 
WPTYPE 
FUNCT? 
Total 
No Partly Yes 
Borehole 
# 156 40 556 752 
% 21% 5% 74% 100% 
Malda Pump 
# 26 1 32 59 
% 44% 2% 54% 100% 
Tap 
# 65 20 32 117 
% 56% 17% 27% 100% 
Protected Spring 
# 2 1 1 4 
% 50% 25% 25% 100% 
Other Protected 
# 2 6 12 20 
% 10% 30% 60% 100% 
Total 
# 251 68 633 952 
% 26% 7% 67% 100% 
 
However, as noted in Section 6.1.1, the List data is less reliable.  If it is excluded 
(Table 6.12), the results remain fairly similar for boreholes (71% functional) and 
Malda pumps (53% functional), but Tap functionality is a third higher, at 36% (plus 
20% partially functional). 
 
Table 6.12: FUNCT by WPTYPE (W, M and U survey data only). 
WPTYPE 
  FUNCT? 
Total 
  No Partly Yes 
BH 
# 112 34 364 510 
% 22% 7% 71% 100% 
Malda 
# 16 1 19 36 
% 44% 3% 53% 100% 
Tap 
# 25 11 20 56 
% 45% 20% 36% 100% 
Protected Spring 
# 1 1 1 3 
% 33% 33% 33% 100% 
Other Protected 
# 1 0 5 6 
% 17% 0% 83% 100% 
Total 
# 155 47 409 611 
% 25% 8% 67% 100% 
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Analysis by District and TA reveals considerable diversity in functionality, as well as 
highlighting geographical variation in the dominant WPTYPE (Table 6.13). In 
Mangochi district, all water points surveyed were boreholes; but in Thyolo district a 
significant proportion were Malda pumps (25/80 in TA Nsabwe, 5/66 in TA 
Chimaliro), and taps were relatively common in Ntcheu district (10/78 in TA 
Chakhumbira, 22/88 in TA Kwataine)15, as well as in TA Lundu in Chikhwawa 
district (15/56).  
 
  
                                         
15 Although the majority of improved water points in TA Kwataine (53/92 in the sampled VDCs) are 
standpipes, not one of them is working.  In contrast, 62% of the 39 boreholes are functional.  Since 
the W surveys used convenience sampling, the functional boreholes are overrepresented in the W 
data. 
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Table 6.13: FUNCT by WPTYPE, by District and TA (W M and U data). 
District TA FUNCT? 
WPTYPE 
BH Malda Tap PS Other All 
Ntcheu 
Chakhumbira 
No 55%   0% 33% 100% 47% 
Partly 2%   100% 33% 0% 15% 
Yes 44%   0% 33% 0% 37% 
Total # 64   10 3 1 78 
Kwataine 
No 35%   100%     52% 
Yes 65%   0%     48% 
Total # 60   22     82 
Mangochi 
Mbwana 
Nyambi 
No 10%         10% 
Partly 14%         14% 
Yes 76%         76% 
Total # 99         99 
Nankumba 
No 13%         13% 
Partly 8%         8% 
Yes 79%         79% 
Total # 90         90 
Thyolo 
Nsabwe 
No 7% 44% 20%   0% 19% 
Partly 4% 4% 20%   0% 5% 
Yes 89% 52% 60%   100% 76% 
Total # 45 25 5   5 80 
Chimaliro 
No 21% 80%       26% 
Partly 2% 0%       2% 
Yes 77% 20%       73% 
Total # 61 5       66 
Chikhwawa 
Lundu 
No 44% 0% 7%     30% 
Partly 11% 0% 0%     7% 
Yes 44% 100% 93%     63% 
Total # 36 5 15     56 
Masache 
No 4% 100% 25%     7% 
Partly 9% 0% 0%     8% 
Yes 87% 0% 75%     85% 
Total # 55 1 4     60 
ALL 
No           25% 
Partly           8% 
Yes           67% 
Total # 510 36 56 3 6 611 
 
Among boreholes only (Table 6.14), the worst performance by far is in TA 
Chakhumbira, where many of the boreholes are very old; and in TA Lundu in 
Chikhwawa, where corrosion due to salinity is a major problem. 
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Table 6.14: Borehole FUNCT by District and TA 
District TA % Functional 
Ntcheu 
Chakhumbira 44% 
Kwataine 65% 
Mangochi 
Mbwana Nyambi 76% 
Nankumba 79% 
Thyolo 
Nsabwe 89% 
Chimaliro 77% 
Chikhwawa 
Lundu 44% 
Masache 87% 
 
Using Pearson’s chi-square test (Table 6.15), I find (as expected) a significant 
relationship between WPTYPE and FUNCT: X2 (2) = 31.836, (p<.001); Cramer’s V = 
.228 (p<.001).  The standardised residuals indicate that this result is mainly driven 
by the poor performance of taps. 
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Table 6.15: Effect of WPTYPE on FUNCT: Chi-square test results. 
WPTYPE 
FUNCT? 
Total 
No Yes 
Other 
Count 20 25 45 
Expected Count 14.9 30.1 45.0 
% within WPTYPE 44% 56% 100% 
% within FUNCT 10% 6% 7% 
% of Total 3% 4% 7% 
Std. Residual 1.3 -.9   
BH 
Count 146 364 510 
Expected Count 168.6 341.4 510.0 
% within WPTYPE 29% 71% 100% 
% within FUNCT 72% 89% 83% 
% of Total 24% 60% 83% 
Std. Residual -1.7 1.2   
Tap 
Count 36 20 56 
Expected Count 18.5 37.5 56.0 
% within WPTYPE 64% 36% 100% 
% within FUNCT 18% 5% 9% 
% of Total 6% 3% 9% 
Std. Residual 4.1 -2.9   
Total 
Count 202 409 611 
Expected Count 202.0 409.0 611.0 
% within WPTYPE 33% 67% 100% 
% within FUNCT 100% 100% 100% 
% of Total 33% 67% 100% 
 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.836a 2 0 
Likelihood Ratio 29.908 2 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.362 1 0 
N of Valid Cases 611     
 
Thus, in conclusion, although analysis of my own survey data does not yield such a 
marked correlation between WPTYPE and FUNCT as for the 2005 Malawi WP 
database, both are very clear about the relative importance of WPTYPE as an 
explanatory factor. 
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Qualitative analysis 
Turning now to the qualitative data, I coded WPTYPE in 36% of the interviews and 
surveys, with 33 references in total (ranking 9th).  Two key themes emerged. 
 
Gravity fed systems are especially prone to failure 
Gravity fed standpipes suffer significantly from problems of both accidental 
damage and deliberate vandalism.  The plastic pipes carrying the water are buried 
only a few inches below ground, and often run alongside roads or paths.  People 
hunting mice sometimes cut the pipes accidentally, and farmers digging their fields 
can easily break a pipe, as a respondent in VDC 3A1 explained: “Sometimes people 
cut the pipe accidentally while cultivating – it happens on a monthly basis.”   
Farmers may also break the pipe deliberately for irrigation purposes, as suggested 
by a respondent in VDC 1A1: “The tap stand doesn’t always give water, due to 
vandalism at Chilobwe. Sometimes people disconnect the pipes in order to water 
their gardens. Then they might reconnect the pipes, or they might not.”  Poor 
management (e.g. slow repair response times) is also a particular problem in 
gravity fed systems, because of the problems of coordinating a system with 
multiple water points. 
 
Afridev handpumps are the most effective and popular technology 
One the one hand, “people always prefer taps” (N5) because they are less labour-
intensive than a pump.  However, “it's easier to manage a borehole than a GFS” 
(D5) because a single point source requires much less coordination than a multiple 
outlet system.   
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In terms of pump technology, Afridev pumps are much preferred to other types by 
users and almost all other stakeholders.  ‘Upgrading’ Afridev handpumps to solar 
pumps or Playpumps is almost always counterproductive.  For example, W597, 
originally an Afridev handpump, was converted to solar power in 2011 by the local 
MP (with assistance from WaterAid and USAID).  The new solar pump has never 
broken down, whereas the old handpump broke several times – but nonetheless the 
users say they preferred it as a handpump because it was much faster.  The flow 
now is very slow, so collecting water takes much longer. 
 
Similar problems were reported with Playpumps.  These are handpumps designed in 
the form of roundabouts, with the intention that children will play on them, 
turning the wheel to drive the pump.  However, women dislike them because they 
are much less efficient than Afridevs at converting motion into pumping action, and 
children quickly get bored of the novelty. One District Water Officer explained: 
“another problem is the Playpump project.  This is another negative project for the 
districts.  We are most enemies of schools now.  We removed Afridev and put 
Playpump. But there are no spares, so the school want us to remove Playpump and 
put Afridev […] It has not worked.  Because there is no backup. They promised to 
train us, give us vehicles but they are not anywhere to be seen and when you try to 
phone them they don't respond” (L3).  An example from a different District is 
W619, where an Afridev was replaced with a Playpump in 2005 by the Co-operative 
(the UK supermarket chain). Users complained that “it is causing a lot of problems 
because the water coming out is too little…  When the Afridev was replaced by the 
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Playpump, the Afridev was still working at that time and working better than the 
Playpump does now”.  EWB fellows (B25, B7) reported similar problems in other 
locations. 
 
Conclusion 
Both the statistical and qualitative analysis indicate that WPTYPE is highly 
significant in explaining water point sustainability, but it certainly does not tell the 
whole story. 
 
6.2.2 INSTQUAL: Quality of installation 
 
I hypothesised that INSTQUAL would be strongly and positively associated with high 
functionality.  Since quality of installation is difficult to measure without expert 
assessment at the time of installation, I used the identity of the installer as a 
proxy. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
The 2005 WP database lists 161 different Installers (after cleaning for duplicates).  
Very few achieved 100% functionality, and those that did had only a handful of 
water points.  However, some major installers with relatively large numbers of 
water points succeeded in ensuring high levels of continued functionality.  Most 
notable among these are GITEC, with an impressive 97% functionality (n=799); and 
MASAF with 82% functionality (n=4022). 
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In contrast, only 54% of Government water points are functional (n=11016); and 
functionality is even worse for UNHCR (31%) and USAID (23%).  However, this 
highlights the importance of considering several factors together: 97% of USAID 
water points are relatively old GFS, and most of the listed UNHCR water points are 
in now-abandoned refugee camps built in the early 1990s when Malawi was hosting 
large numbers of Mozambican refugees.  Indeed GITEC, which has the highest 
functionality rate of all large installers at 97.1%, also has the most concentrated 
portfolio type, with 99.9% of its water points being mechanically drilled boreholes 
fitted with Afridev pumps. However, several other installers are almost equally 
focused on boreholes, yet have lower functionality: examples include JICA with 79% 
functionality, and Plan with 76% functionality.  GITEC is obviously an outlier, even 
among borehole-only installers.   
 
Conducting a chi-square test with 161 possible values for one variable would have 
been far too unwieldy, so I grouped the installers into several types, as shown in 
Table 6.1616.  There is indeed a significant association between installer type (my 
proxy for INSTQUAL) and FUNCT: X2 (8) = 1355.3 (p<.001).  The standardised 
residuals show that this result is particularly driven by the poor performance of 
water points installed by the Malawi Government.   
  
                                         
16 However, the ‘international NGO’ category contains a far lower number of cases than would be 
expected based on experience, suggesting some inaccuracy in this categorisation of INSTQUAL, and 
casting some doubt on the validity of these results. 
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Table 6.16: Effect of INSTQUAL on FUNCT: Chi-square test results (2005 WP 
database). 
INSTQUAL (Installer) 
FUNCT 
Total 
No Yes 
Malawi Government 
Count 4970 5786 10756 
Expected Count 3605 7151 10756 
% within INSTQUAL 46% 54% 100% 
% within FUNCT 30% 18% 22% 
% of Total 10% 12% 22% 
Std. Residual 22.7 -16.1   
Local Government 
Count 9 109 118 
Expected Count 40 78 118 
% within INSTQUAL 8% 92% 100% 
% within FUNCT 0% 0% 0% 
% of Total 0% 0% 0% 
Std. Residual -4.9 3.4   
Intl Bilateral Donor 
Count 136 513 649 
Expected Count 218 431 649 
% within INSTQUAL 21% 79% 100% 
% within FUNCT 1% 2% 1% 
% of Total 0% 1% 1% 
Std. Residual -5.5 3.9   
Intl Multilateral Donor 
Count 19 63 82 
Expected Count 27 55 82 
% within INSTQUAL 23% 77% 100% 
% within FUNCT 0% 0% 0% 
% of Total 0% 0% 0% 
Std. Residual -1.6 1.1   
International NGO 
Count 373 777 1150 
Expected Count 385 765 1150 
% within INSTQUAL 32% 68% 100% 
% within FUNCT 2% 2% 2% 
% of Total 1% 2% 2% 
Std. Residual -.6 .5   
Private Company 
Count 29 172 201 
Expected Count 67 134 201 
% within INSTQUAL 14% 86% 100% 
% within FUNCT 0% 1% 0% 
% of Total 0% 0% 0% 
Std. Residual -4.7 3.3   
Other 
Count 4581 12889 17470 
Expected Count 5856 11614 17470 
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% within INSTQUAL 26% 74% 100% 
% within FUNCT 28% 39% 35% 
% of Total 9% 26% 35% 
Std. Residual -16.7 11.8   
Unknown 
Count 4057 8464 12521 
Expected Count 4197 8324 12521 
% within INSTQUAL 32% 68% 100% 
% within FUNCT 25% 26% 25% 
% of Total 8% 17% 25% 
Std. Residual -2.2 1.5   
Blank 
Count 2336 3972 6308 
Expected Count 2114 4194 6308 
% within INSTQUAL 37% 63% 100% 
% within FUNCT 14% 12% 13% 
% of Total 5% 8% 13% 
Std. Residual 4.8 -3.4   
Total 
Count 16510 32745 49255 
Expected Count 16510 32745 49255 
% within INSTQUAL 34% 66% 100% 
% within FUNCT 100% 100% 100% 
% of Total 34% 66% 100% 
 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1355.292 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 1354.615 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 620.346 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 49255   
 
In summary, therefore, the 2005 WP database shows a significant association 
between INSTQUAL and FUNCT.  I now turn to the survey data collected specifically 
for this thesis.  Respondents named dozens of different institutions and individuals 
as installers, which were in turn classified into 16 categories.  To simplify analysis, 
these were further grouped into NGO, Government/MP, and Other (Table 6.17). 
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Table 6.17: INSTQUAL: Installer by category. 
Survey Type 
Installer 
Total # 
NGO Govt / MP Other Don't know 
L 69% 15% 13% 3% 257 
W 59% 26% 12% 3% 242 
U 27% 21% 14% 37% 174 
M 40% 28% 8% 23% 99 
All 53% 22% 12% 13% 772 
 
Since a significant proportion of Users and Managers did not know the Installer’s 
identity, and since the L data is less reliable, I used the W data alone for my main 
analysis of INSTQUAL. 
 
The chi-square test shows a significant association between INSTQUAL and FUNCT: 
X2 (2) = 7.808, (p<.05); Cramer’s V = .183 (p<.05).  The standardised residuals 
suggest that this result is fairly equally driven by all categories.  To examine this 
relationship in more detail I created dummy variables for Government (n=63), NGO 
(n=143), and three specific NGOs: GITEC (n=40), CU (n=40), and ICEIDA (n=25).  The 
results are shown in Table 6.18. 
 
Table 6.18: Effect of INSTQUAL on FUNCT: Chi-square test results. 
Version Chi-square df p Cramer's V p Odds ratio SSRs* 
INSTQUAL 7.808 2 .020 .183 .020     
NGO 6.167 1 .013 .162 .013 2.069 none 
Government 1.120 1 .290 .069 .290 .714 none 
GITEC 12.830 1 .000 .234 .000 9.354 minus 2.8 for GITEC, NF 
CU 2.058 1 .151 .094 .151 .594 none 
ICEIDA 8.098 1 .004 .186 .004 10.833 minus 2.3 for ICEIDA, NF 
*Significant standardised residuals (more than plus or minus 1.96) 
 
Calculation of the odds ratio suggests that water points installed by an NGO are 
more than twice as likely to be functional than water points installed by others.  
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Even more stark patterns emerge when we look at particular NGOs: both GITEC and 
ICEIDA water points are approximately ten times more likely to be functional than 
other installers’ water points.  For the ICEIDA water points, AGE may be a 
significant confounding factor, since 68% of the ICEIDA water points analysed are 2 
years old or less.  However, all of the GITEC water points are much older, between 
5 and 9 years old.  
 
In conclusion, the data shows very wide variation in functionality according to the 
identity of the installer.  However, it is clear that ‘installer name’ by no means 
fully captures the concept of ‘installer quality’; and other variables such as age are 
likely to be significant.  Insights from the qualitative data, presented below, help 
to interrogate INSTQUAL in more detail. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
INSTQUAL was coded in 53% of the interviews and surveys, with 74 references in 
total (ranking 4th).  Two key themes emerged. 
 
High construction standards = high functionality 
The GITEC boreholes were outstanding among those surveyed in terms of both 
performance and appearance; the quality of their civil works was immediately 
obvious.  Interviewees attributed the success of the GITEC water points to their 
high engineering standards: “There is high functionality in Mangochi East because 
the technical part is just very good, the contractor is very good… they were 
introducing the Revision 4 pumping rod, these are very strong… Up to now no pump 
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rod has broken in the GITEC boreholes” (L3).  This reportedly reflected both the 
level of funding available and the degree of control that the project management 
exercised: “[It was a] very high quality project, GITEC… They had a lot of funding 
so they could do very good drilling, they could drill 4, 5 times to find a good 
source.  They did very good training to the WPC and AMs… [They had] GITEC 
experts from Germany basically stationed there and doing all the work” (D5).  
Another respondent, who had worked on the GITEC project before joining another 
NGO, highlighted the difference between them: “GITEC used 40 bags of cement per 
borehole; [we] use 20 bags per borehole” (N1).  So, while GITEC boreholes may 
have been more expensive at the construction stage (although comparative costs 
are not known), it seems these investments have paid off in terms of sustainability. 
 
Absence of quality control 
Several interviewees observed that lack of quality control is a major problem in the 
sector: “The private sector has no quality control … There is real need for quality 
control in terms of enforcement… at national level it is not being done” (N9). A 
government interviewee suggested that the problem was particularly significant in 
civil society projects: “There are some contractors which are not as professional… 
when the CSOs are drilling boreholes it is not their fault but maybe the contractors 
which they hire. Maybe the contractors once they find the water they will put up 
the pump and the like.  Two days, maybe three months, you will find if they put up 
the borehole in the rainy season – after, it will run dry” (G3). 
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However, government-led projects are equally prone to problems, as observed by 
one local NGO staff member: “The moment you identify a wrong contractor you are 
in trouble. And most of these contractors are indeed crooked contractors, they 
don't do a good job … in fact let me underline the example of MASAF. MASAF was a 
government run project and you know what happens in government procurement. 
There are a lot of shortcuts. Corruption is there and procurement procedures are 
not followed. So it is inevitable that the MASAF contract had such problems. 
Because they would identify wrong contractors for purposes of bribes and other 
kickbacks” (N3). One EWB Fellow, attached to a major borehole installation 
project, observed that neither the contractor nor the government saw the actual 
paper contract as meaningful.  The contractor insisted on doing things ‘as they’ve 
always done’, cutting multiple corners including not doing a proper hydrogeological 
survey, drilling with inappropriate equipment, failing to clean or fill the bore 
properly, and not testing water quality (B11).  Supervision was completely 
inadequate.  
 
Quality problems are often identified too late.  “Right now there is a query from 
[District X], we have people who have gone out to look at some contractors who 
were given boreholes by government or UNICEF and they recorded the wrong 
depth... they are so crafty they say they have drilled above 40 metres but have 
done only 20 metres ... so many boreholes which were previously drilled have dried 
up” (D4).  Even NGOs doing direct implementation (drilling using their own staff 
and rig) face quality problems: “World Vision finished in I think 2002 and then… we 
had [a project funded by DANIDA]. They ended up doing protected wells using a 
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Vonder rig.  None of them are functional…  If you go there, the ones that are 
functioning are maybe 10% of what they did” (L3). 
 
Users themselves also commented critically on poor workmanship.  At several 
water points, users attributed functionality problems to shallow drilling (W149, 
U153, 3A1).  In several VDCs (2B2, 2B3, 3A3), the civil works surrounding many 
water points were in very poor condition, and in some cases (e.g. W240) this was 
despite the water point having only recently been constructed.  An explanation was 
suggested by users at W770: “The civil works cement was shallow – the installer 
and repairers took advantage”.  Cement is a valuable commodity in short supply in 
Malawi. 
 
Users generally have no power to hold installers to account; their only option is to 
hope that the installer will return to check on the work.  An illustrative case is 
W754, a borehole installed by a church just a few weeks before our visit; but 
already showing problems, including low water yield.  Users did not know the name 
of the contractor, and there was no inscription; they said “We are just waiting for 
the church to come and see the problem”.  Occasionally, installers simply never 
finish the job (e.g. W258).  In one such case in VDC 2B1, the community eventually 
clubbed together to complete the installation by buying a footvalve, 2 years after 
the rest of the installation was completed; but others (e.g. two in VDC 1A2) remain 
unfinished several years later. 
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Conclusion 
The data shows that technical quality of installation is highly significant in 
explaining water point sustainability.  Different installers have very different 
functionality records, despite using more or less the same technology and 
approaches.  The outstanding success of GITEC, in particular, calls for further 
investigation. 
 
6.2.3 USERS: User numbers 
 
The higher the number of users, the greater the wear and tear on the water point.  
For this reason, I hypothesised that higher USERS would be associated with lower 
FUNCT. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
The 2005 WP database does not contain data on user numbers, so I examined this 
question by combining the database with district population data from the 2008 
census (NSO 2008).  I found essentially no relationship between user density 
(proxied by the district population divided by the number of water points) and 
water point functionality. 
 
My own User and Manager surveys included two questions about user numbers.  
Unfortunately, the question “How many households use this water point?” rarely 
elicited a specific number.  By far the most frequent responses were ‘many’ (22%), 
‘the whole village (20%), ‘don’t know’ (13%), and ‘several villages’ (7%), while 
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numerical responses ranged from ‘5’ to ‘500’.  Because these responses do not fit 
neatly on to a scale (how many is ‘many’?) it is difficult to analyse the relationship 
between USERS and FUNCT.  The best that can be done is to examine the 
percentage of water points that are functional for each category of user numbers, 
as shown in Table 6.19. 
 
Table 6.19: Relationship between USERS and FUNCT. 
USERS # of responses % of responses % FUNCT 
Several villages 18 7% 78% 
Whole village 53 20% 68% 
Half the village 3 1% 100% 
Many 59 22% 80% 
Few 7 3% 71% 
100-500 14 5% 71% 
51-99 21 8% 71% 
21-50 33 12% 61% 
<20 23 9% 65% 
Don't know 34 13% 68% 
Total 265  71% 
 
The lowest functionality rate is found in the group of water points with the lowest 
user numbers – a somewhat intriguing result, since it is frequently assumed that 
high user numbers lead to more frequent breakdowns and lower functionality.  A 
partial explanation may be that the increased wear and tear associated with high 
numbers of users is offset by the increased availability of skills and funds for 
repairs.  
 
Since most water points are boreholes, the average borehole is intended to serve 
250 people, and the average household size is 5 people, I created a binary variable 
with 50 households as the cut-off point for the purpose of analysing the impact of 
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USERS on FUNCT.  However, the chi-square test shows that the relationship is not 
significant: X2 (1) = 2.888 (p=0.89). 
 
I also asked Users ‘how long do you normally have to queue at the water point?’ 
Queuing time is reportedly a significant problem (Table 6.20): almost half of all 
Users said that they have to queue for more than half an hour to get water, and 
another third have to wait for between 10 and 30 minutes.   
 
Table 6.20: USERS: Queuing time. 
How long do you normally have to queue at the water point? 
No time 4% 
Less than 10 minutes 16% 
Between 10-30 minutes 34% 
Over 30 minutes 45% 
Not applicable 1% 
Total (174 Users) 100% 
 
In summary, the relationship between USERS and FUNCT is complex. However, the 
qualitative data illuminated these findings further. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
USERS was coded in 38% of the interviews and surveys, with 38 references in total 
(ranking 7th).  Two key themes emerged. 
 
‘Congestion’ drives people to use unsafe sources 
Water points are frequently overused or ‘congested’: “there is always congestion 
even at 10pm” (W619) and “the water is never enough – the people from this 
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village go to the next village [to get water]” (U70).  This competition for water 
sometimes drives people to use unsafe water sources instead: U152 reported that 
the whole village use the borehole, but “others prefer going to the river because 
there is too much congestion”.  At W631, respondents reported that people from 
several surrounding villages with broken boreholes all come to this one, which is 
very congested; but “most are taking water from unprotected wells”. 
 
Many users may lead to more frequent breakdowns? 
In one or two cases, respondents suggested a link between high user numbers and 
excessive wear and tear: “The only problem faced is that the spare parts don’t last 
long because it is overused” (M30, manager of a water point used by four villages).  
At W434, respondents said there were frequent breakdowns “because they have 
[only] one borehole”.  However, while this observation makes intuitive sense, it 
was not highlighted by many respondents. 
 
Conclusion 
The data suggest that, while USERS is highly significant in determining a 
household’s access to clean water, it is only marginally significant in explaining 
water point sustainability. 
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6.2.4 AGE: System age 
 
Intuitively, AGE appears likely to be a very significant influence on sustainability, 
since most forms of technology are more likely to break down as they get older.  I 
therefore hypothesised that increased AGE would be associated with lower FUNCT. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
Commencing with the 2005 Malawi WP database, and focusing only on boreholes, 
taps and protected springs (82% of the total 49,517 water points listed in the 2005 
database), I was able to calculate AGE for 31,546 (78%) of the 40,636, by 
subtracting the date of installation from the date of survey. 
 
Using Pearson’s R to examine the degree to which the two variables co-vary, I find 
that increased AGE is indeed correlated with reduced FUNCT (Table 6.21): r is        
-.353, so R2 is 0.124, indicating that approximately 12% of the variability in FUNCT 
is shared by variability in AGE.   
 
Table 6.21: Co-variation of AGE and FUNCT (2005 WP database). 
 AGE FUNCT 
AGE 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.353 
Sig. (1-tailed)   .000 
N 31546 31544 
FUNCT 
Pearson Correlation -.353 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000   
N 31544 40459 
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However, using regression to test the impact of AGE on FUNCT, I find that AGE has 
only a small effect (Table 6.22). 
 
Table 6.22: Effect of AGE on FUNCT: regression results (2005 WP database). 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
AGE -.081 .001 3343.412 1 .000 .922 
Constant 1.652 .021 6398.811 1 .000 5.216 
 
Together these results suggest that AGE has less influence on FUNCT than is 
commonly supposed, and that other factors play a much greater role in explaining 
functionality – or the lack of it.  Using the same statistical procedures to examine 
my own survey data, I find much smaller effects – perhaps due to the considerably 
smaller sample.  Increased AGE is only very slightly correlated with reduced 
FUNCT: r is -.087 (p<0.05), so R2 is 0.007, indicating that less than 1% of the 
variability in FUNCT is shared by variability in AGE (Table 6.23).  Regression (Table 
6.24) confirms that AGE has almost no effect on FUNCT. 
 
Table 6.23: Co-variability between AGE and FUNCT: Pearson’s R results. 
 AGE FUNCT 
AGE 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.087 
Sig. (1-tailed)   .022 
N 540 540 
FUNCT 
Pearson Correlation -.087 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .022   
N 540 955 
 
Table 6.24: Effect of AGE on FUNCT (binary logistic regression). 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
AGE -.020 .010 3.906 1 .048 .980 
Constant 1.462 .148 98.109 1 .000 4.314 
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Taken together, these results suggest that AGE plays only a minor role in explaining 
variation in FUNCT.  Although somewhat counterintuitive, this finding emerges 
strongly from the data.  The fact that my own survey data (540 cases) provides 
much less support for the effect of AGE on FUNCT than the 2005 WP database (over 
30,000 cases) may well merely reflect the more limited sample. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
AGE was, in fact, coded in only one of the interviews and surveys, with one 
reference in total (ranking 10th).  However, as discussed in the introduction to this 
section, this may reflect more about the coding process than about the data itself. 
 
The coded text in fact suggests that the problem is not AGE as such, but rather the 
manager’s inability to maintain or repair the water point, which s/he blames in 
turn on lack of funds: “The problem is with rods, they just break, they are the old 
rods they have never changed since installation… The centralisers are also worn 
out, also the plunger is worn out, the bush bearing…  It breaks down almost daily.  
If I have spare parts I can maintain the borehole and repair everything but we don’t 
have enough funds to buy all the rods” (M25).  Indeed, this leads us neatly into the 
next section, on frequency of maintenance. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, and perhaps counterintuitively, AGE emerges as only marginally 
significant in explaining water point sustainability. 
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6.2.5 MAINTFREQ: Frequency of maintenance 
 
Water points are supposed to be regularly tested and maintained to ensure that 
they work effectively (SKAT-RWSN 2007). I therefore hypothesised that higher 
MAINTFREQ would be positively associated with higher FUNCT.  
 
Quantitative analysis 
MAINTFREQ is, in theory, a continuous variable, and was assessed through six 
separate questions in the Manager surveys.  However, in practice, incidence of 
maintenance is so low that I have treated it as a dichotomous (yes/no) variable 
(Table 6.25). 
 
Table 6.25: MAINTFREQ: Frequency of maintenance. 
Type of maintenance Never done Done at least once 
Leakage test 82% 18% 
Discharge test 82% 18% 
Dismantling and checking of wearing parts 39% 61% 
Tightening of nuts on fulcrum pin 54% 46% 
Dismantled in last 12 months 49% 51% 
Dismantled since installation 53% 47% 
 
Although 51% of Managers (n=49) reported dismantling the water point in the last 
12 months, in only 14 cases was this done without being prompted by a breakdown.  
Similarly, although 61% (n=60) reported dismantling the water point to check the 
wearing parts, in only 9 cases was this done for a water point that had never 
experienced breakdown.  Clearly, true preventive maintenance is relatively rare.  
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Indeed, it may well be that MAINTFREQ is over-reported, as a surprisingly large 
number of Managers claimed to have undertaken maintenance just ‘last month’. 
 
With hindsight, my research instruments failed to give me full insight into the 
occurrence of preventive maintenance.  I wished to avoid simply asking ‘do you do 
preventive maintenance’, as such a question would be highly vulnerable to biased 
self-reporting.  The rationale for asking specifically about leakage tests and 
discharge tests was that these are simple, quick, basic tests that should in theory, 
according to the Afridev manual (SKAT-RWSN 2007) be performed every month. The 
fact that they are not suggests the dominance of an ‘as and when’ rather than ‘just 
in case’ approach to maintenance and repair. 
 
Since so few water points appear to have experienced preventive maintenance, the 
value of quantitative analysis is limited.  Still, the chi-squared test suggests that 
there is a statistically significant relationship between MAINTFREQ and FUNCT (X2 = 
4.175 (1), p<.05) - although this is not as strong as for some of the other variables 
tested.  Additionally, concerns about the reliability of self-reported preventive 
maintenance mean that care must be taken not to over-interpret the data. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
The qualitative data is somewhat more helpful in yielding insights into maintenance 
and repair practices.  MAINTFREQ was coded in 33% of the interviews and surveys, 
with 38 references in total (ranking 7th). Three key themes emerge. 
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Preventive maintenance is very rare 
Preventive maintenance is almost never done at the recommended frequency, and 
in fact is probably almost never done at all.  The distinction between preventive 
maintenance and reactive repair was not clearly made by respondents; indeed, it 
might be that this distinction is somewhat lost in translation.  Certainly, in the vast 
majority of cases, respondents talked about repairs when asked about 
maintenance.  When they did report preventive maintenance, it was hard to tell 
whether this report was accurate.  For example, M48 reported that “they were told 
to maintain every 3 months, and they did it in September [last month]”.  That was 
apparently the first time since the borehole was installed eight years earlier in 
2003. It seems unlikely that the community spontaneously decided to maintain it 
then, immediately prior to my unannounced visit; it seems much more likely that 
this type of response represents ‘courtesy bias’.  This in turn calls into question the 
validity of even the few reports of preventive maintenance that were recorded in 
the surveys. 
 
Preventive maintenance frequently appears unnecessary 
Many well-built water points – especially boreholes - function for many years with 
no problems.  For example, W096, a borehole installed in 2003, has never broken 
down; consequently the Managers have never checked or maintained it.  W051 is 
another example: installed in 1998, its first breakdown was 11 years later in 2009.  
For those 11 years, the community did no maintenance.  They reported that they 
never do preventative maintenance, but only work on the borehole if it is broken.  
The same thing was reported at several other boreholes that have never broken 
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down, and never been maintained (W092, W259, W260, W266).  Cases such as these 
suggest that the ‘standard model’ of dismantling and checking the pump every 
three months may often be unnecessary, especially when water points are well-
constructed in the first place.  Rapid reactive repair capacity is more important.  
 
Low maintenance frequency is both an effect and a cause of lack of skills. 
Because Managers generally only put their skills into practice in reaction to 
breakdowns, rather than according to a regular maintenance schedule, those skills 
wither quickly through lack of practice.  Unlike Area Mechanics, who may be called 
to assist with any one of a large number of water points and thus have more 
frequent opportunities to put their skills into practice, WPC members are 
responsible for only one water point.  If they do no preventive maintenance for 
several years, they may well struggle to repair it if or when it breaks down. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, MAINTFREQ is moderately significant in explaining water point 
sustainability.  However, it is difficult to analyse this variable in isolation as it is 
particularly tightly linked to several others, especially INSTQUAL, SKILLS, FUNDS 
and SPARES. 
 
6.2.6 SPARES: Accessibility of spare parts 
 
Problems with access to spares are often highlighted in the rural water supply 
sector, although as discussed in Chapter Two, opinion is sharply split on the topic.  
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The hypothesis tested here is that increased SPARES is associated with higher 
FUNCT. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
SPARES data was primarily collected through the 99 Manager surveys.  Some data 
was also collected through the W surveys, but it is excluded from this analysis as 
too few responses were recorded.   
 
Regarding stocks of spares, 68% of Managers (n=67) reported having no spares in 
stock at all.  Only a small minority of WPCs kept good stocks of spare parts – just 11 
Managers reported having three or more different spares, and 7 of them were in 
Mangochi district. 
 
In response to the question “If you don’t have a spare part in stock, how far do you 
have to travel to get it?”, only 55 responses were recorded, ranging from 30 
minutes to 12 hours, with the mode being 1 hour, the median 2 hours, and the 
mean 3.1 hours.  These findings suggest that travel distance is not a major barrier 
to accessing spares in most cases. 
 
Nonetheless, 56% of Managers feel they have problems accessing most or all spare 
parts – although 30% feel they have no problems at all (Table 6.26).  Outliers are TA 
Nsabwe in Thyolo District, where 89% report problems (probably due to the difficult 
hilly terrain of this isolated area) and TA Nankumba in Mangochi, where 60% report 
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no difficulty getting parts (probably due to the fact that there was an ongoing 
water point construction project in the area at the time of my survey). 
 
Table 6.26: SPARES: Access to spare parts. 
Do you feel that you have problems accessing spare parts? % of Managers 
No, not at all 30% 
Sometimes, for some parts 4% 
Yes, problems getting most / all parts 56% 
Not applicable 2% 
Don't know 7% 
 
In terms of impact on functionality, however, the chi-square test demonstrates 
that there is no relationship at all between SPARES (perceived difficulty in 
accessing spares) and FUNCT (X2 = .027 (1), p=.868). Thus, the data shows that 
access to spares is not a significant factor influencing functionality. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
SPARES was coded in 64% of the interviews and surveys, with 69 references in total 
(ranking 5th).  Three key themes emerged. 
 
Few WPCs keep spares in stock, and none keep records 
Although many WPCs are reportedly provided with a ‘full set’ of spare parts after 
installation, it is rare that they remain.  It is arguably very inefficient for each WPC 
to hold stocks of multiple spares that many of them will not need for several years.  
Spares may be lost, or ‘lost’ and converted into cash, or simply given away to a 
neighbouring WPC in need.  None of the WPCs appeared to keep any record of 
stocks of spares, nor any log of maintenance or repairs.  Some WPCs said they had 
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spares in stock but did not know what they were (e.g. W284). At a few water points 
respondents complained that they had never been given any spare parts at 
installation (e.g. U160). 
 
Several respondents reported that WPCs prefer to use the community’s 
contributions to buy spares, rather than keeping the money as cash.  At W664 a 
man said “it’s easy to keep spares, but money…” – implying that cash gets ‘eaten’ 
(misused).  An Area Mechanic reported the same thing, and also highlighted the 
fact that inflation can reduce the value of a cash fund, so it is more sensible to 
hold stocks of spares.  Despite this, and despite the fact that some WPCs explained 
their low cash savings by saying they had spent the money on spares, the large 
majority of WPCs had few or no spares in stock, and instead bought parts as and 
when needed. Only a handful of exceptions were found, such as W288, a GITEC 
borehole whose two breakdowns had both been repaired within 2 days using parts 
that the WPC had in stock. 
 
Spares can be bought in most trading centres 
A weak supply chain for spare parts is still seen by some as a key barrier to 
sustainability.  But this study supports the view of one interviewee from an NGO, 
who explained: “In Malawi and the sector there's a big thing 'oh there's this huge 
problem with access to spares, we can't get spares' - but [we] didn't go to a single 
village where they couldn’t get spares” (N5).  Although some survey respondents 
did report problems accessing spares, this was often hard to reconcile with my own 
experience.  For example, in the first VDC I visited (1A1), there was a borehole 
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that had been broken for ‘one month’ due to lack of a U-seal, which reportedly the 
Managers could not find in either Ntcheu or Dedza.  However, I had easily found 
and bought U-seals in Ntcheu two days earlier, for K150 each (less than 50p) from a 
market stall – one of several selling multiple borehole parts. 
 
In other places, different Managers had very different perspectives.  At W559, a 
borehole with no spares in stock, one Manager (M67) reported that spares could be 
bought within a 2-hour return journey walking; but the other (M66) said it was a 12 
hour journey.  The first claim was much more in line with my own experience of 
the geography. 
 
One issue highlighted by several respondents is the provenance of some spare 
parts.  One NGO worker said “sometimes we can find some spare parts in the local 
market. But they are not often original spare parts. In Malawi there is a big 
problem of vandalising the pump so sometimes you can find parts in the market 
that are second-hand” (N7).  Some Managers reported surprisingly low prices for 
parts, such as the new rod for W360 which cost only MWK 2000.  This is only half 
the price of a new one, suggesting that it was probably second-hand.  Another 
example comes from W773, where users reported buying spares – possibly stolen 
parts – from “passers-by”. 
 
Transport costs are sometimes seen as a problem 
The cost of transport is seen as a problem in some areas.  One DWO suggested 
“most of the parts are very cheap but transport is very expensive so they will be 
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failing to buy the spare parts” (L3); while an NGO worker said: “In TA [x], transport 
costs three times the cost of the spare part itself… people wait until someone is 
travelling to the town anyway” (N9).  However, people are constantly travelling 
back and forth to trading centres, even from remote villages, so it seems unlikely 
that this is really a major constraint.   
 
Conclusion 
Access to spares is obviously essential if repairs are required.  However, the 
evidence suggests that it is not only distance to a shop, or whether that shop has 
spares in stock, that determines access to spares; rather, the management of 
resources within the WPC (both spares, and cash) is critically important – a theme 
explored further when we consider the variable FUNDS.  In itself, SPARES is only 
marginally significant in explaining water point sustainability. 
 
6.2.7 SKILLS: Availability of repair and maintenance skills 
 
Water point functionality depends on the availability of human capacity for 
maintenance and repairs, whether in the form of Water Point Committee (WPC) 
members, Area Mechanics (AMs), or other skilled personnel.  The hypothesis tested 
here is therefore that an increase in SKILLS is associated with increased FUNCT. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
SKILLS was assessed through two sets of questions.  Users and Managers were asked 
who is responsible for both minor and major maintenance & repairs (M&R); and 
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data was also collected - primarily through the Manager surveys - regarding the 
workings of water point committees (WPCs).  Table 6.27 shows that about 60% of 
respondents (Users and Managers) feel that the WPC is solely responsible for minor 
M&R, with a further 8% holding the WPC responsible jointly with others (e.g. the 
VDC, VH or DWO).  The WPC are also held to be responsible for major repairs by 
36% of respondents.  However, Managers are more likely to feel that major repairs 
are the responsibility of Area Mechanics alone.  Very few respondents suggested 
that other individuals or institutions bear any responsibility for M&R.  Evidently the 
community management model is very well embedded, at least in theory.  
However, there is some dissonance (highlighted in the qualitative data discussed in 
the next section) between these responses and what is evident in practice, such as 
considerable reliance on politicians as a source of funds for repairs. 
 
Table 6.27: SKILLS: Who is responsible for maintenance and repairs? 
  Minor M&R Major M&R 
  U M Total U M Total 
WPC 59% 62% 60% 36% 35% 36% 
Area Mechanic 10% 15% 12% 20% 38% 26% 
WPC and other 9% 8% 8% 3% 4% 3% 
Other 7% 2% 5% 9% 3% 7% 
Don't know 7% 2% 5% 20% 5% 14% 
Not applicable 3% 4% 4% 3% 7% 5% 
VH 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Other combination 1% 3% 1% 0% 3% 1% 
Community 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
VDC 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
District government / DWO 0% 1% 0% 0% 3% 1% 
NGO 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
WPC and AM       6% 0% 4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Disaggregating responses by District highlights wide variation in the degree of 
reliance on WPCs or AMs (Table 6.28).  Reliance on WPCs is especially high in 
Thyolo and Chikhwawa districts, whereas Area Mechanics are more important in 
Mangochi district and TA Chakhumbira.  In Mangochi, the DWO and NGO partners 
have invested significantly in developing a network of AMs.  But in Chakhumbira 
there is no such network; the high level of reliance on AMs instead reflects low 
capacity on the part of the WPCs, and reliance on one or two local mechanics who 
are not part of any formal AM network. 
 
Table 6.28: SKILLS: Reliance on WPCs or AMs, by District and TA. 
  
Minor M&R Major M&R 
U M Total U M Total 
Ntcheu 
Chakhumbira 
WPC 36% 21% 29% 36% 7% 21% 
AM 29% 43% 36% 36% 57% 46% 
Kwataine 
WPC 38% 56% 45% 29% 28% 29% 
AM 0% 6% 2% 17% 28% 21% 
Mangochi 
Mbwana Nyambi 
WPC 46% 44% 45% 25% 19% 23% 
AM 29% 25% 28% 38% 63% 48% 
Nankumba 
WPC 50% 80% 59% 29% 30% 29% 
AM 17% 10% 15% 17% 40% 24% 
Thyolo 
Nsabwe 
WPC 63% 80% 68% 29% 44% 33% 
AM 4% 0% 3% 29% 11% 24% 
Chimaliro 
WPC 91% 64% 82% 50% 36% 45% 
AM 0% 18% 6% 18% 45% 27% 
Chikhwawa 
Lundu 
WPC 61% 88% 69% 50% 88% 62% 
AM             
Masache 
WPC 79% 92% 83% 46% 64% 51% 
AM 4% 8% 6% 4% 36% 14% 
 
However, the relative importance of WPCs or AMs appears to make little difference 
to functionality (Table 6.29).  Chi-square tests show that there is no significant 
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relationship between FUNCT and SKILLS (in the form of reliance on WPCs or AMs for 
minor or major repairs). 
 
Table 6.29: Effect of SKILLS on FUNCT: Chi-square test results. 
Version of variable SKILLS Chi-square df p Cramer's V p 
WPCminor .491 1 .484 .042 .484 
WPCmajor 1.829 1 .176 .082 .176 
AMminor 3.273 1 .070 .109 .070 
AMmajor 3.773 1 .052 .117 .052 
 
The community management model rests on the assumption that after a WPC is 
established its members will remain active and continue to meet regularly, conduct 
maintenance, and collect funds for repairs, thus ensuring the continued functioning 
of the water point.  My data challenges these assumptions. 
 
77% of Managers reported that a new committee was established when the water 
point was installed, while in a further 10% of cases an existing committee took on 
the role of WPC.  In 6% of cases no committee was created; and, somewhat 
worryingly, 7% of Managers did not know whether a committee existed or not.  In 
only 52% of cases was the WPC reported to be active at the time of the survey, 
although 58% reportedly met at some time in the previous year, with approximately 
half of those reporting 1-3 meetings.  One-fifth of managers reported that the WPC 
met every month or more frequently; indeed, very improbably, 2% reported that 
the WPC met every week – casting doubt on the reliability of self-reported meeting 
frequency. 
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The community management model envisages that a WPC should normally have 10 
members, with equal numbers of men and women.  However, in my dataset, most 
WPCs had only 4 active members (median 4, mode 5, mean 4.3).  WPC Chairs were 
more likely to be male (60%), while Treasurers were more likely to be female 
(71%).  A large majority (91%) of Managers reported that more than half of the WPC 
members were women, and 23% reported that all WPC members were female.  
However, this data also appears unreliable, since almost 40% of Managers reported 
a larger number of female active members than of active members altogether. 
 
More than a third of WPCs (38%) had no members who had received training in 
water point maintenance and repair, and a further 8% had only 1 or 2 trained 
members.  On the other hand, 25% of WPCs reported that all 10 members had 
received training – although whether those members remained active is a different 
matter. 
 
Overall, the main lesson to be drawn here may simply be that the data was often 
contradictory.  Asking a range of questions about WPC operations often served to 
highlight inconsistencies in respondents’ answers.  Consequently it is difficult to 
identify reliable variables whose relationship with functionality can be analysed. 
 
The key variable, of course, is existence of an active WPC – since the community 
management model suggests that there should be a strong positive association 
between existence of an active WPC, and water point functionality.  However, my 
data does not support this hypothesis: chi-square is 0.753 (p=.385), indicating no 
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significant association between SKILLS (in the form of an active WPC) and FUNCT.  
This suggests that WPCs are broadly irrelevant to water point functionality – a 
challenge to the dominant community management model.   
 
Qualitative analysis 
SKILLS was coded in 67% of the interviews and surveys, with 80 references in total 
(ranking 3rd).  Two key themes emerged. 
 
Water Point Committees tend to collapse quickly  
WPCs, which are intended to be self-sustaining institutions, in reality tend to 
collapse quickly.  There appear to be three contributory factors: 
 
1) WPCs often do not see the need to meet, or do maintenance, or collect 
money – especially if the water point functions well for months or years, 
and/or if there are other people who seem likely to take responsibility if 
things go wrong, such as an MP or NGO.  As one NGO observed, “The 
community thinks the NGO or the district will come and do it.  And they 
have in the past” (N2).  A local government worker agreed: “There is a lack 
of maintenance committees … those with an MP there, they think ‘why 
should we [take responsibility] when the MP is there’” (L6). 
 
2) No external agent is monitoring them.  One respondent said: “They are 
pretty much ineffective, WPCs in general. There is a lack of accountability. 
The DWO can't do enough monitoring” (N2).  Another agreed: “…without 
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support from district councils... the WPC will not function.  Soon after the 
project there are no committees” (D1).  And so the cycle is repeated: “When 
the project has been implemented there are these committees set, but after 
the project is finished these committees are disintegrating and not much is 
going on, and when another project comes in, you know they set up the 
same committees and these things seem to have not been going very well.” 
(D1). 
 
3) Membership naturally declines, through people moving away or dying. 
“Mobility of WPCs is a problem… you find you erect a WPC today - tomorrow, 
it's not there. So you find if that WP facility breaks down then there is 
nobody who can maintain it until the district water people have to be 
consulted to assist the communities… Marriage is one factor, business is 
another. People go to Blantyre, Lilongwe for business and they don't come 
back” (L5). Although in theory new members should be elected to replace 
those that leave, in practice this seems very rare.  The experience of M29 
seems more representative: “the committee meets every month, but since 
the chairman had gone to Blantyre in November [i.e. 8 months earlier] they 
have never met”. 
 
In general, WPCs are not ‘live’ institutions. Often only a shell remains, in the form 
of one or two individuals with specific roles (Treasurer, Chair).  
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Managers lack technical skills 
Although the community management model entails training large numbers of 
people at village level, lack of skills is a real problem.  Some respondents believe 
the problem is due to insufficient training, reported in a few locations (W224, 
U175).  One NGO worker stated that only 20-30% of WP committees have been 
trained, so “even for minor problems they don't know where to start from.  So 
because of that you see that a lot of water points are just lying not functioning” 
(N9). However, even among those who have been trained, there is a lack of skills 
and confidence (M25, W536).  Examples of trained Managers who still have a very 
low level of technical understanding include M35, who is Chair of her WPC, but 
cannot identify the spare parts that they have in stock; M52, another Chair who 
said “we don't maintain it because we don't know how the borehole works”; and 
the committee at W495, who said “we were trained but we have no skills”.  
 
The quality of training is one factor.  One EWB Fellow (B6), accompanying a 5-day 
community management training, noted a number of problems: “We covered all 
the topics, but the time spent for most of the topics was cut short.  A lot of things 
contributed to this: people showing up late … people not showing up [at all], 
breaks taking a long time, spending too much time on irrelevant tasks” and 
concluded “based on this one, I have quite a few reservations on how effective 
these trainings are in the long term”.  And even if the training itself were of high 
quality, many WPC members may lack the basic skills (literacy, numeracy, 
technical understanding) to absorb and act on it, or such skills as they have quickly 
wither once the training is over, since preventive maintenance is never done.   
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The role of Area Mechanics is perceived as critically important by several 
respondents: “For point water sources, the key challenge is the need for Area 
Mechanics” (G4).  Where AMs exist, District Water Officers see them as the 
frontline service providers: “Here we have also Area Mechanics… So whenever 
there is minor breakdown the people are going to them instead of to us” (L3).  
There was an active network of official Area Mechanics in only one of the four 
districts studied; but in other districts I came across several ‘unofficial’ AMs, 
providing an important intermediate level of technical support to village-level 
Managers.  Boxes 6.3 and 6.4 provide brief examples. 
 
Box 6.3: The official Area Mechanic 
 
Ms X. is an official Area Mechanic in Mangochi District, trained several years ago as 
part of an NGO programme.  She works with two other AMs in the VDC; they are 
called individually by WPCs, but can call the other AMs to help if the problem is 
big.  According to her records, between the three of them they were called to 
make repairs four times in 2010, and twice in 2011. The AMs are unpaid; instead, 
WPCs are supposed to pay MWK 500 per year (roughly £1.20) as ‘borehole 
insurance’.  Only she receives the money, as she obtained the official forms during 
her training; the other two AMs in this VDC did not. Her records show that only a 
handful of WPCs have paid this ‘borehole insurance’ in the last few years, and none 
were repeat customers.  It thus appears that there is a relatively low level of 
demand for her services. 
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Box 6.4: The unofficial Area Mechanic 
 
Mr Y. is an unofficial Area Mechanic in Ntcheu district.  His only training was in 
1973, but he has learned how to fix modern pumps like Afridevs simply by watching 
and doing.  He is called to help by all villages in his VDC, and even up to 15km 
away.  He says he makes no charge, but just asks villagers to ‘give him something 
so he can buy soap’.  He has trained many others informally through 
demonstration. He goes often to Ntcheu Town because people send him there to 
get spare parts, but he doesn’t keep parts in stock.  He is only ever called when a 
borehole is broken, never for preventative maintenance.  He doesn’t have his own 
tools, but he uses those that were left with each WPC by the installers – two 
spanners and a fishing tool.  He usually replaces worn U-seals with a ring cut from 
an old flip-flop; and when a rod breaks he takes it to be welded at the main road or 
in Ntcheu, at one-tenth of the price of a new rod. 
 
Conclusion 
On the one hand, availability of maintenance and repair skills is undoubtedly 
important.  On the other hand, the existence of WPCs is evidently not an effective 
mechanism for ensuring availability of those skills.  Overall, SKILLS is moderately 
significant in explaining water point sustainability, but an alternative model of 
skills provision is urgently needed. 
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6.2.8 FUNDS: Availability of funds for repairs and maintenance 
 
Finance is needed to pay for spare parts and/or skilled people to keep water points 
functioning.  The community management model is based on the assumption that 
users will pay regular contributions into a ‘water point maintenance fund’, so that 
money will be available in case of breakdown.  My working hypothesis was 
therefore that higher FUNDS would be associated with higher FUNCT. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
A large number of questions regarding this variable were included in the surveys.  
This was for three reasons: 1) to get accurate detail, 2) to provide opportunities to 
triangulate responses, and 3) because this area had been highlighted by previous 
authors (e.g. Haysom 2006) as especially important.  Altogether the surveys 
included 31 questions with bearing on water point finances, of which 20 were 
included in both U and M surveys (273 data points), 1 was included in M and W 
surveys (437 data points), and 3 were included in W, U and M surveys (611 data 
points).  This large quantity of data served to particularly highlight problems of 
data quality. Contradictory and/or inconsistent responses were frequently 
encountered – problems that might not have been so apparent if the surveys had 
simply asked one or two questions about finances and taken the responses at face 
value.  The implications are highlighted in the analysis below. 
 
First, very few people understand how much a water point costs.  Only two Users 
(1%) and nine Managers (9%) thought they knew the cost of a water point, but 
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almost all substantially underestimated the amount; only three guessed anywhere 
close to the real figure (approximately 1 million Malawi Kwacha).  This lack of 
understanding of the economic value of a water point in turn has implications for 
people’s understanding of likely cost of repairs or replacement. 
 
Communities are often encouraged to open a bank account when a new water point 
is installed, as a place to keep the money in the Maintenance Fund.  However there 
is considerable geographical variation: in Mangochi, none of the communities had 
to set up a bank account, and in Ntcheu fewer than 5% reported doing this.  In 
contrast, in Nsabwe (53%), Chimaliro (76%), Lundu (65%) and Masache (42%) a large 
proportion of respondents indicated that a bank account had been opened before 
installation - although in most (72%) of these cases the respondent did not know 
how much money was put into the account.  In the other 22 cases, the amount 
reported ranged from MWK50 to MWK18,000 (median 4000, mean 5407, mode 
2500).  For reference, £1 = approximately MWK 400 at the time of the surveys.  
Reportedly, 82% (64/78) of these bank accounts still exist.  In 44 cases, the amount 
held is not known; in the remaining 20 cases, the amount held ranges from zero (6 
cases) to MWK11,700 (median 2000, mean 2888, mode 0).  However, in only 5 cases 
were we able to verify any of this information using written records. 
 
The core of the community management financial model is regular contributions 
from users into a Maintenance Fund.  A typical model in theory involves monthly 
payments of, say, MWK 50 (a little over 10 pence).  It is important to establish 
whether this happens in practice. 
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Looking at all User and Manager responses together, 36% say they pay monthly, 9% 
pay yearly, 27% pay occasionally, and 25% never pay at all (Table 6.30).  Managers 
are somewhat more likely to indicate annual or occasional payment.  Along with 
other discrepancies in the data, I suggest that this indicates ‘confirmation bias’; 
Users know that they are expected to contribute monthly, so they say that they do.   
 
Table 6.30: FUNDS: frequency of community contributions. 
Does the community contribute financially? Users Managers Both 
No 24% 27% 25% 
Yes, pay per bucket 1% 0% 1% 
Yes, pay monthly per household 39% 29% 36% 
Yes, pay monthly per person 1% 0% 0% 
Yes, pay yearly per household 9% 10% 9% 
Occasionally, when repairs are needed 21% 22% 21% 
Occasionally, various reasons / not sure why 5% 8% 6% 
Other 1% 2% 2% 
Not applicable 0% 1% 0% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 
 
However, among those who say they pay monthly, only 77% report the last actual 
contribution as being within the last month (Table 6.31).   
 
Table 6.31: FUNDS: Date of last contribution 
When was the last time your household paid for water? Users Managers Both 
0-1 month 75% 82% 77% 
2-6 months 11% 7% 10% 
7-12 months 3% 4% 3% 
A long time ago 2% 0% 1% 
Don't know 9% 7% 9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
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A quarter (25%) of U and M respondents indicated that some households are exempt 
from payment.  Reported exemption is particularly high in Mbwana Nyambi (35%) 
and Chimaliro (37%), both high-functionality TAs; and particularly low in Kwataine 
(10%), a low-functionality TA.  It’s plausible that high incidence of exemption may 
be related to equity guidelines set by recent major water point construction 
projects in those TAs.  In most (58%) cases, exemption was in place only for the 
elderly, while in another 33% both the elderly and some other group/s (disabled, 
poor, sick) were exempt.  Overall this suggests that communities see the elderly as 
the main group ‘deserving’ of collective subsidy. 
 
Among those respondents who indicate that the community does pay into a water 
point maintenance fund, 51% say that ‘all or almost all’ of those who are supposed 
to pay do indeed pay, while 31% say that ‘about three-quarters’ do.  26% of 
respondents say that there is no penalty for non-payment, while 48% indicate that 
non-payers are banned from using the water point.  The qualitative data 
considered in the next section contains examples both of people stopping using a 
water point due to non-payment, and reports of dominant characters continuing to 
use a water point regardless of non-payment. 
 
There is data in 50 of the 99 Manager surveys regarding the total amount of the 
previous collection: the median is MWK 2000 (mean 2700, range 200 to 11,700).  
More than a fifth of Managers (22/99) did not know how much had been collected - 
somewhat disconcerting, since almost all Managers were members of the WPC.  
Where money is collected, a large majority of respondents report that this is done 
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by a WPC member (94%) and that the fund is looked after by a WPC member (88%) – 
normally the Treasurer, but sometimes the Chair.  In a small minority of cases the 
money is collected and/or looked after by the VH or a member of the VDC. 
 
Since most respondents report making regular or occasional payments, in theory 
most WPCs should have significant amounts saved for maintenance and repairs.  
There is data on this question from 86/99 Manager surveys (Table 6.32).  Of those 
86, 24 (28%) did not know how much was in the Maintenance Fund, 19 (22%) said 
there was nothing, and 8 (9%) said the question was not applicable (presumably 
because there is no such Fund).  Among the 54 Managers who knew how much was 
held in the Maintenance Fund, the median amount saved was MWK 1150 (mean 
2169, mode 0, range 0 – 11,700). MWK 1150 was worth about £2.75 in July 2012.  
To put this another way, only eleven of the 86 Managers reported that enough had 
been saved to buy a single replacement rod costing MWK 4000. 
 
Table 6.32: FUNDS: Amount held in Maintenance Fund. 
District TA 
% of Managers 
who know how 
much is in Fund 
Total currently held in WP Maintenance Fund 
Mean Median Mode Min. Max. 
Ntcheu 
Chakhumbira 36% 825 400 0 0 2500 
Kwataine 39% 1864   0 0 5000 
Mangochi 
Mbwana Nyambi 60% 3650 3200 3000 0 9450 
Nankumba 86% 2100 2100 1500 0 3600 
Thyolo 
Nsabwe 43% 500   0 0 1500 
Chimaliro 80% 4460 5240 0 0 11700 
Chikhwawa 
Lundu 83% 1044   0 0 4420 
Masache 100% 1075 150 0 0 6255 
All 63% 2169 1150 0 0 11700 
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Clearly, the ideal of the ‘just-in-case’ water point Maintenance Fund is rarely, if 
ever, realised in practice.  Even where some money has been saved, in not one 
case is the amount saved consistent either with likely need, or with the level of 
contributions reportedly made by community members.  
 
A simple calculation highlights the scale of the discrepancy.  Let Fa be the amount 
that is actually in the Maintenance Fund, and Ft be the amount that should 
theoretically be in there - based on the number of households using the water point 
(h), the frequency of payments (f), the size of payments (p), the age of the water 
point (y), and the amount expended so far on maintenance and repairs (m)).  Thus:  
Ft = (p*f*h*y)-m.  It is possible to calculate Ft for 43 cases in my dataset, and to 
compare this with Fa for 30 of them (in the other 13 cases, the Manager did not 
know how much was currently held in the Maintenance Fund).  Table 6.3 presents 
the findings. 
 
In virtually every case the discrepancy is enormous; in only three of the cases does 
the Maintenance Fund hold more than one-fifth of the amount it ought to, and in 
the majority of cases it holds only 1% or less.  On average, the amount saved is just 
2% of what it should be.  While it would be unrealistic to expect a 100% savings 
rate, the sheer scale of this discrepancy strongly suggests that the financial 
assumptions underpinning the community management model are in serious need 
of revision. 
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Table 6.33: FUNDS: Actual versus theoretical amounts in Maintenance Fund. 
WP District TA Theoretical (Ft) Actual (Fa) Fa as % of Ft 
W701 Chikhwawa Lundu       32,901          -    0% 
W771 Chikhwawa Masache       47,750          -    0% 
W279 Mangochi Mbwana Nyambi       50,301          -    0% 
W747 Chikhwawa Masache       52,101          -    0% 
W630 Thyolo Chimaliro       61,501          -    0% 
W710 Chikhwawa Lundu      130,200          -    0% 
W737 Chikhwawa Masache      239,901          -    0% 
W738 Chikhwawa Masache      344,301          -    0% 
W092 Ntcheu Chakhumbira      470,349        300  0% 
W434 Mangochi Nankumba      758,301     2,700  0% 
W765 Chikhwawa Masache       21,500        100  0% 
W530 Thyolo Nsabwe      179,901     1,500  1% 
W686 Thyolo Chimaliro       84,600     1,000  1% 
W332 Mangochi Mbwana Nyambi      107,901     1,300  1% 
W739 Chikhwawa Masache       53,000        650  1% 
W745 Chikhwawa Masache      153,901     2,000  1% 
W298 Mangochi Mbwana Nyambi      149,661     3,000  2% 
W278 Mangochi Mbwana Nyambi      194,781     4,000  2% 
W278 Mangochi Mbwana Nyambi      201,741     4,900  2% 
W621 Thyolo Chimaliro      179,901     5,500  3% 
W769 Chikhwawa Masache         5,300        200  4% 
W741 Chikhwawa Masache         8,690        500  6% 
W280 Mangochi Mbwana Nyambi      109,101     9,450  9% 
W374 Mangochi Nankumba       13,800     1,500  11% 
W459 Mangochi Nankumba       12,000     1,500  13% 
W431 Mangochi Nankumba       23,500     3,300  14% 
W420 Mangochi Nankumba       19,100     3,600  19% 
W316 Mangochi Mbwana Nyambi       10,701     3,000  28% 
W727 Chikhwawa Lundu       14,600     4,420  30% 
W749 Chikhwawa Masache       14,901     6,255  42% 
All   3,746,186    60,675  2% 
 
There are several possible explanations for this discrepancy, as discussed in earlier 
chapters.  Broadly, they fall into two categories: 1) money is not collected in the 
first place, either because people are too poor to pay or for other reasons; or 2) 
money is collected, but is badly managed or misused.   In reality, 2) often leads to 
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1): if people suspect that the Fund is misused, they stop contributing.  This is one 
of the themes that emerges clearly from the qualitative data. 
 
My survey looked at the quality of financial management from several angles.  One 
aspect is recordkeeping; there is data on this from 89/99 Manager surveys.  In 17 
cases (19%), they admitted that no records were kept at all, while in another 41 
cases (46%), records were reportedly kept, but were not available.  In only 22 cases 
(25%) were records available for inspection, and in only 3 of these cases (all of 
them relating to functional water points) were the records of good quality. 
 
Another aspect of accountability relates to whether Managers report back to Users 
on financial matters (Table 6.34). More than two-thirds of Managers state that they 
‘always’ report back to communities; but less than 40% of Users agree; almost half 
the Users say that WPCs ‘never’ report back, but only 15% of Managers agree.  
Since Managers have an incentive to overstate the degree to which they are 
accountable to the community, Users’ responses are more likely to reflect reality. 
 
Table 6.34: FUNDS: WPC accountability.  
Do the WPC report back to the community  
on how the money is spent? Users Managers Total 
Yes, always 39% 68% 50% 
Yes, sometimes 5% 7% 6% 
No, never 43% 15% 33% 
Not applicable 6% 9% 7% 
Don't know 6% 1% 4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
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Users are also twice as likely as Managers to rate financial management as poor or 
very poor (37% vs 19%) (Table 6.35).  Conversely, 67% of Managers rate it good or 
excellent, against only 42% of Users.  Even so, User opinion is fairly evenly split, 
which is perhaps surprising given that objective measures (e.g. amounts saved) and 
qualitative data (considered shortly) both suggest that financial management is 
poor in a large majority of WPCs.  
 
Table 6.35: FUNDS: Quality of financial management. 
How good do you think the financial 
management of this water point is? Users Managers Both 
Very poor 20% 10% 16% 
Quite poor 18% 9% 14% 
OK 6% 5% 6% 
Good 42% 62% 49% 
Excellent 1% 6% 3% 
Not applicable 6% 7% 6% 
Don't know 8% 2% 6% 
  100% 100% 100% 
 
There is, as expected, a relatively strong relationship between financial 
transparency and positive User perception: 70% of WPCs that ‘never’ report back 
are rated poorly by Users, while 76% of WPCs that ‘always’ report back are rated 
positively. 
 
Having thoroughly examined the data on FUNDS, we now come to the core 
question: what is the relationship between FUNDS and FUNCT?  Two variables are 
of particular interest: whether water point users contribute regularly, and the 
amount of money saved in the Maintenance Fund. 
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I classified responses into 3 groups; those who said they contributed regularly 
(every month or year), occasionally, or never. Table 6.36 summarises the cross-
tabulation.  There is a moderately large and significant relationship between (self-
reported) regularity of payment and functionality: X2 (2) = 11.728, P<.005. The 
standardised residuals show that this result is largely driven by the high levels of 
non-functionality among the water points where people do not contribute. The 
direction of the relationship between FUNDS and FUNCT is complex: on the one 
hand people are less likely to contribute towards a broken water point, especially 
if it has been broken for some time; on the other hand, in some cases the only time 
that people do contribute is after the water point has broken down, when the need 
for funds is obvious and urgent.  Care is needed in interpreting the data, and again 
the qualitative data serves to illuminate the issue. 
 
Table 6.36: Relationship between FUNDS and FUNCT. 
Contribute regularly? 
Functional? 
Total 
No Yes 
No 
# 30 38 68 
% 44% 56% 100% 
Occasionally 
# 21 54 75 
% 28% 72% 100% 
Regularly 
# 27 102 129 
% 21% 79% 100% 
Total 
# 78 194 272 
% 29% 71% 100% 
 
Next I consider whether high levels of savings in the Maintenance Fund influences 
functionality.  In theory, high levels of savings would indicate strong capacity on 
the part of the Water Point Committee, and would mean that any breakdowns 
would be rapidly fixed. However, as has already become evident, savings levels are 
 273 
universally much lower than they should be, so it is likely that the data will be too 
limited to draw many conclusions.  I use logistic regression to examine the 
influence of the continuous variable ‘Amount currently held in Maintenance Fund’.  
The results, summarised in Table 6.37, show that the size of the Fund has no 
influence on functionality. 
 
Table 6.37: Effect of FUNDS on FUNCT: binary logistic regression results. 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
FUNDS (amount currently in Maintenance Fund) .000 .000 .164 1 .685 1.000 
Constant .950 .351 7.313 1 .007 2.585 
 
However, savings data is only available for 65 water points, and for most of these, 
savings levels are extremely low.  Statistical analysis is therefore of limited value, 
but the qualitative data sheds further light on to what is really happening with 
raising and managing funds for water supply at community level. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
FUNDS was the variable that was highlighted by far the most frequently by 
respondents.  It was coded in 84% of the interviews and surveys, with 276 
references in total (ranking 1st). Three key themes emerged. 
 
Major inconsistencies between financial theory and practice 
As shown in the previous section, there was frequently a very large discrepancy 
between what should have been saved, according to respondents’ description of 
financial arrangements, and what had actually been saved.  Two main mechanisms 
could explain this: 1) contributions are lower than Users claim, and/or 2) funds are 
 274 
misappropriated by Managers.  In fact, the evidence suggests that these two 
mechanisms are mutually reinforcing. 
 
In a large number of cases, WPC users and managers reported that most users made 
regular monthly contributions, but further probing revealed a more complex 
picture.  It is likely that ‘courtesy bias’ goes some way to explaining this tendency 
to exaggerate contributions.  For example, at W763 respondents admitted they had 
not contributed for ten years, but, aware that this was not how it was ‘supposed’ 
to be, insisted that they planned to start collecting again “next month”. 
There are several reasons why contributions decline.  One obvious point is that 
most users have little disposable income, and many priorities other than water. If 
the money is not required to fix the water point immediately, the incentive to 
contribute is weak.  For example, respondents at W294 reported that they stopped 
contributing in the “hunger months”.  On the other hand, a group of men at W093 
claimed that “shortage of money” is the reason why they don’t repair their 
borehole with a proper U-seal; but when asked how they had enough money to buy 
alcohol (several were obviously drunk) but not enough for water, they replied that 
it was due to “ignorance” – while the women who were listening laughed. 
 
Another factor is the absence of penalties for non-payment.  Some community 
members are feared, and payment is not enforced: “People shout a lot so they 
don’t do anything” (M79; also W18, and VDC 1A1).   If some users can avoid paying, 
others soon question why they themselves should contribute. 
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Villagers also hope that, if something serious does go expensively wrong, a “well-
wisher” or wealthy outsider - such as a politician or an NGO - will fix it for them.  
This happens frequently enough that it is not an unreasonable hope.  For example, 
W221 broke down shortly after installation and remained non-functional for 3 years 
until the 2009 political campaign, when the MP paid for repairs.  Similarly, W348 
was repaired free of charge by the installing NGO two years after it broke down, 
and very shortly before the end of the project - perhaps the NGO wanted to ensure 
maximum functionality levels before the end-of-project evaluation? 
 
As one local government worker explained “What has been happening....  The MPs 
are taking advantage, the MP has repaired it, maybe a small thing has broken down 
and the community waits for the MP to repair it” (L6). A DWO in another district 
complained: “There are some [water points] where the people didn't accept to 
have the rehabilitation because they had to pay a commitment fee.  Because we 
were used to having everything free from government.  They said ah the 
government will pay, maybe our MP will support us...” (L3).  Another respondent 
argued, “there is no incentive right now for communities to collect up to the bar, 
no clarity that that they have to … every couple of years when the district gets lots 
of funding they come along and do all the repairs that area mechanics could do...” 
(N5).  EWB Fellows also noted the counterproductive effect of donors providing 
‘free stuff’ (B13, B26). Although this could be seen as a case of ‘moral hazard’, 
whereby communities do not bear full responsibility for the consequences of their 
inaction, I would suggest that the term is in fact more applicable to the actions of 
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the installers, who evade responsibility for the long-term consequences of their 
installations thanks to the community management model. 
 
Finally, many Users simply do not trust Managers.  Misuse of funds is widely 
reported, so Users have little faith that their contributions will be saved until 
needed.  This finding emerged particularly strongly, as outlined in the next section. 
 
Misuse of WPC funds by WPC members. 
Misuse of funds is the single most important reason why people do not contribute.   
One DWO observed, “the people can raise some funds but the ones that have 
received the funds don't declare them, don't use them properly... so that scares 
the people to contribute more funds” (L3).  A local NGO worker echoed this, 
observing: “Most of the time if you ask why they do not contribute people will say 
they are poor. But … if you probe deeper … it has come to my common knowledge 
that indeed the factor that communities suspect their funds are being embezzled … 
has actually arisen. It is very true people don't actually believe that … the people 
who are entrusted to keep that money will do a fair job. They think they will 
actually spend the money.  But it's difficult to prove that…” (N3). 
 
Indeed, numerous examples were given by respondents of WPC members misusing 
funds intended for maintenance and repair of the water point (including U19, U26, 
U27, M20, M23, U43, U47, M37, M38, M48, W318, W495, W499, M62, W527, M63, 
W536, W553, U108, U117, U123, M84, U144, and U162).  Typical comments 
included: “Some people don’t contribute because people in the past contributed 
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and the WPC misused the cash” (U19); “People refuse to contribute because they 
don’t believe the WPC, they think that they use the cash for their families” (M23); 
“the WPC eats the money … they misuse the funds and buy their own needs” (U47); 
“The old committee took the money for the borehole and made their business with 
it” (W553).  In one case, the respondent was more forgiving: “The funds are used 
differently.  If one WPC member is sick they use the money to take him to hospital.  
The community is aware of this” (W736); but a much more frequent comment was 
“People used to borrow and do business with the money” (U101). 
 
A typical example is W527. At first, the people at this water point said that they 
trusted the committee.  But in response to further questions they said “the fund 
was there but due to some quarrels the fund is nowhere to be seen”.  They 
reported that the Treasurer collected money in the past, but that money 
disappeared over 2 years ago.  Now there is nothing saved, and they don’t 
contribute.   
 
At another water point, U117 reported: “The WPC has been active but in June 
other WPC members realised that the money that the treasurer was keeping was 
not according to records, and when the WPC wanted to check in the book the 
treasurer said that she lost the notebook [as a way of hiding information].”  
Another user at the same water point (U118) added: “One of the WPC members 
was pregnant and had to buy baby clothes out of that [Maintenance Fund]. The 
GVH was told the story and that person had to pay back.  This happened twice with 
the WPC members.” 
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Financial mismanagement is a major reason for the dissolution and replacement of 
committees.  One user explained: “This is the third committee … the community 
don’t contribute and the WPC is not active because the community speaks a lot on 
funds management … The community thinks that WPC are eating their money” 
(U123).  Another, U144, reported that they were on to their fourth committee; the 
previous three had been replaced due to mismanagement of funds.  
 
People often seemed afraid to question the WPC about financial management.  At 
W665, respondents reported that about MWK 22,000 had been collected the 
previous year for borehole repairs, but had disappeared.  A member of the WPC 
disclaimed responsibility, saying “I don’t know anything about the money … the 
treasurer is the only one who knows”.  The people appeared afraid to ask the 
treasurer directly.  
 
At W713, a standpipe in a small town, the tap was closed in 2007 due to an 
“alarming bill”; the committee misused the money, but they were not punished.  It 
was reopened later that year; but the committee is still the same two women who 
‘ate’ the money in 2007. These two women insist no one can take water unless one 
of them is present, so water was not flowing at the time of my visit.  The users 
want to change the committee but they fear these two women: “These two women 
say other women are too junior and cannot pull them down”.  The users believe 
that the water board is also aware of the committee situation, but “even though 
you go to complain to the VH or VDC or water board, they will not pass with their 
decision”.  At W709, another standpipe, users explained that they were afraid to 
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ask the committee members about financial management, for fear of being 
prevented from taking water: “The committee use their position power.  It is very 
impossible [to hold them to account] … We are afraid”. 
 
Abuse of power by chiefs 
Similar concerns were voiced about the role of village heads.  One DWO observed 
that “what happens normally, these WPCs, they are influenced by village 
headmen... to misuse or to mismanage the WP funds… The village headmen are the 
ones who cause problems. Because they go there and they command the WPC to 
give them what they have collected, and because it is the headman the WPC just 
give out the money…” (L5).  Another DWO agreed: “In fact the challenge comes 
when we are setting off those WPCs. It seems there is no proper way we can elect 
the people to be on the committee. You find most of the people are related to the 
chief... they are more powerful, they can abuse” (L2). 
 
In a few places, the VH treats the water point as his personal domain.  For 
example, at W150, my research assistant Yanja reported: “There is no committee; 
the VH does everything alone, these members are like rubber stamps… People have 
doubts because they don’t know how their money is spent.  The VH is very tough, 
everybody fears him.  He says that the borehole is at his compound so he is the 
only one to control it”.  Similar situations were reported by U17 and U128.   
 
More frequently, the WPC operates under the control of the VH.  At W052, the VH 
was a member of the WPC, took the funds that were collected, and has never 
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accounted for them.  Further examples were reported by U142, and U101: “the VH 
used powers to get the cash”; and by M19: “The VH … sometimes he gets the funds 
and misuses it.  He has the powers and controls the WPC”.  A WPC member at 
W550 complained that the VH had sent someone else in her place for the training, 
in order to get the training allowance. 
 
Users find it very hard to hold chiefs or their relatives to account.  For example, at 
W633, users reported that a WPC member (now passed away) had misused all the 
money, but they had been unable to stop him because “he was very troublesome.  
He was a senior man so they were fearing him as a big man in the committee”.  In 
fact, he was a nephew of the VH, and they believe the VH also ‘ate’ (i.e. misused 
funds) with him.  Similar problems are illustrated in Boxes 6.5 and 6.6. 
 
Box 6.5: Public resource, personal profit 
 
When I visited borehole W135, it was only 3 months old.  It had been donated to 
K*** village by American evangelists, and was located next to the compound of an 
obviously wealthy family, who had a large house and a truck.  The father of the 
family was district governor for the Malawi Congress Party, and the son was the 
Village Head.  The villagers reported that the borehole was being operated for 
personal profit by this very well-connected family, who charged other community 
members 150K per month (three times the ‘normal’ rate) to use it.  Most villagers 
were forced to use a ‘spring’ - a muddy trickle - 300m away down a steep hill.  The 
district governor, alerted to my visit, was clearly alarmed that I “might have been 
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given wrong information”.  Attempting to explain his control of the borehole, he 
said “My people are primitive, they don’t want development”.  How he thought 
this justified this example of elite capture was unclear. 
 
 
Box 6.6: Plus ca change… 
 
At W598, visited in July 2012, there was a handwritten notice: ‘Special 
announcement: from July 2012 we will start collecting money at this borehole. 
K50/hh, K100/hh for those with cows.’  The notice was posted by the new 
committee who were elected in January 2012 when the borehole parts were stolen; 
the repair had cost MWK 31,080. The people I met at the borehole – about a dozen 
users - reported that some refuse to pay, but still take water – “they are powerful 
people and can’t be challenged”.  The respondents reported that the old 
committee were collecting money but “they just ate it”, and the VH wouldn’t 
punish the corrupt WPC because “they were eating together”.  I asked about the 
new committee – would they also eat the money?  The answer was surprisingly 
open: “Yes! So far they have used the money to buy parts but in future they will 
eat it”. My translator explained: “The problem is money.  They collect it for the 
borehole but then if they have personal problems they use it”.  But the people 
don’t report misuse of funds, because “They are afraid. These people are 
powerful.  They know how to shout.” 
 
These numerous examples add up to an overwhelming weight of evidence that the 
financial aspect of the community management model simply does not work.  
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Abuse of power, misuse of funds, and absence of trust are all themes that emerge 
vividly from respondents.  These findings pose a major challenge to the theory of 
community management - one that I explore in more depth in Chapter Seven. 
 
Conclusion 
The key finding here is that, in terms of financial management, people default to 
‘as and when’ (collecting funds only when repairs are required) rather than ‘just in 
case’ (saving up in advance).  As one DWO put it, “You find a lot [of WPCs] they 
don't have these water point funds… at that time when the borehole is already 
broken down, they start collecting money” (L1). All the evidence suggests that this 
is eminently logical when resources are short, and there is little trust.  Overall, 
FUNDS is highly significant in explaining water point sustainability. 
 
6.2.9 SUPPORT: Availability of external support  
 
Availability of external post-construction support is thought to be an important 
factor in sustainability (Whittington, Davis et al. 2008). Thus, I tested the 
hypothesis that increased SUPPORT is associated with increased FUNCT. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
Managers reported generally very low levels of post construction support (PCS): 71% 
received none from the installer, and 57% received none from any source.  
However, Mangochi district is an exception (Table 6.38): 46% reported receiving 
PCS from the installer and/or from the District Water Office, with a higher 
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proportion receiving support in TA Nankumba, where there was an ongoing WASH 
project at the time of my survey.  In Chikhwawa, installers provided little PCS, but 
the DWO made multiple visits to a number of sites, especially in TA Masache.  
 
Table 6.38: SUPPORT: Frequency and source, by District and TA. 
District TA 
Post-construction support 
Frequency 
Source 
Installer DWO MOIWD Other 
Ntcheu 
Chakhumbira 
None 69% 69% 77% 85% 
Single monitoring visit 15% 15% 8%   
Don't know 15% 15% 15% 15% 
Kwataine 
None 72% 67% 100% 100% 
Single monitoring visit 11% 6%     
Multiple monitoring visits 17% 17%     
Maintenance (free)   11%     
Mangochi 
Mbwana 
Nyambi 
None 69% 63% 100% 100% 
Single monitoring visit 6% 19%     
Multiple monitoring visits 25% 19%     
Nankumba 
None 30% 40% 100% 80% 
Single monitoring visit 20% 30%   10% 
Multiple monitoring visits 50% 30%     
Other       10% 
Thyolo 
Nsabwe 
None 70% 80% 100% 80% 
Single monitoring visit   20%     
Multiple monitoring visits 30%     20% 
Chimaliro 
None 82% 64% 100% 91% 
Single monitoring visit 9%     9% 
Multiple monitoring visits 9% 36%     
Chikhwawa 
Lundu 
None 88% 88% 100% 100% 
Multiple monitoring visits 13% 13%     
Masache 
None 92% 58% 100% 100% 
Multiple monitoring visits 8% 42%     
 
There was a strong correlation between receiving no PCS and being dissatisfied 
with availability of PCS (50/54).  On the other hand, of those that received PCS 
more than once, less than half (8/17) were satisfied.  Cross tabulation suggests 
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there is little relationship between SUPPORT and FUNCT: 77% of water points that 
had received ‘good’ PCS (two or more visits) were functional, but so were 72% of 
those where no PCS was received at all (Table 6.39).   
 
Table 6.39: Relationship between SUPPORT and FUNCT. 
 SUPPORT 
FUNCT? 
Total 
No Yes 
Any PCS at all? 
No 
# 16 41 57 
% 28% 72% 100% 
Yes 
# 14 27 41 
% 34% 66% 100% 
Good PCS? 
No 
# 26 55 81 
% 32% 68% 100% 
Yes 
# 4 13 17 
% 24% 76% 100% 
Total 
# 30 68 98 
% 31% 69% 100% 
 
The chi-square test confirms that this relationship between SUPPORT and FUNCT is 
small and not statistically significant (Table 6.40) - a finding that conflicts with 
that of Whittington, Davis et al. (2008).  Again, the qualitative data illuminates the 
findings further. 
 
Table 6.40: Effect of SUPPORT on FUNCT: Chi-square test results. 
Variable Chi-square df p Cramer's V p 
GoodPCS? .486 1 .486 .070 .486 
MinimalPCS? .442 1 .506 .067 .506 
NoPCS? .414 1 .520 .065 .520 
 
Qualitative analysis 
SUPPORT was coded in 47% of the interviews and surveys, with 53 references in 
total (ranking 6th).  Two key themes emerged. 
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Support is not usually requested; and even if it is, it is usually not forthcoming. 
There appears to be a self-fulfilling pattern of low expectations and low provision 
of PCS.  Most communities with a broken-down water point had not reported it to 
anyone outside the village, even though this is supposed to be one of the roles of 
local government structures (VDCs reporting to ADCs, ADCs reporting to Districts).  
Even when communities do report breakdowns and request assistance, support is 
usually not forthcoming (e.g. W568; W570).  Politicians were in fact mentioned 
more frequently than any other source of external support in the qualitative data; 
but as already discussed, their input tends to be concentrated at the time of 
election campaigns – with one or two honourable exceptions (e.g. in VDC 4A3). 
 
DWOs lack both human and financial capacity 
One of the key limitations on provision of PCS is the shortage of Water Monitoring 
Assistants at District level.  One DWO observed: “In fact whenever the communities 
have a problem they are supposed to contact the WMA located in their respective 
TA. But we have that problem of shortage of WMAs… We need to provide backup 
service… We don't have enough resources... we need to have enough WMAs to 
monitor those WPCs” (L2).  A donor echoed this, saying: “it's still very much a low 
capacity issue with not having enough WMAs” (D2).   
 
Some locate the root of the problem at national level: “The Ministry is weak and 
can't play that role at national level, that oversight, that planning, that 
coordination.... and the ministry is weak at a district level… most DWOs have [just] 
a water officer” (N5).  Another NGO observed that “MOIWD is one of the biggest 
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ministries in Lilongwe [but] when you go to the district it is only one or two people 
who are qualified.  The rest they are just picked straight from school” (N9).  While 
DWOs struggle with extremely low monthly financial transfers from central 
government (as detailed in Chapter Four), donors suggest that this is not due to 
their lack of generosity, but rather to MOIWD policy:  “The districts are … not 
empowered in terms of resources… us development partners would want to put 
more resources, so they have to find a mechanism…to get more funding to the 
districts for water supply” (D1). 
 
One Malawian working for a major donor contrasted community management with 
the previous centralised support system: “The way that rural water supply has been 
managed, it’s more or less the policy that government has. There has to be a WPC 
and that WPC has to be trained. It’s a policy, not imposed by donors… The bottom 
line is what people need is continuous support, which I believe was there… in the 
time of Kamuzu Banda. WPCs were all functioning and there was a group of people 
from central government going to repair boreholes all over Malawi.  But it’s not 
sustainable.  That is why the government came with policy to say they will provide 
funding to build, but O&M that has been pushed to communities and I know 
communities, without support from the district council… the WPC will not function. 
Soon after the project there are no committees” (D1).  This comment suggests that 
community management was introduced because centralised support, while 
effective, was (financially) ‘not sustainable’.  However, since community 
management is also unsustainable (both financially and institutionally), perhaps it 
may be time to reconsider more centralised approaches to providing support. 
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Conclusion 
Overall, SUPPORT is moderately significant in explaining water point 
sustainability.  Although the statistical analysis suggested a weak association, the 
qualitative analysis highlighted the urgent need for more resources to strengthen 
capacity in District Water Offices, which are expected by all stakeholders to play 
the main role in providing post-construction support.  Interestingly, none of the 
respondents suggested that PCS should be (in part at least) the responsibility of the 
donors or NGOs who fund most of the installations. 
 
6.2.10 THEFT: Incidence of theft 
 
I now turn to the tenth and last variable tested.  Theft and vandalism are 
highlighted as significant issues in some parts of the literature (Kleemeier 2000, 
Campbell 2009).  It is worth noting here that Malawians tend to use the word 
‘vandalism’ interchangeably with ‘theft’, rather than with the conventional English 
meaning of ‘purposeless damage’.  I hypothesised that higher THEFT (of water 
point parts, rather than funds) would be associated with lower FUNCT. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
The lack of a specific question on theft in my surveys was a significant omission, 
given that I had identified it as a potentially significant explanatory variable.  
However, theft or vandalism was spontaneously mentioned by a significant number 
of respondents when discussing reasons for breakdown, non-functionality, and 
dissatisfaction, so I was able to construct a THEFT variable using this data. 
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Table 6.41 shows the percentage of surveyed water points in each VDC (those at 
which a User, Manager or Water point survey was conducted - that is, not including 
Listed water points) at which theft was reported.  Some water points had 
experienced theft several times, but each WP is only counted once in the table.  
Red shading highlights VDCs where a higher-than-average percentage of water 
points have experienced theft. 
 
Table 6.41: Reported THEFT by District and TA and VDC. 
District TA VDC # WPs # Theft* % Theft* 
Ntcheu 
Chakhumbira 
Lihako 1 6 0 0% 
Zidana 18 5 28% 
Tchayatchaya 7 1 14% 
Namale 19 3 16% 
Kwataine 
Masitimale 18 4 22% 
Chimphamba 14 3 21% 
Nachiye 8 1 13% 
Mangochi 
Mbwana Nyambi 
Mkumba 16 0 0% 
Mzinda 25 5 20% 
Kumbalama 18 2 11% 
Nankumba 
Chamba 17 1 6% 
Kasankha 20 0 0% 
Chiwalo 19 0 0% 
Thyolo 
Nsabwe 
Ndaona 18 4 22% 
Chalonda 13 0 0% 
Mzundu 15 0 0% 
Chimaliro 
Chidothe 7 4 57% 
January 12 7 58% 
Boyidi 14 8 57% 
Chikhwawa 
Lundu 
Tomali 5 1 20% 
Sekeni 15 1 7% 
Nkhwazi 10 0 0% 
Masache 
Jackson 7 1 14% 
Mphonde 8 0 0% 
Masache 9 1 11% 
Total 338 52 15% 
*# Thefts and % Theft = # and % of WPs at which theft was reported (each WP is only counted once). 
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Overall, theft was reported at 15% of all surveyed water points; but the problem is 
concentrated in particular areas.  Most noticeable is the very high incidence of 
theft in TA Chimaliro – over 50%.  Above-average incidence was also reported in 
several other VDCs.  In 7 of the 52 cases (6 of them in low-functionality Ntcheu 
District) the theft occurred after the water point had already broken down; but in 
the other 45 cases, parts were stolen from a functioning water point, often causing 
permanent breakdown. This raises the question of whether theft is a significant 
determinant of functionality.  The chi-square test indicates that, indeed, THEFT is 
significantly associated with FUNCT (X2 (1) = 9.635, p<.005; Cramer’s V = .169, 
p<.005).  Put another way, water points that have experienced theft are more than 
2.5 times more likely to be non-functional than the rest. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
The survey notes and interview transcripts provide more details.  THEFT was coded 
in 71% of the interviews and surveys, with 114 references in total (ranking 2nd). 
 
Theft is a major cause of breakdown 
As noted above, many cases of theft or ‘vandalism’ happen while a water point is 
still functioning.  An NGO worker explained: “A key [problem] is vandalism.  People 
take the rods and then they sell in black market.  For fixing other boreholes.  A 
new rod is 3500 Kwacha, a black market one 1500.  People steal and they sell to 
other areas” (N4).  A DWO concurred: “[People steal] pump rods and spare parts 
and sell them to other people… Sometimes [it is] people from the boma [town], 
sometimes people from the same village” (L1). 
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As described in section 6.2.6 on spare parts, there appears to be a strong demand 
for cut-price (second hand, perhaps often stolen) spare parts.  One NGO observed: 
“We had some problems with MPs in some areas during the campaign, because they 
provide a lot of water points but sometimes they provide second hand - we don't 
know where they got them from” (N7).  A DWO (L5) blamed the growth in private 
traders – itself a direct result of efforts to strengthen the spare parts supply chain - 
for the problem. 
 
Examples of boreholes that stopped working due to theft include W264 (installed in 
2005; one year later all the rods were stolen); 3A1 (a solar pump installed at a 
hospital in 2007; the solar panel was stolen in 2010); W595 (parts stolen 3 times in 
2012); W634 (parts all stolen in 2002 after 4 years functioning); and W656 (pump 
stolen in 2002, in the same month that it was installed).  In some cases the theft 
occurred even before construction was complete.  W637 is an unfinished borehole, 
part-drilled as part of the 2004 presidential campaign.  The drilling company 
reportedly bought the pipes but ‘ate’ them instead of installing them.  Several 
other unfinished installations, mainly MASAF projects, were observed in Ntcheu 
district. 
 
Villagers were often unwilling to speculate openly about the thieves’ identity.  
Respondents at W638 explained “we don’t want to hang people”.  But some 
respondents expressed views.  At W595, the VH thought people within the village 
were communicating with thieves from outside; at W634 my translator suspected 
that the surrounding households were the thieves; and at W656 the people thought 
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the WPC Chair and Vice-chair (both now dead) stole the pump.  At W669 everyone 
knew the Village Head had sold the rods to a nearby WPC and “ate” the money.  
They had complained to the Police, and the VH “ran away”.  But he still comes 
back to visit sometimes, and now his sister has become the chief. 
 
Some NGOs have tried to tackle the theft problem by providing locks, and in some 
places, especially in Thyolo district, the WPCs have welded pumps closed.  But this 
means that when the water point breaks down, the repair job is much more 
complicated and expensive. 
 
The problem of vandalism also affects gravity fed systems, where one incident can 
stop the water supply for thousands of people.  The problem was illustrated 
graphically by one DWO: “Like for example, the [xx] scheme has got 107 taps.  Out 
of the 107, all are not functioning because at the source it was vandalised… You 
know at the intake we normally use the 110mm diameter galvanised pipe.  So these 
ones are vandalised just to make hoes. They make hoes from this pipe. Some make 
axes... Now we tried again to use the PVC pipes.  The PVC pipes are also vandalised 
to make teapots… So it's difficult” (L5). 
 
Area Mechanics are often implicated in theft. 
Several telling comments were made linking theft with Area Mechanics.  One DWO 
despaired: “There is a lot of vandalism.  We have trained so many people and now 
they are able to [remove] these small bolts and move these parts and take them to 
other parts and sell them. So we are training even robbers” (L3).  One specific 
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example is W166.  In 2006 this borehole broke down, and the villagers consulted 
the MP who found someone to repair it.  Three weeks after the repair was done, 
the parts were all stolen, and the people are sure that the mechanic is to blame.  
They complained to the MP, but he did nothing. 
 
One DWO has tried to learn from experience elsewhere: “Theft, that’s not a big 
issue [here]… In Thyolo the problem of theft came about because the district and 
NGOs trained area mechanics and then at the same time they gave them materials 
which would enable them to dismantle an entire borehole.  Learning from that 
same experience … we have trained [Area Mechanics] but we have not given them 
any equipment.  We have left the materials with the WPC” (L2). 
 
In the same way as the loss of trust in WPCs’ financial management skills creates a 
vicious circle of low savings, the lack of trust in AMs undermines their capacity to 
provide a good service.  One illustration of this comes from a District where an 
NGO proposed that Area Mechanics should travel around with spare parts so that 
they could perform repairs immediately. However, the proposal was opposed by 
the Area Mechanics themselves, who said that it would feed the perception of them 
stealing spares from one pump to fix another one (N5). 
 
Conclusion 
These findings show that the variable THEFT is moderately significant in explaining 
water point sustainability.  While some damage is accidental (such as farmers 
cutting through GFS pipes by mistake while cultivating), most ‘vandalism’ is 
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deliberate theft; and the WPCs and AMs, who are expected to be the guardians of 
water point functionality, are often implicated. 
 
6.2.11 Other proximate explanatory variables 
 
The sections above have considered in turn the ten key explanatory variables 
identified in Chapter 2.  Before drawing them all together to examine their relative 
importance and interactions, I briefly consider the other three ‘design and 
installation’ explanatory variables – geology, climate and siting.  Although I was 
unable to collect data specifically on these variables, some useful insights 
nonetheless emerged. 
 
Geology 
Geology and topography certainly do affect functionality.  As one interviewee 
pointed out, “the coverage is affected by the topography because in some other 
areas people have settled in areas where we can't provide them with potable 
water, and in some other areas we also have problem of salinity. So even if we drill 
boreholes in those areas, with the salinity you cannot use the water points, so they 
end up using other unprotected sources” (L2).  This problem of salinity particularly 
affects parts of Chikhwawa district, and lakeshore parts of Mangochi district.  Salty 
water has a doubly negative impact: in addition to leading to corrosion of the 
water point hardware, it is often undrinkable.  More generally, geography and 
topography influence the choice of WPTYPE.  Gravity fed systems are particularly 
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suited to hilly terrain, and are particularly prone to breakdown; hence the lower 
functionality of water points in mountainous districts like Phalombe and Mulanje. 
 
Climate 
Interestingly, there were no references at all to climate in the interviews or 
surveys.  Although some international NGOs claim that climate change is leading to 
the drying up of water points, no suggestion of this emerged during my research.  A 
number of water points indeed only functioned seasonally – particularly many of 
the Malda pumps in hilly TA Nsabwe, Thyolo district – but no respondent suggested 
any longer-term variation or decline, or any link to a change in climate. 
 
Siting 
The phenomenon of broken water points being abandoned if there was another 
functioning one close by was noted by several interviewees (D2, A1) and observed 
in several locations. For example, W724 broke down in 2011 after 5 years with no 
problems, but no-one has bothered to repair it because they now have a standpipe.  
Other problems with siting were also noted.  W395 reportedly functioned perfectly 
from installation in 2001 up until 2009, when a nearby homeowner built a toilet 
right next to the water point.  It was therefore abandoned, and a new borehole 
(W396) was subsequently installed a hundred metres away.  
 
The problem of political influence on siting was also noted.  For example, W740, a 
Climax wheel pump installed in the 1970s, worked for less than a year.  The Village 
Head had insisted that it should be installed near his house, overriding the 
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installer’s topographical objections.  There was only water in the wet season, so 
the pump was abandoned after one season.  A much more recent example is W726, 
a brand new Afridev borehole installed just 2 weeks before my survey, at the site 
of a big new agricultural market hall located in the middle of nowhere in 
Chikhwawa district.  The borehole functions, but the water is completely 
undrinkable, with an extraordinarily high concentration of salt.  Reportedly, the 
water was tested during construction, and yet installation continued.  The waste of 
time, money and an expensive new pump set is hard to understand. 
 
So, while siting has some influence, and geology is a key determinant of WPTYPE, 
climate is not a major factor. My focus on the other ten explanatory variables thus 
appears justified.  In the next section, I summarise and consolidate my findings on 
those ten variables. 
  
6.2.12 Combined analysis 
 
Tables 6.42 and 6.43 summarise the results of statistical analyses of each variable.  
Green highlighting denotes statistically significant results.  Based on the secondary 
data, the most significant variable is WPTYPE, with a chi-square test statistic three 
times that of INSTQUAL.  Based on the primary data, the most significant variable 
is again WPTYPE. Large and significant effects are also clear for (in descending 
order of influence) FUNDS, THEFT, INSTALLER, SKILLS (one element only), and 
MAINTFREQ; while USERS, AGE, SPARES and SUPPORT are not significant. 
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Table 6.42: Determinants of FUNCT: categorical explanatory variables. 
Variable Note Chi-square df p Odds ratio 
WPTYPE 
2005 database: WPTYPE 4053.528 6 .000  
WPTYPE = Borehole, Tap, or Other 31.836 2 .000  
INSTQUAL 
2005 database: Installer 1355.292 8 .000  
Installer = NGO, Govt, or Other 7.808 2 .020  
Installer = NGO 6.167 1 .013 2.07 
Installer = Government 1.120 1 .290 0.71 
Installer = GITEC 12.830 1 .000 9.35 
Installer = CU 2.058 1 .151 0.59 
Installer = ICEIDA 8.098 1 .004 10.83 
USERS # HH users = >50 2.888 1 .089  
MAINTFREQ Leakage test ever done? 4.175 1 .041 4.46 
SPARES Problems accessing spares? .027 1 .868  
SKILLS 
Major repairs = WPC / AM / other 7.709 2 .021  
Minor repairs = WPC .491 1 .484  
Major repairs = WPC 1.829 1 .176  
Minor repairs = AM 3.273 1 .070  
Major repairs = AM 3.773 1 .052  
Is WPC active? .753 1 .385  
FUNDS Do HH contribute regularly? 11.728 2 .003  
SUPPORT 
Good PCS? .486 1 .486  
Minimal PCS? .442 1 .506  
No PCS? .414 1 .520  
THEFT Theft reported? 9.635 1 .002 2.54 
 
Table 6.43: Determinants of FUNCT: continuous explanatory variables. 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
AGE (2005 WP database) -.081 .001 3343.412 1 .000 .922 
Constant 1.652 .021 6398.811 1 .000 5.216 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
AGE (my primary data) -.020 .010 3.906 1 .048 .980 
Constant 1.462 .148 98.109 1 .000 4.314 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
FUNDS (my primary data) 
(amount currently in Maintenance Fund) 0 0 0.164 1 0.685 1 
Constant 0.95 0.351 7.313 1 0.007 2.585 
 
My original intention in this research was to combine all ten variables in one 
statistical model using loglinear analysis.  However, due to the diversity of variable 
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types (continuous and categorical) and of data sources (W, L, M and U), and the 
limited number of data sources for some variables, this is not possible.  In any 
case, as this section has demonstrated, the quantitative data frequently does not 
offer a full – or coherent - picture.  It is only through triangulating findings from 
both quantitative and qualitative analysis that it becomes possible to contextualise 
both, and arrive at a clearer understanding of the phenomenon being studied.  So, 
to conclude this section, Table 6.44 summarises the results of my quantitative and 
qualitative analyses combined. 
 
Table 6.44: Determinants of FUNCT: Summary of findings. 
Variable 
Influence 
Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis Combined analysis 
WPTYPE Very high High Very high 
INSTQUAL High High High 
USERS Low Low Low 
AGE Low Low Low 
MAINTFREQ Medium Medium Medium 
SPARES Low Medium Low 
SKILLS Medium High High 
FUNDS High Very high Very high 
SUPPORT Low Medium Medium 
THEFT High High High 
 
In Chapter Seven, I offer my interpretation of these results in light of the literature 
reviewed in Chapters Two, Three and Four.  However, before moving on to this, I 
present the results of one more element of my mixed methods analysis. 
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6.3 FACTOR RANKING EXERCISE 
 
As set out in Chapter Four, a ‘factor ranking exercise’ was carried out with 
interviewees at national and district level. In total, 19 people participated.  They 
were asked to identify in their own words the key factors influencing water point 
sustainability, and to allocate percentages (weightings) to each factor to indicate 
relative importance. 
 
Between them, the 19 respondents identified 74 factors, with percentages 
attributed to each ranging from 5% to 100%.  To analyse these factors, I began by 
using the proximate explanatory variable framework, and attempted to see 
whether the factors freely identified by interviewees corresponded to the variables 
identified in Chapter Two.  The answer was ‘only in part’.  It soon became clear 
that four more categories were required in the classification: ‘community 
ownership’, ‘sector coordination’, ‘sector funding’, and ‘other’.  More than half of 
the factors identified fell within these categories, and more than a quarter within 
just one, ‘community ownership’. 
 
Inevitably, there is a subjective element to classifying responses in this way. There 
is also some degree of overlap; for example, the issues referred to by one 
respondent as relating to external support may have been phrased by another as 
problems of coordination.  Nonetheless, Table 6.45 summarises the common 
themes emerging. 
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Table 6.45: Factors influencing sustainability: frequency and weighting (by rank) 
of interviewees’ responses. 
 Factor # mentions Weighting 
1 Community Ownership 14 20.1% 
2 Sector Coordination 8 16.1% 
3 FUNDS** 5 11.3% 
4 Sector Funding 6 10.3% 
5 SPARES 6 9.5% 
6 SKILLS 5 8.0% 
7 SUPPORT 6 7.1% 
8 Other 8 6.3% 
9 THEFT 6 4.9% 
10 INSTQUAL 2 2.9% 
11 AGE 2 1.8% 
12 WPTYPE 1 0.6% 
13 USERS 1 0.5% 
14 Geology 1 0.3% 
15 Siting 1 0.3% 
** i.e. ‘availability of funds for repair and maintenance’ at community level 
 
Evidently, ‘Community Ownership’ is seen as the most important factor overall.  
However, it has many dimensions.  Examples of comments classified under this 
heading include the following (percentages in brackets show the weighting given by 
the individual respondents):  
• (60%) “Lack of community ownership - because of the way facilities are 
provided to communities (not in dire need, not informed or trained on 
management).  Very common with some NGOs.”  
• (50%) “Lack of ownership - the borehole may have been 'donated' so there is 
limited ownership towards fixing it.”  
• (35%) “[Problems with] management arrangements.” 
• (35%) “Lack of accountability of WPC and / or poor community leadership.” 
• (25%) “[Lack of] community ownership.”  
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Some other responses, classified elsewhere, are also related to community 
ownership.  For example, the following comments were classified under ‘Funds’ 
(i.e. ‘Availability of funds for repairs and maintenance’ at community level) but 
could also be seen as reflecting aspects of low community ownership.  In fact, they 
highlight one of the specific ways in which community ownership may fail, i.e. 
through breakdown of the financial mechanisms that both reflect, and enable, 
ownership. 
• (70%) “Lack of operation and maintenance funds or unwillingness of 
communities to contribute towards O&M funds.” 
• (30%) “Lack of trust of WPC members or other leaders (who are collecting 
money) so WPCs have no funds.” 
• (25%) “Communities not willing to pay (don't understand up front 
investment, don't prioritise water, alternative sources nearby etc.) so have 
no funds in savings.” 
• (40%) “Lack of willingness by the communities to contribute funds towards 
VLOM due to poverty.” 
 
Overall, a consistent message emerges, that this concept of ‘community ownership’ 
needs to be more closely interrogated.  This is a theme that I take up in Chapter 
Seven. 
 
The next factor, ‘Sector Coordination’ is mentioned by 8 respondents.  Example 
comments include: 
• (100%) “Inadequate capacity at District level.” 
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• (60%) “[Lack of] O&M framework for the community to regulate and guide 
implementation and no coordination in approaches.”  
• (40%) “Coordination and collaboration.” 
• (40%) “Conflict of choices of technology.  Multiple suppliers (government, 
NGOs).  Communities prefer taps over boreholes.”  
 
It is worth noting that the first response listed above accounts for one-third of the 
overall weighting of this factor in this analysis, even though the respondent does 
not mention the word ‘coordination’.  However I considered this was the most 
appropriate category for this comment, although it also reflects a wider concern 
with lack of skills, funding, and perhaps motivation at district level. 
 
The problem of inadequate funding for the sector overall (as distinct from repair 
and maintenance funds at community level) was mentioned by 6 respondents.  
Example comments include:  
• (50%) “Lack of funding to district.” 
• (40%) “Inadequate resources to equally distribute new water points.”  
• (30%) “Lack of operational resources at district level - for district officers to 
do their monitoring.”  
• (30%) “Low funding in the sector.” 
 
Analysis by respondent type is summarised in Table 6.46.  It is evident that donors 
and national government staff place relatively more emphasis on issues of 
community ownership than do NGOs or local government staff.  No local 
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government respondent highlighted sector coordination as a problem (although 
they did emphasise lack of external support).  Instead, they suggested that 
problems with accessing spare parts are the most important influence on 
sustainability - a conclusion that is not borne out by the analysis in section 6.2.6. 
 
Table 6.46: Factors influencing sustainability: top three factors by respondent 
type. 
Respondent 
Type (#) 
# of 
Factors 1st 2nd 3rd 
Donor (4) 8 Community Ownership (28%) 
Sector 
Coordination (26%) 
Sector 
Funding (15%) 
Local 
Government (5) 9 Spares (21%) 
Sector 
Funding (20%) 
Community 
Ownership (18%) 
National 
Government (5) 12 
Community 
Ownership (28%) 
Sector 
Coordination (16%) Theft (13%) 
NGO (5) 10 Sector Coordination (24%) Funds (19%) Skills (18%) 
 
Overall, the factor ranking exercise provided a useful alternative perspective on 
the research question, drawing out the key themes of community ownership, sector 
coordination and sector funding.  These are all examined further in Chapter 7. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter has presented a clear and comprehensive analysis of the factors 
influencing water point sustainability in Malawi, using qualitative and quantitative 
data to interpret and interrogate each other.  Important findings and new insights - 
including some that challenge received wisdom - have emerged from the analysis.  
Table 6.47 summarises the key points. 
 
Table 6.47: Proximate explanatory variables: Key findings. 
Variable Influence Key findings 
WPTYPE Very high Boreholes have significantly higher functionality than piped systems.  Afridev pumps are much better than solar pumps or Playpumps. 
INSTQUAL High 
Government water points have lower functionality than NGO water points.  
Excellent functionality among some NGOs is due to investment in 
technical quality of both hardware and software. 
USERS Low 
Queuing time is a significant influence on whether people use safe water 
points; but user numbers per se are not a major influence on 
functionality. 
AGE Low Age is not a major influence on functionality; other factors are much more significant. 
MAINTFREQ Medium 
Preventative maintenance is almost never done.  For high-quality water 
points, maintenance is rarely required.  Low MAINTFREQ is both a cause 
and a consequence of low SKILLS. 
SPARES Low Few spares are held in stock by WPCs.  But physical barriers to access are not very significant; questions of finance are more important. 
SKILLS High 
Most WPCs are essentially defunct.  Few WPC members are capable of 
repairing a water point.  There are insufficient numbers of Area 
Mechanics.  WPCs tend to wait for outsiders (MPs, NGOs) to fix their water 
points. 
FUNDS Very high 
Very low levels of savings by WPCs.  Frequent reports of poor financial 
management.  Low transparency and accountability, low trust.  Frequent 
reports of conflict within communities over finance. 
SUPPORT Medium 
Little external support, follow up or monitoring is provided.  When 
provided, it is associated with a small increase in the likelihood of 
functionality. 
THEFT High Theft of parts is relatively common, and frequent in certain locations. 
 
Building on this empirical understanding, the next chapter analyses the underlying 
dynamics that influence the operation of the factors discussed above.  I examine 
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the differences between the theory and the reality of community management, 
and offer an explanation for the findings outlined in this chapter. 
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Chapter 7  
ANALYSIS OF UNDERLYING INFLUENCES 
 
Introduction 
 
The empirical findings presented in Chapter Six throw new light on the question 
posed in Chapter Three: Does the evidence support the hypothesis that ‘community 
management is an effective way to ensure sustainable provision of public goods and 
services’?   
 
This chapter addresses this question directly, considering two specific aspects in 
turn: 
• To what extent does the operation of community management in practice 
reflect its potential benefits in theory?   
• What explains the differences between the theory and the practice of 
community management?   
 
The implications for rural water supply in Malawi in particular, and for public 
service provision in poor countries in general, are then outlined in Chapter Eight. 
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7.1 COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 
 
I first assess the extent to which the results of community management in practice 
reflect its potential benefits in theory.  The literature reviewed in Chapter Three 
suggested two sets of benefits: efficiency & effectiveness (‘instrumental’ benefits, 
in shorthand), and equity & empowerment (‘intrinsic’ benefits).  I consider these in 
turn. 
 
7.1.1 Efficiency and effectiveness 
 
In theory, community management is both efficient and effective, because it 
locates the responsibility for, and the skills to undertake, maintenance and repair 
as close as possible to where they are needed.  This localisation should minimise 
‘friction’ and delays by ensuring that the individuals with the skills to make repairs 
are also those (the community members) who are most motivated to do so, 
because they depend on the water point.  The key mechanism is ‘ownership’, 
through which people feel that they have the responsibility, authority and power to 
act.  Thus, community managers – water point committee members - should be 
best placed to ensure sustainable rural water supply, through: 
• conducting regular preventive maintenance;  
• making rapid, high-quality repairs in case of breakdown; 
• collecting and saving funds to pay for repairs as needed. 
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In practice, this study found that these assumptions are erroneous.  Consistent 
patterns emerged across multiple locations, strongly supporting generalised 
findings that contradict the theory. 
 
Preventive maintenance is almost never done 
As shown in Chapter Six, preventive maintenance is very rare.  Most water points 
are like W051: “they never do preventative maintenance; they only do things to it 
if it is broken”.  As one District Water Officer observed: “we train the people but … 
most of them after training they have not touched the borehole” (L3). The 
philosophy of ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ applies almost universally, and 
understandably: boreholes that have never broken down have generally never been 
maintained (e.g. W092, W259, W266 and many others).  Managers are nonetheless 
aware that they are supposed to do regular preventive maintenance; thus, many - 
like M48, noted in Chapter Six - claimed that they had done so “just last month”.   
 
The only really plausible example of regular preventive maintenance recorded 
among the hundreds of water points visited was at W741, where the WPC chair 
explained that he greased the pump twice a month using grease given to him free 
by a bicycle mechanic.  This water point was indeed in good condition.  
 
Repairs are often slow and sub-standard 
Although WPCs are expected to be able to ensure rapid repairs when a water point 
breaks down, in reality repairs are often both slow, and sub-standard – if they are 
done at all.  One example is the use of an improvised U-seal made out of an old 
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‘slipper’ (a plastic flipflop), reported at several water points (e.g. W100) – even 
though a new U-seal costs only K200 (about 50p), and is widely available in trading 
centres.  A second example is the practice of fixing broken rods by ‘tying them 
with string’, reported several times in VDC 2B3, and observed at the very first 
water point visited for this study.  These practices, and the (rather more effective) 
use of welding to fix broken rod connections, are not due to inaccessibility of 
spares; in VDC 2B3, the district capital is only 30 minutes away down a major 
tarmac road with frequent vehicles.  Instead, they reflect unwillingness or inability 
to pay. 
 
Despite training, many WPC members struggled with the most basic technical 
aspects of their role.  For example, at W211, the ten committee members were 
trained in 2009 by the installer for 6 days.  Yet, when the borehole needed a 
replacement bobbin (a simple job) they could not fix it: “When they tried 
themselves, it was not sweet”.  They were unsure what a U-seal looks like, and 
unable to identify a bush bearing.  A similar situation was found at W768, where 
the committee believed that the borehole breakdown was due to ‘rubbers’ (i.e. the 
U-seal, a very simple problem to fix) – but had not actually attempted to open the 
borehole to find out.  Even at W316, a GITEC borehole, a User reported: “though 
the WPC was trained but they fail to maintain the borehole. It took the area 
mechanic to maintain it and since then it has not been dismantled because they 
are afraid that they may fail again” (U55). 
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Some Managers are startlingly uninformed: M32 is Chair of her WPC, which she 
reports as “active” – but she doesn’t know when they last met or who came to the 
meeting, nor who the treasurer is; while M74, another Chair, “cannot mention 
anything on the parts of the borehole” (i.e. she knows nothing about it).   A 
respondent at W495 spoke for many when he observed that “we were trained but 
we have no skills”.  Even where skills are available, it often takes weeks or months 
to repair a water point, because it take time to collect funds to pay for spare 
parts. 
 
In a large number of other cases (e.g. W497, W501, W513) committees were 
reported to be “trained, but not active”.  Other explanations for loss of WPC 
capacity include migration (for marriage, for work) and death: for example, M52 
reported that “the first WPC is no longer functioning because most of them died 
and the new ones are not trained”.  One EWB fellow working on a borehole 
rehabilitation project noted that many of them “only had a few broken parts that 
could easily have been replaced if the Water Point Committee responsible for the 
well had taken action” (B16). 
 
Committees are unable to collect and save funds 
The evidence presented in Chapter Six showed that most WPCs were characterised 
by limited and/or inactive membership, infrequent or non-existent meetings, weak 
technical skills, and financial management problems.  In no case was the amount 
saved by the WPC in the maintenance fund consistent with reported contributions.  
Misuse of funds is very frequently reported.  The vicious circle of low trust, low 
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contributions and low motivation causes long delays in making repairs when 
breakdowns do occur.   
 
One example is W357, a broken borehole next to a school.  The committee 
members were trained “but they have not opened it to maintain it” because, the 
Headmaster said, “they were not organised”.  Committee members said that they 
reported the problem to the VH, but it needed money to fix it and no-one was 
contributing. The school felt that the village should repair the borehole, and the 
villagers believed the school should do it.  In consequence no one took 
responsibility, and the borehole remained broken down.   
 
WPC members often struggle to keep WPC money separate from their personal 
funds.  A telling example (M48) was reported by Yanja: “it shows that in the past 
the treasurer used the money for business, because when I asked for satisfaction 
with financial arrangements she said that no any because she stopped doing 
business because people only contribute 3 months a year” - i.e. the Treasurer 
admits using WPC funds as capital for her personal business. 
 
Because users do not trust committees to save funds, the ‘just in case’ model of 
financial management does not work.  Instead, funds are collected on an ad hoc 
basis when needed - and it can take weeks or months to collect the money required 
to make a repair. 
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Summary 
The evidence does not support the instrumental ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ 
claims of the community management model.  In reality, community management 
is usually characterised by neglect of maintenance, slow and substandard repairs, 
and failure of committees to save sufficient funds.  
 
However, it could be argued that community management might still be worth 
supporting on the basis of empowerment and equitability – even if it is inefficient 
and ineffective.  I therefore now examine whether the model delivers these other 
compensating intrinsic benefits. 
 
7.1.2 Equity and empowerment 
 
In theory, community management is both equitable and empowering.  It should 
provide a model of democratic, egalitarian social organisation that will liberate and 
include people who are otherwise marginalised, and it should empower community 
members by equipping them with the skills and authority needed to ensure that 
their water needs are met.  Thus, community management should: 
• Challenge inequality; 
• Build social capital; 
• Empower individuals. 
 
In practice, this study again found that these assumptions are erroneous; consistent 
patterns emerged of negative, counter-theoretical effects. 
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Existing unequal village power relations are reinforced 
Far from being an arena in which ‘lowers’ can hold ‘uppers’ to account (Chambers 
1994), community management often provides a new arena for the reproduction of 
existing inequalities.  As detailed in section 6.2.9 in the previous chapter, water 
point committees are frequently used by their members and by village heads as a 
means of projecting personal power, especially through misuse of funds.  For 
example, M19 reports that “the VH… sometimes he gets the funds and misuses it.  
He has the powers and controls the WPC”.  Community members explain that they 
cannot hold their committees to account because “the committee is higher than 
the community” (W108) – committee members have more status and power than 
ordinary community members. 
 
GITEC boreholes, too, despite their high functionality overall, suffer from the same 
problems.  For example, at W316, U56 reported: “The VH is very tough requesting 
money now and then so I decided to stop [using the borehole]”.  Yanja explained: 
“everybody complained about the VH that he uses community money so some 
people just stop going to the borehole and drink at the river… Some people were 
banned because the VH wants money and others haven’t found the money [so] they 
are chased from the [borehole]”.  Overall, users feel there is “no benefit [from the 
borehole] because most of the time we don’t use it due to VH behaviour” (U56).  
Interestingly, this interview was interrupted by the VH: Yanja noted that “the lady 
was interviewed in private and the VH came while the interview was in process so 
she was unable to answer some of the questions but at first she said that the VH 
misused the funds”. 
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There is very little that villagers can do to change their VH, since it is an inherited 
position.  In contrast, WPC members are elected, and can in theory be 
democratically replaced.  However, in practice, WPC membership often remains 
unchanged for years (W219), even when the members are no longer active (M40).  
In other cases the committee is re-elected, often in response to the previous 
committee’s inaction (M18) or discovery of financial mismanagement (M19, M20) - 
but even so, users seem to have little hope that the new committee will be any 
better than the old one (W598). 
 
Community management breeds conflict, instead of building social capital 
Numerous managers reported dissatisfaction with their role due to conflict among 
WPC members, or between them and the wider community – often linked to 
money.  For example, U49 used to be a WPC member but stopped “due to how the 
chair’s daughter talked to her - she talks and shouts a lot”; and as a consequence, 
“It is difficult to maintain [the borehole] since there are only 2 people remaining in 
the committee”.  M48 reported that “We don't meet as a WPC but only when 
problems arise.  Some members stopped because there are always quarrels at the 
borehole so they can't manage”.  Many Users and Managers alike made the same 
observation as M23: “people refuse to contribute because they don’t believe the 
WPC, they think that they use the cash for their families”.  Consequently many 
WPC members “just stopped – they were discouraged because of how the 
community talk” (M40), or “because the community don’t listen to them” (M67).   
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In some cases, WPCs are encouraged by installers to raise money for water point 
repairs through collective work - building on traditions of self-help - rather than 
through household contributions.  One such case was found by this study; but it is a 
tale of conflict rather than successful collective action: “There are about 10 
households who are not using the borehole next to them because they disagreed.  
They had a garden for the water point and everybody worked in the tomato 
gardens, but after selling the tomatoes the WPC did not want to tell people what 
they got (total cash) and they assigned the community another work (garden) to 
do, so the community insisted that they should hear what they got from the first 
garden. And because of this they were told not to drink at that borehole any more.  
The VH has done nothing to resolve the issue.  Even the health worker has done 
nothing so all these people draw their water from the unprotected well” (Yanja, 
interview with U86). 
 
Another example of conflict came from W676. As noted by Yanja, “This lady (U127) 
interviewed went for training.  She was previously one of the WPC and when she 
tried to implement what she was trained on the procedures of buying parts and 
borehole management people hated her.  For instance: they were taught that when 
they want to buy spares, two should be sent not one, and several times other WPC 
members had sent one, so on trying to ask reasons for this she was removed from 
the WPC.”  Another User of the same water point (U128) explained further: “the 
community wanted to know what they contributed for quite a long time and the 
WPC answered that they bought parts so people were surprised because the 
borehole has never broken down since installation and [they] were not informed 
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[about] anything.  So everybody was angry and stopped contributing … the 
community did not trust the WPC and people talks a lot so this committee was 
discouraged and worse the VH had to take control of everything when the WPC 
stopped.  So a new WPC was elected though not respected and active”.  In this 
case, the borehole itself has never broken down, but the conflict caused within the 
community by the establishment of the WPC has been very significant. 
 
Unsurprisingly, no Managers admitted that they themselves had diverted funds, but 
many Managers as well as Users referred to problems with previous committee 
members abusing their position.  For example, M75 explained that her WPC was 
active “but it’s a new WPC”; there was a committee before but it “mismanaged 
funds” so a new one was elected.  In fact, as Yanja noted, “this is the third WPC.  
As to what happened with the first one she [M75] don’t know but the second one 
did not manage the finances properly and also took the VH as a WPC member.  This 
did not please community so it was dissolved and this third WPC was elected.  So 
this WPC was not trained.  All that were trained are no longer active”.  From a 
positive perspective, this quote suggests that the community was able to override 
an attempt by the Village Head to ‘capture’ the WPC – which, if true, suggests that 
the democratic principles underpinning WPCs in theory are being practised in at 
least some locations. 
 
Individuals feel disempowered 
Far from finding community management an empowering experience, both users 
and WPC members tended to find the opposite.  Users reported frequent conflict or 
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arguments over money (W265, W064, W295, W539, W348), and voiced their 
frustration at their inability to hold WPC members or village heads to account (e.g. 
U101).  For their part, WPC members reported frustration that users did not trust 
them or “spoke badly of them” (M23, M40, W596), as well as frustration with the 
failure of higher authorities to respond when called on.  For example, M26 
explained that they had “done a lot of contributions and there is no change on the 
functioning of the borehole.  There is really need that the DWO should assist 
otherwise they have spent a lot and the borehole is not functioning.”    
 
Many cases were reported of WPC members refusing to continue serving on the 
WPC (e.g. W295).  At W537, “the committee is there but it is not active because 
people don’t listen to these committee members and they are not respected or 
recognised as a WPC. So they just stopped doing anything at this water point” 
(U100).  At W559, M67 explained that the WPC is inactive “because the community 
don’t listen to them”. At W530, “the installer has some relations that are giving 
problems at this borehole.  Those people can collect money though they are not 
WPC members and use the monies for their own benefit.  So the WPC that is there 
is not active because these people are giving them problems” (M63). 
 
While there were some examples of villagers displaying initiative in management of 
their water point (e.g. the greasing done at W741) there were many more examples 
of villagers expressing resignation and disempowerment and just waiting for 
someone else - such as politicians, churches, and NGOs - to resolve problems 
(W096, M59, W727). 
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A sobering example of disempowerment comes from VDC 3B2, where two 
community members, Mr X and Mrs Y, were trained as Area Mechanics by an NGO in 
2004.  At first they fixed boreholes together, but then, as Mr X explained, they 
“stopped working together because people were talking a lot thinking that these 
two are in love.  And the husband to Mrs Y was also angry”.  Since then Mrs Y has 
not worked as a mechanic, and Mr X is the only AM in the VDC.  This case highlights 
the difficulty of overcoming deeply embedded attitudes to gender. 
 
Summary 
The evidence does not support the intrinsic ‘equity’ and ‘empowerment’ claims of 
the community management model.  In reality, community management is usually 
characterised by reproduction of existing power imbalances, misuse of funds, 
increased conflict within communities, and disempowerment both of users and, in 
some respects, WPC members.  Users and Managers alike appear resigned to WPC 
dysfunctionality; unable to use ‘voice’ to shape the institution, Users ‘exit’ by 
refusing to contribute financially, and Managers ‘exit’ by ceasing to be active. 
 
Overall, this study has found that community management has largely failed to 
deliver the intended benefits, and has in many cases given rise to new problems.  
There are two key dimensions of this failure – hardware (the water point itself), 
and software (the management arrangements).   
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7.1.3 Two key dimensions of failure: hardware and software 
 
Hardware: the technology 
On the technical side, many installations are of poor quality.  Professional audit 
and inspection are rare; supervision is left to overstretched District Water Officers 
who pay occasional visits to sites - but often only when transported by, and paid a 
daily allowance by, the installer themselves (N9).  Communities are left to provide 
unskilled ‘supervision’ – and then to manage, maintain and repair the installations, 
in line with national policy on community management (L1).  There are not enough 
highly skilled technicians, and there are far too many poorly trained amateur WPC 
‘managers’.  This is inefficient, because it is time-consuming and expensive to train 
large numbers of amateurs, very few of whom will ever make use of the training; 
and ineffective, because it does not lead to the desired result of functioning water 
points.   
 
In fact, the findings of this study strongly suggest that some of the key 
determinants of sustainability – the factors that positively impacted on efficiency 
and effectiveness of rural water supply - were non-participatory, technical factors: 
water point type, and installation quality.  High-quality installations, such as the 
GITEC installations in parts of Mangochi District, often remain functional for many 
years with no maintenance.  They key factor here is technical expertise: careful 
siting, high quality components, and professional construction, as noted by 
interviewee D5, quoted earlier. 
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There is of course some overlap between the quality of the hardware and the 
quality of the software component.  GITEC water points are of notably higher 
construction quality than others; and community management seemed to work 
somewhat better at many of them than elsewhere.  An example is W288, a GITEC 
borehole constructed in 2006 which had only broken down twice in 5 years.  The 
first time (in 2009) it needed a new footvalve; the repair was done in 2 days.  The 
second time (in 2011) it needed a new U-seal – this was replaced on the same day 
by a WPC member, using a U-seal that they had in stock.  They have recently 
bought more spares, and they have about K4000 saved.  Overall, this is perhaps the 
best exemplar of a model water point. 
 
However, many GITEC water points still suffered from the same non-technical 
problems as others.  There were several examples in VDC 2A3.  At W298 there were 
many quarrels over financial management; at W316, the VH controlled the 
borehole and misused the funds; and again at W318 the WPC had misused the 
funds.  In all three cases the borehole was still functioning, although the first two 
had ongoing minor problems (broken handle, difficult pump action) that were not 
being fixed because of conflict.  It is fair to conclude that the high technical 
quality of GITEC boreholes helps to reduce the incidence and seriousness of such 
conflict, and is the key determinant of their functionality.   
 
The corollary is that poor technical quality is a key determinant of non-
functionality, with numerous examples among those installed by MPs (e.g. W149), 
government (W726), UNICEF (W258), NGOs (W701), and churches (W754). In all 
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these cases, technical failures in construction meant that the water point worked 
for only a short time, if at all.  Hardware and software are mutually-reinforcing to 
some extent, in that a water point that breaks down frequently is likely to place 
more stresses on the committee.  In these cases, community management was 
unable to prevent poor construction, and unable to overcome its impact.  Clearly, 
an alternative approach is necessary to ensure technical quality, and thus high 
functionality. 
 
Software: the management arrangements 
Community management fails in two key respects in ‘software’ terms: it does not 
ensure availability of technical skills, and it generates conflict over money.  
Regarding the first problem, as one of the EWB Fellows observed, “the knowledge 
on how to repair the system usually deteriorates faster than the system itself, thus 
when it finally does break down, there’s no one left who knows how to fix it” 
(B25).  As noted above, WPC members frequently do not have the technical skills to 
fulfil their responsibilities for maintenance and repair – either because they were 
inadequately trained, because they have forgotten, or because those that were 
trained are no longer WPC members.  Wider support systems – Area Mechanics and 
District Water Offices – are themselves weak, and need long term support (B4). 
 
Regarding the second problem, the findings of this study provide strong evidence 
that community management generally undermines, rather than strengthens, social 
capital - because it places financial management responsibilities on individuals and 
groups who are ill-equipped to cope with them, and as a result it erodes trust and 
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increases conflict.  WPCs are too embedded in their villages to be able to 
consistently and accountably collect, save and spend funds.  Instead, they can all 
too easily become vehicles for the consolidation of existing power structures – 
particularly those rooted in traditional authority - and the extraction of rents.  Far 
from promoting empowerment and equity at community level, in too many cases 
community management has the opposite effect. 
 
This study has highlighted the complete breakdown of the ‘just-in-case’ financial 
model on which community management is predicated.  Communities do not make 
regular collections and save the money safely so that they can make immediate 
repairs when required; instead, they wait until the need is urgent before collecting 
money.  This practice is entirely unsurprising, for two reasons.  First, in rural 
Malawi - where many people live at subsistence level, incomes are highly seasonal, 
and inflation and devaluation have major impacts on the purchasing power of 
savings - it makes little sense to set aside significant cash sums for long periods.  
Secondly, in a social environment where access to banking is almost unknown, 
record-keeping is very rare, deference is strong, and the dividing line between 
public and private finances is frequently blurred, people tend to assume (generally 
correctly, as this study has shown) that those with access to such cash sums may 
find it hard to keep them set aside untouched.  The clarity with which these 
findings emerge provides an interesting contrast with much of the practitioner 
literature (e.g. Harvey and Reed 2004) where misuse of funds is only mentioned 
tangentially, via an emphasis on the importance of trust and transparency. 
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There is some debate as to whether villagers are unable to meet the costs of water 
supply, or whether they are simply unwilling to pay.  This is a complex issue, but 
the findings of this study suggest the latter.  While several respondents in this 
study noted that the poorest villagers (the elderly or very sick) were exempt from 
contributing, the financial limitations faced by the large majority of WPCs were 
primarily attributable to unwillingness rather than inability to pay – and this 
unwillingness was directly linked to the breakdown of trust between community 
members and the WPC.  In theory, most households could afford K50 per month, 
and in theory these contributions would have added up to more than enough to 
keep the water points functional in virtually every case.  But in practice, these 
funds were not available.  Community management is thus demonstrably unable to 
ensure the financial viability of rural water supply.  It is evident that a different 
approach is required to ensure the availability of adequate finance for 
maintenance and repairs, and thus ensure water point sustainability. 
 
Summary 
The findings of this study strongly support the conclusion that community 
management is neither efficient and effective, nor equitable and empowering.  
Indeed, more often than not, it is the opposite.  The evidence for these failures of 
community management forms a consistent pattern across multiple locations, 
numerous installers, and several technology types.  These findings not only 
confirm, but also substantially extend, previous critiques of community 
management (Schouten and Moriarty 2003, Lockwood and Smits 2011), and 
highlight the fact that the institution of the water point committee, central to 
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community management, is unable to sustain itself.  I now offer an explanation for 
the findings described above. 
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7.2 EXPLAINING THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE IN 
COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT 
 
The literature analysed in Chapter Three suggested that two concepts might be 
particularly helpful in explaining the differences between the theory and the 
practice of community management: ‘institutional bricolage’ (Cleaver 2012) and 
‘civil society failure’ (Mansuri and Rao 2013).  Together with the analytical 
approaches outlined in Chapter Four, these enable us to explore the political 
economy of community management. 
 
7.2.1 Institutional bricolage 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the concept of institutional bricolage illuminates 
the way in which new institutions interact with existing structures.  In some cases 
the interaction between old and new may result in the wholesale replacement or 
absorption of one by the other, but more usually it produces a hybrid that may 
have unintended consequences (Cleaver 2012, Cleaver, Franks et al. 2013). 
 
The limits of institutional design 
Proponents of community management, motivated by the failure of previous 
institutional arrangements to deliver public services, envisaged that water point 
committees would constitute a real improvement on what went before – even if not 
perfect in practice.  Water Point Committees were designed to be the main 
mechanism to deliver this, both in form (democratically-elected and gender-
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balanced) and in function (specific technical and financial responsibilities and 
powers). 
 
Of course, the WPC is not the only such institution that has been created at village 
level in recent decades.  Similar committees - forest committees, natural resource 
management committees, community based child care committees, home based 
care committees – have been established widely in the name of development by 
both government and non-governmental organisations (Chiweza 2010).  However, 
water point committees are perhaps one of the clearest examples of the 
phenomenon, since a) water supply concerns every person in the village, and b) 
WPCs are almost always considered to have revenue-raising powers. 
 
This new institutional form, the WPC, was inserted into a context already 
contested by two dominant types of power and authority: the chief and the state17.  
The assumptions underlying this process of institutional insertion were rarely 
articulated, but can be discerned with hindsight.  Essentially, the design of the 
WPC was predicated on the assumption that it was possible to carve out an 
independent sphere of influence for the WPC, and that the design principles 
(democracy, gender equality) would trump context.  But, as Poteete and Ribot 
(2011) have pointed out, efforts towards democratisation and decentralisation are 
always contested by those whose power is threatened, using ‘repertoires of 
domination’. 
                                         
17 Other types of authority (e.g. religious authority) are also significant, but they are not central to 
the argument here. 
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As described in Chapter Four, the ‘traditional chiefly’ and ‘modern state’ forms of 
authority already compete for political space and influence – and frequently 
overlap to a significant degree at village level.  For example, although VDCs are 
intended to be separate from traditional authority, in practice the GVH is often 
‘elected’ as the VDC Chair.  So, whereas the community management model 
envisages the water point as an isolated sphere of influence in which the WPC is 
dominant, in reality – as this study’s fieldwork has so clearly demonstrated - the 
WPC is by far the junior partner in relation to traditional authority (represented by 
the chief) and the modern state (represented by the DWO; although the DWO is 
itself very much dominated by the central Ministry).  
 
In practice, this study has found that the unintended consequences of the 
community management model are significant, and seriously under-recognised.  In 
immediate practical terms, community management creates a substantial direct 
burden of new obligations, including time to be spent in meetings, and conflict 
over access to new resources – participation requirements that can be seen as a 
‘regressive tax’ (Casey, Glennerster et al. 2012).  But more importantly, 
community management interacts with traditional authority and the modern state 
to produce counter-intuitive and undesirable results - the consolidation of 
clientelism, and erosion of the social contract. 
 
The consolidation of clientelism 
In effect, the WPC represents a challenge to traditional authority; the WPC’s 
values of democracy, meritocracy and equality stand in direct contrast to the 
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values of heredity and gender bias embodied in the institution of the chief.  This 
conflict is made explicit only rarely; none of the interviewees in this study 
commented on it directly.  However, the study’s findings provide many examples of 
where traditional authority has responded to this implied challenge either through 
direct takeover of the WPC, or through a more gradual process of co-option and 
capture. 
 
One example of takeover is W150, where Yanja found that “there is no committee 
but the VH just appointed this lady to take part at borehole management, the VH’s 
daughter is the secretary.  He does everything alone, these members are like 
rubber stamps… it is the VH who does everything. People have doubts because they 
don’t know how their money is spent…  The VH is very tough, everybody fears him.  
He says that the borehole is at his compound so he is the only one to control the 
BH” (Yanja’s notes, W150).  More widespread, though, is co-option: the chief 
appoints his relatives and friends to the WPC (W633); WPC members are prevented 
from participating in training so that a chief’s relative may claim the ‘sitting 
allowance’ (W550); the chief controls the WPC (M19); the chief ‘eats’ the 
maintenance funds (W052, U101, W598).  Thus, through bricolage, the new 
institution (the WPC) is shaped by the existing institutional context (neopatrimonial 
authority) in such a way that it becomes an instrument of that authority, rather 
than an alternative to it.  These findings echo those of several researchers (Zulu 
2008, Msukwa and Taylor 2011, Zulu 2012), who warn against romanticising 
traditional authority and report high levels of community distrust of chiefs.  They 
also chime with the findings of Rigon (2014) who highlights the way that the 
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introduction of a new participatory institution – a residents’ committee – in a 
Nairobi slum actually institutionalised pre-existing power imbalances between 
landlords and tenants. 
 
Bricolage goes deeper than political capture, however; existing social inequalities 
are reproduced through the new participatory institutions.  Even if not actually 
members of the chief’s family, WPC members are not seen as ‘public servants’, but 
rather as holders of high-status positions whom it is not possible to hold to 
account: in the words of one respondent, “the committee is higher than the 
community” (W108).  Community management thus becomes an arena in which 
inequality between ‘uppers’ and ‘lowers’ is reproduced rather than challenged. In 
a social context in which the ‘grain’ (Kelsall 2008) is hierarchical and deferential, 
an institutional form that rests on assumptions of democracy, equality and 
downward accountability is bound to struggle without ongoing support. 
   
Erosion of the social contract 
This problem of downward accountability is also visible in the way that the WPC 
interacts with the DWO and other agents of the modern state.  Communities – or 
citizens - have very low expectations of the state.  This means that users and 
managers rarely trouble to report the breakdown of their water point to the next 
level up in the democratic structure (e.g. the Area Development Committee) or to 
the DWO.  Instead, they invest their hopes in individual patrons such as politicians 
or foreign donors.  In this way, community management contributes to the erosion 
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of the ‘social contract’, the idea that the citizen’s consent to be governed rests on 
provision of public goods by the state.  
 
Instead, the state is personalised, through individual politicians.  Communities 
often rely on the assistance of outsiders to resolve problems and undertake repairs: 
“We are waiting for some organisation to come and give us funds to fix it” (W536); 
“We are just waiting for the church to come and see the problem” (W754).  The 
role of MPs and prospective MPs is important here, especially at election time.  For 
example, W221, a borehole installed by MASAF in 2005, broke down shortly after 
installation and remained broken for 3 years; it was eventually repaired in 2009 
“during the political campaign time” by the local MP.  This role of politicians in 
supporting rural water supply appears to be seen by both parties within the frame 
of clientelism rather than of citizenship; people hope that the ‘Big Man’ will 
dispense largesse in their direction, but they know they may have to wait some 
considerable time, and they claim it as a gift rather than as a right.   
 
Such repairs may also be at the cost of breakdowns elsewhere.  One TA reported 
that during the political campaign period, people steal parts from one area to fix 
boreholes in another area.   A DWO also noted that ‘mechanics’ associated with an 
MP caused more problems than they solved: “instead of increasing numbers 
functioning it was decreasing.  But because they were political we were unable to 
control them… Instead of repairing they make boreholes even worse.  They were 
not adequately trained” (L5). 
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Clientelist logics shape relationships at district and national level too.  Resource 
allocation is politically driven rather than being based on need; available funds at 
District level are divided up equally between MPs, rather than being allocated to 
the areas with lowest access to water (L6).  Politically, there is no mechanism for 
local accountability, since there have been no local elections since 2000.  At 
national level, one government official acknowledged, “If one district is so vocal 
and … is good at negotiation, definitely they will get more money regardless that it 
is low [need]” (G3). 
 
Summary 
Community management does not always fail.  But only rarely does it succeed in 
anything close to its theoretical form.  Instead it is shaped by local circumstances, 
and many communities ‘muddle through’ with a variant that pays lip service to 
participation and collective action, but actually relies on key individuals (like the 
mechanics profiled in Chapter 6) and clientelist relationships in the attempt to 
sustain water point functionality.  In this bricolage process, context is dominant; 
existing arrangements form an ‘institutional corridor’ (Cleaver 2012: 205) 
constraining the transformational potential of new, designed institutions.  To use 
the language of political economy analysis, the informal neopatrimonial rules of 
the game are the primary factor shaping institutional outcomes, at community 
level as well as at district and national level. This fact has been seriously (and, for 
some, conveniently) underappreciated by many actors in the sector.  It is at the 
root of what could be seen as ‘civil society failure’ – but which I will argue is, 
rather, a product of state and donor failure. 
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7.2.2 Civil society failure? 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Mansuri and Rao have coined the term ‘civil society 
failure’, to mean ‘a situation in which groups that live in geographic proximity are 
unable to act collectively to reach a feasible and preferable outcome’ (2013: 4).   
 
Approached from the ‘village angle’, the problems of community management do 
indeed appear to be a clear illustration of this very situation.  Certainly, the 
findings of this thesis provide ample evidence in support of Olson’s (1977) original 
observations on collective action: it is inherently difficult, large groups face large 
costs, and a minority with strong private interests can dominate the majority.  This 
study demonstrates that collective action by civil society has proved vulnerable to 
many of the elements of state and market failure, including information 
asymmetries and co-ordination problems: 
• Users do not know how much repairs cost or how much money has been 
collected or spent (W340);  
• DWOs do not know which water points are non-functional (L1);  
• Committees struggle to work together (U49);  
• DWOs are unable to coordinate the work of installers (L2). 
 
Thus, from one perspective, the failure of community management could be seen 
as an example of civil society failure.  However, I suggest that this is an inadequate 
label or explanation, because the problems described in the previous section are 
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rooted in the wider political economy of community management.  Examination of 
the ‘mechanisms of failure’ illustrates this point. 
 
Mechanisms of failure 
The failure of community management in rural water supply in Malawi highlights 
two mechanisms of failure originally identified by Pritchett et al with reference to 
the failure of some countries to achieve progress in state capability: isomorphic 
mimicry, and premature load-bearing (Pritchett, Woolcock et al. 2010).  While 
these concepts were originally developed with reference to what the authors call 
‘big development’, they are also highly relevant to ‘small development’, at project 
and community level.  
 
Isomorphic mimicry – the theory that high capability can be achieved by adopting 
the outward structures and procedures that characterise high-capability 
institutions – underpins the design of water point committee.  The committee – an 
institutional form associated with collective action and the delivery of public 
functions in mature democracies – is intended to be both the delivery mechanism 
for a public good (clean water) as well as a model of democracy in action.  Because 
such committees are assumed to be a ‘Good Thing’ both practically and 
normatively, their existence and effectiveness remain largely unquestioned. 
 
Premature load-bearing – the early abdication of responsibilities to institutions and 
individuals that do not have the capacity to shoulder them – is, likewise, a key 
characteristic of community management.  The role of management, maintenance 
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and repair of public water supply infrastructure, which in most countries requires 
state-wide coordination and expert management, is delegated to armies of low-
skilled WPC members.  Not only do many of them lack the technical skill to fix a 
borehole or the financial understanding to keep accounts – problems that are 
generally not resolved by a one-week training course – but, as argued above, the 
strain of community management often undermines the limited social capital that 
exists.   
 
Simultaneously, the fashion for decentralisation has led to premature load-bearing 
by DWOs, who obviously lack financial capacity – and often technical capacity (N9, 
B20) – to fulfil their functions.  DWOs receive very limited funds from central 
government – barely enough to cover office expenses, let alone provide support to 
communities.  As one DWO explained “This month we got 59,000 and we spent 
35,000 on annual rental for our postal box.  Then we pay water bills, electricity 
bills, we buy reams of paper, then the money is finished” (L5).  This has a seriously 
detrimental effect on their ability to fulfil their responsibilities, as observed by an 
EWB Fellow: “More times than I can count, I have come in to the office just to see 
the whole staff sitting outside under a tree playing checkers or bawo (an African 
version of mankala) all day — not because of laziness, but instead because there is 
no funding for fuel, motorcycle maintenance, or some other necessary item to do 
their work.  Village meetings should be attended by our staff but are not, borehole 
drillings should be overseen by our staff but they aren’t, and so on and so forth — 
all due to lack of funding” (B20).  Similar problems of inactivity in DWOs were 
reported by other EWB Fellows (B15, B17, B13), but not always attributed simply to 
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lack of funding.  Other factors noted included an unwillingness to engage with 
‘capacity-building’ (B15, B24) and the ‘allowance culture’ whereby staff appeared 
willing to undertake activity (such as field visits) only if they received additional 
financial incentives beyond their salaries (B17, B6, B11, B27). These observers 
suggest that Districts do not just lack funding, but also (in some cases) motivation. 
 
Thus it is evident that ‘civil society failure’ is an inadequate label or explanation 
for the problems of community management.  Communities themselves cannot be 
blamed for the problems they have faced implementing the approach, and the 
solution is not to exhort them (or train them) to do better.  Rather, community 
management is flawed at its root, because it is a product of the abdication of 
responsibility by the state, and by donors. 
 
State failure 
Community management provides an excuse for state failure. It enables the state 
to place responsibility for provision of one of the most basic public services, water 
supply, into the hands of the users themselves, and to disclaim any responsibility 
for performance.  This is decentralisation taken to an extreme. In no other public 
service sector (health, education, roads) is the assumption made that all recurrent 
costs should be borne by the users, nor that maintenance of the service should be 
done by amateurs. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, decentralisation was supposed to ensure that 
government would be more accountable to the people.  But the absence of top-
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down accountability mechanisms means that the theory of decentralisation leading 
to empowerment is meaningless.  Because the central state has decentralised 
responsibility but not resources, both the capacity and the credibility of the local 
state are undermined; district staff are disempowered.  Because a government job 
is a job for life, and performance review is not done, there are few incentives for 
district or national staff to improve performance (B15); rather, they are motivated 
by allowances (as noted earlier) and by career progression (G3).  The result is a 
vacuum that is filled by ad hoc and clientelist mechanisms.  Arguably, 
decentralisation has resulted in a shift away from citizen-state relations to client-
patron relations. 
 
Donor failure 
Community management also acts as a figleaf for donor failure.  Donors – major 
bilaterals and multilaterals, as well as NGOs – have played a key role in promoting 
community management, not least through making it a core component of the 
water projects they fund.  Their motives are arguably twofold: ideology and 
convenience.  Ideologically, many people working in development are indeed ‘true 
believers’, philosophically committed to community management as a way of 
operationalizing participation, caught up in ‘romantic ideas about groups and 
institutions’ (Cleaver 2004: 271); and even those that are not may find it hard to 
articulate their concerns for fear of appearing reactionary.  But convenience is an 
even more powerful incentive: community management means that responsibility 
for the most complex part of ensuring rural water supply – long term sustainability – 
is removed at a stroke from the hands of the donors.   The model enables large 
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organisations with well-paid staff to transfer all the responsibility (but no 
resources) for management of WASH infrastructure to voluntary WPCs. 
 
Cleaver (2012: 38) highlights ‘the non-project nature of people’s lives’ - the 
fundamental difference between the world of development, with its projects and 
contracts, and the realities of the people enrolled in and affected by them.  
Meshing the two often results in what – to adapt a telling image from Rakner, 
Mukubvu et al. (2004) - we might call ‘the project as theatre’.  Communities and 
donors alike collaborate to build a fiction of collective action that enables both to 
meet their short-term needs (communities to access resources, and donors to 
spend them.)  Essentially, ‘development’ is seen as an exogenous process by 
community members (Msukwa and Taylor 2011); the idea of ownership of 
development is an oxymoron which may be adopted in order to access resources, 
but is not internalised.  While the project is ‘live’, both parties have an incentive 
to perform their role according to script.  But when the curtains are drawn and the 
donor audience leaves, it is unclear what incentives for performance remain.   
 
In the case of community management, I argue that those incentives cannot be 
provided, as theorised, by the pressures of downwards accountability.  The 
contrast between results in Rwanda on the one hand, and Uganda on the other 
(Golooba-Mutebi 2012), highlights the importance of upwards accountability in 
determining performance in the rural water sector.  Since donors continue to hold 
the purse-strings in the rural water sector in Malawi, and have been the key 
advocates for community management in the past, I argue that they have a large 
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responsibility to acknowledge their own role in its failure, and consider 
amendments and alternatives. 
 
Summary 
In this section I have argued that the problems of community management cannot 
be blamed on the failures of communities, but should rather be seen as a symptom 
of the abdication of responsibility by the state, supported by donors.  In the next 
and final section I link this analysis back to the wider literature by considering 
recent debates on the potential (or limitations) of collective action, and the role of 
aid. 
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7.3 WIDER LESSONS 
 
7.3.1 The limits of collective action 
 
One recent and influential theme in the policy literature suggests that many of the 
failures in public service provision in sub-Saharan Africa can be traced to problems 
with the principal-agent model underpinning many development interventions, and 
that solutions are more likely to lie in collective action (Booth 2012). However, my 
findings offer a different narrative. 
 
At village level, this study has shown that the potential of collective action, in the 
form of community management, is very limited.  As Cleaver has pointed out, ‘for 
poor communities there are crippling limits to what can be achieved through 
collective action in the absence of productive connections to authoritative and 
resourceful agencies’ (Cleaver 2012: 190) – authority and resources which are 
intimately tied to principal-agent dynamics.  The same conclusion was reached by 
Kleemeier (2000) in her study of rural water systems in Malawi; she identified the 
core of the sustainability problem as being the fact that community management 
institutions have only ineffective local government institutions above them to 
which they can link. Essentially, collective action cannot compensate for failure or 
abdication of responsibility on the part of the next layer up.  Indeed, it could be 
suggested that the discourse of participation has been distorted, in the form of 
community management, to serve as an ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 1990), 
obscuring the need to engage with the way that the state functions. 
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Interestingly, one of the components of the Africa Power and Politics research 
programme summarised by Booth (2012) was a study by Cammack and Kanyongolo 
(2010) which sought to identify factors that positively influence the provision of 
essential public goods at the local level.  They identified three core issues: ‘the 
strength of the ‘sanctions regime’; the presence or absence of cohesive 
communities capable of sustaining collective action; and the extent to which the 
relevant actors and agencies coordinate their activities’ (2010: 3; 8).  The first of 
these, in particular, is clearly a classic principal-agent issue, concerned with 
performance management and accountability.  A similar point is made by Golooba-
Mutebi (2012) who contrasts rural water supply in Rwanda and Uganda and finds 
that it is not participation that makes the difference, but rather the factors 
relating to hierarchy and structure: inspection and supervision, coordination 
capacity, and top-down enforcement of accountability mechanisms.  Key to success 
in Rwanda has been a move away from user committees based on voluntarism. 
 
Despite the fact that many of the sector characteristics of rural water supply – such 
as the nature of the good, its visibility and political salience – could be argued to 
provide strong incentives in theory for (downward) accountability in service 
delivery (Mcloughlin and Batley 2012), this study shows that this does not happen.  
Users have such low expectations of the state, and have so internalised the 
discourse of community management, that they do not hold the state responsible 
for delivery of safe water.  Thus – for the moment at least - upward accountability 
mechanisms appears to offer the best hope of improving sector performance.     
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Kelsall (2011) pursues a related line of enquiry in asking: does the absence of the 
state facilitate the development of community activity?  The evidence suggests 
otherwise; a capable state is a precondition for capable civil society, which cannot 
flourish when the state is either too weak or too strong. Thus the core issue is 
making the state work better; civil society cannot compensate for a weak state.  
Booth (2011b) also makes the point that failure in service provision is due to the 
absence of top-down management disciplines, and Crook and Booth (2011) suggest 
that ‘a developmental form of neo-patrimonialism’ is the most probable way of 
creating ‘the necessary vertical discipline’ in terms of governance arrangements to 
deliver public goods. Cammack and Kelsall (2011) highlight the importance of 
technocratic integrity to developmental patrimonialism, and Cammack and 
Kanyongolo (2010) note the significance of rules and sanctions in increasing trust 
(as in Malawi under the Banda regime).  As Cammack (2012) points out, trust is 
critically important as a basis for self-help and collective action; but my findings 
show that the community management model undermines rather than builds 
community trust, precisely because of the absence of rules and sanctions. 
 
7.3.2 The role of aid 
 
What then should be the role of aid?  In this study I have problematised the role of 
donors in supporting community management, and argued that the solution to 
sustainability lies in strengthening the state.   
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My argument is two-fold.  First, donors need to acknowledge the counterproductive 
effects of overemphasising community management.  Much greater realism about 
the capacities of communities to collectively manage resources is required; and 
discussion in the sector about the need for greater professionalization (Smits 2013) 
needs to be reflected in resource allocation decisions.  Secondly, donors must take 
more responsibility for ensuring sustainability themselves.  In practical terms this 
means committing funds for recurrent as well as capital costs, and integrating long-
term monitoring and support into development projects.  Donors can, do and 
should use their power and position as the source of funds to require certain 
standards of performance on the part of recipients – and this has been shown to 
increase the quality and impact of aid (Selaya and Thiele 2012).  
 
There is growing interest in the water sector, mirroring the aid world more widely, 
in a variety of innovative financing models such as output-based aid (OBA), results-
based aid, and cash on delivery aid (e.g. Savedoff and Martel 2011).  Lucas (2011), 
summarising research on OBA in the WASH sector, finds that only a small proportion 
(3-4%) is in WASH. Donors may withhold part of the payment (typically 20-25%) for 
3-6 months to check that installed systems are robust, but payments are not 
dependent on long-term sustainability and the assumption is still that user fees will 
cover long-term maintenance and repairs; in this respect, OBA may be a solution to 
failures at the installation stage, but not to failure in ongoing operation and 
maintenance.  Another approach focused on ensuring performance over the longer 
term is now being piloted by the Dutch - a ‘Sustainability Clause’ in its water 
project contracts, under which recipients of funds are contractually obliged to 
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ensure a certain level of functionality after ten years (Lockwood 2013).  Such 
approaches may offer a means by which donors can contribute to encouraging the 
‘rules and sanctions’ necessary for sustainability, and provide incentives for 
professionalization and improved performance in the sector.  This will not be 
possible, however, unless donors commit to funding the most cost-effective 
approaches on an ongoing basis. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that community management in practice rarely lives 
up to the theory.  Rather than being a means of ensuring efficiency and 
effectiveness in the water sector, community management is usually characterised 
by neglect of maintenance, slow and substandard repairs, and failure of 
committees to save sufficient funds.  And, far from being a mechanism of equity 
and empowerment, in reality community management is frequently characterised 
by reproduction of existing power imbalances, misuse of funds, increased conflict 
within communities, and disempowerment of users and, often, managers.  
Community management generally undermines, rather than strengthens, social 
capital.  It places technical and financial management responsibilities on 
individuals and groups who are ill-equipped to cope with them, and as a result it 
erodes trust and increases conflict.  
 
Insufficient attention has been paid to the way in which community management is 
shaped through a process of institutional bricolage, and the way that this results in 
the strengthening of clientelism and erosion of the social contract.  While the 
problems of community management could be conceptualised as ‘civil society 
failure’ or a collective action problem, I argue that it results from the abdication of 
responsibility by the state and by donors.  Ultimately, community management 
cannot substitute for a functioning, effective state.   
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Chapter 8  
CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter draws conclusions and discusses the implications of this study – both 
for the rural water supply sector in Malawi, and for sustainable public service 
provision in general.  Reflections are offered on the evolution of the research 
questions, analytical framework, and research design; and on the limitations of the 
study.  I outline the original contribution made by this research, and suggest 
potential extensions and directions for future research. 
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8.1 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
8.1.1 Results and conclusions 
 
This thesis has answered the question of ‘which factors influence water point 
sustainability, and why’ at two levels. 
 
At the immediate presenting level I have tested the ten main determinants of 
sustainability discussed in the literature, and demonstrated that several of them 
(USERS, AGE, SPARES) have very little effect on performance, whereas others 
(WPTYPE, FUNDS, INSTQUAL) are highly significant.  
 
Beyond these presenting factors, at a deeper level, this thesis has also analysed the 
political economy of the community management model by which sustainability is 
supposed to be ensured.  The findings demonstrate that community management is 
not an effective way to ensure sustainable provision of public goods and services.  
Community management, on balance, is inefficient and ineffective, inequitable 
and disempowering.  It provides an excuse for duty-bearers – donors, politicians, 
and officials – to abdicate responsibility; and it strengthens neopatrimonialism and 
undermines accountability. 
 
The process of institutional bricolage results in the erosion of the capacity of water 
point committees to fulfil their intended functions; isomorphic mimicry is 
insufficient to create genuinely equitable and empowering institutions.  Donors and 
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central government abdicate responsibility, forcing premature load-bearing on 
structures at district and village level, leading to their collapse. As a result, 
participatory and democratic structures are co-opted into a wider pattern of 
clientelism – a system of power relations that has far deeper roots and greater 
strength than the new committees. 
 
On the one hand, these observations are not new.  Critiques of community 
management have been common in the WASH literature for ten years at least 
(Schouten and Moriarty 2003) as well as in the wider literature on CBNRM (Nunan 
2006).  On the other hand, community management is indubitably the dominant – 
indeed only – model in use in Malawi and in many other countries.  Key 
stakeholders remain entirely committed to it in theory and in policy, and appear to 
believe that it merely requires a few minor adjustments in practice – a little more 
training for WPCs, a few more WMAs conducting follow-up in the Districts.  Few if 
any critiques make the deeper point articulated by this study: that the model of 
community management itself is flawed and counterproductive, and is a distraction 
from efforts to build a more effective state.  
 
This conclusion rests on two levels of analysis.  First, the quantitative analysis 
presented in Chapter Six showed that the key determinants of water point 
sustainability were (in descending order of influence): 
• water point type,  
• availability of funds,  
• incidence of theft,  
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• installation quality,  
• availability of skills, and  
• frequency of maintenance.  
Integrating these findings with qualitative data analysis confirmed these 
conclusions and demonstrated that communities faced significant problems with 
poor financial management and consequent conflict, suggesting that the key 
problems related to the ‘software’ or management arrangements, as much as to 
‘hardware’ or technical issues. 
 
A second level of analysis, presented in Chapter Seven, explained these findings 
with reference to underlying factors including the interaction between old and new 
institutional forms, and the operation of political and economic incentives at 
multiple levels.  The enduring dominance of the community management model is 
thus seen to derive primarily from the way in which it fulfils the needs of donors, 
politicians and officials to abdicate long-term responsibility for service provision, 
rather than from fulfilling citizens’ needs for sustainable access to clean water.  
Thus, ‘failure of community ownership’ masks the reality of serious failures within 
the water supply sector overall, including severe imbalances in the allocation of 
resources and responsibilities. 
 
In summary, this study concludes that community management has failed the 
people it was designed to empower; in rural water supply, participation and 
collective action are burdensome rather than liberating.  The solution to the failure 
of community management lies not in trying harder, but rather in structural 
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changes to the way rural water supply is delivered and managed, with renewed 
emphasis on, and attention to, the role and responsibilities of the state – a process 
that also requires reorientation on the part of donors. 
 
8.1.2 Implications for rural water supply in Malawi 
 
The findings of this study suggest three key practical measures by which 
sustainability of rural water supply in Malawi might be substantially improved.  In 
line with the argument that the key failure lies less with civil society and more 
with donors and the state, these propositions are directed at the latter.  They are 
offered not as blueprints, but rather as constructive ideas that deserve to be 
tested empirically. 
 
Payment for performance, rather than installations 
Ultimately, as Kremer and Miguel pointed out, if donors wish to ensure long term 
sustainable provision of public goods and services, they need to ‘endow funds 
earmarked for this purpose rather than counting on potentially illusory voluntary 
local contributions’ (2007: 1060-1).  Donor rhetoric on sustainability needs to be 
matched with action to ensure: 
• Allocation of a much greater proportion of WASH funds to management, 
maintenance and repair; 
• Equitable allocation of funds for capital investment, including prioritisation 
of underserved areas; 
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• Use of financial incentives such as performance-linked management 
contracts and sustainability clauses (Lockwood 2012) to reward good, and 
penalise poor, performance. 
 
The current financial model in the rural water supply sector requires a major 
overhaul.  Donors pay almost exclusively for installations alone: they focus 
overwhelmingly on investment in new infrastructure.  Users effectively pay for 
poor performance: the more frequently their water point breaks down, the more 
they have to pay.  Inevitably, they quickly become demotivated. 
 
This financial model creates numerous perverse incentives – for donors to prioritise 
quantity over quality, for installers to cut corners, for Districts to focus all their 
efforts on courting new donors, for Managers to divert funds, for Users to avoid 
contributing.  An improved financial model would instead reward positives (such as 
continuous water point functionality) and penalise negatives (such as poor 
accountability).  While there are no silver bullets - experiments in Indonesia have 
shown significant improvements in health system performance resulting from 
changing financial incentives, but no equivalent effect in education (Olken, Onishi 
et al. 2012) – it is nevertheless evident that the current financial model in rural 
water supply is unsustainable.  The clear implication of this research is that instead 
of paying for installations, donors should pay for performance.   
 
The same applies to user fees.  Although there are strong arguments in favour of 
abolishing user contributions altogether and funding water supply through taxes or 
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transfers, a shift in financial model might also make it easier to collect 
contributions from users if required. Users’ main concerns are predictable service 
provision and non-exploitation; they may well be willing to pay a regular fee if they 
believe that everyone else is paying the same (no free-riding) and that no one is 
exploiting them (no rent-seeking).  Ensuring this, however, may be challenging. 
 
Professionalisation of water point management 
This study has effectively identified the problems of volunteer-based public service 
provision: dysfunctional water point committees, maintenance not done, repairs 
often delayed and difficult to organise, expertise in short supply, and conflict 
endemic.  These findings lend weight to the increasingly insistent calls for greater 
professionalisation of rural water supply (Carter 2011, Lockwood and Kang 2012).  
Instead of an army of poorly trained and demotivated committee members, the 
sector needs to create professional roles and incentive structures capable of 
delivering a steadily improving level of service. In no other public service sector is 
responsibility placed so heavily on amateurs. 
 
Professionalisation might take many forms, and would best be articulated by those 
already working in the sector themselves.  But this study suggests several 
amendments to the community management model - at village, VDC, and district 
level – that could together result in a much more effective system for managing 
rural water supply. 
• At village level, multiple WPCs could be replaced with a single ‘water point 
manager’ for each village.  These individuals, appointed on merit and paid a 
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stipend by the DWO, would be responsible for conducting routine 
maintenance, calling in the AM when repairs are needed, and reporting on 
functionality to the District. 
• At group village level, each VDC should have at least one Area Mechanic, a 
post open only to people living in that VDC, with appointment on merit 
based on competitive application.  AMs would be responsible for repairing all 
water points in their VDC and would be paid by the DWO according to how 
many water points they care for, the type and age of each water point, and 
the percentage of time that the water point functions.  They would be 
required to undergo regular refresher training and testing to ensure skill 
levels. 
• At District level, every TA should have a Water Monitoring Assistant, with 
responsibility for managing the AMs and collecting data on WP functionality 
from Managers.  District Water Officers would be responsible for approving 
all new installations, ensuring that investment is allocated in line with 
equity principles.  Districts would be allocated funding – considerably more 
than at present – based on the formulas discussed in the previous section. 
• At national level, professionalisation will require the establishment of a 
culture of performance management, for staff as well as for water points.  
The wide variation in calibre of RWS staff interviewed for this study suggests 
that such a culture is currently lacking.  National information management 
systems – notably, a functional and ‘live’ water point database, will also be 
needed. 
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Professionalization of water point management would create many new jobs within 
a national career hierarchy.  Opinion surveys throughout Africa consistently show 
that unemployment tops the list of respondents’ concerns (Afrobarometer 2014), 
and it is a major reason why people migrate to cities - but employment is too often 
a neglected area of development effort.  Creating a professional hierarchy of posts 
with increasing levels of technical skill could potentially provide an important 
route for capable and committed individuals to obtain employment in the sector. 
 
Professionalisation will inevitably entail costs.  But amateurism is also costly.  
Under the community management model, ten people must be trained for each 
water point – but a large majority of them make little or no use of that training.  
The alternative approach of training and employing one Manager per village and 
one Area Mechanic per VDC might well be no more expensive.  It would also make 
it much easier for DWOs to monitor the frequency and quality of their work. 
 
Transparency and accountability   
There are multiple opportunities to apply the lessons identified by Reinikka and 
Svensson (2003), Olken (2005) and Reinikka and Svensson (2011) regarding 
transparency in public services to the rural water supply sector.  Two in particular 
stand out. 
 
First, construction standards.  This study has shown that installation quality is a 
major influence on functionality - and yet there is no mechanism in place to ensure 
consistent application of minimum standards in construction.  Independent expert 
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inspection and audit of installations, coupled with financial penalties for sub-
standard construction, could be a highly cost-effective way to improve installation 
quality with consequent long-term savings to donors, the state, and users.  
Establishing such an inspectorate is an action that any donor could initiate 
immediately, beginning with their own funded installations. 
 
Secondly, transparency.  It is currently extremely difficult to access information in 
the sector.  Record-keeping at village level is virtually non-existent. Information 
systems at District level are often piecemeal and of poor quality: for example, 
Mangochi’s water point mapping data was rendered unusable by an individual’s 
inability to use Excel, and Ntcheu’s monthly DWO reports are only sporadically 
compiled and rarely filed.  If this researcher struggles to access information, it 
seems unlikely that citizens will be able to access and use it to hold their public 
servants to account.  In the immediate future, the best hope lies not in bottom-up 
demand for transparency and accountability – which has been found in Tanzania to 
be a very inadequate mechanism for improving water point performance (Daraja 
2011) but in top-down performance disciplines, such as in the Rwandan water 
sector (Golooba-Mutebi 2012).  Again, this is an area in which donors have the 
ability to lead, through incorporating these principles in programme design, and 
then holding their grantees and loanholders to them.  The growing emphasis in 
recent years on ‘value for money’ in development (DFID 2011), and the need to 
establish, repair or strengthen feedback loops in aid (Barder 2009), both require 
increased transparency and accountability.  Payment for performance means that 
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funding needs to be conditional on good information, on both expenditure and 
results. 
 
8.1.3 Implications for public service provision in general 
 
The three propositions outlined above are specific to the rural water supply sector 
in Malawi.  But they highlight some key themes that are of relevance to the 
provision of other public goods and services in resource-poor countries.   
 
While community management is rooted in the participatory paradigm, the three 
propositions outlined above can be seen to be rooted in a different, more 
‘universalist’ paradigm.  Box 8.1 summarises, in a highly simplified format, the 
broad contours of each paradigm. 
 
Box 8.1: Two development paradigms 
Participatory Universalist 
Demand-led Supply-led 
Flexible Standardised 
Localised Centralised 
Amateur / voluntary Professional 
Collective action Principal-agent 
Downward accountability Upward accountability 
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Whereas the participatory paradigm rests on the assumption that things are best 
done by people for themselves, and that most people prefer to do things 
themselves, the universalist paradigm rests on the assumptions that benefits of 
scale are significant, that the provision of many public goods and services requires 
significant expert involvement, and that in most cases people would rather not 
take responsibility for doing things themselves if other people can do so with as 
much, or greater, ease and efficiency – a point highlighted many years ago by 
Eyben and Ladbury (1995).  While a case can perhaps be made that management of 
fisheries or forests requires participation in order to take full account of the 
nuances of local context, something like water supply is primarily a technical 
function and therefore amenable to more of a ‘blueprint’ approach. 
 
While the problems of community management could be seen as a collective action 
problem requiring a collective action solution – in line, perhaps, with the 
conclusions of Booth (2012) – this thesis suggests otherwise.  In fact, I argue that 
the failures of community management are largely attributable to insufficient 
attention to principal-agent dynamics, including donor-recipient, funder-installer, 
and manager-user relationships. 
 
This lack of attention to principal-agent dynamics results in too much scope for 
variability in the participatory paradigm.  Whether or not people receive a 
consistent level of public service depends not on their needs or rights as citizens, 
but to a very large extent on the capacities and commitment of the individuals 
involved – the WPC members, the chief, the TA, and the DWO.  Although 
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technically the WPC is the agent of the users, in practice users have little authority 
over the WPC; and the other agents are all accountable upwards on the basis of 
clientelist, rather than performance-based, logics.  These conclusions echo the 
findings of Baird, McIntosh et al. (2013), who show that the demand-driven 
elements of community development programmes were regressive, but the 
centrally determined features (e.g. specific allocation of funding to specific 
districts) were progressive. 
 
The importance of principal-agent approaches is illustrated by experience with 
police reforms in Rajasthan (Banerjee, Chattopadhyay et al. 2012): the two 
successful reforms did not require sustained local input and were ‘robustly 
implemented’, whereas the unsuccessful reforms were reliant on local 
participation and as a result were not successfully implemented.  Ultimately, 
community management – and participatory or ‘small development’ approaches 
more broadly – are not a solution for big development problems, or a substitute for 
investment in developing a functioning system by which the state ensures provision 
of public services.   
 
In some respects this argument chimes with the proposal made by Kelsall (2008) 
that development needs to ‘go with the grain’ of existing social and political 
arrangements, since ‘institutions work best when they build on local 
understandings of power, authority, ways of behaviour and modes of organisation, 
and less well when external behaviours are imposed’ (Kelsall 2008: 640).  As my 
research has demonstrated, community management does not enable users to hold 
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managers to account, or enable villagers to effectively demand support from 
districts or NGOs.  Accordingly, delivery of rural water supply through a more top-
down, centralised framework would be more in line with ‘local understandings’ 
than a community management model that does not take account of traditions of 
clientelism and deference.  
 
And yet, if ‘the grain’ is patriarchal, hierarchical, authoritarian and unaccountable, 
‘going with it’ is surely not a solution to that part of underdevelopment 
attributable to these characteristics.  Positive social change very often requires 
going against the grain: in Britain, the abolition of slavery, the extension of 
suffrage to women, and the decriminalisation of homosexuality all ‘went against 
the grain’.  In practice, ‘going with the grain’ risks being deeply regressive, and 
some associated suggestions – such as organising public services along kin lines –
could be extremely dangerous.  But the core of the idea, relating closely to 
bricolage, makes sense: development interventions need to explicitly acknowledge, 
analyse, and organise themselves with reference to existing social and political 
structures. 
 
This thesis, then, makes the case that donors should reconsider their longstanding 
support for community management of rural water supply - and perhaps, by 
extension, other participatory approaches that are vulnerable to co-option. As 
Moore (2001) highlighted, aid relationships can themselves sustain ‘political 
underdevelopment’; my research suggests that community management has 
contributed to this through inadvertently strengthening clientelist relationships, 
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and undermining the development of the social contract between citizen and state. 
Even if aid can do little to influence outcomes positively in neopatrimonial states 
(Cammack 2007), donors nevertheless have an obligation to try: first, to do no 
harm – and therefore to avoid promoting approaches that have been shown to 
undermine social capital; and secondly, to strengthen the capacity of the state to 
equitably and effectively deliver public services. 
 
Thus development actors ‘need to focus on mechanisms for reducing government 
failures rather than increasing the burden on citizens to help themselves in ways 
that leave state failures largely intact’ (Devarajan, Khemani et al. 2014: 21).     
Undoubtedly, greater donor use of carrots and sticks cannot fix all the problems of 
public service provision, nor is such influence a substitute for citizen (or client) 
power.  However, this study has demonstrated that users themselves simply do not 
have the power – as citizens and voters, or as clients and consumers – to do the 
institutional heavy lifting of initiating improvement in public services.  Rather, it is 
those that direct financial resources into the sector who are in a position to shift 
the incentives for improved service provision, to monitor performance effectively, 
and to generate the information that citizens need in order to exercise voice. 
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8.2 REFLECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This next section steps back from the content of the study itself to reflect critically 
and reflexively on the research process.  Reflexivity - ‘the researcher being aware 
of his [sic] effect on the process and outcomes of research’ (Anderson in Thorpe 
and Holt 2008: 183) - is an important requisite in research of all types, although it 
is particularly emphasised in qualitative research (Finlay 2002, Finlay and Gough 
2008).  Given the subjective nature of this discussion, I adopt a personal tone in 
this section.  
 
8.2.1 Research questions and analytical framework 
 
This study began life as a nagging question that repeatedly confronted me in my 
work for an international NGO – ‘how much difference will this [activity x] make in 
the long term?’  I was conscious of a growing frustration, concern, and indeed 
scepticism about the value of much of the development work we did, rooted in my 
increasing awareness of failed water points, non-existent latrines, abandoned half-
constructed buildings, and dead livestock.  The decision to focus on water came 
very naturally, prompted by personal experience, by the availability of data, and 
by the clarity of the ‘theory of change’ associated with rural water supply.  Thus 
my initial research questions – ‘How long do the benefits of investment in improved 
rural community water points endure?  What factors contribute towards 
sustainability?’ - emerged from my curiosity about what I had observed (White 
2009). 
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My topic appeared, on the surface, very simple, perhaps too basic; colleagues 
queried whether there was already substantial research on these questions.  I felt 
somewhat embarrassed that I was unable to find very much; searching back issues 
of key development studies journals, I was puzzled by the apparent dearth of 
academic research on the subject.  On the other hand, I found a copious and at 
times overwhelming grey literature: reports from NGOs and other international 
organisations; data from the JMP; books and articles and conference papers written 
by practitioners, often with a very practical focus.  While much of this material 
was useful, a significant proportion was biased in some way, and almost none made 
use of anything that could be called an ‘analytical framework’.  However, in its 
totality this literature pointed to a range of factors influencing sustainability, 
which I consolidated into the list presented in Chapter 2.  Identification of these 
factors enabled me to design research instruments and begin fieldwork, while 
keeping an open mind on how to address the deeper themes of empowerment and 
ownership that were clearly central. 
 
My initial intention was to examine sustainability at three levels - outputs (water 
points), outcomes (access to clean water), and impacts (improved health and other 
benefits) - and also to analyse both the scale and distribution of costs and benefits 
associated with rural water supply.  To achieve this I planned to use GPS mapping, 
video, direct testing of water quality, and cost-benefit analysis.  However, like 
most (perhaps all) doctoral researchers, I found that a core part of the research 
process involved scaling back my initial over-ambitious plans.  Even so, the 
resulting pared-down research design and methodology still generated substantial 
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amounts of data, to which I could not do full justice within the parameters of a 
PhD. 
 
At the same time, my research aim evolved.  I started with a very practical, 
positivist approach, frustrated with the sector’s apparent vagueness about 
causality.  I was intrigued by the opportunity that quantitative methods seemed to 
offer to distil the messy reality into clear constituent parts – ‘factors’ – and draw 
clear, definitive statistical conclusions about their relative influence.  However, as 
I engaged with that messy reality in increasing depth, I gained a new appreciation 
of the limitations of a quantitative approach.  It seemed evident that the data 
could not simply speak for itself, and that I would need to pay just as much 
attention to interpretation and explanation as I did to quantitative description. 
Hence, my research questions evolved into a two-part format: 1) what are the 
main factors contributing to variation in the sustainability of improved public water 
points in rural Malawi, and how much of an influence does each factor have?; and 
2) how and why do these factors influence sustainability?   
 
It was particularly challenging to clarify the first part of my analytical framework 
because I found it hard to see where the big concepts of empowerment, ownership 
and participation fitted alongside variables such as siting and post-construction 
support.  I knew that I very much wanted to retain the practical focus of the study, 
but that at the same time I needed to situate it in a wider body of theory.  For a 
long time I struggled to reconcile the two – frustrated at the lack of theoretical 
depth in the sector-specific literature, and unsure how to conceptualise my topic in 
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a theoretical way.  Indeed, it was only through immersion in the data and the 
iterative process of reflection on both data and literature that I was able to 
crystallise my framework into its final format.  Once I had articulated my second-
stage research questions – regarding the differences between community 
management in theory and in practice – I then realised that I could productively 
draw on political economy analysis and the concepts of institutional bricolage and 
civil society failure to frame my work.  
 
However, I remain conscious of the flaws in the resulting framework - somehow it 
seems both too complex and artificially neat.  Perhaps, to some extent, I am still 
coming to terms with having been unable to fulfil my initial hopes of generating a 
very clear, definitive, quantified answer to my questions, and the fact that my 
research developed in directions I did not fully anticipate.  Certainly, I am 
conscious that the process of fitting messy reality into any analytical framework is 
rather like stuffing jelly into a string bag: it bulges out of the sides, and sections 
are liable to fall off. 
 
Nevertheless I am confident that I have both addressed a question of real practical 
relevance, and engaged with it at a deeper-than-practical level.  I had not 
expected at the start of this research that my focus would shift in this way, and 
that my main conclusion would be a trenchant critique of community management 
and its interaction with clientelism; but both the literature and the data have led 
me steadily to this point. 
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8.2.2 Research design and methods 
 
I began this study with a clear opinion on the research design required: any study 
of sustainability had to be longitudinal, in order to capture the time dimension.  I 
also had definite views on sampling (probability-based) and on methods 
(emphasising the quantitative).  In all these aspects I was seeking the objectivity 
that I considered was so lacking in NGOs’ own assessments of the value and long-
term impact of their work.  I wished to differentiate my study as far as possible 
from the small-n, purposively-sampled, qualitative studies that seemed to 
predominate in the NGO world and in the practice-based literature more generally.  
Although I did not realise it at the time, my concerns in many ways mirrored those 
articulated by Agrawal (2001) regarding research on the determinants of 
sustainable institutions for managing common property resources. 
 
As I engaged with the practicalities of research design, however, I had to adapt 
these views somewhat.  For example, once I had gained access to the 2005 WP 
database, it became clear that it contained almost no baseline data regarding 
determinants of sustainability.  Furthermore, pure probability sampling with 5% 
margin of error and 95% confidence level would require visiting 382 water points 
randomly distributed throughout the country – a logistical challenge beyond my 
capacity as a lone postgraduate student.  My eventual research design, as 
described in Chapter 5, evolved in response to these issues.  While this may lay my 
work open to criticisms relating to rigour, I believe that this design and approach to 
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sampling has retained the best of both worlds, combining objectivity and 
representativeness with nuance and depth. 
 
Methodologically my ideas also evolved considerably in the first year or so of my 
research.  I was clear from the beginning that I wanted to conduct surveys and 
analyse data statistically, but – despite taking advantage of all the available 
statistical training – I did not fully understand what type of data I needed to collect 
in order to conduct certain statistical tests.  As a result, my research instruments 
collected a great deal of data (multiple questions on each variable) and when it 
came to analysis it took quite some time to work out what data should be used for 
which test.  With hindsight, a pre-analysis plan would have helped avoid any risk 
that I might end up cherry-picking data or ‘data mining’, which can lead to 
erroneous conclusions (Casey, Glennerster et al. 2012). 
 
The process has both strengthened my respect for those who have the skills to do 
high-quality quantitative research, and also strengthened my appreciation of the 
risks and potential flaws inherent in such research.  I frequently found that the 
objectivity of my quantitative data was compromised by inconsistency in 
respondents’ answers, or that considerable detail and nuance had to be sacrificed 
to squeeze the answers into pre-determined categories.  The process reinforced 
the value of using mixed methods, and I was happy to find that the failure of my 
plan to collect data on smartphones meant that Yanja was able to record much 
more qualitative data (observations and interviews) than I had initially envisaged – 
data that was very valuable in interpreting the more quantitative findings. 
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In summary, working with very large amounts of data from multiple sources 
required me to think hard about how to sift, categorise, and select the most 
important elements.  At the same time I aimed to be open to letting insights 
emerge and crystallise in the iterative process of moving back and forward 
between datasets, and between the data and the literature.  
 
8.2.3 Researcher identity 
 
As a relatively privileged white researcher from the former colonial power, my 
identity could not fail to influence this study.  My own assumptions and approach 
were undoubtedly shaped by my past experience: of growing up in Kenya, of 
volunteering in Uganda, and of working for development NGOs for many years. 
While I could not escape this (nor did I wish to), I endeavoured to read as widely as 
possible, and to design the research to be as objective as possible, in order to 
minimise the impact of my personal biases.  In company with Lashaw (2012), I have 
struggled at times with the problem of critiquing a progressive sector with whose 
aims I agree, and in which I have worked for over a decade, but about whose 
actions and results I am ultimately quite sceptical. 
 
My white, British, female identity undoubtedly also influenced the way in which 
Malawians responded to me during data collection. I made efforts to mitigate this 
through working with an extremely able local research assistant (Yanja), through 
modifying my own style of dress and behaviour to demonstrate respect for local 
culture, and through emphasising my status as an independent research student, 
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not associated with any donors or projects. However, various incidents during the 
research process demonstrated the influence of these barriers of language, culture 
and ethnicity, and of local expectations – including the translation problems 
described in Chapter Five, and the requests for assistance received in several 
locations.  These barriers inevitably limited the extent to which I was able to gain 
deep insight into Malawi and my topic.  The most important factor in overcoming 
these barriers was the skilled support of Yanja.  I was fortunate to have worked 
with her before beginning this study, and knew that she was hardworking, 
conscientious and precise.  However, most important of all was her consummate 
skill in adapting her own approach to her respondents, so that she was equally 
comfortable talking to a village householder, a government official, or a local 
politician. Her guidance and insight were invaluable. 
 
My identity and positionality have undoubtedly also influenced the data analysis 
and thus the findings of this study.  In acknowledgement of the potential for bias in 
analysis, I have endeavoured to ensure that the warrant for my conclusions is clear 
and robust through combining insights from multiple sources and types of data.  My 
discussion of the role of donors in these last two chapters reflects my own position 
as a citizen of a donor country, and as a development worker within the aid 
system. 
 
No research is without flaws, and no research is entirely objective (Gorard 2010); 
what is crucial is to acknowledge the limitations of the work, and this has been my 
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purpose above.  The next section emphasises the strengths of this research, its 
original contribution, and the ways in which it could be further extended. 
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8.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
8.3.1 Original contribution of this study 
 
This study has offered new insights on a longstanding set of questions regarding 
sustainability and participation.  There are two dimensions to the originality of my 
thesis. 
 
First, the research design. This is a large-n study of a representative sample of 
water points – in contrast to much of the existing literature on water point 
sustainability, which often takes the form of small-n, purposively-sampled case 
studies, or has limited empirical content.  Additionally, this study innovatively uses 
both qualitative and quantitative data from both primary and secondary sources to 
build up a rich picture of the rural water supply sector in Malawi, combining 
deductive hypothesis-testing with inductive theory generation.  As such, it 
explicitly links a technical analysis of the proximate factors that appear to explain 
variation in water point sustainability, with a theoretical analysis of the underlying 
political, social and economic dynamics influencing those factors.   
 
Secondly, the conclusions.  By linking technical and theoretical analysis I have been 
able to go beyond critiquing community management in practice to showing how it 
is flawed in theory.  I have analysed the way that community management 
interacts with a neopatrimonial context through a process of institutional bricolage 
that results in what has been called civil society failure, but in fact reflects failures 
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on the part of the state and donors.  The study has provided an explanation for the 
enduring strength of the community management model, by using political 
economy analysis to demonstrate the powerful incentives that perpetuate the 
model despite its flaws.  Finally, this thesis has engaged with recent debates 
regarding the optimal balance between collective action and principal-agent 
action, suggesting that the solution to the failure of principal-agent accountability 
lies not in placing greater emphasis on collective action – at least not in rural water 
supply - but rather in strengthening top-down performance discipline by focusing 
attention on the metrics that matter (e.g. continued water point functionality).   
 
My findings and conclusions thus extend both the empirical literature on rural 
water supply, and the theoretical literature on participation, political economy, 
and public service provision. 
 
8.3.2 Future directions 
 
There are many possible directions in which this study could be extended.  Here I 
briefly outline four areas that I consider to be particularly important. 
 
Analysis of cost-effectiveness 
The first area in which I would wish to extend this work is in the analysis of cost-
effectiveness. Initially I had hoped to compare data on results (e.g. number of days 
that a water point is functional) with information on inputs (capital costs and 
running costs).  This turned out to be beyond the scope of this study; simply 
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analysing results data alone was complex enough, without attempting to analyse 
inputs too.  Nevertheless, this would be an extremely practical, useful piece of 
research, which could test the working hypothesis that high-quality installations 
(such as GITEC water points) might be more expensive (perhaps considerably so) in 
the short term, but nevertheless more cost-effective than lower-quality 
installations once sustainability is taken into account. 
 
Experimental research 
Even if my critique of community management is fully accepted, the question of 
‘what would be better?’ remains.  The three proposals presented in section 8.1.2 
require rigorous testing to see whether they would indeed lead to improved 
sustainability.  This would be comparatively simple for a major donor to fund, on a 
pilot basis. 
 
Comparative sectoral case studies 
One interviewee (D4) reflected that “of course, education and health they are 
much better, well organised.  The water sector is not well organised”.  One major 
question that demands investigation is why performance in Malawi’s WASH sector is 
so poor, when performance in its health and education sectors appears to be so 
much better.  One hypothesis could be that progress in the health sector has been 
exogenous, driven largely by donors who have themselves been driven by high-
profile global efforts to tackle HIV and strengthen health systems.  If this is indeed 
the case, then it is important to investigate what Malawi’s WASH donors need to do 
differently to secure similar progress in WASH. 
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Comparative country analysis 
The conclusions of this study have clear implications beyond the specific sector 
that was the focus of the research.  Relating my findings to the literature gives me 
confidence that the phenomena I identify are not limited to Malawi alone, nor just 
to the rural water supply sector.  However, as noted in Chapter Two, water point 
functionality appears to be much higher in some countries (e.g. Senegal, 
Madagascar) than others.  Further research is needed to examine the extent to 
which the problems analysed in this thesis are also found in other countries and 
sectors; and to explore in more detail whether my critique of community 
management is fully justified. 
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8.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Researching and writing this thesis has been a challenging, stimulating, and 
occasionally uncomfortable undertaking. The process of examining one apparently 
technical question in depth has, somewhat unexpectedly, opened up a large field 
of wider questions about the development process, the theory of participation, and 
the responsibilities of those with economic and political power. 
 
In articulating my critique of community management I have been conscious of the 
danger of rejecting participation too strongly.  I strongly believe in every person’s 
right to have their voice heard, to be active both in their community and on the 
wider political stage.  My findings highlight what happens when participation 
becomes an obligation rather than a right, when responsibility for public service 
provision is abdicated by government, and when institutional models collide.   
 
My hope is that this thesis will contribute to a growing recognition in the 
international development sector of the unintended consequences of development 
interventions predicated on enforced collective action, a greater emphasis on 
accountability for sustainable results, and, ultimately, the realisation of the right 
to safe and sufficient water for all. 
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APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
Ellie Chowns 
Doctoral Researcher 
International Development Department 
University of Birmingham, UK. 
 
 
 
Research Question: ‘What are the main factors contributing to variation in the 
sustainability of improved community water points in rural Malawi?’ 
 
Introduction 
I am a postgraduate student in the International Development Department at the 
University of Birmingham in the UK. Before becoming a student, I worked for over 
ten years for international development NGOs. That experience prompted this 
research, which is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK. 
As part of good research practice, this sheet offers detailed information about my 
research so that you can give your informed consent for participation in this study. 
 
Purpose of my research 
My aim is to develop a better understanding of the factors that support long-term 
sustainability of development projects. I am looking at why some development 
projects create benefits that last for a long time, but others do not. My research 
focuses on rural water supply, because water is such an important basic need and 
right, and because it is relatively easy to assess whether a water point is 
sustainable, i.e. continues to function over time.  However, it is more difficult to 
assess why there is such significant variation in sustainability. 
 
My research focuses particularly on three sets of factors: 
1) Mechanisms for financing operation, maintenance and repairs (incentives); 
2) Mechanisms for supporting and coordinating stakeholders (institutions); 
3) Mechanisms for data collection, management and use (information). 
I seek to find out which combinations of incentives, institutions and information 
are most effective at ensuring water point sustainability, and why. 
 
Research design and methods 
I am using a mixed methods sequential research design, with longitudinal, cross-
sectional, and case study elements. Based on analysis of existing secondary data 
(the 2005 dataset of almost all water points (WPs) in Malawi) I have selected two 
pairs of neighbouring districts for collection of new qualitative and quantitative 
data: 
• Mangochi (high-functionality) and Ntcheu (low-functionality) 
• Thyolo (high) and Chikwawa (low). 
In high-functionality districts I conduct my primary fieldwork in the highest-
functionality TA, and vice versa in low-functionality districts. 
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In each TA I randomly select 6 VDCs, and in each VDC I randomly select 4 WPs for 
data collection.  For each WP I conduct surveys with two randomly-selected WP 
users, and two purposively-selected WP managers / maintainers.  In total I will be 
conducting 384 surveys regarding 96 WPs in 24 VDCs in 4 Districts.  In each District I 
will also spend some days staying in one of the survey villages to observe water 
use. 
 
Additionally I will conduct interviews with key informants at District level (DWOs, 
AMs, NGOs, HSAs) and national level (MOIWD and others). 
 
Sampling diagram 
 
 
Intended use of the research 
The results of this research will be shared with individuals and organisations that 
are involved in funding, installing, managing, maintaining and repairing rural water 
points both in Malawi and in other countries.  I hope that this research will help 
identify ways to further improve the sustainability of rural water supply. 
  
Malawi  
District 1 
District-level 
Respondents 
(DWO, HSA etc) 
TA 
TA 
VDC 1 
GHV / VDC chair / 
VDC members 
Water Point 1 
2x WPC members 
/ caretakers 
2x WP users 
Water Point 2 
Water Point 3 
Water Point 4 
VDC  2 
VDC 3 
VDC 4 
VDC 5 
VDC 6 
District 2 
District 3 
District 4 
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
 
What participation entails 
I would like to conduct a semi-structured interview with you, which means that I 
have a set of questions that I would like to ask you, but that I am also interested to 
hear anything else you would like to tell me.  I expect that the interview will take 
about 30 minutes, but please feel free to let me know if you would like to set a 
different time limit.  I would like to voice-record the interview so that I can 
concentrate on listening to you rather than worrying about writing notes; I hope 
this is OK with you. 
 
I may want to use quotes from you in the write-up of my research.  I will not use 
your name, but I would like to be able to refer to you by your location, and your 
job title or role (e.g. District Water Officer, Dedza).  This means there is a 
possibility that some people reading the research might be able to guess who said 
what.  If you would be worried about this, and would prefer me to treat your 
response as anonymous, please let me know.   
 
Before using any quotes in this way, I will do my very best to contact you (by email 
or by text) to give you the details of the quote, and check that you are happy for 
me to do this.  I would therefore like to take your contact details (mobile number 
and email address). 
 
When I have finished my thesis (in 2013) I will send you a copy by email, or send 
you a web link, so that you can read the whole document if you wish.  I will also 
send a paper copy to the District Water Office in each District where I conduct 
research, as well as to the MOIWD. 
 
My research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, which is a 
public body in the UK that funds research. It gets most of its funding from the UK 
government.  A condition of ESRC funding is that they ask for a copy of the data I 
collect for their own archives and for sharing so that other researchers may use it 
in future.  However, all data will be anonymised before it is sent to them. 
 
By agreeing to be interviewed you are confirming that you accept these points and 
give your consent to participate in this research.  However, you are free to 
withdraw from the research at any point if you wish. 
 
Date of interview:  
Interviewee name:  
Job & Location:  
Email:  
Telephone:  
Other contact information:  
Please sign here to confirm that you consent to 
the interview on the basis outlined above: 
 
Thank you very much indeed for your time and kind assistance. 
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APPENDIX 3: SURVEY FORM: LIST OF WATER 
POINTS BY VDC 
 
VDC Name, TA, District  
Date of survey  
 
 Informant name M/F Role / title 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
 
 Village Name # hh 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
6   
7   
8   
9   
10   
11   
12   
13   
14   
15   
16   
17   
18   
19   
20   
 
Map & notes: 
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Villages and Water Points in the VDC 
 VillageName WPType Functional?  Location Installer Installed Problem / Notes 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
6        
7        
8        
9        
10        
11        
12        
13        
14        
15        
16        
17        
18        
19        
20        
21        
22        
23        
24        
25        
26        
27        
28        
29        
30        
31        
32        
33        
34        
35        
36        
37        
38        
39        
40        
41        
42        
43        
44        
 
Unprotected sources 
Village Type and Number 
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APPENDIX 4: SURVEY FORM: WATER POINTS 
 
 Question Answer 
1.  Village  
2.  Date of survey  
3.  WP Location  
4.  ICWP Type BH / Tap 
5.  Afridev? Yes / No 
6.  Functional? Yes / Partly / No 
7.  Installation Date  
8.  Installer  
9.  Rehabilitation Date  
10.  Rehabilitator  
11.  Inscription  
12.  Pump make  
13.  Serial plate # & Date  
14.  Depth  
15.  # of rods  
16.  # BDs since installed  
17.  First BD date  
18.  First BD duration  
19.  First BD problem  
20.  First BD action taken  
21.  First BD repaired by  
22.  First BD repair cost  
23.  Last BD date  
24.  Last BD duration  
25.  Last BD problem  
26.  Last BD action taken  
27.  Last BD repaired by  
28.  Last BD repair cost  
29.  Active WP Committee? Yes / No    
30.  # members  
31.  Committee trained? Yes / No 
32.  Date of training  
33.  # days & trainer  
34.  Last time funds collected?  
35.  Did everyone contribute? Yes / No   Details: 
36.  Amount of funds held now?  
37.  Spares in stock? Yes / No   Details: 
38.  Spares bought from?  
39.  Cttee know parts and prices? Yes / Partly / No   Details: 
40.  Photo taken? Yes / No 
41.  Names of people in photo  
42.  Consent secured? Yes / No 
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APPENDIX 5: SURVEY FORM: USERS 
#_____ 
 Question Answer options 
1.  Informed consent given? 0 no       
1 yes 
2.  Survey location / WP name  
3.  Survey date  
4.  Survey conducted… 1 In private 
2 Others present 
5.  Respondent gender 1 male 
2 female 
6.  Respondent found where? 1 at home 
2 at water point 
3 at VH home 
4 other 
7.  Are you a member of the VDC or WPC or other committee? 0 no 
1 WPC 
2 VDC 
3 other 
8.  How many people live in your household?  
9.  Who collects water in your household? 1 women 
2 girls 
3 boys 
4 men 
10.  How many litres of water does your household use each day? 
(1 jerrycan = 25 litres) 
 
11.  What is your main source of water in the dry season? 0 unprotected source e.g. well, river 
1 protected source (ICWP) e.g. 
borehole, tap 
12.  What is your main source of water in the wet season? 0 unprotected source e.g. well, river 
1 protected source (ICWP) e.g. 
borehole, tap 
13.  Do you harvest rainwater in the wet season? 0 no 
1 yes 
14.  Where do you get your household’s water from if the IWCP is 
not working? 
0 Unprotected well 
1 River or stream 
2 Other 
15.  What do you use safe (protected source, ICWP) water for? 0 never use protected sources 
1 Drinking 
2 Cooking 
3 Handwashing 
4 Bathing 
5 Washing dishes 
6 Washing clothes 
7 Irrigation 
8 Other 
16.  What do you use unsafe (unprotected source) water for? 0 never use unprotected sources 
1 Drinking 
2 Cooking 
3 Handwashing 
4 Bathing 
5 Washing dishes 
6 Washing clothes 
7 Irrigation 
8 Other 
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17.  If you use unprotected water sources, why? 
 
0 never use unprotected sources 
1 ICWP broken 
2 ICWP low yield 
3 ICWP water is expensive 
4 ICWP far away 
5 ICWP queue too long 
6 ICWP tastes worse 
7 ICWP water too hard 
8 Other 
18.  How long do you normally have to queue at the ICWP? 
 
0 no time 
1 less than 10 minutes 
2 10-30 minutes 
3 over 30 minutes 
19.  How far do you have to walk to the ICWP? 0 Less than 500m 
1 More than 500m 
20.  How many households use this water point?  
21.  Is there enough water for the number of users? 1 yes always enough 
2 normally enough 
3 often not enough 
4 never enough 
22.  Is there another functioning ICWP within one kilometre of 
this one? 
0 no 
1 yes 
23.  Who initiated installation of the water point? 1 The community themselves 
2 An outside organisation 
24.  Were you involved in any of the following decisions about 
this WP? 
0 No, not involved in any 
1 Technology type  
2 Siting 
3 Management arrangements 
4 Financing arrangements 
99 Don’t know / can’t remember 
25.  Were other community members involved in any of the 
following decisions about this WP? 
0 No, not involved in any 
1 Technology type  
2 Siting 
3 Management arrangements 
4 Financing arrangements 
99 Don’t know / can’t remember 
26.  Did the community contribute financially to installation? 
 
0 No 
1 Yes 
99 Don’t know 
27.  How much altogether? (MWK)  
28.  How much for her household? (MWK)  
29.  Did your household contribute in-kind to installation? 0 No, did not contribute in kind 
1 Labour 
2 Local materials 
3 Land 
4 Other 
99 Don’t know / can’t remember 
30.  Did the community contribute in-kind to installation? 0 No, did not contribute in kind 
1 Labour 
2 Local materials 
3 Land 
4 Other 
99 Don’t know / can’t remember 
31.  Do you know how much the WP cost to install altogether? 0 no 
1 yes 
32.  If yes, how much? (MWK)  
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33.  Did community have to set up a bank account at installation? 0 no 
1 yes 
99 don’t know 
34.  How much did community put into that account? (MWK)  
35.  Does that account still exist? 0 no 
1 yes 
99 don’t know 
36.  If yes, how much is in it (MWK)?  
37.  Who installed the WP? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
38.  If NGO or other, please give details  
39.  Who paid for it? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
40.  Who paid for it? (extra text if required)  
41.  Who owns it? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
42.  Who owns it? (extra text if required)  
43.  Who is responsible for day to day management? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
44.  Who is responsible for day to day management? (extra text if 
required) 
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45.  Who is responsible for doing maintenance and minor repairs? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
46.  Who is responsible for doing maintenance and minor repairs? 
(extra text if required) 
 
47.  Who is responsible for doing major repairs? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
48.  Who is responsible for doing major repairs? (extra text if 
required) 
 
49.  Does the community contribute financially to operation and 
maintenance of the WP? 
0 no 
1 yes, pay per bucket 
2 yes, pay monthly per household 
3 monthly per person 
4 yearly per household 
5 yearly per person 
6 occasionally, when repairs are 
needed 
7 occasionally, various reasons/not 
sure why 
8 other 
50.  If pay per bucket, how much per bucket?  
51.  If pay regularly per household, how much?  
52.  Are some households exempt? 0 No 
1 Yes 
53.  Which households are exempt from paying for water? 0 None 
1 Elderly 
2 Disabled 
3 Sick 
4 Poor or vulnerable 
5 Female-headed households 
6 Child-headed households 
7 Other 
54.  What proportion of users are exempt? 1 All or almost all 
2 About three-quarters 
3 About a half 
4 About a quarter 
5 Less than a quarter 
6 Very few or none 
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55.  What proportion of those that are supposed to pay actually 
do pay? 
1 All or almost all 
2 About three-quarters 
3 About a half 
4 About a quarter 
5 Less than a quarter 
6 Very few or none 
56.  Is there any penalty for non-payment? 0 No penalty 
1 Yes: not allowed to use ICWP 
2 Yes: ‘naming and shaming’ 
3 Yes: other 
57.  When was the last time your household paid a contribution 
for water? 
 
58.  How much did you pay (MWK)?  
59.  Who collected the money? 0 no-one (no money has been 
collected) 
1 WPC member 
2 VDC member 
3 VH/GVH 
4 other 
99 don’t know / can’t remember 
60.  Where is the money for the WP kept? 0 nowhere (no funds are held) 
1 in a bank account 
2 by a WPC member 
3 by a VDC member 
4 by the VH / GVH 
5 other 
99 don’t know / can’t remember 
61.  Do the WPC report back to the community on how the 
money is spent? 
0 no, never 
1 yes, sometimes 
2 yes, always 
99 don’t know 
62.  How good do you think the financial management of this 
water point is? 
1 Very poor 
2 Quite poor 
3 OK 
4 Good 
5 Excellent 
63.  Any other comments?  
64.  What are the benefits of this WP? (if it is functioning) 1 Less time spent fetching water  
2 Less waterborne disease 
3 Subjective well-being (washing 
more etc) 
4 Other 
65.  If other, please give details.  
66.  Are there any problems with this water point? 0 no, no problems 
1 Frequent breakdowns 
2 Water quantity (low yield) 
3 Cost 
4 Distance 
5 Time queuing 
6 Quality (taste) 
7 Quality (hardness) 
8 Other 
67.  If other, please give details.  
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68.  How satisfied are you with the management arrangements 
for this WP? 
1 Very dissatisfied 
2 Slightly dissatisfied 
3 Don’t know / no response 
4 Quite satisfied 
5 Very satisfied 
69.  How satisfied are you with the financial arrangements for 
this WP? 
1 Very dissatisfied 
2 Slightly dissatisfied 
3 Don’t know / no response 
4 Quite satisfied 
5 Very satisfied 
70.  How satisfied are you with the overall performance of this 
WP? 
1 Very dissatisfied 
2 Slightly dissatisfied 
3 Don’t know / no response 
4 Quite satisfied 
5 Very satisfied 
71.  What type of latrine do you have? (check visually) 0 None 
1 Private 
2 Shared 
3 Cover 
4 Good privacy 
5 Good cleanliness 
6 Good ventilation 
7 Ecosan 
72.  Latrine notes  
73.  What type of handwashing facility do you have (check 
visually) 
0 None 
1 HWF but no water or soap 
2 HWF with water but no soap 
3 HWF with soap but no water 
4 HWF with water and soap 
74.  Notes…  
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APPENDIX 6: SURVEY FORM: MANAGERS 
 #_____ 
 Question Answer options 
1.  Informed consent given? 0 no 
1 yes 
2.  Survey location / WP name  
3.  Survey date  
4.  Survey conducted… 1 In private 
2 Others present 
5.  Respondent gender 1 male 
2 female 
6.  Respondent found where? 1 at home 
2 at water point 
3 at VH home 
4 other 
7.  Are you a member of the VDC or WPC or other committee? 0 no 
1 WPC chair 
2 WPC treasurer 
3 Other WPC member 
4 WP caretaker (paid) 
5 WP caretaker 
(unpaid) 
6 VDC chair 
7 VDC treasurer 
8 Other VDC member 
9 VH 
10 GVH 
8.  WP type 1 Borehole - Hand. 
Drilled - Manual Pump 
3 Borehole - Mech. 
Drilled - Manual Pump 
4 Borehole - Mech. 
Drilled - No Pump 
5 Borehole - Mech. 
Drilled - Powered 
Pump 
6 Spring - Protected 
7 Standpipe - Gravity 
Fed 
8 Standpipe - 
Motorized System 
88 Other Protected 
Source 
9.  WP functionality 0 Not functional 
1 Partly functional 
2 Functioning well 
10.  If not functioning, why is this?  
11.  WP installation date  
12.  WP ID  
13.  How many households use this water point? (approximately)  
14.  Is there enough water for the number of users? 1 yes always enough 
2 normally enough 
3 often not enough 
4 never enough 
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15.  Is there another functioning ICWP within one kilometre of this one? 0 no 
1 yes 
16.  Who initiated installation of the water point? 1 The community 
themselves 
2 An outside 
organisation 
17.  Were you involved in any of the following decisions about this WP? 0 No, not involved in 
any of these decisions 
1 Technology type
  
2 Siting 
3 Management 
arrangements 
4 Financing 
arrangements 
99 Don’t know / can’t 
remember 
18.  Were other community members involved in any of the following 
decisions about this WP? 
0 No, not involved in 
any of these decisions 
1 Technology type 
2 Siting 
3 Management 
arrangements 
4 Financing 
arrangements 
99 Don’t know / can’t 
remember 
19.  Did the community contribute financially to installation? 
 
0 No 
1 Yes 
2 Don’t know 
20.  How much altogether?  
21.  How much for his/her household?  
22.  Did your household contribute in-kind to installation? 0 No, did not 
contribute in kind 
1 Labour 
2 Local materials 
3 Land 
4 Other 
99 Don’t know / can’t 
remember 
23.  Did the community contribute in-kind to installation? 0 No, did not 
contribute in kind 
1 Labour 
2 Local materials 
3 Land 
4 Other 
99 Don’t know / can’t 
remember 
24.  Do you know how much the WP cost to install altogether? 0 no 
1 yes 
25.  If yes, how much? (MWK)  
26.  Did community have to set up a bank account at installation? 0 no 
1 yes 
99 don’t know 
27.  How much did community put into that account? (MWK)  
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28.  Does that account still exist? 0 no 
1 yes 
99 don’t know 
29.  If yes, how much is in it (MWK)?  
30.  Amount verified from written records? 0 no 
1 yes 
31.  Who installed the WP? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / 
MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
32.  If NGO or other, please give details  
33.  Who paid for it? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / 
MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
34.  Who paid for it? (extra text if required)  
35.  Who owns it? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / 
MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
36.  Who owns it? (extra text if required)  
37.  Who is responsible for day to day management? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / 
MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
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38.  Who is responsible for day to day management? (extra text if 
required) 
 
39.  Who is responsible for doing maintenance and minor repairs? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / 
MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
40.  Who is responsible for doing maintenance and minor repairs? (extra 
text if required) 
 
41.  Who is responsible for doing major repairs? 1 Community 
2 VH 
3 VDC 
4 WPC 
5 WP caretaker 
6 District Govt / DWO 
7 National Govt / 
MOIWD 
8 NGO 
9 Area Mechanics 
10 Other 
99 Don’t know 
42.  Who is responsible for doing major repairs? (extra text if required)  
43.  Date of last leakage test.  
44.  Date of last discharge test.  
45.  Date of last dismantling and checking of wearing parts.  
46.  Date of last tightening of nuts on fulcrum pin.  
47.  # of times dismantled in last 12 months  
48.  # of times dismantled since installation  
49.  Who does the maintenance? 0 No-one / 
maintenance not 
done 
1 WPC (group) 
2 WPC (single 
member) 
3 Area Mechanic 
4 Other 
50.  Is this person paid? 0 no 
1 yes 
51.  If yes, how much?  
52.  Date of last breakdown  
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53.  Type of last breakdown 0 Has never broken 
down 
1 Bobbin 
2 Cup seal / U-seal 
3 Bearing bush outer 
4 Bearing bush inner 
5 O-ring 
6 Rod centraliser 
7 Rod 
8 Rising Main 
9 Headset 
10 Theft 
11 Other  
99 Unknown 
54.  Type of last breakdown (extra details if required, e.g. if theft)  
55.  Duration of last breakdown (# of days)  
56.  Was repair attempted? 0 no 
1 yes 
57.  Who attempted repair? 
 
 
 
 
 
0 No-one 
1 WPC member/s 
2 Other villagers 
3 Area mechanic 
4 DWO 
5 Other govt 
6 Installer 
7 NGO 
8 Other 
58.  Who attempted repair? (give details if required)  
59.  Was repair successful? 0 no 
1 yes 
60.  Cost of repair (labour, MWK)  
61.  Cost of repair (parts including transport costs, MWK)  
62.  # of breakdowns in last 12 months?  
63.  # of breakdowns since installation?  
64.  # of months after installation until first breakdown?  
65.  Type of first breakdown? 0 Has never broken 
down 
1 Bobbin 
2 Cup seal / U-seal 
3 Bearing bush outer 
4 Bearing bush inner 
5 O-ring 
6 Rod centraliser 
7 Rod 
8 Rising Main 
9 Headset 
10 Theft 
11 Other  
99 Unknown 
66.  Duration of first breakdown?  
67.  How many days in the last year has the WP NOT been functional?  
68.  How many days in the last 5 years has the WP NOT been functional?  
69.  How many times has the WP broken down due to a broken U-seal?  
70.  How many times has the WP broken down due to a broken O-ring?  
71.  How many times has the WP broken down due to a broken rod?  
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72.  Which of these spare parts do you have in stock here in the village? 0 None 
1 Bobbin 
2 Cup seal / U-seal 
3 Bearing bush outer 
4 Bearing bush inner 
5 O-ring 
6 Rod centraliser 
7 Rod 
8 Other 
73.  If you don’t have a spare part in stock, how far do you have to travel 
to get it? (time in hours for one return journey) 
 
74.  How much does it cost for transport?  
75.  How much does a new U-seal cost? (MWK)  
76.  How much does a new O-ring cost? (MWK)  
77.  How much does a new rod cost? (MWK)  
78.  Do you feel that you have problems accessing spare parts? 0 no, not at all 
1 sometimes, for 
some parts 
2 yes, problems 
getting most/all parts 
79.  Was a WP committee created when the WP was installed? 0 no, no committee 
was created 
1 yes, a new one was 
created 
3 a committee 
already existed  
80.  Is the WP Committee active now? 0 no 
1 yes 
81.  How many times has the WPC met in the past 12 months?  
82.  # of months since last meeting?  
83.  How many active members on the WPC?  
84.  How many have received at least 3 days of training in WP 
maintenance and repair? 
 
85.  How many are the same people that were on the WPC when the WP 
was installed? 
 
86.  How many attended last meeting?  
87.  How many are women?  
88.  Is the chair a man or woman? 1 man 
2 woman 
89.  Is the treasurer a man or woman? 1 man 
2 woman 
90.  If there was a WP committee before, but it is no longer active, why 
is this? 
 
91.  If there is no WP committee, who is managing the WP?  
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92.  Does the community contribute financially to operation and 
maintenance of the WP? 
0 no 
1 yes, pay per bucket 
2 yes, pay monthly 
per household 
3 monthly per person 
4 yearly per 
household 
5 yearly per person 
6 occasionally, when 
repairs are needed 
7 occasionally, 
various reasons/not 
sure why 
8 other 
93.  If pay per bucket, how much per bucket?  
94.  If pay regularly per household, how much?  
95.  Are some households exempt? 0 No 
1 Yes 
96.  Which households are exempt from paying for water? 0 none 
1 Elderly 
2 Disabled 
3 Sick 
4 Poor or vulnerable 
5 Female-headed 
households 
6 Child-headed 
households 
7 Other 
97.  What proportion of users are exempt? 1 All or almost all 
2 About three-
quarters 
3 About a half 
4 About a quarter 
5 Less than a quarter 
6 Very few or none 
98.  What proportion of those that are supposed to pay actually do pay? 1 All or almost all 
2 About three-
quarters 
3 About a half 
4 About a quarter 
5 Less than a quarter 
6 Very few or none 
99.  Is there any penalty for non-payment? 0 No penalty 
1 Yes: not allowed to 
use ICWP 
2 Yes: ‘naming and 
shaming’ 
3 Yes: other 
100.  When was the last time funds were collected from households?  
101.  How much did each household have to pay?  
102.  How much was collected in total?  
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103.  Who collected the money? 0 no-one (no money 
has been collected) 
1 WPC member 
2 VDC member 
3 VH/GVH 
4 other 
99 don’t know / can’t 
remember 
104.  Where is the money for the WP kept? 0 nowhere (no funds 
are held) 
1 in a bank account 
2 by a WPC member 
3 by a VDC member 
4 by the VH / GVH 
5 other 
99 don’t know / can’t 
remember 
105.  Do the WPC report back to the community on how the money is 
spent? 
0 no, never 
1 yes, sometimes 
2 yes, always 
99 don’t know 
106.  Are written records kept of WP income and expenditure? 0 no 
1 reportedly yes, but 
not available 
2 yes, seen but poor 
quality 
3 yes, seen and good 
quality 
99 don’t know 
107.  How much was collected in the past 12 months? (MWK)  
108.  How much was spent on WP O&M in the past 12 months? (MWK)  
109.  Total collected since installation? (MWK)  
110.  Total expended since installation? (MWK)  
111.  Total currently held in WP fund? (MWK total)  
112.  If this is significantly less than would be expected based on 
theoretical hh contributions, why do they think this is? 
 
113.  How good does the respondent think the financial management of 
this water point is? 
1 Very poor 
2 Quite poor 
3 OK 
4 Good 
5 Excellent 
114.  Any other comments?  
115.  Have you ever received any post-construction support from the 
installer? 
0 no, none 
1 single monitoring 
visit 
2 multiple monitoring 
visits 
3 extra training 
4 maintenance (free) 
5 maintenance (had 
to pay) 
6 repairs (free) 
7 repairs (had to pay) 
8 other 
99 don’t know 
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116.  Have you ever received any post-construction support from the 
district government / DWO? 
0 no, none 
1 single monitoring 
visit 
2 multiple monitoring 
visits 
3 extra training 
4 maintenance (free) 
5 maintenance (had 
to pay) 
6 repairs (free) 
7 repairs (had to pay) 
8 other 
99 don’t know 
117.  Have you ever received any post-construction support from central 
government / MOIWD? 
0 no, none 
1 single monitoring 
visit 
2 multiple monitoring 
visits 
3 extra training 
4 maintenance (free) 
5 maintenance (had 
to pay) 
6 repairs (free) 
7 repairs (had to pay) 
8 other 
99 don’t know 
118.  Have you ever received any post-construction support from any other 
source? 
0 no, none 
1 single monitoring 
visit 
2 multiple monitoring 
visits 
3 extra training 
4 maintenance (free) 
5 maintenance (had 
to pay) 
6 repairs (free) 
7 repairs (had to pay) 
8 other 
99 don’t know 
119.  Give details of other source  
120.  What are the benefits of this WP? (if it is functioning) 1 Less time spent 
fetching water  
2 Less waterborne 
disease 
3 Subjective well-
being (eg washing 
more) 
4 Other 
121.  If other, please give details.  
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122.  Are there any problems with this water point? 0 no, no problems 
1 Frequent 
breakdowns 
2 Water quantity (low 
yield) 
3 Cost 
4 Distance 
5 Time queuing 
6 Quality (taste) 
7 Quality (hardness) 
8 Other 
123.  If other, please give details.  
124.  How satisfied are you with the management arrangements for this 
WP? 
1 Very dissatisfied 
2 Slightly dissatisfied 
3 Don’t know / no 
response 
4 Quite satisfied 
5 Very satisfied 
125.  How satisfied are you with the financial arrangements for this WP? 1 Very dissatisfied 
2 Slightly dissatisfied 
3 Don’t know / no 
response 
4 Quite satisfied 
5 Very satisfied 
126.  How satisfied are you with the availability of spare parts? 1 Very dissatisfied 
2 Slightly dissatisfied 
3 Don’t know / no 
response 
4 Quite satisfied 
5 Very satisfied 
127.  How satisfied are you with the availability of external support? 1 Very dissatisfied 
2 Slightly dissatisfied 
3 Don’t know / no 
response 
4 Quite satisfied 
5 Very satisfied 
128.  How satisfied are you with the overall performance of this WP? 1 Very dissatisfied 
2 Slightly dissatisfied 
3 Don’t know / no 
response 
4 Quite satisfied 
5 Very satisfied 
129.  What type of latrine do you have? (check visually) 0 none 
1 Private 
2 Shared 
3 Cover 
4 Good privacy 
5 Good cleanliness 
6 Good ventilation 
7 Ecosan 
130.  Latrine notes  
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131.  What type of handwashing facility do you have (check visually) 0 None 
1 HWF but no water 
or soap 
2 HWF with water but 
no soap 
3 HWF with soap but 
no water 
4 HWF with water 
and soap 
132.  HWF notes  
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APPENDIX 7: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Introduce self and research, and secure informed consent (go through Participant 
Information Sheet and Consent Form).   
 
Interview to be conducted in English if possible, otherwise in Chichewa with 
Research Assistant translating.   
 
Interview to be voice recorded, if consent given. 
 
Date:  
Interviewee:  
Consent form attached? Yes / No 
 
Guide Questions 
 
1. Please could you tell me who you are and what work you do / what 
involvement you have in the water supply sector? 
 
2. My research is looking at the question of sustainability: specifically, why 
some water points keep working for a long time, while others stop working 
quite quickly.  Do you feel that there is a problem with sustainability of 
water points in this district / in Malawi, and if so why? (Prompt for 
examples). 
 
3. Introduce Factor Ranking Exercise.  Prompt for explanation of ratings. 
 
Ranking Exercise: Factors contributing to WP non-sustainability 
Rank: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Factor:           
Rating:           
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
I am particularly interested in three sets of issues: financing of maintenance and 
repairs; coordination and support mechanisms; and data management / 
communication of information. 
 
4. Regarding financing of maintenance and repairs: 
• How is this organised in this area currently, and why?   
• How effective is the current approach? 
• What do you think could be done to improve it?  (Who needs to do what 
differently?  What are the barriers?  What would it cost?) 
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5. Regarding coordination and support: 
• How is this organised in this area currently, and why?   
• How effective is the current approach? 
• What do you think could be done to improve it?  (Who needs to do what 
differently?  What are the barriers?  What would it cost?) 
 
6. Regarding data management / communication of information 
• How is this organised in this area currently, and why?   
• How effective is the current approach? 
• What do you think could be done to improve it?  (Who needs to do what 
differently?  What are the barriers?  What would it cost?) 
 
7. Do you have any data on water points that you would be willing to share 
with me, such as lists of water points installed, or mapping or monitoring 
data?  I am hoping to analyse as much secondary data as I can to build up as 
accurate a picture as possible.  Of course I would share my analysis with 
you, and would acknowledge your assistance in my thesis, if you wish. 
 
8. Finally, what do you think is the single most important thing that could be 
done to improve the sustainability of clean water supply in this area?  Who 
should be responsible for it, and how much would it cost? 
 
Thanks given Yes / No 
Recap/check on consent Yes / No 
Check whether copy of research is desired. Yes / No 
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APPENDIX 8: VDCS SURVEYED 
 
The study covered 4 Districts, 8 TAs, and 25 VDCs.  One day was spent on data 
collection in each VDC, except for Namale, where we spent 2 days, because travel 
to and within the VDC was particularly slow.  Numbers of WPs listed (L+W) and 
surveyed (W), and numbers of User (U) and Manager (M) surveys conducted, are 
also shown. 
 
District & TA Date VDC L+W L W U+M U M Total 
N
tc
he
u 
Chakhumbira 
19/07/11 Lihako 1 34 28 6 0 0 0 34 
20/07/11 Zidana 18 0 18 13 6 7 31 
21/07/11 Tchayatchaya 8 1 7 0 0 0 8 
22/07/11 Namale 19 0 19 15 8 7 34 
Total 79 29 50 28 14 14 107 
Kwataine 
25/07/11 Masitimale 24 6 18 12 8 4 36 
26/07/11 Chimphamba 36 22 14 14 8 6 50 
27/07/11 Nachiye 32 24 8 16 8 8 48 
Total 92 52 40 42 24 18 134 
M
an
go
ch
i Mbwana Nyambi 
19/10/11 Mkumba 19 3 16 12 8 4 31 
20/10/11 Mzinda 30 5 25 15 8 7 45 
21/10/11 Kumbalama 35 17 18 13 8 5 48 
Total 84 25 59 40 24 16 124 
Nankumba 
24/10/11 Chamba 47 30 17 11 8 3 58 
25/10/11 Kasankha 41 21 20 12 8 4 53 
26/10/11 Chiwalo 48 29 19 11 8 3 59 
Total 136 80 56 34 24 10 170 
Th
yo
lo
 
Nsabwe 
19/06/12 Ndaona 31 13 18 11 8 3 42 
20/06/12 Chalonda 30 17 13 12 8 4 42 
21/06/12 Mzundu 32 17 15 11 8 3 43 
Total 93 47 46 34 24 10 127 
Chimaliro 
23/06/12 Chidothe 35 28 7 9 6 3 44 
24/06/12 January 38 26 12 11 8 3 49 
25/06/12 Boyidi 45 31 14 13 8 5 58 
Total 118 85 33 33 22 11 151 
Ch
ik
hw
aw
a Lundu 
27/06/12 Tomali 5 0 5 12 8 4 17 
28/06/12 Sekeni 22 7 15 8 6 2 30 
29/06/12 Nkhwazi 10 0 10 9 7 2 19 
Total 37 7 30 29 21 8 66 
Masache 
30/06/12 Jackson 7 0 7 12 8 4 19 
01/07/12 Mphonde 13 5 8 12 8 4 25 
02/07/12 Masache 20 11 9 12 8 4 32 
Total 40 16 24 36 24 12 76 
OVERALL TOTAL 679 341 338 276 177 99 955 
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APPENDIX 9: INTERVIEWEES 
 
I conducted 20 formal semi-structured interviews with a total of 26 respondents; 5 
were joint interviews.  Interviews were conducted during fieldwork trips in 2011 
and 2012.  Of these interviews, 14 were voice-recorded and later transcribed, 
while at the other 6 I took comprehensive notes.  Nineteen of the 26 individuals 
also provided responses to the factor ranking exercise. 
 
Key: 
Type A = Area Mechanic 
D = Donor 
G(N) = National Government 
G(L) = Local Government 
N = NGO 
T = Traditional Authority 
R/N R = voice recorded 
N = notes taken 
F * = responded to factor exercise 
 
List of interviewees: 
Type Organisation Job Title Location R/N F 
A Mzimba VDC Area Mechanic Mangochi N  
D  DFID Water and Sanitation Adviser Lilongwe R  
D  JICA Senior Programme Officer Lilongwe R * 
D  JICA Senior Programme Officer  Lilongwe R * 
D  UNICEF WASH Officer Lilongwe R * 
D  UNICEF WASH Officer Lilongwe R * 
G(L) Chikhwawa DWO District Water Officer Chikhwawa R * 
G(L) Mangochi DWO Acting DWO Mangochi R * 
G(L) Mangochi DWO Water Monitoring Assistant Mangochi R * 
G(L) Ntcheu District 
Council 
Director of Planning and 
Development 
Ntcheu R * 
G(L) Ntcheu DWO District Water Officer Ntcheu R  
G(L) Thyolo DWO District Water Officer Thyolo R * 
G(N) MOIWD Economist (M&E) Lilongwe R * 
G(N) MOIWD Chief Civil Engineer, Water 
Supply Services 
Lilongwe N * 
G(N) MOIWD Deputy Director Water Supply 
Services 
Lilongwe N * 
G(N) MOIWD (NWDP) Acting Project Coordinator Lilongwe N * 
G(N) MOIWD (NWDP) Senior Civil Engineer Lilongwe N * 
N  Concern Universal Project Manager Ntcheu R * 
N  Concern Universal WASH Project Manager Ntcheu R * 
N  Engineers Without 
Borders 
Co-Director Lilongwe R  
N  Engineers Without Fellow Mangochi R * 
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Type Organisation Job Title Location R/N F 
Borders 
N ICEIDA Staff member Mangochi N  
N  InterAide Joint Country Director Lilongwe R  
N  Water For People Programme Manager Chikhwawa R * 
N  WaterAid Country Representative Lilongwe N  
N  WES Network National Coordinator Lilongwe R * 
 
 
I also met with 13 other key informants, but did not conduct formal interviews with 
them. 
 
Type Job Title and Organisation Location 
N  M&E Officer, WaterAid Lilongwe 
N  Fellow, Engineers Without Borders  Mzuzu / Lilongwe 
N  Country Director, Concern Universal Blantyre 
G(N) Local Government Finance Officer Lilongwe 
N  Fellow, Engineers Without Borders Ntcheu 
T  TA Chakhumbira Ntcheu District 
T  TA Kwataine Ntcheu District 
T  TA Mbwana Nyambi Mangochi District 
T  TA Nankumba Mangochi District 
T  GVH Ndaona (deputising for TA Nsabwe) Thyolo District 
T  TA Chimaliro Thyolo District 
T  TA Lundu Chikhwawa District 
T  TA Masache Chikhwawa District 
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APPENDIX 10: BLOGS ANALYSED 
 
I analysed the blogs of 28 individuals working in Malawi for Engineers Without 
Borders, an NGO.  All were Canadian nationals undertaking placements in Malawian 
WASH institutions.  Placement duration varied widely, as did the analytical value of 
the blog.  The data comprised 739 blog posts totalling 1377 KB of data (nearly five 
times as much data as in the survey notes), with wide variation in terms of the 
percentage of material that related to their work and the subject of this study.  
After initially reading each blog in full, I classified them as of high, medium or low 
analytical value, and then thoroughly coded only those that I considered to be of 
high or medium value.  The table below summarises the data analysed. 
 
Code # Posts KB First post Last post Placement locations % re work Analytical value 
B20 15 68 13/02/2011 03/04/2012 Various, Mangochi 80% High 
B25 44 40 15/02/2010 17/12/2011 Thyolo, Chikhwawa 75% High 
B16 55 62 05/04/2011 10/08/2011 Machinga 75% High 
B24 19 59 01/09/2008 04/12/2011 Chileka, Lilongwe 70% High 
B15 13 29 21/07/2011 08/01/2012 Nkhata Bay, Mwanza 60% High 
B17 86 159 26/04/2011 04/12/2012 Ntcheu, Lilongwe 40% High 
B6 28 67 12/08/2012 11/02/2013 Mangochi 30% High 
B7 60 24 01/03/2010 01/12/2011 Karonga, Mzuzu, Lilongwe 30% High 
B11 48 207 01/12/2010 02/02/2012 Karonga, Salima, Lilongwe 20% High 
B4 30 21 01/07/2010 23/12/2011 Mzimba 35% Medium 
B27 13 52 28/03/2011 27/01/2012 Phalombe 30% Medium 
B13 27 61 11/03/2011 14/02/2012 Mzimba, Kasungu 20% Medium 
B26 29 58 11/04/2011 21/11/2011 Mzimba 10% Medium 
B1 9 15 25/03/2011 14/06/2011 Nkhata Bay 80% Low 
B21 16 16 01/04/2010 13/12/2010 Thyolo   50% Low 
B2 22 17 24/03/2011 08/08/2011 Maganga, Salima 30% Low 
B3 15 9 01/03/2011 22/11/2011 Mwanza 20% Low 
B5 7 21 23/04/2012 12/07/2012 Salima 20% Low 
B10 8 11 09/05/2012 09/08/2012 Mulanje 20% Low 
B19 19 15 28/04/2012 24/08/2012 Balaka 15% Low 
B22 16 202 28/04/2012 29/11/2012 Balaka 15% Low 
B8 23 19 01/04/2012 15/08/2012 Lilongwe 10% Low 
B12 13 7 12/05/2011 15/07/2011 near Lilongwe 10% Low 
B23 22 55 06/03/2012 14/02/2013 Phalombe, Zomba 1% Low 
B9 57 3 01/09/2011 01/05/2012 MphereMphere, Mzuzu 0% Low 
B14 18 8 26/03/2011 09/08/2011 Chitipa 0% Low 
B18 21 56 26/04/2011 27/08/2011 Mzuzu, Kamwendo 0% Low 
B28 6 16 06/03/2012 04/07/2012 Zomba 0% Low 
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APPENDIX 11: QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIABLES AND 
SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
This Appendix sets out how the quantitative research instruments (the questions in 
the L, W, M and U surveys) relate to the first stage of the analytical framework 
(the outcome variables, proximate explanatory variables and associated 
hypotheses). 
 
Key: 
L = List of WPs by VDC 
W = Water point survey 
U = User survey 
M = Manager survey 
Thus ‘L3’ indicates question #3 in the List survey, ‘W6’ indicates question #6 in the 
Water point survey, and so on. 
 
Outcome variables 
 
I define the outcome of interest, water point sustainability, as ‘continued 
functionality over time’.  Since I am unable to observe multiple water points over 
time, I use several components of sustainability as proxy outcome variables: 
functionality at the time of the survey (FUNCT), frequency of breakdown 
(BREAKFREQ), duration of breakdown (BREAKLENGTH), days operational since 
installation (DAYSFUNCT), quality of water (WATERQUAL) and quantity of water 
(YIELD). 
 
Variable Survey questions used for 
statistical analysis 
Other relevant survey 
questions 
FUNCT 
Functionality 
• L3 W6 M9 Functional?  
BREAKFREQ 
Frequency of 
breakdown 
• W16 M63 # of 
breakdowns since 
installed? 
• M62 # of breakdowns in 
last 12 months? 
• W17 First breakdown 
date 
• W23 Last breakdown 
date 
• M52 Date of last 
breakdown 
• M53 Type of last 
breakdown 
• M54 Type of last 
breakdown (extra 
details if required, e.g. 
if theft) 
• M56 Was repair 
attempted? 
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Variable Survey questions used for 
statistical analysis 
Other relevant survey 
questions 
• M57 Who attempted 
repair? 
• M58 Who attempted 
repair? (give details if 
required) 
• M59 Was repair 
successful? 
• M60 Cost of repair 
(labour, MWK) 
• M61 Cost of repair (parts 
including transport 
costs, MWK) 
• M64 # of months after 
installation until first 
breakdown? 
• M65 Type of first 
breakdown? 
• M69 How many times 
has the WP broken down 
due to a broken U-seal? 
• M70 How many times 
has the WP broken down 
due to a broken O-ring? 
• M71 How many times 
has the WP broken down 
due to a broken rod? 
• L7 Problem / Notes 
BREAKLENGTH 
Duration of 
breakdown 
• W18 M66 First breakdown 
duration 
• W24 M55 Last breakdown 
duration 
 
DAYSFUNCT 
% of days 
operational 
In the last year: calculated 
from 365 minus 
• M67 How many days in 
the last year has the WP 
NOT been functional? 
Since installation: calculated 
from AGE minus  
• M68 How many days in 
the last 5 years has the 
WP NOT been functional? 
 
WATERQUAL 
Quality of 
water 
• U66 M117 Are there any 
problems with this water 
point? - Quality (taste); 
Quality (hardness) 
Note: I did not have the 
technical capacity to collect 
and analyse data on other 
aspects of water quality. 
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Variable Survey questions used for 
statistical analysis 
Other relevant survey 
questions 
YIELD 
Quantity of 
water 
• U66 M117 Are there any 
problems with this water 
point? - Water quantity 
(low yield); Time queuing 
• U21 M14 Is there enough 
water for the number of 
users? 
Note: I did not have the time 
or equipment to collect 
objective data on yield. 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
Variables that were identified in the literature review but are not tested by this 
study are shown in italics. 
 
Variable Survey questions used for statistical 
analysis 
Other relevant survey 
questions 
DESIGN AND INSTALLATION FACTORS 
Geology  • W14 Depth 
• W15 # of rods 
This is difficult to assess 
without detailed 
geological data. 
Climate  No survey question. This is 
difficult to assess without 
detailed meteorological 
data. 
Siting  • U19 How far do you 
have to walk to the 
ICWP? 
• U22 Is there 
another functioning 
ICWP within one 
kilometre of this 
one? 
• U24 Were you 
involved in any of 
the following 
decisions about this 
WP? 
• U25 Were other 
community 
members involved 
in any of the 
following decisions 
about this WP? 
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Variable Survey questions used for statistical 
analysis 
Other relevant survey 
questions 
WPTYPE 
Type of 
technology 
• L2 W4 M8 WP Type • W5 Afridev? 
• W12 Pump make 
INSTQUAL 
Quality of 
installation 
• L5 W8 M31 U37 and M32 U38 
Installer, combined into one 
• W10 Rehabilitator 
USERS 
User numbers 
• U20 M13 How many 
households use this water 
point? 
• U18 How long do you normally 
have to queue at the ICWP? 
• L #hh in village 
(divided by #WPs) 
AGE 
System age 
• L6 W7 M11 Installation Date 
(subtracted from Survey Date) 
• W9 Rehabilitation 
Date 
POST-CONSTRUCTION FACTORS 
MAINTFREQ 
Frequency of 
maintenance 
• M43 # of months since last 
leakage test. 
• M44 # of months since last 
discharge test. 
• M45 # of months since last 
dismantling and checking of 
wearing parts. 
• M46 # of months since last 
tightening of nuts on fulcrum 
pin. 
• M47 # of times dismantled in 
last 12 months. 
• M48 # of times dismantled 
since installation. 
 
SPARES 
Accessibility of 
spare parts 
• W37 M72 Which spare parts do 
you have in stock? 
• M73 If you don’t have a spare 
part in stock, how far do you 
have to travel to get it? (time 
in hours for one return 
journey) 
• M78 Do you feel that you have 
problems accessing spare 
parts? 
• W38 Spares bought 
from? 
• M74 How much 
does it cost for 
transport? 
• M75 How much 
does a new U-seal 
cost? (MWK) 
• M76 How much 
does a new O-ring 
cost? (MWK) 
• M77 How much 
does a new rod 
cost? (MWK) 
• M126 How satisfied 
are you with the 
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Variable Survey questions used for statistical 
analysis 
Other relevant survey 
questions 
availability of spare 
parts? 
SKILLS 
Availability of 
maintenance 
and repair 
skills 
Responsibility for maintenance and 
repairs: 
• M39 U45 / M40 U46 Who is 
responsible for doing minor 
maintenance and repairs? 
• M41 U47 / M42 U48 Who is 
responsible for doing major 
maintenance and repairs? 
 
Water Point Committees 
• M79 Was a committee created 
when the WP was installed? 
• W29 M80 Is the WP committee 
active now? 
• M81 How many times has the 
WPC met in the last 12 
months? 
• W30 M83 How many active 
members are on the 
committee? 
• M87 How many are women? 
• W31 W32 W33 M84 How many 
WPC members have received 
at least 3 days of training in 
WP maintenance and repair? 
• W27 M57 M58 Last 
breakdown – who 
attempted repair? 
• W26 M59 Was 
repair successful? 
• M49 Who does the 
maintenance? 
• M82 How many 
months since last 
WPC meeting? 
FUNDS 
Availability of 
funds for 
maintenance 
and repair 
• M24 U31 Do you know how 
much the WP cost to install 
altogether? 
• M25 U32 If yes, how much? 
• M26 U33 Did the community 
have to set up a bank account 
at installation? 
• M27 U34 How much did the 
community put into that 
account? 
• M28 U35 Does that account 
still exist? 
• M29 U36 If yes, how much is in 
it? 
• M30 Amount verified from 
written records? 
• U49 M92 Does the community 
• U50 M93 If pay per 
bucket, how much 
per bucket? 
• Wx How many 
households 
contribute 
financially to this 
WP? 
• M106 Are written 
records kept of WP 
income and 
expenditure? 
• M107 How much 
was collected in 
the past 12 months?  
• M108 How much 
was spent on WP 
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Variable Survey questions used for statistical 
analysis 
Other relevant survey 
questions 
contribute financially to 
operation and maintenance of 
the WP? 
• U51 M94 If pay regularly per 
household, how much? 
• U52 M95 Are some households 
exempt? 
• U53 M96 Which households are 
exempt from paying for water? 
• U54 M97 What proportion of 
users are exempt? 
• (W35) U55 M98 Did everyone 
contribute [to the last 
collection] / What proportion 
of those that are supposed to 
pay actually do pay? 
• U56 M99 Is there any penalty 
for non-payment? 
• (W34) U57 M100 Last time 
funds collected / When was 
the last time your household 
paid a contribution for water? 
• U58 M101 How much did you 
pay (MWK)? 
• M102 How much was collected 
in total? 
• U59 M103 Who collected the 
money? 
• U60 M104 Where is the money 
for the WP kept? 
• U61 M105 Do the WPC report 
back to the community on how 
the money is spent? 
• W36 M111 Amount of funds 
held now / Total currently 
held in WP fund? [Fa] 
• [Amount of funds that should 
in theory be held – Ft] 
• [Discrepancy between 
theoretical and actual 
amounts held – Ft-Fa] 
• U62 M113 How good do you 
think the financial 
management of this water 
point is? 
O&M in the past 12 
months? 
• M109 Total 
collected since 
installation? 
• M110 Total 
expended since 
installation? 
• M112 If this is 
significantly less 
than would be 
expected based on 
theoretical hh 
contributions, why 
do they think this 
is? 
• U63 M114 Any other 
comments? 
• U69 M120 How 
satisfied are you 
with the financial 
arrangements for 
this WP? 
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Variable Survey questions used for statistical 
analysis 
Other relevant survey 
questions 
• U69 M120 How satisfied are 
you with the financial 
arrangements for this WP? 
SUPPORT 
Availability of 
external 
support 
• Have you ever received any 
post-construction support 
from: M115 the installer, M116 
the district government / 
DWO, M117 central 
government / MOIWD, M118 
any other source? (Give 
details). 
• M122 How satisfied are you 
with the availability of 
external support? 
 
THEFT 
Incidence of 
theft 
Note: No explicit question on theft 
or vandalism was included in any of 
the surveys.  Instead, I analyse 
whether it was spontaneously 
mentioned by respondents. 
• Is theft of WP parts reported? 
• Is financial mismanagement 
reported? 
• Is community conflict 
reported? 
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APPENDIX 12: QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: 
CODING STRUCTURE 
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APPENDIX 13: QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: 
CODING FREQUENCY 
 
Coding frequencies in NVivo for proximate explanatory variables (Survey notes and 
interviews only). 
 
 
Variable 
name Sources 
As % 
of 
total 
As % of 
Sources 
(n=45) 
Rank by 
% of 
Sources 
Refs 
As % of 
total 
Refs 
Rank 
by % 
of Refs 
1 WPTYPE 16 7% 36% 8 33 4% 9 
2 INSTQUAL 24 11% 53% 5 74 10% 4 
3 USERS 17 8% 38% 7 38 5% 7 
4 AGE 1 0% 2% 10 1 0% 10 
5 MAINTFREQ 15 7% 33% 9 38 5% 7 
6 SPARES 29 13% 64% 4 69 9% 5 
7 SKILLS 30 13% 67% 3 80 10% 3 
8 FUNDS 38 17% 84% 1 277 36% 1 
9 SUPPORT 21 9% 47% 6 53 7% 6 
10 THEFT 32 14% 71% 2 114 15% 2 
 TOTAL 223 100%   777 100%  
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